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# THREE YEARS OF NAVAL WARFARE

BY  
R. H. GIBSON



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Dedicated  
TO  
THE MEMORY  
OF THOSE SAILORS AND MARINES  
WHO HAVE LAID DOWN THEIR LIVES IN THE  
SERVICE OF THEIR COUNTRY IN ORDER THAT THEIR  
COUNTRY MIGHT LIVE  
AND IN  
GRATITUDE FOR THE SPLENDID SERVICES OF  
LORD JELlicoe, HIS OFFICERS, AND MEN OF THE GRAND  
FLEET, THE OVERSEAS FLEETS, AND PATROLS

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## PREFACE

A HISTORY of the naval war since 1914 is of a very far-reaching character, but I have endeavoured to localise the many campaigns into separate chapters, although a small amount of overlapping is unavoidable. The stupendous events of the last few years have followed one another in such rapid succession that few people realise the enormous task which our Navy was called upon to perform. From the terribly sudden collapse of the whole fabric of Germany's commerce the success of this work must be evident; and although in 1915 many of our ships were still engaged on foreign service, practically all naval matters centralised in home waters. The book is divided into two parts, the first dealing with the work of the Royal Navy around our shores, and the second part treating the British and Allied Fleets abroad.

The veil over our Fleet remains as inscrutable as ever, and one is tempted to question the need for such absolute secrecy. The enemy is, of course, greatly hindered in learning of the dispositions and strength of our squadrons and patrols, but the disappointment which the public feels is keen. It tends to make us overlook the wonderful patience of our sailors in their long and weary vigil for the hiding foe. Some day let us hope that we shall be told the full story of the glorious deeds of our men who had kept the seas in fair weather and foul, in winter and summer, by night and day, in the hope of encountering the enemy, in the enforcing of the blockade, in the protection of our vast overseas trade, in the supplying of our overseas forces, and in keeping our coasts immune from the inhuman and murderous invader.

To ensure this our "silent Navy" has suffered losses—even severe losses—but the many gallant lives which have

been lost have not been laid down in vain. Their loss leaves their comrades more determined than ever to carry on to the end. The perils are manifold, and there is little chance vouchsafed to them in battle should their ship be mortally hit. When it is remembered that in the short space of a few hours in the Jutland battle over 5700 lives were lost, and that 1500 others perished in the triple sinking of the large cruisers in September 1914, the perils will be realised. We have as yet lost only a few modern ships, but it is a melancholy fact that practically all their crews have perished with them.

Our patrols are for periods varying from weeks to months in constant danger from mines and submarines and the ever-present hazard of shipwreck. Sometimes nothing more is ever heard of these ships after leaving port except for a small amount of wreckage washed ashore, and their fate is a matter of pure conjecture; at other times only a few of the crew survive the loss of their ship and are cast on inhospitable shores, and again perhaps a boat or two may be picked up days after the mishap. For it must be remembered that the unfrequented seas have to be actively patrolled as well as the more populous areas. Should the disaster occur at night in the northern latitudes, then the sufferings of the crew are terrible. If one ever gives a thought as to what is happening in these seas, let him not forget the debt which we owe to these brave and uncomplaining heroes who are patrolling ceaselessly the chilly waters of the Arctic regions, the wild Atlantic, and the treacherous North Sea in all weathers and seasons.

In concluding this brief appreciation, we must add a word of tribute to the services of our minesweepers, steaming through death to prevent death. These brave crews are drawn exclusively from the trawling industry, under the command of R.N.R. officers and skippers, and have performed in the most courageous manner feats full of danger in all weathers. They clear the seas from the deadly menace of the floating and drifting mine set adrift by the enemy submarines, pseudo-neutral merchantmen and

fishing craft, so that our commerce and the neutral nations' commerce and finally our own warships can patrol and cruise on the seas with at least one peril temporarily removed. These mines are ever being sown, mostly by submarines following in the wake of the sweepers, and the task of sweeping them up is never finished.

If this book should give the reader a clearer insight into the wonderful task which our Navy, " Britain's sure shield," has so successfully carried out, it will have achieved its desired object. The present times are undoubtedly serious and, despite the inevitable fluctuations, it is as well to realise that the submarine problem is yet far from being solved. The one fact which points to ultimate success is that, as in the previous campaigns, the shipping losses are very much reduced around our shores. We must put implicit trust in our sailors, who will assuredly win through in this danger as they have done so often before.





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## THE GROWTH OF THE ROYAL NAVY

WE have been so long accustomed to hear the title of "Mistress of the Seas" applied to our country, yet it is not every one who knows it was very much in danger of passing from our hands during the Victorian period. This country had been slowly but all too surely drifting from her position as the first naval Power as the result of the policy of Mr. Gladstone's Government, whereby the Navy was so persistently starved. Several events abroad had from time to time caused a panic, but beyond a very temporary outpouring of funds, which were invariably squandered, no real progress was made. The next naval Power, France, was rapidly coming up with us, and her expenditure was very little behind ours during the eighties. Armoured ships were then in their infancy, and the only warships of this class which we possessed were nearly all freak ships.

It was not until the famous Naval Defence Act was passed in 1889 that the crisis was reached. The motley assortment of the various types of warships was the result of this spasmodic and indiscriminate construction policy, and few warships were in a fit state to put to sea without an extensive overhaul. By thoroughly acquainting the public with the peril to which we were rapidly approaching, a far-sighted party of men forced Parliament against its will to consent to the immediate construction of eight battleships ("Royal Oak" class), two smaller battleships (*Barfleur* and *Centurion*), nine first-class cruisers ("Edgar" class), twenty-nine second-class cruisers ("Apollo" class), and eighteen gunboats ("Speedy," "Niger," and "Dryad" classes). This huge programme cost £21,500,000 and was to be completed by 1894.

On the completion of these ships the largest annual programme to date was brought forward and passed, providing for seven battleships ("Majestic" class), six second-class

cruisers and two sloops, and by 1900 this country was again secure. Thus by a tremendous effort England was saved from drifting on to the rocks of national disaster, and competition by the next naval Power was not only rendered impossible, but our Navy was brought up to the position of the Two-Power Standard, the superiority against any two naval Powers.

Germany at this time possessed a very small Fleet of no significance at all, and her Army was her one force. When she realised the impossibility of becoming a Power of any consequence without a Navy, efforts were made to secure a vote for the establishment of a comparatively moderate Navy. The Jameson Raid and President Kruger's telegram from the Kaiser strikingly illustrated to the Germans their weakness, and they utilised the event in emphasising this fact to the German people, who had hitherto looked upon their Army as their one weapon of defence and offence. The Boer War, with the seizure of the German steamer *Bundesrat*, suspected of carrying arms to the Boers, further accentuated Germany's impotence in the world's affairs, and in 1900 a new German Naval Act was passed and carried out, which almost doubled the proposed establishment. From this time onward the rise of the German Navy was extraordinary, and its purpose was clearly obvious.

When in 1906 our Liberal Government set about a retrenchment of the Cawdor Naval Programme, Germany responded by providing for six armoured cruisers struck out of the original 1898 programme, and two years later announced a system of replacement of all battleships of twenty years of age, thus again increasing her rate of construction. The cruisers of course became battle-cruisers, consequent on the introduction of the type by ourselves in 1907, but they were later changed to battleships in their programme. The new Act also provided for four capital ships annually during 1908-11, and thereafter for two, but when the reduction would take place a new Act was passed providing for 3 battleships, 2 light cruisers, and 54 submarines, thus bringing the strength of the Imperial



German Navy in 1920 up to 41 battleships, 20 battle and armoured cruisers, 40 light cruisers, 144 destroyers, and 72 submarines, whilst the expenditure since the beginning of the growth of the German Navy had increased 292 per cent.

We know now for what purpose this formidable Fleet was built, but there were few men who in 1900 foresaw the remarkable rise of this country's insignificant Navy. Until then, the Power from whom we thought we had the most to fear was France, possibly Russia, but never Germany. Since that date many things had happened—the terrible disaster to the Russian Fleet, the naval retrenchment of our neighbour across the Channel, the rise of the American and Japanese Fleets, but the most unforeseen was the expansion of a negligible naval Power to the second place amongst the navies of the world. The motive for the successive amendments to the German Naval Act of 1900 was remarkably frank, and it was clearly a challenge to us. But for the drastic reform of our Navy during the last ten years, it would not be pleasant to contemplate what the European situation would be to-day. Lord Selborne in 1904 stated that the new German Navy was “of the most efficient type and is so fortunately circumstanced that it is able to concentrate almost the whole of its Fleet in home waters.” In other words, there were none of the useless and obsolete ships in the German Navy so familiar in our Navy at that time, and that with her small coastline and her few colonies she is able to keep practically all this newly-created Fleet within striking distance of our shores.

In 1904 a thorough and drastic reform was made throughout our Navy. A great number of old warships were scrapped, there was a complete reorganisation of the entire Fleet, including the withdrawal of numerous ships of no value from the distant seas, and the centre of gravity was shifted from the Mediterranean to Home Waters. There was also the creation of the nucleus system whereby personnel transferred from the useless ships were put aboard the older ships in commission as nucleus crews, the remainder of their complements being drawn from the various Reserves.

Of course, after the mutilation of the Cawdor Programme (whereby four capital ships were provided for annually), which entailed the reduction to two and later to three ships laid down, there came the inevitable panic when Germany instantly increased her construction. Undeterred by our reduction, all the Powers, Germany foremost, increased their programmes until, unless strong action were taken by our Government, there was a serious danger of our again losing our Two-Power Standard. Public opinion again forced the Government to take steps to procure our supremacy, and again they had to submit although they would not take heed from their naval advisers. As a result four ships were laid down, and in addition four others were also voted to replace the deficiency of the 1907, 1908, 1909 programmes. These latter, known as the "contingent four," were the result of the national cry, "We want eight, and we won't wait," and are the "Orion" class, whilst the other four were the "Lion" battle-cruisers and the two "Colossus" battleships. Their immediate construction was necessary, as Germany had actually accelerated her already amended programme by beginning the construction of her 1909-10 programme before the scheduled time. Thus this policy of retrenchment, based upon the grounds of humanity, produced absolutely the opposite effect which had been desired—that of arresting this world-race of naval armaments, although it has been put forward that the decrease was due to a desire to await the perfection of the new 13·5" gun. The subsequent programmes from 1910-15 were either four or five capital ships to be laid down annually, and of the later estimates nothing is of course known. It was stated that by the end of 1916 the whole of the "Royal Sovereign" class would be in service, which would bring our total Dreadnought force up to forty-three as against Germany's twenty-eight.

During the great reform of 1904 a committee decided that instead of the multitudinous types of warships then in vogue, there were only four different types necessary to the composition of a modern Fleet. Firstly, two kinds of

battleships—one type a ship carrying the greatest number of heavy guns of one calibre combined with heavy armour protection, whose speed would be about 21 knots; and the other a ship of greater speed, 25 knots, and carrying fewer heavy guns and less armour protection to counteract the weight of the enormous engines necessary to produce the high speed (which in some cases has reached as much as 32 knots). These ships were later classified as battle-cruisers. Secondly, a considerable number of light cruisers of high speed, for duty at home as scouts for the battle squadrons and for patrolling the distant seas. Thirdly, two types of destroyers were considered necessary, one for accompanying the battle squadrons, and the other for purely coastal purposes, though only thirty-six of these latter were built as their utility was doubtful. Finally, powerful submarines were needed to complete a modern Navy. There are, it is true, several other ships still constructed, *dépôt*-ships, oil-carriers, transports, etc., but these are purely non-combatant vessels.

This policy was carried out without exception until the outbreak of war, when the value of monitors for assisting military operations was recognised, and a great number of this type of warship have since taken the water. Flotilla leaders are also an innovation, but several of the earlier light cruisers had until then taken their place. Whether this war has produced any new types of warships time alone will show, but there seems little likelihood of any really new craft being evolved yet. A glance at any old Navy List will show the various types of warships—coast-defence battleships, armoured cruisers, first-class and third-class cruisers, torpedo boats, gunboats, and sloops, which are now no longer built.

To enter into the much-discussed arguments as to the utility of the armoured cruiser does not come within the province of this book, but a word might briefly explain the reason for the cessation of their construction. In the Russo-Japanese War, from which many valuable lessons have been derived, Admiral Kamimura's squadron was used more as a



detached flying battle squadron than as a cruiser force, the prevalent idea being that they would be used more or less as an advanced force capable of dealing damage to the enemy should he not be in force, whilst their superior speed would enable them to draw away if the enemy should prove too strong. Being vastly superior to any other cruisers, it was held that they would be able to command the outer seas and consequently strangle the enemy's commerce, for their large fuel capacity gives them a relative radius of action and sea-keeping endurance and enables them to remain on their stations longer than any other warship, excepting perhaps battleships. Amongst the objections to these cruisers was their large cost if used solely as cruisers, and the large crew which was needed to man them. A model cruiser must be speedy and powerful, having a large fuel capacity for extensive patrolling, together with a small cost in order that a considerable number can be turned out—not at all easy qualities to combine. The Battle of Jutland tragically illustrated the weakness of their protection when used as a flying battle squadron. It will be remembered that of Rear-Admiral Arbuthnot's squadron only the *Duke of Edinburgh* survived the battle, so terrible are the effects of modern high explosive shells on any but the stoutest of armour. With the advent of the "Invincible" battle-cruisers, these armoured cruisers ceased to be built, and provision was made for a number of less costly but more valuable light cruisers.

The first-class protected cruisers also became too costly, though the first ships of this class, the "Edgars," proved excellent ships, and have been extensively used in this war in connection with the Dardanelles campaign as the famous "blister-ships." Prior to the war they formed the Special Service Squadron, and were used as a training squadron for boys. The third-class cruisers have merged into second-class cruisers, and all now come under the heading of "light cruisers." Torpedo boats have also merged into destroyers, for the thirty-six modern craft were really built as coastal destroyers; whilst the torpedo-gunboat, which was built

to destroy the numerous and small torpedo boats of that day, was not fast enough to catch them, and the modern destroyer may be said to have evolved from this species.

I will now give a brief survey of the existing Royal Navy as it was on the outbreak of hostilities.

**BATTLESHIPS.**—The battleships on the active list in 1914 were all built subsequent to the famous Naval Defence Act of 1889, and are divided into two classes—ships of a mixed armament built prior to the *Dreadnought*, called pre-Dreadnoughts, and ships built after the inception of this well-known battleship called Dreadnoughts. The oldest class is the “Majestic,” of which nine were launched between 1894–96, and they have a tonnage of 14,900 and a nominal speed of 17·5 knots, though this is now greatly reduced. They were armed with four 12” guns mounted in two turrets, one fore and the other aft, and twelve 6” guns in casemates on the ships’ sides formed their secondary armament. Their armour consisted of 9” Harveyed steel 200’ long, which left the ends unprotected, but they were in the nineties considered to be the finest squadron of ships afloat. They are the only class of battleship in the Royal Navy with their funnels constructed abreast, the idea being that they thus presented a smaller target to the enemy’s fire; but the great disadvantage was that should a shot hit one funnel the other one would inevitably be also holed, and the practice was abandoned in all later ships. The nine ships were named *Majestic*, *Magnificent*, *Cæsar*, *Hannibal*, *Illustrious*, *Mars*, *Jupiter*, *Prince George* and *Victorious*.

The next class consisted of the six “Canopus” ships launched between 1897–99. They displace 12,950 tons and carry a similar armament to their predecessors, but have a greater speed of 18·25 knots. Their protection is also reduced to 6” thick Harvey nickel steel, but this decrease in tonnage and armour was necessary so that this squadron of battleships could be dispatched to the East via the Suez Canal if it were necessary. Their higher speed and smaller draught rendered these ships an extremely mobile squadron, and they have been extensively employed abroad before the war



and since. Their names are *Canopus*, *Albion*, *Goliath*, *Ocean*, *Glory* and *Vengeance*.

Following this class came the eight "Formidables," launched in 1898-1902, of 15,000 tons, and 18 knots. These ships are protected with Krupp steel 9" thick amidships, giving a good protection, and 2" in their bows. They have proved useful ships, but misfortune has dogged them. They are the *Formidable*, *Bulwark*, *Implacable*, *Irresistible*, *London*, *Venerable*, and the later *Prince of Wales* and *Queen*.

The "Duncan" class, launched in 1901, was again smaller, but carried the same armament. Their tonnage was 14,000 and they have a speed of 19 knots, whilst their armour is 7" thick Krupp. They have been employed on foreign stations until recently, but of the six which were built, *Duncan*, *Albemarle*, *Cornwallis*, *Exmouth*, *Russell* and *Montague*, the latter ship stranded on Lundy Island during a fog on May 13, 1906, and broke her back.

All the foregoing ships have four torpedo tubes, excepting the "Majestics," which have five; and as an anti-torpedo battery the lighter classes carry twelve 3" 12-pounders and the heavier classes eighteen.

After these four classes come the two smaller battleships which were originally built for Chile in 1903, but were purchased by us to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Russians. They are quite different from the usual British standard, and have a tonnage of only 11,988 and a speed of 20 knots; they carry four 10" guns, fourteen 7.5" guns, and fourteen 14-pounders for repelling torpedo attacks, and they have also two torpedo tubes. It will thus be seen that for their size they are exceptionally heavily armed, and for service abroad they are well suited. They were renamed *Triumph* and *Swiftsure*, and in 1914 the latter was the East Indies flagship and *Triumph* was at Hong-Kong. Their armour is identical with the "Duncan" class.

We now come to the finest squadron of pre-Dreadnoughts in the world, the well-known "King Edward VII" class. Although their nominal speed remained unaltered their

tonnage was raised to 16,350, but the chief innovation was in their armament, and was the first step which culminated in the *Dreadnought*. The four 12" pieces were still carried, but the 6" gun was replaced by four 9·2" guns as their secondary battery. The smaller weapon was still retained, but only ten of them were carried. It had become doubtful whether the 6" gun would be of much use in a naval action, owing to the rapid progress in naval gunnery and the consequently greater range at which they would be fought with the more powerful 12" guns. Therefore the 9·2" weapon was substituted and a very strong armament resulted. They were, of course, very much more costly, and eight ships were launched during 1903-5, comprising *King Edward VII*, *Africa*, *Britannia*, *Commonwealth*, *Dominion*, *Hibernia*, *Hindustan*, and *New Zealand*, which latter was renamed *Zealandia* when the fine battle-cruiser of that name was presented by that colony.

Disadvantage goes with advantage, and it was found that there was much difficulty in "spotting" the fall of the various shells, as there was but little difference between the drop of 12" and 9·2" shell, and a 9·2" and a 6" projectile. This defect was removed in the two succeeding ships, *Lord Nelson* and *Agamemnon*, and the 6" gun was abolished, whilst ten 9·2" guns were substituted. The 12" guns were also carried, and twenty-four 12-pounders completed their powerful armament.

It must be understood that the 12" gun of 1906 was vastly superior to the weapon of 1894, and similarly the 1910 type was more powerful than that of 1906.

Turning to the world-famous battleship *Dreadnought*, we come to the greatest change in naval design of modern times. The chief innovations in this ship were twofold: firstly, her armament was radically altered and only two types of guns were carried, a main armament and an anti-torpedo battery. The main armament consisted of no fewer than ten 12" guns disposed in the following manner: two mounted fore and four aft, all on the centre line, and a pair on either beam, so enabling eight heavy guns to be fired

from either broadside, six ahead and six astern. The same anti-torpedo battery was carried. The second chief point was the installation of turbine machinery instead of the usual reciprocating engines, and by this step the high speed of 21 knots for a battleship was obtained. They were the first turbines to be placed in any warship larger than a light cruiser, and the success of this ship led to its adoption by every naval Power. She was also constructed in record time, being laid down at Portsmouth on October 2, 1905, launched by King Edward on February 10, 1906, and leaving on her trials on October 1, 1906. Her construction was kept a profound secret and enabled us to gain a very valuable advantage over any foreign Power, though by the policy of the subsequent Government we went very near to losing it. The adoption of these new features necessarily increased her tonnage, which was brought up to 17,890, and she cost no less than £1,813,000.

At the same time three "large armoured cruisers" were constructed; they were of slightly less tonnage, but possessed the enormous speed of 28 knots. To obtain this their protection had to be reduced to 7" armour owing to the great engine space required for their huge turbines. They also carried fewer guns, eight 12" and sixteen 4" guns, but they were nevertheless little less costly than their larger and more heavily armed sister. They carried their guns in twin turrets as usual, two fore and two aft, but amidships they were mounted *en échelon*, i. e. at an angle of forty-five degrees to the centre line, which enables all the guns to be fired from either broadside. They were, of course, the *Invincible*, *Inflexible* and *Indomitable*; the secrecy with which they were built baffled all the German agents at work in this country, and the contemporary German *Blücher* was very much inferior. These three "large armoured cruisers" were later termed "fast battleships," and yet again "battle-cruisers"; but after a dozen more had been built the name reverted to "fast battleships," from which it is evident that their rôle was determined with difficulty. Though the *Dreadnought* was completed two years before the "Lord



Nelsons," yet there was really no retrogression, for the extremely rapid construction of this ship necessarily left the others behind.

The next battleships were the three "Bellerophons" and the three "St. Vincents." They were of similar design to their predecessor excepting that their masts were differently arranged. They had the same 11" armour and carried ten 12" guns, but the latter ships had eighteen 4" guns mounted as their anti-torpedo battery in comparison to sixteen on the "Bellerophons." *Bellerophon*, *Superb* and *Téméraire* are of 18,600 tons, and *St. Vincent*, *Collingwood* and *Vanguard* displaced 19,250 tons. They were built during the years of 1906-8, the period of starvation under the Liberal Government, which with *Neptune* and *Indefatigable*, laid down during 1908-9, produced only eight ships instead of the necessary twelve.

The *Neptune*, for many years the Fleet flagship, was launched in 1909; she displaced 19,900 tons, and was closely followed by *Hercules* and *Colossus*. The chief difference is that the disposition of their heavy guns was altered. It will have been noticed that of the two aft pairs of guns, the rearmost turret obscures the fire of the one behind for astern fire, but this defect was remedied by superposing the most amidship turret and thus enabling it to fire over the rearmost guns. Their amidships guns were also mounted *en échelon*, and thus their offensive power was much increased. The battle-cruisers *Indefatigable*, *Australia* and *New Zealand* are of 18,750, 19,200, and 18,800 tons respectively, and were completed between 1911-12. They carry the same armament, but have 8" armour, and as they are longer, a wider radius of fire is permitted for the amidships guns.

We now come to what are termed "super-Dreadnoughts," in which the 12" weapon is replaced by the 13.5" gun, which has a greater accuracy at long ranges, besides having a better penetrating power. The three classes which are thus covered are the "Orion," "King George V," and "Iron Duke" ships. They all carry ten 13.5" guns mounted on the centre line,

the guns fore and aft being superposed in twin turrets and the amidships gun is only available for broadside fire. They all have the usual 21 knots speed, and the first two classes carry sixteen 4" guns and three torpedo tubes, whilst the later class has a dozen 6" pieces, two 3" anti-aircraft guns and four torpedo tubes. When it is remembered that this weapon formed our pre-Dreadnoughts' secondary battery, the great advance in the power of torpedo craft will be realised. The *Iron Duke*, *Marlborough*, *Benbow* and *Emperor of India* are remarkable for the absence of torpedo nets, and their tonnage is about 25,000. The *Orion*, *Conqueror*, *Monarch* and *Thunderer* are of 22,500 tons, and *King George V*, *Ajax*, *Audacious* and *Centurion* displace about 23,000 tons. This latter class was completed between 1912-13, the four previous ships during 1911-12, whilst only two of the "Iron Dukes" were completed before war broke out.

The battle-cruisers *Lion* and *Princess Royal* also carry the new gun. Two pairs are mounted in the superposed position forward, and the others are mounted amidships and aft. Only four can thus be fired ahead, two astern, but all the eight from their broadsides. With a foe like Germany this arrangement has not been successful, and our pursuing ships could only utilise their forward guns in the chases. Their tonnage was 26,350, their speed 28 knots, and their cost was no less than £2,085,000, whilst they absorb the enormous complement of 980 men, due to the huge engines, which have developed 31·8 knots.

The last of these swift battle-cruisers were the *Queen Mary* of 27,000 tons, and *Tiger* of 27,500 tons. They were completed during 1913-14. Like the "Iron Dukes," a battery of 6" guns is carried on *Tiger*, but eight 13·5" guns are again carried. They both cost about £2,000,000, and were undoubtedly the finest ships afloat prior to the war. Their armour was increased to 10", one inch increase to the *Lion's*, but their contemporary battleships were carrying 12" armour.

Although the Admiralty have ceased to build battle-



cruisers, yet provision was made for five fast battleships in 1912, and of these *Queen Elizabeth* was just completed in 1914, *Barham* shortly afterwards, and presumably during 1915 *Malaya*, *Valiant* and *Warspite* also joined the Fleet. They have a nominal speed of 25 knots and a tonnage of 27,500, and carry eight 15" guns, which is probably the latest pattern. Sixteen 6" guns were also carried for repelling torpedo attacks. They are also the first battleships to burn oil fuel exclusively, and this innovation greatly increases their steaming radius besides being less bulky and easier to take aboard. Their armour is reported to be 13·5" thick.

The last class that was laid down prior to the war was the "Royal Sovereign," consisting of *Royal Sovereign*, *Royal Oak*, *Revenge*, *Resolution*, *Ramillies*, *Renown*, *Repulse* and *Resistance*. They are battleships in name and character and displace only 25,500 tons, but carry ten 15" and twelve 6" guns, and have a nominal speed of 21 knots. They also burn oil fuel exclusively, but of course nothing has been published about their details. They were launched between 1914-15.

They are the last battleships whose construction has been officially announced, but on the outbreak of war there were several warships building in this country for foreign Powers. Amongst these were four Dreadnoughts in various stages of construction, two for Turkey and two for Chile. The former were known as *Reshadieh* and *Sultan Osman I*, but immediately after the outbreak of war the Admiralty purchased them, and under the names of *Erin* and *Agincourt* they have already proved their value. *Erin* was launched in 1913 and has a tonnage of 23,000; she comes under the heading of a super-Dreadnought as she carries ten 13·5" and sixteen 6" guns, besides four 12-pounders. Her speed is about 21 knots, and generally corresponds to our "King George V" ships. *Agincourt*, although displacing 27,500 tons, carries no fewer than fourteen 12" guns, all of which are mounted on the centre line; she has also twenty 6" and sixteen small guns and three torpedo tubes. Her speed is 22 knots, and

this pair of ships was a very handsome addition to our battle squadrons. The Chilean ships were named *Almirante Cochrane* and *Almirante Latorre* and were taken over later, the latter receiving the name of *Canada*. They were both the largest British battleships to date, and were of 28,000 tons. Their speed was stated to be about 23 knots, and they are the sole ships in the Royal Navy which carry 14" guns, of which ten are carried in addition to sixteen 6" and several 14-pounder guns. No official announcement was made of the acquisition of the former, and her new name was also unknown. These emergency ships complete the list of the British battleships and battle-cruisers.

ARMoured CRUISERS.—The thirty-five armoured cruisers launched between 1899 and 1907 all bear a marked resemblance to each other, and they all have a belt of armour 6" thick amidships excepting the "Monmouth" class. No armoured cruisers had been built since the old *Shannon* in 1875, but during the South African War they were introduced into the Navy again. They were all expensive craft ranging from £750,000 to £1,450,000, and as cruisers pure and simple were extravagant ships, seeing that three light cruisers of the same period could be built for one such armoured cruiser. As a light battle-squadron they were cheap, but no test was made of this theory until the Battle of Jutland in 1916; those ill-fated ships were of the latest classes, yet their 6" Krupp armour afforded them little protection from the terrible gunfire of modern actions and the increased power of the torpedo. Over a dozen of these ships have been lost and, although against the smaller enemy cruisers and in patrolling the shipping lanes and convoying troopships they have proved exceedingly useful, if costly, they are not a real success in modern warfare.

The first class consisted of the six "Cressy" ships which have a tonnage of 12,000 tons, a speed of 22 knots and an armament of two 9·2", twelve 6", and several smaller guns. Their complements are 750 each. They include *Cressy*, *Aboukir*, *Bacchante*, *Euryalus*, *Hogue* and *Sutlej*.

We then had the four larger ships of 14,100 tons and

23 knots, the *Drake*, *Good Hope*, *King Alfred* and *Leviathan*, but four additional 6" pieces were carried and a crew of 900. As they were becoming far too costly (about £1,000,000) and absorbed too many men, a considerable reduction was made in their design. It has been said that they were in character really armed transports, and in the next class only 540 men were carried. Ten of these cruisers—*Monmouth*, *Berwick*, *Cornwall*, *Cumberland*, *Donegal*, *Essex*, *Kent*, *Lancaster*, *Suffolk* and *Bedford*—were launched during 1901–3, and they displaced only 9800 tons, but had a nominal speed of 23 knots (although fourteen years later *Kent* raised 27 knots in the Falkland Battle). The 9·2" gun was abandoned and only fourteen 6" and eight 12-pounders constituted their armament, whilst their armour is only 4" thick amidships, tapering to nothing in the bows and stern. *Bedford* was wrecked in the Straits of Korea on August 21, 1910, but the other cruisers have been actively engaged in patrolling the ocean routes.

The remaining classes are all very similar, and there are only slight differences in their armaments. First there come *Devonshire*, *Antrim*, *Argyll*, *Carnarvon*, *Hampshire* and *Roxburgh* of 10,810 tons and a speed of over 23 knots, which carry four 7·5" and six 6" guns. They were again more costly and required 655 men to man them. Next there are *Black Prince* and *Duke of Edinburgh* with six 9·2" and ten 6" guns, of 13,550 tons and a similar speed. These ships cost over £1,000,000, and are very similar to *Warrior*, *Achilles*, *Cochrane* and *Natal*, except that these mount four 7·5" guns in place of the 6" weapon. They were all completed between 1905–7.

Finally, we have the three "Defence" cruisers carrying four 9·2" and ten 7·5" guns, and displacing 14,600 tons. They are *Defence*, *Shannon*, *Minotaur*, and they cost £1,400,000, nearly as much as the battle-cruisers which followed them.

PROTECTED CRUISERS (1st class).—The first of these ships were laid down under the Naval Defence Act of 1889, and they proved very useful and seaworthy craft. They are



protected by an armoured deck to prevent damage to their engines and boilers, but they have no side armour. As they were built they would have little chance in an action nowadays, but the first ships have been altered to the "blister-ships" and are now claimed to be torpedo-proof. These are *Edgar*, *Endymion*, *Hawke*, *Grafton*, *Theseus*, of 7350 tons, and *Gibraltar* of 7700 tons, which carry two 9·2" and ten 6" guns, and *Crescent* and *Royal Arthur* of 7700 tons, which carry one 9·2" and twelve 6" guns. They were completed between 1893-4, and were followed in 1898 by the *Powerful* and *Terrible*. These two huge ships were almost as expensive as armoured cruisers, and required a crew of 840 to man them. They carried an armament of two 9·2" and sixteen 6" guns and had a speed of 22 knots. Certainly they came in useful during the Boxer rebellion and in the Boer War, but they were not a success. Their tonnage was 14,100. Between these two classes of ships there had been built two other cruisers, *Blake* and *Blenheim* of about 9000 tons, but they have been used as dépôt ships for many years. The last class of this type were eight in number, *Diadem*, *Amphitrite*, *Andromeda*, *Argonaut*, *Ariadne*, *Europa*, *Niobe* and *Spartiate*. They were of 11,000 tons and 20·5 knots; they carried sixteen 6" and a dozen smaller guns, and cost about £550,000. *Niobe* was purchased by Canada in 1910, but after 1902 no further protected cruisers of this type were built. They are not, on the whole, a success.

PROTECTED CRUISERS (2nd class).—These ships and all the subsequent classes are now termed light cruisers, but it will be better to describe them under the heading in which they were built. It will be remembered that twenty-nine second-class cruisers were advocated in 1889, but only fifteen of these were on the active list in 1914, of which seven have been converted into minelayers. These were *Andromache*, *Latona*, *Naiad*, *Thetis* of 3400 tons, *Apollo*, *Intrepid*, *Iphigenia* of 3600 tons, all of which are minelayers, and were launched during 1888-9. Then come *Terpsichore*, *Sappho*, and *Scylla* of 3400 tons, and *Æolus*, *Brilliant*,

*Melpomene*, *Sirius* and the Canadian *Rainbow* of 3600 tons. All these ships are of about 19 knots speed, and carry two 6" and about half a dozen 4·7" pieces. Most of them are obsolete, but a few were recommissioned in 1914. After these came *Astræa*, *Cambrian*, *Charybdis*, *Flora*, *Forte*, *Fox*, *Hermione*, *Bonaventure* of 4360 tons, which were completed during 1894–5. They differed but little from the earlier ships. Then came the nine "Talbot" cruisers, which have done good work during the earlier part of the war. They were completed during 1897–8, and displace 5600 tons and carry eleven 6" guns. Their cost was about £275,000, and they needed a crew of 416. They can steam about 19 knots, and are named *Talbot*, *Diana*, *Dido*, *Doris*, *Eclipse*, *Juno*, *Minerva*, *Isis*, *Venus*.

These handy ships were followed by the *Arrogant*, *Furious*, *Vindictive* and *Gladiator*. Their tonnage is 5750 and their speed is about 19 knots. They have only ten 6" guns, but several smaller ones. The latter was lost in collision with a liner in 1909. The *Hermes*, *Hyacinth* and *Highflyer* of 1898 were two knots faster, but displaced only 5600 tons, and they were followed by *Challenger* and *Encounter* in 1902–3. These were of 5880 tons, and both classes carried the same armament as the "Talbots." *Hermes* was later equipped as a seaplane-carrying ship, and she was the first ship of its kind.

The construction of this class of ship was suspended for six years, and before following the course of the new ships it will be better to review the third-class cruisers.

PROTECTED CRUISERS (3rd class).—Under the Naval Defence Act provision was made for the immediate construction of several cruisers of about 2500 tons called the "Pearl" class, but there remains only the *Philomel* on the active list. This cruiser was the oldest light cruiser serving with the exception of the little *Medea* of 2800 tons, which was built in 1888. The *Philomel* herself is now a unit of the New Zealand Navy and carries eight 4·7" guns, her speed is about 18 knots, and her tonnage is 2575. Next there came the ten "Pelorus" ships—*Pelorus*, *Proserpine*,



*Pegasus*, *Perseus*, *Pyramus*, *Pomona*, *Prometheus*, *Psyche* of 2135 tons, and *Pandora* and *Pioneer* of 2200 tons. Their speed is about 20 knots, their cost £150,000, and they carry eight 4" and some smaller guns. They have been greatly employed on foreign stations, and were admirably adapted for harbour service and such operations as the suppression of gun-running in the Persian Gulf.

Not until 1903-4, after the "Challengers" had been built, were any more of these protected cruisers built. The four "Topaze" ships were then launched. One of these, *Amethyst*, was equipped with turbines at the instigation of Lord Fisher, and such was the success of the experiment that almost every warship laid down subsequently was similarly equipped. No ship larger than a destroyer had formerly had turbines installed, and great credit is due to the energy of Lord Fisher for his courageous action in the face of considerable opposition. A speed of 23·5 knots was obtained in her. The other ships were *Diamond*, *Sapphire*, and *Topaze*. In the next year there were built the eight scouts, *Adventure*, *Attentive*, *Foresight*, *Forward*, *Patrol*, *Pathfinder*, *Sentinel* and *Skirmisher*, all of which have a tonnage of about 3000 and can steam at 25 knots. They are now armed with nine 4" quick-firing guns, although originally equipped with 12-pounders. They are handy little craft.

UNPROTECTED CRUISERS.—In 1908 there were constructed seven ships of about 3500 tons, absolutely devoid of armour, which were equipped with turbines giving a speed of 25 knots. These were *Boadicea*, *Blanche*, *Blonde*, *Bellona*, *Active*, *Amphion* and *Fearless*. They were armed with ten 4" guns, but are not considered a success.

Meanwhile, with the cessation of the construction of the armoured cruisers, a greatly improved class of light cruisers was brought out during 1909-10. These were *Bristol*, *Glasgow*, *Gloucester*, *Liverpool* and *Newcastle* of 4800 tons, and they were armed with a couple of 6" and ten 4" guns. Their speed of 25 knots was of course obtained with turbines. During the next year *Dartmouth*, *Falmouth*, *Wey-*

*mouth* and *Yarmouth* were also launched, and they were of 5250 tons; eight 6" pieces were carried, in addition to the two torpedo tubes. They were perhaps slightly slower, but only cost about £335,000. In 1911-12 there were launched *Chatham*, *Dublin* and *Southampton* of 5400 tons, but with the exception of a speed of 25·5 knots they are identical with the "Dartmouths." In 1913 the last three ships—*Birmingham*, *Nottingham* and *Lowestoft*—took the water, and these valuable cruisers were of 5440 tons and had an extra 6" piece mounted.

All these cruisers were in 1912 termed "light cruisers," and they have proved of immense value during the war, both at home and abroad. The "Sentinels," "Boadiceas," and "Topazes" were employed as flotilla leaders in 1914, pending the construction of ships of this type, and all these modern cruisers, with their high speeds, are now employed constantly in the patrol of the North Sea.

LIGHT ARMoured CRUISERS.—We now come to the last of these small ships, the light armoured cruisers, the ships which have been called by Mr. Churchill "destroyers of destroyers," "the fastest, cheapest and smallest vessels protected by vertical armour in the British Navy." They are, in fact, a type of ship between the latest light cruiser and the latest destroyer. They are fast enough to overhaul any destroyer, and with their superior armament are able easily to destroy them. They have acted both in this capacity and as swift Fleet scouts, and are regarded as a most successful type of ship. The displacement is about 3500 tons, and they carry two 6" and six 4" guns. Moreover, they burn oil fuel exclusively, and can steam well over 30 knots with their turbines. The first eight were named *Arethusa*, *Aurora*, *Galatea*, *Inconstant*, *Phaeton*, *Penelope*, *Royalist* and *Undaunted*, and they were completed after the outbreak of war. They have been followed by *Calliope*, *Caroline*, *Carysfort*, *Champion*, *Cordelia*, *Comus*, *Conquest* and *Cleopatra*, which carry an additional 6" gun and displace 4000 tons. Their speed is also 30 knots. Of course there have been many more constructed since, amongst which are

*Castor, Canterbury, Chester, Colleen*, etc., but there are no details available.

**TORPEDO BOATS.**—When the torpedo had reached the practical stage during the seventies, large numbers of small vessels were built mostly for foreign Powers for the purpose of carrying these engines of destruction. They were but diminutive craft of about 30 tons, but they possessed the very high speed in those days of 18 knots. They could of course only be used in coastal waters, but it became evident later that ships confined to one harbour were of little use, as the enemy might never come near or attack that port. The idea of the use of these craft was for them to dash out under cover of the night and by their very smallness approach the enemy ships outside unseen, and then discharge their torpedoes. What happened afterwards did not matter much, but in the following confusion the small attacker might escape. Larger ships were then constructed, and the first British torpedo boat, the *Lightning*, was launched in 1877. Eight years later ships of 40 tons and 20 knots were introduced, though an experimental ship "O 81" was built by Messrs. White in 1885 which displaced 125 tons. So numerous were the craft built by France, at that time semi-hostile, that the menace of the torpedo boat was considered to be very serious, and an attempt was made to find the antidote. From these investigations a type of ship was evolved during 1886–95 which went by the name of "Torpedo-Boat Catcher." These are now called "Torpedo Gunboats," and of these *Speedy, Seagull, Spanker, Speedwell, Gossamer* and *Skipjack* of 735 tons and armed with two 4·7" guns, are the oldest in service. These were built during 1890–1, and they were followed in 1893–4 by *Jason, Leda, Circe, Niger, Hebe* and *Antelope* of 810 tons, and in 1894–5 by *Halcyon, Hazard, Harrier, Hussar* and *Dryad* of 1070 tons. As their best speed was only 19 knots they were thus at the outset useless for their rôle, but have since been useful as minesweepers, fishery protection cruisers and coastal patrols.



Meanwhile the construction of torpedo boats continued both at home and abroad, and the Admiralty ordered special manœuvres in 1892 to solve the problem. They resulted in the evolution of the "Torpedo-Boat Destroyer" of to-day. This ship was designated to have a superiority over the French torpedo boats, which had then reached a stage of good seaworthiness, and also to be used for night attacks on the enemy battle squadrons. They were much smaller than the torpedo-gunboats, and displaced only 220 tons, but they had the great speed of 27 knots. The *Havock* was the first of these, and she was launched in 1893; and she was followed by about forty similar craft, all of which have been scrapped several years ago. They were armed with six 6-pounder guns.

TORPEDO-BOAT DESTROYERS.—Our oldest ships are now classed A and D, and the latter have a speed of 30 knots, and all are armed with one 12-pounder and five 6-pounder guns, as well as a couple of torpedo tubes. Their tonnages range from 280 to 340. The former consist of *Boxer*, *Bruiser*, *Conflict*, *Fervent*, *Lightning*, *Opossum*, *Porcupine*, *Sunfish*, *Surly*, *Wizard* and *Zephyr* (*Opossum* and *Sunfish* only have one torpedo tube). The D's are *Angler*, *Coquette*, *Cygnets*, *Cynthia*, *Desperate*, *Fame*, *Mallard*, *Stag*.

During 1896 and 1902 there were launched *Arab*, *Earnest*, *Express*, *Griffon*, *Kangaroo*, *Lively*, *Locust*, *Myrmidon*, *Orwell*, *Panther*, *Petrel*, *Quail*, *Seal*, *Spiteful*, *Sprightly*, *Syren*, *Success*, *Thrasher*, *Virago*, *Wolf*. They have the same armament, but *Orwell* has six 3-pounder guns. Two other boats, *Gala* and *Tiger*, were lost during 1908, but were replaced by *Albacore* and *Bonetta*, which carry three 12-pounder guns and steam at 26 knots, in comparison to the speed of the others of about 30 knots. All the above are in the B class, and the C class are very numerous and displace from 350 to 400 tons. The usual armament is also carried, and their speed is 30 knots. They are *Albatross*, *Avon*, *Bat*, *Bittern*, *Brazen*, *Bullfinch*, *Cheerful*, *Crane*, *Dove*, *Electra*, *Fairy*, *Falcon*, *Fawn*, *Flirt*, *Flying Fish*, *Gipsy*, *Kestrel*, *Leopard*, *Leven*, *Mermaid*, *Osprey*, *Ostrich*, *Otter*, *Racehorse*,

*Recruit, Roebuck, Star, Sylvia, Thorn, Vigilant, Violet, Vixen, Vulture, Whiting.* There were also three ships equipped with turbines, *Velox, Viper* and *Cobra*, but the latter broke her back in the North Sea in 1901 whilst she was in charge of a navigating party who were delivering her to the Admiralty. She was struck by a huge sea, and she foundered with sixty-seven of her company. In the same year *Viper* stranded off Alderney. These early turbine-driven ships were very frail, as the greater part of their tonnage was devoted to the large engines; and their length in proportion to their weight was too great to ensure strength. Owing to insufficient coal capacity this class were unsuitable for high seas work, but the next class were much more stoutly built, and although the tonnage was nearly doubled the length remained unaltered.

This class was formerly known as the River class, but is now known as the E class. These ships came out between 1902-4 and were a great improvement. They were more roomy and habitable for the crews, as they had high fore-castles which prevented the heavy seas from almost drowning every one aboard. All the previous craft had the turtle-back forecastles and flush decks. They were of over 500 tons and had the moderate speed of 25·5 knots, as greater attention was made in regard to their structural strength. They are *Arun, Boyne, Chelmer, Cherwell, Colne, Dee, Derwent, Doon, Erne, Ettrick, Exe, Foyle, Garry, Itchen, Jed, Kale, Kennet, Liffey, Moy, Ness, Nith, Ouse, Ribble, Rother, Swale, Teviot, Ure, Usk, Waveney, Wear* and *Welland*. *Blackwater* and *Lee* were both lost during 1909, but were replaced next year by *Stour* and *Test*. *Eden* was equipped with turbines, and all of them mount four 12-pounder guns and a couple of torpedo tubes.

At the same time there was built another type—coastal destroyers of 200 tons, but they were little more than improved torpedo boats and are now called as such. Twenty of them were built during 1901-4, but after the thirty-six modern torpedo boats constructed during 1906-9 no further ships were built.



In the next destroyers a great change is noticeable in their design, for turbines were universally adopted in place of the reciprocating engines, and oil fuel was burned instead of coal. Their size was increased to about 880 tons, and the armament to five 12-pounders in *Afridi*, *Cossack*, *Ghurkha*, *Mohawk* and *Tartar*, and to about 1000 tons in *Amazon*, *Crusader*, *Maori*, *Nubian*, *Saracen*, *Viking* and *Zulu*, whose armament is two 4" guns. A speed of over 33 knots was realised from these very valuable craft, which were brought out during 1907-10.

In the G class, formerly the Coastal, their size was reduced to about 900 tons, their speed to 27 knots, and their armament to one 4" and three 12-pounder guns. They also burnt coal, and were stationed in the Mediterranean in 1914. Their names are *Basilisk*, *Beagle*, *Bulldog*, *Foxhound*, *Grasshopper*, *Grampus*, *Harpy*, *Mosquito*, *Pincher*, *Racoon*, *Rattlesnake*, *Renard*, *Savage*, *Scorpion*, *Scourge* and *Wolverine*.

The twenty H class ships are *Acorn*, *Alarm*, *Brisk*, *Cameleon*, *Comet*, *Fury*, *Goldfinch*, *Hope*, *Larne*, *Lyra*, *Martin*, *Minstrel*, *Nemesis*, *Nereide*, *Nymphe*, *Redpole*, *Rifleman*, *Ruby*, *Sheldrake* and *Staunch*. They, again, burn oil, but a speed of 27 knots was obtained and their tonnage was only about 780. They were launched during 1910-11.

In 1911 slightly larger ships were launched, and in three of which a speed of over 30 knots was obtained. They had a similar armament—two 4" and two 12-pounder guns. These were *Acheron*, *Archer*, *Ariel*, *Attack*, *Badger*, *Beaver*, *Defender*, *Druid*, *Ferret*, *Forester*, *Goshawk*, *Hind*, *Hornet*, *Hydra*, *Jackal*, *Lapwing*, *Phoenix*, *Sandfly*, *Tigress*, and the larger and faster *Firedrake*, *Lurcher*, *Oak*.

Next there came in 1912-13 the "Acastas" (K class) of about 935 tons, which have a speed of 29-32 knots. They are armed with three 4" and one machine-gun, and also four 21" torpedo tubes. They are *Acasta*, *Achates*, *Ambuscade*, *Ardent*, *Christopher*, *Cockatrice*, *Contest*, *Fortune*, *Garland*, *Hardy*, *Lynx*, *Midge*, *Owl*, *Paragon*, *Porpoise*, *Shark*, *Sparrowhawk*, *Spitfire*, *Unity* and *Victor*. It was this flotilla which got so badly knocked about after the Jutland Battle.

The last boats to take the water before war broke out are the well-known L class, of which twenty were built. These were *Laertes*, *Laforey*, *Lance*, *Landrail*, *Lark*, *Laurel*, *Laverock*, *Lawford*, *Legion*, *Lennox*, *Leonidas*, *Liberty*, *Linnet*, *Llewellyn*, *Lookout*, *Louis*, *Loyal*, *Lucifer*, *Lydiard* and *Lysander*. Their tonnage is about 950, they burn oil fuel and can steam at about 35 knots, but in other respects resemble the K craft.

Only thirteen M destroyers were provided for in 1914, namely, *Manly*, *Mansfield*, *Mastiff*, *Matchless*, *Mentor*, *Meteor*, *Milne*, *Minos*, *Miranda*, *Moorsom*, *Morris*, *Murray* and *Myngs*. They were even smaller, only displacing about 750 tons, but carry an extra 4" gun and the speed of 35 knots is maintained. No further details are to be had, but they probably also carry four torpedo tubes.

These ships were doubtless completed during 1915, and a large number of new craft have since been added to our flotillas. In Sir John Jellicoe's Dispatch on the Jutland Battle several new names were mentioned, and also from time to time there have been reports of new ships. First there is the *Lassoo*, mentioned in the Sylt raid in March 1916, which was mined later in August, and which was probably a replacement of the wrecked *Louis*. Four new M destroyers, *Magic*, *Mænad*, *Moresby* in the Jutland Battle, and *Medusa*, lost in the Sylt raid, have also appeared; *Narborough*, *Nerissa*, *Nestor*, *Nicator*, *Nomad* and *Nonsuch*, of the N class; *Obdurate*, *Onslaught*, *Onslow*, and *Ophelia* of the O class, and finally, *Pelican* and *Petard* of the P craft. Of the *Abdiel* nothing is known, and there are no details to be had of any of the above destroyers. Later still during 1917 the *Mary Rose* and *Strongbow*, numbered by the Germans as G 29 and G 31, were also reported, and there is no doubt that this class of warship has been pushed ahead with extraordinary rapidity, as they are so urgently required for convoying and submarine hunting.

This action also brought forward several of our new flotilla leaders, of which we now have several. Our first leader was built so far back as 1907, but it was really an

"experimental ocean-going destroyer." This was the *Swift* of 2170 tons, and her tremendously high speed of 36 knots was even exceeded on trials. She carries four 4" guns and two torpedo tubes, and was undoubtedly the fastest warship afloat for several years. Her high cost, £280,000, prevented further ships being built, for in this respect she was little less than a light cruiser without the protection of those ships. We had in 1914 four flotilla leaders in various stages of construction, and they were really large destroyers of 31 knots and equipped with six 4" guns. These were *Marksman*, *Lightfoot*, *Kempenfelt* and *Nimrod*. There were also a couple building for Chile of 1430 tons and 32 knots, and these were taken over and renamed *Broke* and *Faulknor*, and were later followed by *Botha* and *Tipperary* of 1850 tons and 31 knots, all these ex-Chilean ships being armed with six 4" guns. A crew of about 150-200 is believed to be carried. Of the newer *Termagant* and *Turbulent* there are no available details. All of these ships are really powerful destroyers and form a sort of flagship for the flotilla, and are less costly than the light cruisers which were formerly employed for this duty.

Since the end of 1916 the Admiralty have refrained from disclosing the identity of the losses amongst the flotillas, in order to preserve our naval secrets so that the enemy will not be able to gauge the rate of new construction.

SUBMARINES.—Submarines, like destroyers and torpedo boats, are a comparatively recent invention, and may be described as underwater destroyers. As they have developed to such an extraordinary extent during these years of warfare, a brief outline of their history and their remarkable growth will be of interest.

The real origin of these craft dates back as far as the seventeenth century, when a Dutchman and an Englishman both built an "ark for submarine navigation," and the latter claims to have travelled a fair distance down the Thames in 1645. But it was the American, David Bushnell, who was the first to obtain any degree of success. Between 1771 and 1775 he built a small craft, now in an American



Museum, which in shape resembled an egg and when afloat stood up on one end. The motive power was supplied by a screw driven by men. This vessel failed to secure any success against the British ships which were blockading the American ports, although attacks were attempted by taking the craft awash to the ships and then fixing a clockwork explosive machine against their hulls.

Fulton, the American, was the next successful inventor. He came over to France in 1801 and, receiving financial aid from Buonaparte, he built a vessel which he called *Nautilus*. The ship was driven by an engine worked by men, but when in surface trim sails were hoisted. Light was supplied by a small glass aperture in the hull, as candles used up too much oxygen. He installed a copper globe containing one cubic foot of compressed air at 300 lbs. per sq. in., and he claimed that he could remain submerged for four hours. He did on July 3 descend to a depth of 25' in Brest Harbour and remained there for an hour, and with this ship he made a demonstration off Boulogne before several French naval experts, and successfully blew up a small ship. Later he built another craft, *Nautilus II*, and he was then employed by the French Government against us. His one notorious attempt ended in failure, when he attacked the 74-gun *Ramillies* and almost bored through her bottom with an auger. In 1803 Fulton came over to England to offer his services. He was equally unsuccessful against his former employers, though he attacked some French ships in the Boulogne Roads. Two years later, however, by means of a spar torpedo, *i. e.* a torpedo fixed and fired from the end of a long spar, he blew up a stout brig of 200 tons in the Downs off Walmer Castle.

In 1844 a Frenchman, Dr. Payenne, constructed a "machine" of 62 tons which had a length of 43' and a breadth of 10'. She was sausage shaped and was built exclusively for excavation purposes in harbours, and therefore had no propelling machinery. For rising and descending weights of 4 tons were carried over pulleys, so that to rise the weights were lowered to the harbour



bottom, when the natural buoyancy of the wooden vessel, once released of the weights, would cause it to rise to the surface. The bottom of the ship was partly open to enable the crew to carry out their work. Though perhaps hardly a "submarine," this caisson provided an excellent subject for experimenting on the restoration of the purity of her atmosphere by carbonic acid gas.

The next step in submarine construction was made during the American Civil War in the sixties. As the Confederate Government possessed no large warships, they depended upon the mine, the ram and the torpedo; they also constructed several "underwater torpedo boats" at Charleston and Mobile, in which they hoped to approach the Federals outside unseen. These little ships were called "Davids," and were installed with steam-engines with collapsible funnels. They were cigar shaped, and although very unreliable, they seem to have had many adventures in the year 1863-4. One unsuccessfully torpedoed the Federal *New Ironsides* off Charleston during the winter, and another, also unsuccessful, damaged the *Minnesota*.

A much-improved vessel was built in 1863 at Mobile, and this was hand-propelled by eight men who turned the propeller shaft. She also carried a commander who navigated her from a sort of conning tower, and a chief gunner. This ship, during her adventurous career, accounted for no fewer than six crews, forty-seven men in all, before being finally lost. Her record is hardly credible, and the patriotism of the crews is almost beyond belief.

Whilst on her trial trip, commanded by a Lieutenant Paine, she was swamped by the wash of a passing steamer, as the hatches had been left open whilst running awash, and all but the Commander were drowned. She was raised and again Paine took charge, but she was swamped for a second time with six of her crew during a squall. Raised again, the indomitable Paine took her out for the third time, but she capsized off Sumpter Point, and as the crew were below, all but Paine were lost. For the fourth time this death-ship was taken out, this time in charge of one

of her builders, but she dived into the muddy bottom owing to trouble with the steering gear and hydroplanes, and the whole of her crew perished. Incredible as it seems, this *David* was again raised and volunteers were found, but striking a ship's cable, she was again lost. For the last time she was raised, and with great heroism on the evening of February 17, 1864, the sixth crew, comprising two army officers and five men, navigated her out of the harbour, across the bar in an awash condition, and gained the sea. She was then submerged, and they attacked the blockading ships from seaward. Unseen, she ran alongside the Federal corvette *Housatonic* and successfully sank her with a spar torpedo, but at the same time perished in the explosion, together with her brave crew.

Fourteen years later a Liverpool clergyman, the Rev. W. G. Garnett, built a vessel, and in the next year he constructed another at Messrs. Cochrane & Co.'s yard which had an air-purifying device installed, whilst the screw was worked by a steam-engine. Unfortunately she was lost during a trial in the Irish Sea.

Sweden was the next country to make any real progress. In 1885 the *Nordenfjelt* of 60 tons, measuring 64'  $\times$  9'  $\times$  11', was built; she had steam-engines fitted. Her descent was controlled by vertical propellers which stopped when an ascent was required, and for awash conditions ballast was carried. She could travel at a fair speed underwater. She was purchased in 1886 by Greece after successful trials in the Bay of Salamis, and two larger craft were ordered by Turkey, the *Nordenfjelt II* and *Nordenfjelt III*. They were shipped in sections to Constantinople, but, as might be expected in such a country, only sufficient parts arrived to put together one vessel. This craft was quite successful, but when a torpedo was fired she stood up vertical, so unstable were these craft then. In the same year, 1887, a vessel was constructed at Barrow called *Nordenfjelt IV*, of 245 tons submerged and 260 tons on the surface. She measured 125'  $\times$  12', and although she made the trip from Barrow to Southampton without mishap,

the Admiralty refused to purchase her on the grounds of instability and low speed; and no further steps were taken by our Admiralty until 1901 after all the Powers, excepting Germany, had already constructed several.

During this period France had brought this extremely difficult craft to a practical stage. Calling for tenders in 1886, M. Dupuy de Lôme two years later commenced the construction of the *Gymnote*, and after his death the work was continued by M. Gustave Zédé, who was supported by Admiral Aube. This craft measured  $59' \times 5.9' \times 6'$ , but her longitudinal stability was unsatisfactory. Five years later a submarine of 266 tons was built at Toulon and named after M. Gustave Zédé, who had died. Like the *Gymnote*, she was driven by accumulators, and had a designed speed of 16 knots. The fumes given off by the accumulators made the crew ill, and as several cells had to be taken out, only 8 knots were realised. Longitudinal stability was also very poor, and to counteract this defect three additional rudders were fitted on the sides. This craft performed the 41-mile voyage from Toulon to Marseilles in an awash condition in seven hours and twenty minutes.

In 1897 the *Narval* was built at Cherbourg, and she was the first craft to be able to be navigated in three distinct conditions, namely, in surface trim with her ballast tanks empty and similar to a torpedo boat, awash with the conning tower and chimney above water like the "Nordenfelts," and finally completely submerged with the ballast tanks filled. She was driven by triple expansion engines of 250 h.p. (submerged), and when on the surface by a motor of 158 accumulators. Though, of course, these vessels have now been removed from the active list, they were the stepping-stones to the present-day vastly improved submarines.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic much success had been gained. In 1875 Mr. J. P. Holland, of New Jersey, built a submarine canoe seating one occupant who worked the screw by pedals, the "crew" having his head encased in a diving helmet and lying in a recumbent position. This little craft measured  $16' \times 1.65' \times 2'$ .



Two years later at the Albany City Ironworks he constructed a petrol-driven craft of 4 h.p., but it was smaller in length though 3·5' in breadth. In 1881 an internal combustion engine was installed in a 19-ton vessel, much larger than the previous ships, and the seventh vessel he built was very similar to the "Nordenfelts," though the steam-engine was replaced by an internal combustion engine. She was built in 1895 at Cramp's Yard, Philadelphia. The ninth "Holland," built at Elizabethport, N.J., in 1900, marked a considerable advance, and the submarine weighed 75 tons. For ballast, 10 tons of water were carried, and she measured 53·83'  $\times$  10·25'  $\times$  10·51'. A 50-h.p. Otto gasoline motor was used and a speed of 7 knots was obtained; and when submerged an electric motor was used, just as in the present submarines. She submerged by filling her tanks, and for diving two horizontal rudders or hydroplanes were fitted. During 1901-9 twelve improved submarines were built for America of about 120 tons.

It was by these "Hollands" that our Admiralty were finally induced to provide for the construction of five submarines at Barrow. The first was launched on November 2, 1901, by Messrs. Vickers, the renowned submarine builders. She displaced 104 tons when on the surface and 120 tons when fully submerged, and she was practically similar to the contemporary American vessels then building. Gasoline engines were used when in surface trim which gave a speed of 8·5 knots, and when submerged by electric motors giving a speed of 6 to 7 knots. A single torpedo tube was her only offensive weapon.

A word here about the general character of these ships will be of use. Submarines have developed more than any other type of warship during the war, and our enemy has been reduced to the use of these craft alone, with the exception of a few destroyer raiders. The one great advantage in their favour is their ability to approach their victim unseen, and even if their presence is known a state of general uneasiness exists. They are in theory underwater torpedo boats pure and simple, and whilst the surface boats depend upon



surprise attacks and are forced to make the attack at night when their black hulls are almost indistinguishable from the darkness, the submarine can by reason of her invisibility operate both by day and by night. On the other hand, there are a multitude of difficulties to contend with.

A submarine can now cruise in four different conditions : (1) riding on the surface using her oil engines, more commonly known as "oiling," (2) awash with her hull submerged except for the conning tower and periscopes, (3) submerged with the sole exception of the tips of her periscopes, (4) and totally submerged.

The first position is, of course, useless when enemy ships are in the vicinity ; but as the internal combustion engines can be used whilst the batteries are recharged, and incidentally the crew can get a breath of fresh air, the submarine generally proceeds to her station in this trim. The speed, although not high, is also considerably increased. The awash condition is more generally used when it is necessary to dive at a moment's notice from the attentions of the enemy. The third position is used for attacking. The submarine, once submerged, derives its sight from the periscopes, which are steel tubes about 6" in diameter with an arrangement of mirrors inside whereby the scene above the surface of the water is reflected upon a chart in the conning tower. In this condition it is necessary for the utmost vigilance on board the surface ships ; on a calm day to the experienced eye a periscope can be recognised, but if the seas are at all rough then the chances of detecting the "eye" of the submarine correspondingly diminishes. At the same time, however, should the waves be at all high, then the range of the vision of the submarine is considerably restricted unless she also rises further out of the water. So much has been written about these craft that a description of them is unnecessary ; in general appearance they resemble a fat cigar or a torpedo, and on their top runs a small deck, the conning tower (an oval drum-shaped erection from which the observer seated in here can see through very thick glass portholes the neighbouring area),

and the periscopes, two in all the later ships, fitted on to the conning tower. The chief external difference between British and German submarines is the bows; the German forepart resembles a boat, which they claim gives greater stability. All recent craft carry wireless, and our D and E classes are armed with a small armament of 12-pounders mounted on disappearing platforms. All Germany's later vessels are also armed, and it is with these guns that she has helped to make her name a thing of loathing throughout the civilised world, for the crews have turned them on the struggling passengers and crews in the water. At each end inside their hulls torpedo tubes are carried, thus placing the submarine at the distinct disadvantage of not being able to turn her tubes on her enemy, but having to manœuvre herself into the desired direction. To attack successfully a moving ship the submarine will have to take an observation with her periscope, and if the victim is steaming in her direction she will submerge until the enemy comes up. Then she will again rise, take aim, and let go her torpedoes; and then unless an opportunity presents itself to rise to see the result, she will either sink to the bottom or dive and travel underwater until she considers herself in safe waters, as the destroyers will be scouring the vicinity in search of her. With a merchantman these difficulties did not exist until they were armed and convoys provided, and these craft at once rose to the surface and watched their handiwork with the utmost callousness and cruelty.

The submarine is divided into several chambers. First there is the fore torpedo compartment, then come the crew's quarters, next a compartment under the conning tower where a mass of delicate machinery for steering and diving and the periscope charts and various control gears are at the hand of the observer, then the engine-room, and finally the stern torpedo chamber, if stern tubes are carried. Under all this are the stores of compressed air, oil-fuel tanks and water-ballast tanks. The stern tubes are more for attacking a pursuer than for offensive purposes. Above all, the hull of the submarine is very fragile, though nowadays very thin

armour plating is carried ; and a few well-placed shots from a destroyer would sink a submarine once and for all, whilst a shell from a heavy gun would blow a submarine to pieces.

In the last few years the submarine has greatly increased in size and power, and we have sent three C class craft out to China, which travelled the greater part of the long journey on the surface ; and the six B class submarines which were sent to Gibraltar and Malta accomplished the voyage across the Bay of Biscay in very heavy weather with hardly any discomfort to the crews, whilst their escort, the cruiser *Diana*, felt the seas very much. They were, of course, submerged. Later, in 1913, the two Australian submarines, AE 1 and AE 2, both successfully performed the 13,000 miles journey to Sydney entirely under their own power. They were escorted as far as Aden by *Eclipse*, where they were met by Australian ships and thence escorted to Australia.

Whilst details are rightly withheld, the pre-war limit of their radius, 1200 miles, is now greatly exceeded, and submarines can travel across the Atlantic with ease. Several Canadian-built craft crossed the ocean during 1915, and a couple of German craft also put into Baltimore. The enemy has now no need to return home for supplies, for the existence of depots on "neutral" and unfrequented shores and a system of submarines especially built as dépôts have enabled them to revictual in the unfrequented waters.

The most successful defence against these formidable warships lies in high speed which enables the attacked to draw away and steam an irregular course without losing ground. With the submarine ahead ramming is extensively tried, but should the submarine be able to discharge a torpedo before hurriedly diving, then the speedy destruction of the ship must be expected, as a torpedo fired at such close quarters creates such enormous havoc that the victim in some cases has been blown in two.

After the first five "Hollands" were laid down in 1904, Vickers commenced the construction of the thirteen A class craft. These were of 204 tons, between 110' and 150' in length, and had a speed of 11 knots on the surface and a



submerged speed of 7 knots. A 1 carried only one torpedo tube, but all the others have two. The eleven B class were all launched during 1905, and displaced 313 tons when submerged and 280 when on the surface. Their speeds were 13 and 8 knots respectively. During 1906-7 they launched the first sixteen C boats, of similar speed and displacement, and in the next year the Admiralty commenced to construct four others at Chatham, the last two, C 19 and C 20, being of 321 tons. The remainder of the thirty-eight were completed at Barrow during 1908-9, with the exception of C 33 and C 34, which were built at Chatham. Meanwhile a very much improved craft, D 1, had been launched at Barrow, whose surface displacement was 550 tons and submerged displacement 600 tons. Her surface speed was 16 knots, and she carried an extra torpedo tube. She was followed during 1909-11 by seven sister ships, whose submerged speed was 10 knots, and D 4 had a disappearing gun mounted on her deck. They were all twin-screw. In 1912-14 eleven E class boats were launched, and they were again a marked advance upon their predecessors. Their surface tonnage and speed were 725 and 16 knots, but submerged they displaced 810 tons (excepting E 1, E 2, AE 1 and AE 2). Four torpedo tubes are carried. There have been over thirty of this class built, although in 1914 only eighteen were known to be built or building. In addition there were several experimental craft in various stages of construction. Hitherto all the submarines had been built either at Barrow or Chatham, and in 1914 Vickers had under construction "Nautilus," V 1, V 2, V 3 and V 4. In addition Messrs. Scott's of Greenock were building "Swordfish," S 1, S 2, S 3 and "S" *Fiat S. G.*, Messrs. Armstrong, Whitworth of Elswick were building W 1-W 4, and finally there was F 1 building at Chatham.

Of the above submarines, the five "Hollands" and the first four A craft were scrapped before 1914; A 7, B 2, and C 11 were accidentally lost, and probably the B class have also been discarded. During 1914-17 we have lost C 34, D 5, AE 1, AE 2, E 3, E 7, E 13, E 15, E 17, E 20, E 22



and another unnamed. Both British and German craft have been shrouded in secrecy for many years, but ship for ship our craft were superior to the enemy before 1914. It is a pity that the Admiralty cannot see their way to publish our successes instead of the mishaps, for the enemy does exactly the reverse; and the impression is given that our submarines are not to be compared with the successful German craft, whereas the North Sea has witnessed many a thrilling incident in connection with our submarines.

MONITORS.—Very soon after the outbreak of hostilities the Admiralty acquired from Brazil three river monitors which were building in this country in 1914 for service on the Amazon. They were renamed *Humber*, *Severn* and *Mersey*, and they have been followed by a vast number of similar craft. During 1914–15 several were dispatched to the Dardanelles, the Ægean Sea, the Egyptian coast, the German East African coast, to the Tigris and Euphrates, and of course to the Belgian coast. More recently they have appeared in the Adriatic Sea and off the Palestine seaboard. The original ships were of 1260 tons and could steam at 11·5 knots, as for their original purpose speed was unessential. Their armament consisted of a couple of 6" guns, two 4·7" howitzers and ten smaller pieces. They were admirably suited for supporting land operations, for with their light draught they could stand well in and at the same time frustrate any submarine attacks.

Later monitors were armed with two 14" guns or a 9·2" gun in the bows and a 6" piece astern. They were claimed to be torpedo-proof, owing to their small draught. So far the only monitor lost, the M 30, was sunk by gunfire. Most of these craft are numbered, but a few have received names, of which *General Crauford*, *Lord Clive*, *Marshal Ney*, *Picton*, *Prince Eugene*, *Prince Rupert*, etc., have come before the public notice in connection with the Adriatic and Belgian coast operations.

GUNBOATS AND SLOOPs.—There are also a few small ships which have rendered valuable services in all quarters of the globe. Of the five gunboats, *Ringdove* of 805 tons, 13 knots

and with an armament of six 4" and two 3-pounders, *Bramble*, *Britomart*, *Thistle*, and *Dwarf* of 710 tons, which were built in 1898 and can steam at about 13 knots and carry two 4" and four 12-pounder guns, the best known is the latter, which has done very good work off the West African coasts.

Of the ten sloops the smallest is *Racer*, built in 1884, of 970 tons, 10 knots, which carries a couple of 5" pieces; next there is *Algerine* of 1050 tons and 13 knots, which is eleven years younger. During 1890-98 *Rosario*, *Vestal*, *Shearwater* and *Rinaldo* were built, and they displace 980 tons and steam at over 13 knots, and carry four 4" guns. Lastly in 1900-3 we have *Cadmus*, *Clio*, *Espiègle* and *Odin* of 1070 tons, which carry two extra guns. All these four have rendered good service in Mesopotamia and off Flanders, and though of little value nowadays, they can take the place of more powerful craft which would have to be detached for these operations.

There are, in addition, many auxiliary ships such as Surveying Ships, Special Service and Dispatch ships, but they are too numerous to describe. There are also dépôt-ships for submarines and destroyers, and a few yachts.

**AUXILIARY SHIPS.**—A great number of trawlers have been requisitioned for patrol work and minesweeping in the North Sea, in the Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas, and in the Dardanelles; no praise can be too great for the manner in which their peril-fraught task has been carried out. Before coming to the armed liners, we come to an entirely novel type of ship which was unknown before 1914; this is the seaplane carrier. Although nothing much is known of these ships, it is evident from photographs that a spacious deck is their chief characteristic, from which the seaplane is able to rise for its flights. On its return it is hauled aboard by the derricks. In the case of transformed merchant ships the forward deck has been cut through and the seaplanes lie in the original hold. There was only one ship under construction in 1914, the *Ark Royal*, but amongst

the commissioned liners and cross-Channel packets we know of *Campania*, *Canning* and the *Engadine*, *Paris* and *Riviera*.

ARMED LINERS.—In peace time these ships are well-known liners, which are hired or purchased by the Admiralty in times of war; and this practice was extensively used in the olden times, the East Indiamen belonged to this category. Armed ships can be divided into three classes: (1) ships armed purely to defend themselves, against submarines nowadays, previously against the numerous privateers and frigates; (2) auxiliary cruisers, ships intended to patrol either the shipping lanes or in the main theatre of war, thereby augmenting the original cruiser force; (3) armed tugs, yachts, motor vessels, etc., used for coastal patrolling and boarding traffic.

As the first and third classes explain themselves, there is no need to dwell upon them. The auxiliary cruisers were previously the large ocean liners or fast cross-Channel steamers, and they are armed with 6" and 4·7" guns. They are, of course, incapable of standing up to a regular cruiser, and even if pitched against another auxiliary cruiser there is serious danger of both ships sinking, as the much larger target, combined with their very thin hulls, are not conducive to withstanding any battering from gunfire. For patrolling and acting as intelligence ships far out to sea their large bunkers stand them in good stead, and they can keep the seas for a much longer period than the light cruiser. A large number of liners were commissioned in September 1914 as auxiliary cruisers, and they have performed very useful services in spite of numerous losses.

Many other liners have been converted into *transports* for troops and animals and stores, etc., and they are perfectly legitimate prey to any warship. Like auxiliary cruisers, they can be sunk at sight; indeed, if a ship was warned by a submarine before being torpedoed, fire would be opened immediately on the submarine if guns were carried. It must not be overlooked that a transport is a warship, as she is carrying war material, and she is kept



in a state of readiness for repelling an attack. Several transports have been lost, many unhappily with large loss of life, and a list of these losses will be found appended.

HOSPITAL SHIPS.—A hospital ship, on the other hand, is held to be immune from attack, but our inhuman and brutal foe refuses to recognise the laws of civilisation, and after sinking five such ships, he declared that all hospital ships found in the Channel and along the East Coast will be sunk at sight. He alleged that we had employed them as transports for ammunition, for of course this would be a flagrant breach of the Geneva Convention.

On the outbreak of war there was only one hospital ship, the *Maine*, in the Navy, but since then about fifty of our most commodious liners and Channel packets have been equipped as floating hospitals. The larger ships are for service with the troops in the Mediterranean and other distant theatres of war, whilst the smaller ones transport the everflowing stream of wounded from France to England, and the remainder are attached to the Grand Fleet.

By international law it is laid down that the hulls shall be painted white, with a broad green band running the length of the ship, though the band is red if the ship belongs to a private society or person. Two Red Crosses punctuate the band, fore and aft on either side, and to secure further protection these distinctive marks are lighted up at night. The Red Cross Flag of Geneva is also flown in addition to the national flag, and there can be no mistake made in ascertaining the character of the ship. They can be visited and examined by a belligerent Power, but cannot be sunk or captured, nor can the medical staff or the wounded be taken prisoners of war. Such are the rules governing these ships, which have been so grossly violated by the enemy, who even tried to prevent the arrival of rescue ships in one case by jamming the wireless appeals for help.

At the end of this volume will be found detailed the Royal Australian Navy, but there are two other forces which must be described—the *Royal Indian Marine* and the



*Royal Canadian Navy.* The former consists of seven troop-ships—

	Tons.	Speed.	Armament.
<i>Dufferin</i> . . .	7457	19	Six 4" and eight 3-pounders.
<i>Hardinge</i> . . .	6520	18	„ 4.7", six 3-pounders, and four Maxims.
<i>Northbrook</i> . . .	5820	16	Six 4" and six 3-pounders.
<i>Dalhousie</i> . . .	1960	14	„ 6-pounders.
<i>Lawrence</i> . . .	1154	13	Four 6-pounders and four machine-guns.
<i>Investigator</i> . . .	1015	13.5	
<i>Minto</i> . . .	930		

Besides the cruisers *Niobe* and *Rainbow*, which have been described, Canada possesses the Customs cruiser *Margaret*, four surveying ships, and the five gun-vessels —

	Tons.	Speed.	Armament.
<i>Canada</i> . . .	780	17	Four 3-pounders.
<i>Minto</i> . . .	1100	16	„ 6-pounders.
<i>Curlew</i> . . .	400	11	Three machine-guns
<i>Constance</i> . . .			
<i>Acadia</i> . . .	526	10.5	Six „ „

This, then, is a brief outline of the forces on which the security of this country rests, and we must now endeavour to follow the events since the momentous days of August 1914.

## PART I

### CHAPTER I

#### BRITAIN PREPARED

WHEN one so often hears the statement that the war found this country in a state of unreadiness, the fact that no foreign soldier has set foot on these shores is ample proof of the fallacy of this fact. Our Army, we know, was totally inadequate in strength to be pitted against any of the Continental Armies, though what it lacked in numbers was more than counterbalanced by the wonderful bravery and discipline of our troops during the terrible strain in August and September 1914. That this state of unreadiness existed in the Royal Navy is utterly untrue; in fact the German General Staff could hardly have chosen a better time for us to precipitate their long-awaited campaign of aggression.

The cause of this fortunate state of affairs can be traced back to some months previously, when Mr. Winston Churchill on March 17, 1914, intimated in the House of Commons that there would be no grand naval manœuvres in July; instead there was to be a general mobilisation of the Third Fleet, manned by nucleus crews and augmented by the Royal Fleet Reserve, who would be called up from their civilian employment for a seven days' training. The cost of this scheme, which was of the utmost importance, was only £50,000 compared to the £180,000 which would be entailed by the annual grand manœuvres. There would be the usual annual review, at which the King would be present.

On July 20 the long line of warships passed before His Majesty, who in *Victoria and Albert* was stationed off the *Nab* Lightship, and disappeared into the Channel to what every one thought were the ordinary exercises, but what proved

to be the preliminary movements of the war. Little did the average man imagine that in the space of ten days these same ships would be called upon to stand between Britain and the ruthless invader. The mobilisation of the Third Fleet was concluded on July 24, and the 1500 seamen and marines were sent back to their homes, as this was prior to the dispatch of the arrogant Austrian ultimatum to Serbia; and further to illustrate the confidence that the Serbian trouble would not spread, on this day the Admiralty decided to establish a small squadron of old battleships and cruisers on Hull. Four days later, when the Austrian ultimatum was dispatched to Serbia, matters at once took a grave turn, and through the foresight of our First Sea Lord, the Grand Fleet was ordered to stand fast, and all movements of our Fleet were veiled from the public. On the next day, August 1, Germany declared war on Russia, who had mobilised part of her army in response to the Austrian declaration; and Russian troops crossed the frontier, whilst German soldiers entered Cirey in France. On August 3 the mobilisation of the British Fleet was completed, thanks entirely to the voluntary response of the reserves who came forward prior to the King's Proclamation, and at 11 p.m. on August 4 Britain declared war on Germany in consequence of the cowardly ultimatum to Belgium.

Here it will be convenient to observe the disposition of this mighty armada in August 1914, both at home and abroad. There were three Home Fleets, which consist of both battle squadrons and flotillas, and all are included in the Grand Fleet. There were also the Mediterranean Fleet, the China and East Indies Squadrons, the Australian and New Zealand Squadrons, a West Atlantic, South African and West African Squadron, in addition to a flotilla based on Gibraltar.

Their composition is as follows—

## THE GRAND FLEET

### FIRST HOME FLEET

*Iron Duke.* (Commander-in-Chief's Flagship.)

*Sappho.* Attached Ship. (Cruiser.)

*Oak.*                    "           "       (Destroyer.)

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## FIRST BATTLE SQUADRON

*Marlborough.* (Flag.)  
*Collingwood.* "  
*St. Vincent.* "  
*Colossus.* *Vanguard.*  
*Hercules.* *Superb.*  
*Neptune.*

## SECOND BATTLE SQUADRON

*King George V.* (Flag.)  
*Orion.*  
*Ajax.* "  
*Audacious.* *Conqueror.*  
*Centurion.* *Monarch.*  
*Thunderer.*

## FIRST BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON

*Lion.* (Flag.) *New Zealand.*  
*Queen Mary.* *Invincible.*  
*Princess Royal.*

## SECOND CRUISER SQUADRON

*Shannon.* (Flag.)  
*Achilles.*  
*Cochrane.*  
*Natal.*

*Bellona.* Attached Cruiser.  
*Cyclops.* " Ship.

*Boadicea.* Attached Cruiser.  
*Assistance.* " Ship.

## THIRD BATTLE SQUADRON

*King Edward VII.* (Flag.)  
*Hibernia.* "  
*Africa.* *Dominion.*  
*Britannia.* *Hindustan.*  
*Commonwealth.* *Zealandia.*

## FOURTH BATTLE SQUADRON

*Dreadnought.* (Flag.)  
*Téméraire.*  
*Bellerophon.*  
*Agamemnon.*

## THIRD CRUISER SQUADRON

*Antrim.* (Flag.) *Devonshire.*  
*Argyll.* *Roxburgh.*  
*Blanche.* Attached Cruiser.

## FIRST LIGHT CRUISER SQUADRON

*Birmingham.* *Lowestoft.*  
*Nottingham.* *Southampton.*  
*Blonde.* Attached Cruiser.

## MINESWEEPING SQUADRON

*Circe.* *Seagull.*  
*Gossamer.* *Speedy.*  
*Jason.* *Speedwell.*  
*Leda.* *Skipjack.*

} Gunboats.

*Driver.*  
*Seaflower.*  
*Seamew.*  
*Sparrow*  
*Spider.*

} Trawlers purchased in 1909.

## SECOND HOME FLEET

### FIFTH BATTLE SQUADRON

*Queen.* (Flag.) *Bulwark.*  
*Formidable.* *Prince of Wales.*  
*Implacable.* *Venerable.*  
*London.* *Irresistible.*

### SIXTH BATTLE SQUADRON

*Lord Nelson.* (Fleet Flagship.)  
*Russell.* (Flag.) *Duncan.*  
*Albemarle.* *Exmouth*  
*Cornwallis.* *Vengeance.*

### FIFTH CRUISER SQUADRON

*Carnarvon.* (Flag.)  
*Falmouth.*  
*Liverpool.*  
*Diamond.* Attached Cruiser.

### SIXTH CRUISER SQUADRON

*Drake.* *King Alfred*  
*Good Hope.* *Leviathan.*  
*Topaze.* Attached Cruiser.

## MINELAYING SQUADRON (Cruisers)

*Andromache.* *Intrepid.* *Latona.* *Thetis.*  
*Apollo.* *Iphigenia.* *Naiad.*



## THIRD HOME FLEET

## SEVENTH BATTLE SQUADRON

*Cæsar.*                      *Prince George.*  
*Illustrious.*                *Victorious.*  
*Magnificent.*

*Sapphire.* Attached Cruiser.

## EIGHTH BATTLE SQUADRON

*Albion.*                      *Goliath.*  
*Canopus.*                   *Ocean.*  
*Glory.*

*Amethyst.* Attached Cruiser.

## SEVENTH CRUISER SQUADRON

*Cressy.*                      *Hogue.*  
*Euryalus.*                  *Sutlej.*

## EIGHTH CRUISER SQUADRON

*Donegal.*                   *Amphitrite.*  
*Monmouth.*                *Challenger.*

## NINTH CRUISER SQUADRON

*Europa.*                    *Highflyer.*  
*Cumberland.*              *Vindictive.*

TENTH CRUISER SQUADRON  
(Late Training Squadron)

*Edgar.*                      *Grafton.*  
*Endymion.*                *Hawke.*  
*Crescent.*                  *Royal Arthur.*  
*Gibraltar.*                *Theseus.*

## ELEVENTH CRUISER SQUADRON

*Diana.*                      *Juno.*  
*Doris.*                      *Minerva.*  
*Eclipse.*                   *Talbot.*  
*Isis.*                        *Venus.*

## HUMBER SQUADRON

*Majestic.* (Flag.) Battleship.  
*Mars.*                      "  
*Jupiter.*                   "  
*Hannibal.*                "  
*Aboukir.*                Cruiser.  
*Bacchante.*              "

## PATROL FLOTILLAS

<i>First.</i>	<i>Second.</i>	<i>Third.</i>	<i>Fourth.</i>
22 "I" class.	20 "H" class.	20 "L" class.	20 "K" class.
<i>Sixth.</i>	<i>Seventh.</i>	<i>Eighth.</i>	<i>Ninth.</i>
Composed of the "A," "B," "C," and "D" classes.		12 "F" class.	24 "E" class.

## EIGHT SUBMARINE FLOTILLAS

## FOREIGN SERVICE SQUADRONS

## MEDITERRANEAN FLEET

## SECOND BATTLE-CRUISER SQUADRON

*Inflexible.* (Flag.)  
*Indefatigable.*  
*Indomitable.*

## FIFTH DESTROYER FLOTILLA

*Blenheim.* (Depot.)  
*Basilisk.*                   *Pincher.*  
*Beagle.*                    *Racoon.*  
*Bulldog.*                   *Rattlesnake.*  
*Foxhound.*                *Renard.*  
*Grampus.*                *Savage.*  
*Grasshopper.*            *Scorpion.*  
*Harpy.*                    *Scourge.*  
*Mosquito.*                *Wolverine.*

## FIRST CRUISER SQUADRON

*Defence.* (Flag.)  
*Black Prince.*  
*Duke of Edinburgh.*  
*Warrior.*

# 44 THREE YEARS OF NAVAL WARFARE

## SECOND LIGHT CRUISER SQUADRON

*Chatham.* *Gloucester.*  
*Dublin.* *Weymouth.*

## TORPEDO BOATS

O 44. O 46. O 64.  
O 45. O 63. O 70.

*Hussar.* Attached Gunboat.  
*Imogene.* " Ship.

SUBMARINES  
B 9, B 10, B 11.

## GIBRALTAR FLOTILLA

### TORPEDO BOATS

83. 89. 91. 93. 95.  
88. 90. 92. 94. 96.

### SUBMARINES

B 6. B 7. B 8.

## CHINA SQUADRON

*Triumph.* (Reserve at Hong Kong.) *Cadmus.* Sloop.  
*Minotaur.* (Flag.) Cruiser. *Clio.* "  
*Hampshire.* " *Bramble.* Gunboat.  
*Yarmouth.* Light Cruiser. *Britomart.* "  
*Newcastle.* " *Thistle.* "  
*Chelmer.* Destroyer.

### RIVER GUNBOATS

*Colne.* "  
*Fame.* "  
*Jed.* "  
*Kenet.* "  
*Ribble.* "  
*Usk.* "  
*Welland.* "  
O 35. Torpedo Boat.  
O 36. " "  
O 37. " "  
O 38. " "  
C 36. Submarine.  
C 37. "  
C 38. "  
*Rosario.* Sloop. (Depot.)

*Robin.* 1897. 85 tons. Canton R.  
*Sandpiper.* " " " "  
*Kinsha.* 1901. 616 " Yangtze,  
*Moorhen.* 1902. 180 " " "  
*Nightingale.* 1897. 85 " " "  
*Snipe.* " " " "  
*Teal.* 1902. 180 " " "  
*Widgeon.* 1905. 195 " Chung-king.  
*Woodcock.* 1890. 150 " "  
*Woodlark.* " " " "  
(Used for the suppression of piracy.)  
*Alacrity.* Dispatch Boat.

## AUSTRALIAN SQUADRON

*Australia.* (Flag.) Battle-cruiser.  
*Melbourne.* Light Cruiser.  
*Sydney.* " "  
*Brisbane.* " " (bldg.)  
*Encounter.* " "  
*Pioneer.* " "  
*Protector.* Gunboat.  
*Gayundah.* "  
*Salumah.* "  
*Tingira.* Training Ship.

### FLOTILLA

*Parramatta.* Destroyer.  
*Warrego.* "  
*Yarra.* "  
*Derwent.* "  
*Swan.* "  
*Torrens.* "  
AE 1. Submarine.  
AE 2. "  
*Penguin.* (Depot.)

## NEW ZEALAND SQUADRON

*Pyramus.* Cruiser.  
*Psyche.* "  
*Philomel.* "

## CAPE OF GOOD HOPE SQUADRON

*Hyacinth.* (Flag.) Cruiser.  
*Astræa.* "  
*Pegasus.* "

## EAST INDIES SQUADRON

*Swiftsure.* (Flag.) Battleship.  
*Dartmouth.* Light Cruiser.  
*Fox.* " "  
*Espiègle.* Sloop.  
*Odin.* "  
*Sphinx.* Special Service Sloop.  
 (Built 1882, 1130 tons, 12·5 kn.)

WEST ATLANTIC (FOURTH  
CRUISER) SQUADRON

*Suffolk.* (Flag.)  
*Berwick.*  
*Essex.*  
*Lancaster.*  
*Bristol.*

## WEST COAST OF AMERICA

*Algerine.* Sloop.  
*Shearwater.* "

## WEST COAST OF AFRICA

*Dwarf.* Gunboat.

## SOUTH-EAST COAST OF AMERICA

*Glasgow.* Light Cruiser.

Of course great alterations were made in the above dispositions on the outbreak of war, chiefly in regard to the foreign squadrons, and after the rounding up of the German raiders their pursuers were ordered home; but several arrived off the Dardanelles and assisted in that campaign. Of the three Home Fleets, now known as the Grand Fleet, we know practically nothing. The Flotillas have expanded enormously. With regard to the sloops and gunboats in the above, not enumerated in the foregoing chapter, these have been employed on special duties and are probably now scrapped.

It was in this condition in which this country took the fateful step, and the entirely satisfactory state of affairs was due to the personal action of the First Sea Lord, H.S.H. Prince Louis of Battenberg (now the Marquis of Milford Haven), ably supported by Mr. Winston Churchill. We are so often reminded of the various politicians and Admiralty Boards who are responsible for the general efficiency of our Fleet, but we have previously seen that the country awoke to its peril as far back as 1904, and again in 1909, and had by a great effort placed the Navy in its proper superiority. It is, however, certain that disaster would have befallen us had Prince Louis not taken, in the words of Mr. Churchill, "the first step which secured the timely concentration of the Fleet." In his letter to Mr. Churchill in August 1915



he says: "The news from abroad on the morning of the 26th (July) was certainly very disquieting. . . . After making myself acquainted with all the telegrams at the Foreign Office . . . I directed the Secretary to send an order to the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleets at Portland to the effect that no ship was to leave her anchorage until further orders." After this, in conjunction with Mr. Churchill, he took all the necessary steps which placed the entire Navy on a war footing twenty-four hours before the declaration of war, and by August 4 the Grand Fleet had already proceeded to its allotted stations.

We know it was the German plan to intercept our Fleet on its passage to Rosyth and the other bases along the East Coast of England and Scotland by sending out minelayers to strew their course with their deadly machines, but through the resolute action of Prince Louis the Fleet had already reached its destinations by the time that the line of mines extending from the mouth of the Thames to the Dutch coast was laid.

The first shot to be fired at sea was in the destruction of one of these minelayers. On August 5 the *Amphion* and the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla were patrolling the southern area of the North Sea when they surprised the converted Hamburg-Amerika liner *Königin Luise* engaged in its nefarious task. After a chase lasting for about an hour she was brought to and sunk by the destroyers *Lance*, *Lark* and *Linnet*; the survivors were then picked up and transferred to the leader *Amphion*. The search then continued for other enemy ships, but at 6 a.m. next morning, when they were returning, *Amphion* had the misfortune to strike a mine on the very spot on which the minelayer had been sunk. A fire broke out aboard, and she was so seriously damaged that it soon became evident that she would have to be abandoned. In twenty minutes from the time when she struck the mine all the wounded and the survivors had been transhipped to the destroyers, and three minutes later another explosion occurred forward, which blew the magazine up, and the ship sank. The falling debris caused a few more casualties amongst the rescue boats, and it was found that

149 of the crew had been killed and 32 wounded, together with 20 German prisoners who had been confined in the forepart of the cruiser and who were all killed by the first explosion. Captain Fox, 16 officers and 135 men were saved. This was the only loss which the Germans, hoping to cripple our Fleet, caused us.

Failing to secure any success with their minelayers, the Germans settled down to a policy of attrition with their submarines, mines, etc., in the hope of wearing down our strength by incessant attacks on our patrolling squadrons. In this they have also failed, though they have accounted for several of our warships from time to time. The first attack, which ended in disaster to themselves, was made by several submarines on August 9, when the First Light Cruiser Squadron was attacked. They were beaten off, and one of them, U 15, was sunk by fire from *Birmingham*.

During these days all the more modern warships were stationed "somewhere in the North Sea," but our outlying cruisers were very actively engaged in capturing the enemy's commerce; captured German and Austrian liners and tramps were pouring into our ports, and many were seized in the ports where they were lying. Large numbers of others sought refuge in neutral harbours, where they remained for over two years before these countries in turn declared war against the world's aggressor; and only a few managed to put to sea as armed commerce raiders. No fewer than twenty-four British cruisers, besides several French ships, were guarding the trade routes from, and hunting down, these raiders in the Atlantic Ocean. Within a fortnight our trade had resumed almost its normal flow.

Meanwhile, three hours after the declaration of war several of our D and E submarines had already taken up positions in the Bight of Heligoland, waiting for the enemy warships to emerge and at the same time taking very valuable observations and surroundings. It was well known that Germany would attempt either to come out in force immediately, trusting to our Fleet being dispersed, and try conclusions before our superiority would assert itself; or to emulate

the famous torpedo attack by the Japanese on Port Arthur immediately on the outbreak of hostilities. Both of these projects were frustrated by the action of the First Sea Lord, and until the Jutland Battle in 1916, the German High Seas Fleet had never ventured far from its bases. Failing to take our Fleet by surprise when the odds would probably have been even, the German Admiralty were forced to try to reduce our superiority by attrition both with submarines and mines. In this she has again failed; and though it is true that we have lost several warships in the North Sea, yet these losses have been made good and the Navy has now expanded beyond recognition, the latest official number of ships being computed at about 5000 vessels, this estimate including the numerous patrolling craft, tugs, minesweepers, etc.

Every effort was made to induce the foe to come out and give battle, but he persistently and wisely refused; for once the favourable opportunity had passed, he had nothing to gain by losing his valuable warships when he would not be able to cause us any proportionate loss. It was his wisest policy to keep his fleet intact, a "fleet in being" constituting a perpetual menace, at the same time retaining his superiority over the Russians in the Baltic. The German Fleet, curiously enough, occupies the same position towards the Russians as we do towards the Germans; but being the central force, they have the distinct advantage of being able to shift their strength from one foe to the other. In this policy they are admirably served by the Kiel Canal, which enables them to concentrate their squadrons with the utmost secrecy. With their North Sea coast very strongly defended with minefields and fortifications on Heligoland and on the mainland, they can pass their entire Fleet into the Baltic without seriously jeopardising their rear; and it speaks volumes for the skill of the small Russian Fleet to have suffered so little whilst making the enemy pay dearly for any enterprise. The German losses in the Baltic have not all been caused by mines and submarines, and the Russian Fleet, in comparison to the German Fleet, does not remain behind its



defences; it has stood up to an immensely stronger force and thoroughly beaten it, and the Germans, once bitten, kept religiously in their harbours, sending out only a few torpedo craft.

During August the North Sea was full of patrolling cruisers and submarines, but beyond a bit of desultory fighting on the 17th, no collision occurred until the last days of this month. On August 18 it was announced that the whole of the British Expeditionary Force had been landed in France without the loss of a single life or a single pound of stores, and this was undertaken within a few hours' steaming of the German ports. So well were our forces disposed that not a single German ship emerged from its shelter to dispute their transport. Had they done so, our Eighth Submarine Flotilla, accompanied by the destroyers *Firedrake* and *Lurcher*, were ready stationed in the Bight of Heligoland, and doubtless our larger ships were also in readiness.

#### THE BIGHT OF HELIGOLAND ACTION

On the morning of August 28 a considerable force of British cruisers and destroyers carried out a reconnaissance in force—to use the official term, “a scooping movement”—with the object of inducing the German cruisers, guarding the entrance of the Heligoland Bight, to come out and engage our destroyers which had steamed into the Bight. Lest there should be any danger of our destroyers, led by *Fearless* and the new *Arethusa*, being too heavily engaged, the first Battle-cruiser Squadron and a few cruisers were at hand under Vice-Admiral Beatty. The Eighth Submarine Flotilla with the two destroyers under Commodore Keyes had already taken up their stations, and Rear-Admiral Christian with *Euryalus* and the Eighth Cruiser Squadron, together with *Amethyst*, were stationed to the west to intercept any enemy cruisers breaking out. Thus were these elaborate preparations made.

The action opened at 7 a.m., when *Arethusa* and *Fearless* with the First and Third Destroyer Flotillas under Commodore Tyrwhitt sighted an enemy destroyer off Heligoland, and half an hour later several more destroyers and light cruisers. A

sharp action ensued, and *Arethusa* became heavily engaged by several destroyers and a large four-funnelled cruiser, either *Roon* or *Yorck*. This ship then turned her fire on *Fearless* at 8 a.m., but *Arethusa* continued her fight and engaged and severely damaged a two-funnelled cruiser, which was seen to turn away to Heligoland. During this fight *Arethusa* was also badly hit and at one time only one 6" piece remained in action, all the others and her torpedo tubes being temporarily disabled; her speed was also reduced to 10 knots, and these two ships then retired. They had, however, heavily punished the enemy destroyers, and one, V 187, was seen to be sinking. This craft was the German commodore's ship, and boats from *Defender* and *Goshawk* were at once lowered to rescue the drowning sailors. There then occurred the first act of treachery with which the enemy has fouled his name, for immediately a cruiser of the "Stettin" class opened fire upon the boats; fortunately our submarine E 4 perceived what was happening with her periscope, and rose to the surface to attack the cruiser. Having driven her off, she returned and picked up the crew of the *Defender's* boat which had been left behind, and also a German officer and two men, leaving eighteen German wounded in the boat in charge of another officer and six men, who were allowed to make for Heligoland. E 4 then dived under and brought her visitors home.

Meanwhile, the *Arethusa's* guns were repaired and everything made ready for any emergency, though her speed still remained reduced. At 10 a.m. news was received that *Firedrake* and *Lurcher*, the submarine escort, were being chased by light cruisers; *Arethusa* and *Fearless* went to their assistance, and arriving off Heligoland, they sighted the four-funnelled cruiser again. Fire was immediately opened upon them, and although greatly outranged, *Fearless* and the First Flotilla attacked her and pursued her into the mist. Ten minutes later she reappeared, and she was then attacked with torpedoes, and a message was sent to Beatty for assistance. Beatty had already been attacked by submarines but had evaded them, and he came up at full speed in order to take the enemy by surprise before he could retreat. In

the meantime *Arethusa*, *Fearless* and the First Flotilla were again being heavily attacked, but by splendid fire from the two cruisers the large enemy ship was driven off. The light cruiser *Mainz* was then sighted and engaged, and after twenty-five minutes she was seen to be sinking forward. She had fire aboard and had received serious damage to her bows, and she was finished off by the First Light Cruiser Squadron. *Firedrake* very skilfully ran alongside and took off 220 of her crew.

On the arrival of the battle-cruisers they found *Fearless* and the First Flotilla retiring, and *Arethusa* and the Third Flotilla engaging the light cruiser *Köln*; immediately a chase at 27 knots began, in which *Lion* came across the *Ariadne* and fired two salvos at her, when she disappeared into the mist, burning furiously and sinking. This very fine piece of gunnery was carried out at a speed of 28 knots at a ship also steaming at a very high speed and travelling at right angles to her. Owing to the danger from floating mines no pursuit was ordered, and the battle-cruisers circled round to complete the destruction of the *Köln*. She was sighted at 1.25 p.m. steaming to the south-east, and *Lion* again opened fire, this time with only two turrets. Ten minutes later *Köln* also sank, and although destroyers searched the waters around no survivors were found. In addition another German destroyer was reported sunk.

As the British ships had thus destroyed all the enemy ships outside the Bight, and were not a match for any battle squadron which the enemy would send out, Beatty decided to retire. Though closely attacked by submarines, no hits were made, but *Queen Mary*, sighting a torpedo coming straight for her, avoided the impact by a sharp turn of the helm; and the torpedo raced harmlessly alongside the huge ship. By 6 p.m. all the cruisers and destroyers had returned, and the whole force retired covered by the battle-cruisers. It was then seen that *Arethusa* could barely steam at 6 knots and further progress was impossible; the destroyers *Laurel* and *Liberty* had also been badly hit during the spirited attacks on the enemy cruisers, and *Amethyst* was



ordered to take the former ship in tow. At 9.30 p.m. *Hogue* also took *Arethusa* in tow, the feat being very skilfully accomplished in pitch darkness excepting for two hand lanterns, and the plucky little ship arrived at the Nore at 5 p.m. next day and slowly proceeded up to Chatham.

In the meantime the wounded were all transhipped to *Bacchante* and *Cressy*, whilst *Liverpool* was detached to Rosyth with 86 prisoners from *Mainz*. Thus ended a very admirable cutting-out expedition, and that a larger bag was not taken was entirely due to the prudence of the enemy, whose ships did not venture out very far; those that did were sunk—the *Köln*, *Mainz*, *Ariadne*, and the destroyer V 187 and another—whilst seven others arrived at Kiel badly damaged. The enemy loss in personnel was about 870, as the greater part of the *Ariadne's* crew was rescued by their own destroyers. We lost 3 officers and 29 men killed and 2 officers and 54 wounded from *Arethusa*, *Fearless*, *Laertes*, *Laurel*, *Liberty*, *Druid*, and *Phoenix*; and of these ships the two cruisers and *Laurel* and *Liberty* were also damaged.

After this brilliant little episode, the Germans indiscriminately-scattered floating mines in the North Sea, mostly by innocent-looking trawlers, and several mishaps resulted both to warships and to merchant ships. Amongst the first victims were several commissioned trawlers, taken over by the Admiralty for patrolling and minesweeping purposes, and on this same day, August 28, H.M. trawlers *Craithie* and *D. Irvine* both struck mines and sank with the loss of five killed and nine wounded. Again on September 2 *Eyrie* was lost with seven of her crew, and on the next day the drifter *Lindsell* blew up off the East Coast and one officer and four men were killed. A few minutes later the old gunboat *Speedy* was similarly lost with one of the crew, whilst an officer and two of the crew were seriously injured. More serious was the torpedoing of the *Pathfinder* on the afternoon of September 5; this light cruiser foundered so quickly that she took down with her 259 of her crew. Her assailant was stated to have been sunk later, but this was not confirmed.

Not content with making war on our commerce, the enemy sank fifteen trawlers and captured their crews, whilst many more fell victims to their drifting mines.

The Admiralty had announced on August 12 that "a number of fast merchant vessels, fitted out in British arsenals, are being commissioned by the Admiralty for the purpose of patrolling the trade routes, and keeping them clear of German commerce raiders," and in the September Navy List there appeared the names of twenty-six converted liners as auxiliary cruisers. Simultaneously with its publication occurred the stranding of the ex-White Star liner *Oceanic* off the West Coast of Scotland on September 9, though fortunately without loss of life. This was the first of several disasters, but, as will be seen later, these auxiliary cruisers have proved their worth, and have appeared in all quarters of the globe.

In a second attempt to entice the enemy out, on the 9th and 10th, Beatty and his squadrons and flotillas again made a sweep right into the Bight, but not a single German warship was seen. More fortunate than the larger ships was Commander Horton in E 9 on the morning of September 13, when he espied the old light cruiser *Hela* six miles off Heligoland; this he successfully torpedoed, and although hunted for hours, this daring officer calmly proceeded on his mission, that of examining the outer anchorages of the island, on the next day. E 9 was one of the submarines which were in these waters within three hours after the declaration of war. The work of our submarines, which were continually in these waters, has been carried out with the utmost skill and daring. The waters are thickly sown with minefields, and in anything but calm weather the crews get no peace, as the short, steep seas which race past the island cause the submarine great trouble; one minute they are lifted up high, then the next down they come with a thud on to the bottom. Gales were experienced during mid-September, but despite these difficulties all the work allotted to them was carefully carried out. E 6 on the 25th narrowly escaped destruction from a mine which had become entangled, but

after half an hour's strenuous work by two of her crew the mine was released.

It was on September 22 that we suffered our first really heavy loss, when three cruisers were torpedoed and sunk one after the other with heavy loss of life; and though the triple loss could have been avoided, it must be remembered that the submarine menace was then in its infancy. The two later losses occurred as the cruisers were standing by to pick up the survivors from their stricken sister ship. The Admiralty after this disaster issued an order to the effect that "No act of humanity, whether to friend or foe, should lead to a neglect of the proper precautions and dispositions of war, and no measures can be taken to save life which prejudice the military situation. Small craft should be directed by wireless to close the damaged ship with all speed." How strictly Captain Loxley of the *Formidable*, three months later, adhered to this order will be related in due course. The mistake of employing old and slow cruisers for patrolling submarine-infested seas was not recognised for several months, but fortunately we had no repetition of a similar catastrophe. Of course most of our new light cruisers were scouring the seas for the raiders, and these older ships were the only craft available.

The three old armoured cruisers *Aboukir*, *Cressy* and *Hogue* were patrolling off the Dutch coast in the early hours of September 22. At about 6 a.m. the *Aboukir* was struck by a torpedo from a lurking submarine, and immediately the two other cruisers closed in to assist. Scarcely had the boats from *Hogue* got clear when she herself was struck by two torpedoes, and she at once began to heel over until five minutes later she was floating bottom up. *Aboukir*, on the other hand, remained afloat for half an hour. Meanwhile *Cressy* had also lowered boats, but barely five minutes had elapsed before a torpedo also struck her amidships on the starboard side, and she immediately took a list; this was at 7.15 a.m. A second torpedo missed, but a quarter of an hour later a third hit her, and she began to heel rapidly until just before eight o'clock she sank. A Dutch trawler



near by refused any aid, but two Dutch steamers rescued about 120 men from *Hogue*, and most of these were brought to Harwich by the destroyer *Lucifer*; and 156 officers and men were picked up by a Lowestoft trawler, mostly from *Cressy*. Several other survivors were landed at Harwich and Lowestoft by the light cruiser *Lowestoft*, and about 280, who were later sent back to England, were taken to Holland. Unfortunately the loss of life was heavy: from the *Aboukir* 25 officers and 502 men were lost; from *Cressy* 25 officers and 535 men; and from the *Hogue* 12 officers and 36 men—in all a death-roll of 1135 men. Many brave deeds of heroism are recorded, and all the crews displayed splendid discipline and courage, acts of self-sacrifice being especially numerous. Germany claimed that U 9 sank all three cruisers, but six torpedoes at least were discharged, and it is unlikely that such an old craft would carry more than four torpedoes aboard.

Owing to the continued minesowing by the enemy and the consequent losses to shipping, it was announced on October 2 that the Admiralty were reluctantly compelled, as a counter-measure, also to sow a minefield to the south of the German mines. This step was very necessary to the safety of our coast, for the German minefield, whilst forming an obstacle for our ships, did not render the North Sea uninhabitable for the foe, who of course knew the safe channels. Three days later the two patrol trawlers *Princess Beatrice* and *Drumoak* were both mined and sunk, with the loss of eleven and ten of their crews respectively.

On the next day E 9 secured her second victim whilst patrolling off the Ems River; this time it was the destroyer S 126, whose crew were nearly all rescued by another destroyer; but on the 15th we suffered another loss to our patrolling cruisers. The two old cruisers *Hawke* and *Theseus* were patrolling the north coast of Scotland when they were attacked by U 9; the latter ship managed to evade her attacker, but *Hawke* was less fortunate and, being struck by a torpedo, she sank with 26 officers and 499 men. These losses are greatly to be deplored, as the many lives lost

are irreplaceable, although the ships themselves were semi-obsolete.

This month of fluctuations witnessed many events, and the balance was somewhat restored on the 17th when the new light cruiser *Undaunted*, now in command of Captain Fox, with the destroyers *Lance*, *Legion*, *Lennox* and *Loyal*, encountered the four German destroyers S 115, S 117, S 118 and S 119 off the Dutch coast. After a running fight all the enemy ships were sunk and sixty-one prisoners taken, and the British loss was but three wounded on *Legion* and *Loyal*. Next day, however, our submarine E 3 was sunk by a German cruiser off the German coast, and presumably all on board, numbering three officers and twenty-five men, were lost.

In the meantime the first bombardment of the Belgian coast had commenced. Owing to requests from the Allied commanders for assistance in stemming the advance of the Germans along the coast on Calais, a miscellaneous flotilla consisting of the three ex-Brazilian monitors, cruisers, gunboats, sloops and destroyers, under the command of the late Rear-Admiral Hood, left our ports to deliver a very systematic shelling of the German positions and trenches around Nieuport, and thus rendered very valuable support to the left flank of the Belgian Army. These operations are described later, and it will suffice to say that the work was most successfully carried out, and it completely prevented the enemy from reaching his long-cherished object. In connection with these operations, on October 24 *Badger* rammed a submarine off the Dutch coast, and as her bows sustained some damage, the German claim of her safe return was improbable.

On the last day of this month the old cruiser *Hermes*, used as a seaplane-carrying ship, was torpedoed in the Straits of Dover with the loss of twenty-two killed and seven wounded.

Two days previously a somewhat important change in the Administration at the Admiralty had occurred. It is not desirable to enter into this incident, as the more that is

said the more we must deplore the gross ingratitude of a certain section of the public. Since the outbreak of war there had been many scandalous and treacherous statements made, hardly ever openly, about the position of our First Sea Lord, who was born in Austria. So distinguished an officer in the service of this country needs no word in repudiation of these lying reports, but having seen "all was well" with the Fleet in which he had lived, he put an end to the scandal by relinquishing his appointment "on the grounds that my birth and parentage have the effect of impairing my usefulness on the Board of Admiralty in some respects." This he did on October 28, but greatly to the sorrow of Sir John Jellicoe and the whole Fleet, and perhaps more than any one, of His Majesty. No doubt this campaign was engineered by enemy agents in this country who were eager to get rid of such a distinguished Admiral, but nothing palliates the conduct of those whose protection he had secured, who had any hand whatsoever in the spreading of the infamous reports.

His successor was Admiral of the Fleet Lord John Fisher, but unfortunately the temperaments of the First Sea Lord and that of Mr. Winston Churchill were not conducive to harmony, and both vacated their offices in the last days of May 1915, when on the 26th Mr. Balfour succeeded Mr. Churchill as First Lord, and on the 28th Lord Fisher was replaced by Admiral Sir John Jackson as First Sea Lord. Lord Fisher was appointed chairman of the Inventions Board on July 4. This Administration remained in office until the appointment of Admiral Jellicoe at Whitehall in January 1917.

In the North Sea up to the beginning of November no German warship other than torpedo craft had emerged from its shelters, but during the winter months the enemy began a series of raids on the East Coast towns. The object of these excursions is not easy to understand, as the places chosen for their depredations were chiefly pleasure resorts. Even if the indiscriminate slaughter of civilians was their



aim, which is hardly likely, their valuable battle-cruisers were thus laid open to attack. Making these swift dashes across the North Sea on a dark, misty night, unperceived by our patrols, was then quite an easy task, and the enemy made three such attacks before he suffered disaster and discontinued this practice.

The first raid was made on the night of November 3-4, when a squadron of enemy cruisers, comprising *Von der Tann*, *Seydlitz*, *Moltke*, *Blücher*, *Yorck*, the light cruisers *Graudenz*, *Kolberg*, and *Strassburg*, appeared off the Norfolk coast. A few shells were fired at Yarmouth, but all fell short, and the only casualty was one wounded on the patrolling gunboat *Halcyon*, which sent out a wireless message reporting the whereabouts of the enemy. They, however, made off, and although pursued until dusk by our light cruisers, they could not be brought to action. During the pursuit our submarine D 5 struck a floating mine, which had been thrown out by the rearmost enemy cruiser, and only two officers and two men who were on the bridge were saved. The enemy nevertheless suffered more heavily, for the *Yorck* struck a chain of mines in Jahde Bay on their return, and she took down with her 251 of her crew.

Before the second of these raids occurred, several minor incidents in connection with the patrols were reported. On the 5th H.M. trawler *Mary* sank after striking mines, and one officer and seven men were killed. Six days later the old gunboat *Niger* was torpedoed and sunk in the Downs, and fifteen of her crew were killed or died from injuries. Again, on the 15th a German submarine was rammed by a French torpedo boat off Westende before it had time to discharge a torpedo at the French ship, and from the quantities of oil which rose to the surface its loss was presumed. On the 18th the auxiliary cruiser *Berlin* put in at Trondhjem for repairs to her engines, which had been damaged by high steaming. Although this cruiser was known to have been fitted out as a minelayer, she had none of these machines aboard, and there was little doubt that she had been engaged in indiscriminate minesowing. As she failed to clear in

twenty-four hours she was interned. Another submarine, U 18, was rammed by a British patrol off the northern coast of Scotland at about 12.30 p.m. on November 23; almost an hour later she rose to the surface flying the white flag and with all but one of her crew lined up on deck. The destroyer *Garry* then came alongside to take them off, and the submarine conveniently foundered just as the last man was rescued. The one man lost stayed behind to blow up the crippled submarine, and bravely perished with her. The outer hull had evidently been pierced by the patrol's bow, and the water between the inner and outer hulls deprived her of her buoyancy, and so rendered her safe return impossible.

Three days later a very deplorable loss occurred, the more so as the disaster was an accident pure and simple, and it was not due to any act of the enemy. Shortly before 8 a.m. on November 26 there was a terrific explosion on *Bulwark*, and when the clouds of smoke and steam had drifted away it was seen that she had entirely disappeared beneath the waves, and of all her crew of about 780 only fourteen men were picked out of the water. The ship had been practically blown in two, and the Court of Inquiry attributed the cause of the disaster to an internal explosion from the ignition of the gases given off from the ammunition.

Unfortunately a sister ship was shortly afterwards lost, also of the same squadron. In the early hours of New Year's Day the *Formidable* was off the Start Point. The night was very wild and dark, and just after midnight the ship was struck by two torpedoes. She listed immediately, but Captain Loxley and his officers displayed the utmost coolness in getting out the boats; he moreover signalled to the other ships not to stand by as he suspected the presence of lurking submarines. Only four boats were launched and one of these was immediately swamped; of the others one with seventy-one men aboard was picked up by a light cruiser, another arrived at Lyme Regis carrying fifty sailors of whom twelve died from exposure during their terrible night, whilst the pinnace was very skilfully picked up by

the Brixham trawler *Providence* and the seventy men were transhipped and carefully fed and clothed with all the available stores aboard. Captain Loxley went down with his ship, standing on the bridge with a cigarette in his mouth, and 550 officers and men thus perished. By his calm bravery a repetition of the *Cressy* catastrophe was avoided.

In the meantime there had occurred the second of the raids on our coasts, and the heavy loss of life which resulted is one of the most wanton of Germany's many acts of barbarity which have astounded the world. It is true that there were a few troops stationed at Scarborough, but this affords no excuse for the cowardly wholesale murder of the civilian population. In this raid misty weather again aided the enemy in making his dash across the North Sea by night, and also his return. The exact composition of the German squadron is unknown, but that it consisted of battle-cruisers is without a doubt, whilst a cruiser or two also accompanied them. Arriving off Scarborough, Whitby, and the Hartle-pools, the squadron commenced a deliberate shelling of the sea fronts, demolishing whole rows of houses and killing all their unfortunate inhabitants, who were at breakfast. They were immediately attacked by patrolling destroyers, who sent a message to Beatty with his battle-cruisers; but when the enemy learnt that reinforcements were arriving, an hour later he made off closely pursued by destroyers. Such good use was made of their small guns that over 200 Germans were killed and wounded on the enemy ships. Aided by the mist they succeeded in eluding Beatty, who had now come up and was actually within range, though obscured by the fog, and steaming at full speed, regained their ports. The light cruiser *Patrol* lost four killed and four wounded, and the destroyers *Doon* and *Hardy* lost four killed and twenty-six wounded. The civilian casualties were unfortunately very heavy, amounting to 130 killed and over 300 injured, many of whom later succumbed to their injuries. The Germans again strewed mines in their wake, and several steamers and trawlers fell victims to them. The only bright spot on the whole cruel, purposeless affair was the extraordinary



message from a destroyer which was received at the Admiralty: "Am engaging three Dreadnoughts." To which was sent the reply: "Use your torpedoes."

Our minesweepers were engaged in their task until December 31, in constant bad weather which greatly added to their peril, and they could only locate the minefield from the losses sustained. The raid had taken place on December 16, and on the 19th the minesweeper *Orianda* was blown up, whilst ten minutes later *Passing* and *Star of Britain* were also seriously damaged. Even on January 6 the sweeper *Banyers* was also struck by one of these machines.

Not only in the North Sea were mines laid, but even off the Irish coast. Fortunately we escaped serious loss in this area.


Christmas Day was celebrated by a seaplane raid on the German warships lying off Cuxhaven. Seven seaplanes, carried by *Empress*, *Engadine* and *Riviera*, and escorted by light cruisers and destroyers, left for their flight on Christmas Eve. The ships stopped off Heligoland, and the seaplanes rose at about 7.30 a.m. for their destination. During their absence the escorting ships were attacked by two Zeppelins and several seaplanes and submarines, and there ensued the most novel action recorded, that of cruisers beating off aircraft and submarines. The Zeppelins were put to flight by the anti-aircraft guns on *Arethusa* and *Undaunted*, and the submarines were also evaded; the seaplanes, on the other hand, attacked the ships very closely, but unsuccessfully. For three hours this fight continued, when three of our airmen returned and were picked up; three others were later picked up by our waiting submarines after their machines had been destroyed, and the seventh was rescued by a Dutch trawler.

It was either in this raid or on the return of the Germans from Scarborough that the *Von der Tann*, according to various reports, was either sunk or seriously disabled in collision with the light cruiser *Frauenlob*, or was sunk or seriously damaged whilst shifting her position to escape our seaplanes. As this fine ship did not figure in the later exploits, it is quite

probable that she suffered serious damage or complete disablement.

The third and the most disastrous to the enemy of these senseless raids on our coastal towns was attempted on the morning of Sunday, January 24, a fine day with a north-east wind and clear visibility. The German squadron consisted of *Moltke* (flag), *Seydlitz*, *Derfflinger*, and *Blücher*, six light cruisers and two destroyer flotillas. Under cover of darkness they again succeeded in making their dash across the North Sea, but in the vicinity of their course was a strong British patrolling squadron under Beatty, comprising *Lion* (flag), *Tiger*, *Princess Royal*, *New Zealand* and *Indomitable*, the light cruisers *Lowestoft*, *Nottingham* and *Southampton*, which were disposed on his port beam, and the *Arethusa*, *Aurora* and *Undaunted*, with their three destroyer flotillas ahead. At 7.25 a.m. the flotilla led by *Aurora* sighted the enemy steaming in a N.W. direction for the English coast; shots were exchanged and immediately the Germans turned about, closely followed by the light cruisers, who gave Beatty valuable information. Beatty himself was then fourteen miles to the W.N.W., and a stern chase ensued. By the splendid efforts of the engineering departments, full speed was worked up, and a course was set to the southward to endeavour to cut right across the rapidly retreating enemy's line, and later a S.E. course was set, our ships running nearly parallel to the fleeing enemy. Still gradually overhauling the foe, the battle-cruisers worked up to a speed of 28.5 knots—three and a half knots in excess of the nominal speed of the two older ships—until, exactly an hour after the enemy had been sighted, fire was opened by *Lion* at a range of 20,000 yards. Our line was disposed: 1. *Lion* (flag), 2. *Tiger*, 3. *Princess Royal*, 4. *New Zealand*, and 5. *Indomitable*; whilst Von Hipper flew his flag on *Moltke*, followed by *Seydlitz*, *Derfflinger* and *Blücher*, with their light cruisers ahead and their destroyers on the starboard beam.

Until 9 a.m. *Lion* continued to fire single shots at *Blücher*, but ten minutes later *Tiger* opened fire on *Seydlitz*, and *Lion* shifted her fire on to *Derfflinger* at a range of 18,000 yards







and obtained several hits. As these two ships were well ahead of the others, they came under fire from Von Hipper and sustained some casualties and slight damage. At this time *Princess Royal* was engaging *Blücher*, but at 9.25 a.m. she transferred her fire to *Derfflinger*, who thus came under fire from two of our ships; the slower *Blücher* now became engaged by *New Zealand* and commenced to fall astern, owing to the terrible fire experienced from our four battle-cruisers, who had in turn all opened fire upon her with considerable effect.

Shortly after 9.35 a.m. the two flagships exchanged shots, and flames speedily broke out aboard the German ship, whilst *Derfflinger* was also afire. *Seydlitz* was engaged by *Tiger* until a smoke screen from their destroyers intervened, when she attacked *Blücher* again. It was this screen of smoke which enabled the enemy to change their course to almost due east; and the range thus increasing, our ships were ordered to raise their utmost speed and change their course to N.N.E. An attempt by the enemy destroyers to interfere was frustrated by a few shots from *Lion* and *Tiger*, and our light cruisers were so disposed as to intercept any enemy ship falling out of the line.

At 10.48 a.m. submarines were sighted but no successful attacks were made. *Blücher*, on fire and listing heavily, quitted their line and made for a northerly direction, whereupon *Indomitable* was detached to complete her destruction, and two torpedoes from *Arethusa* finally sank her. The survivors, numbering only 283, were brought to Rosyth by a destroyer. It was at about 11 a.m. that a lucky shot from the retreating foe struck the feed tanks on *Lion*, which rendered her port engine useless, so falling out of the line, she shaped for the N.W. Beatty called the destroyer *Attack* to him and boarded her at 11.35 a.m. This unfortunate damage left our squadron without leadership, and at 12.30 p.m. the new flagship met the returning battle-cruisers, when he boarded *Princess Royal*. Whether the results would have been greater it is impossible to say, as the enemy had reached his minesown area when the pursuit

was broken off; but the damage to the *Lion* was undoubtedly a great misfortune.

At about 3.30 p.m. *Lion* was taken in tow by *Indomitable*, owing to trouble with her starboard engine, and she arrived safely at Rosyth. She had lost four killed and about fifteen wounded. *Tiger* was but slightly damaged, and lost ten killed and eleven wounded, but returned home under her own steam. The new destroyer *Meteor*, who lost one killed and one wounded, was also somewhat damaged and was towed home by *Liberty*.

In addition to the loss of the *Blücher*, the light cruiser *Kolberg* was engaged by *Aurora*, and was observed later by *Arethusa* to be badly battered and sinking. The Germans admit that a small cruiser had been hit but had returned, and she doubtless received severe punishment. The claim that their destroyer V 5 sank *Tiger* was without any foundation, and the enemy have cause to remember a second drubbing they received at her hands off Jutland a year later.

The salient features of this action were the unprecedented speed at which it was fought, full speed being stated as 28·5 knots, but what the "utmost speed" was is unstated, and the favourable disposition of the German armament. Both sides possessed the fastest ships afloat, and their capabilities were well tested in this direction; with regard to the guns, a comparison of the strengths of the squadrons does not adequately give a true return—

BRITISH.			GERMAN		
<i>Tiger.</i>	Eight	13·5" guns.	<i>Derfflinger.</i>	Eight	12" guns.
<i>Lion.</i>	"	" "	<i>Seydlitz.</i>	Ten	11" "
<i>Princess Royal.</i>	"	" "	<i>Moltke.</i>	"	" "
<i>New Zealand.</i>	"	12" "	<i>Blücher.</i>	Twelve	8·2" "
<i>Indomitable.</i>	"	" "			

(N.B.—The smaller guns so conspicuous on all German warships would not probably be used at all, except during a threatened torpedo attack.)

It has been shown that our armaments are designed with the object of bringing the greatest number of weapons to bear on a broadside, whereas on the German ships all



their guns can be fired astern with the exception of their forward turret. With this arrangement, at the commencement of the chase our cruisers could at the most only use four heavy guns each, whilst *Moltke* and *Seydlitz* could bring no fewer than eight guns each to bear on their pursuers, and *Derfflinger*, like the British, could use four. *Blücher*, who ought never to have accompanied the squadron owing to inferior speed, had six 9·2" guns which could have been trained astern. Thus the Germans were not so out-gunned as it would appear on the surface, but their guns were of a smaller calibre, as they favour more rapid firing to our heavier, if slower, shooting.

Considering that practically all the hits registered were British, we have reason to be proud of our gunners, for it must be remembered that the ranges were continually changing owing to the very high speed at which all the ships were travelling. The extreme range at which the action opened is somewhat similar to the 18,000 yards at which the "Invincibles" opened fire at the Falklands battle a month previously.

With the exception of a small raid on Lowestoft in the spring of 1916, no further raids have been successful; and with the failure of this raid the Germans definitely gave up the attempt to wrest from us the command of the seas until the tremendous Battle off Jutland. Here again they suffered defeat, and subsequently contented themselves with the submarine campaign, occasionally relieved by torpedo boat sorties.

The action off the Dogger Bank, fought on January 24, terminated the first phase of naval warfare. The enemy was bottled up in his own ports, and beyond three raiders still at large no German warship was flying the German Standard on the High Seas. The "bottling up" was not at all the object of our aims—indeed it has been seen that every inducement was offered to the enemy to come out and give battle. A fleet "bottled up" in its own harbours still remains a menace, whereas a fleet that comes out either

emerges the victor or leaves the seas a vanquished force. In the present case the Second Naval Power remained practically intact (save for a few valuable light cruisers), whilst the First Naval Power, about 60 per cent. stronger, patrols and regulates all traffic just outside its waters. The stronger fleet must be in a position to deal with any sudden action of the enemy if it intends to retain its supremacy; but as all such operations would, of course, be undertaken by the enemy in the most favourable conditions, it is easy to see that although the enemy may be apparently quiescent, no relaxation is possible until a decisive battle is fought. The enemy, therefore, can pursue the policy of remaining behind his minefields and fortifications, providing a perpetual menace to his superior foe; or, on the other hand, come out to give battle, from which even if he should emerge victorious he would have inevitably lost several all too valuable ships, and thus would not be in a position to carry out the multitudinous duties of the superior fleet. Taking the very unlikely proposition of the two contending fleets engaging with their entire strengths, the enemy would lose so many of his fewer ships that the menace would be practically disposed of; he would of course account for several of our ships, but this would not affect the relative standing to any degree.

That the enemy may attempt such an undertaking towards the final collapse of the Central Empires is not at all improbable, for the position would be that of "nothing to lose and all to gain" by such a course. Knowing that their ships would either have to be scuttled or captured by us, it is unlikely that, exasperated by the taunts of their brothers in the Army and by the populace, they will quietly remain in harbour until the inevitable day; rather will they come out and endeavour to cause as much damage to our Navy as is in their power, even though disaster be their end, or at least sally out, like the Russian Port Arthur Fleet, and make for neutral harbours, where they will be interned. If they slip out into the Baltic and enter Swedish ports, then it will be almost impossible to intercept them; but should

they emerge into the North Sea, one may have every hope that our sailors will be on the "right spot at the right time."

## APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I

### THE BELGIAN COAST BOMBARDMENTS, 1914-17

APART from the general warfare in the North Sea, reference has been made to a completely separate series of operations which were undertaken by our Navy. It will be remembered that during September and October, after the failure of the German arms on the Marne, desperate efforts were made by their troops to force an advance along the coast and secure Calais for a base for their torpedo craft and for their projected invasion of England. In consequence the Allied Army Commanders made requests to the Admiralty for assistance in support of the flank of the hard-pressed little Belgian Army to prevent this objective from materialising. Valuable ships could not be spared in these early days, but on October 17 a fleet of heterogeneous warships, under the command of the late Rear-Admiral Hood, left these shores to partake in a bombardment of the enemy's troops and positions along the Belgian coast.

The operations were commenced on the next morning, by the three monitors *Humber*, *Severn* and *Mersey*, and the scouts *Attentive* and *Foresight*, with several destroyers. The batteries at Westende and Middlekirke were engaged, and machine-guns were landed from *Severn* to assist in the defence of Nieuport, one officer being killed whilst leading the men. During the first few days shrapnel caused many casualties on the ships, but no ships were lost, although *Amazon* was badly holed. On the 23rd great assistance was given to the Belgian Army near Nieuport, and the batteries at Ostend were also engaged. Submarines were seen, but they were unsuccessful in their attacks; and it will be remembered that on the next day *Badger* rammed one of these craft, and it is possible that it was one of the submarines which had



ineffectually attacked the destroyer *Myrmidon* and the sloop *Wildfire*.

Of course the enemy at once took counter-measures, and by the 28th they had brought up heavy guns which replied very vigorously to our ships. Larger warships were then sent for, including the battleship *Venerable* and the cruisers *Brilliant* and *Sirius*, to engage the bigger pieces. This day the enemy's fire was particularly accurate, and several casualties occurred. The destroyer *Falcon*, whilst guarding the *Venerable* from submarine attack, lost her commander and nine men killed with fourteen others wounded; on *Brilliant* and the sloops *Rinaldo* and *Vestal* there were two killed and twenty wounded, whilst the forward turret on *Mersey* was put out of action and two of her crew were hit. Although no losses in ships were sustained, the sloops *Vestal* and *Wildfire* were somewhat damaged.

On November 9 the first bombardment ceased, as the country around Nieuport was inundated, and the warfare had been reduced exclusively to trench work. Indeed hardly any troops were to be seen, and the rush for Calais had thus been prevented with great success and at very little cost. Admiral Hood's force comprised the battleship *Venerable*, the cruisers *Attentive*, *Foresight*, *Brilliant* and *Sirius*, the three monitors *Humber*, *Mersey*, *Severn*, the gunboats *Hazard*, *Bustard*, *Excellent*, the sloops, *Rinaldo*, *Vestal*, *Wildfire*, the submarines C 32 and C 34, and the destroyers *Amazon*, *Cossack*, *Crusader*, *Maori*, *Mohawk*, *Nubian*, *Viking*, *Crane*, *Falcon*, *Flirt*, *Mermaid*, *Myrmidon*, *Racehorse*, *Syren*. In addition there were placed under his command the five French destroyers *Aventurier*, *Capitaine Mehl*, *Dunois*, *François Garnier* and *Intrépide*.

Considering that this collection of ships was constantly operating within a few hours' steaming from the enemy's ports, it speaks volumes for the supremacy, moral as well as material, which we had then attained over the enemy. No interference beyond unfruitful submarine attacks was attempted during the three weeks in which this fleet was at work.

Almost a year later a second series of attacks on the Belgian ports were carried out with marked success and at a small cost. These ports had been converted into veritable hornets' nests by the enemy, whose submarines derived great benefit from them. By utilising Ostend and Zeebrugge as bases they had no need to return to German ports to replenish their stores of fuel and provisions, and thus could easily prey upon our commerce entering the busy Thames.

Operations commenced on the morning of August 23 under Vice-Admiral Bacon. A violent shelling by our new monitors and a large number of other craft was directed on Zeebrugge, and much damage was caused to the factories and earthworks and to ships in the harbour. One of these was a destroyer which endeavoured to escape from the terrible fire, but she was encountered off Ostend by two French destroyers and sunk after a brief fight. The next attack was delivered on September 6, when five monitors attacked Ostend and wrecked the submarine works and quays; our fire was returned with considerable accuracy. Westende was also shelled by three gunboats, and this place was again visited on the 19th, together with Middlekirke and Raversyde; French batteries near Nieuport greatly assisted in this attack. Five days later a large combined attack was delivered on the fortifications both east and west of Ostend, embracing Knocke, Blankenberge, Heyst and Zeebrugge; great damage was done to the German batteries, military dépôts and factories, and several large fires broke out. On the 26th, 27th, and 30th the attack was continued, especially on the batteries at Westende and Middlekirke, and large explosions were observed. Zeebrugge was revisited on October 3, and several outbreaks of fire were seen. A few isolated shellings during October and November completed the work.

Admiral Bacon states that the damage inflicted by six extensive bombardments and eighteen minor shellings includes the sinking of the destroyer, two submarines and a large dredger; three large factories were destroyed, and several guns, ammunition dumps, etc. were also disposed of. He especially emphasises the splendid marksmanship obtained

by novel methods, and of the protection afforded to the fleet by the destroyers and patrolling craft under difficult conditions. He gives no list of the ships engaged, but states that "eighty craft were engaged in these operations manned for the greater part by naval Reserve officers and former fishermen." He had under him the Sixth Destroyer Flotilla, and was assisted by the Second French Light Cruiser Squadron and patrol, of which he states that three ships were lost. The British losses were thirty-four killed and twenty-four wounded from the drifter *Great Heart* which was mined, the minesweeper *Brighton Queen* also mined, and the armed yacht *Sanda* which was sunk by gunfire. This ship was commanded by the oldest naval officer afloat, Lieutenant-Commander Gartside-Tipping, aged seventy, and he was unfortunately killed when his ship went down.

From the dispatch we glean the names of the cruiser *Hyacinth*, the gunboats *Bustard*, *Excellent* and *Redoubtable*, the monitors M 25, *General Craufurd*, *Lord Clive*, *Marshal Ney*, *Prince Eugene*, *Prince Rupert* and *Sir John Moore*, and the above craft.

Vice-Admiral Bacon's second Dispatch covers the period from December 1915 to July 1916. He states that during the winter months gales and the shortness of the days greatly interfered with offensive operations, and the report really deals with the work of the Dover Patrol. He, however, says that during the spring certain opportunities arose which resulted in a shelling of the Belgian seaboard. This presumably refers to the operations on April 24, when an extensive air raid was made by our seaplanes on Mariakerke, in which several fights occurred. On the next day a squadron of monitors, destroyers and auxiliaries, driving in the hostile patrolling ships, bombarded Zeebrugge and its environs for forty minutes, and caused great havoc to the harbour; a longer attack in the afternoon by a larger squadron resulted in several fires breaking out. Admiral Bacon says that as a result of these operations several submarines and a few surface ships were sunk, the cost being four officers and



twenty-two men killed, and one officer and two men wounded.

Of the Dover Patrol he states that whilst the weather impeded our destroyers and patrols, the enemy was thereby enabled to carry out his minesowing and submarine activities more easily. Nevertheless of the 21,000 merchantmen which passed through the Patrol, only twenty-one ships were either sunk or badly damaged; and more creditable still, the whole of the transport to France was unmolested and not a single life was lost. To achieve this remarkable success we sacrificed 4 per cent. of our patrolling ships and suffered a consequent loss of seventy-seven officers and men. *The Times* has reported that the destroyer *Viking* was mined on January 29, 1916, whilst escorting a troopship in the Channel, and that her commander was amongst the lost.

During 1917 there have been incessant bombings by our seaplanes of the shipping and quays of Bruges, Zeebrugge, Ostend and several other fortified towns near and on the Belgian coastline, with a view to harassing and destroying the submarine works and bases which have been constructed at these places, and very much damage has been caused to the enemy. Bombardments have practically ceased, but there is no relaxation in the continual patrol of the Straits of Dover, and the attempts of the enemy to frustrate this series of operations during the winter of 1916-17 will be related in due course.

## CHAPTER II

### THE WAR OF ATTRITION IN THE NORTH SEA, 1915-16

THE spring of 1915 was marked by the official beginning of the submarine "blockade" of these islands, of which there are two distinct phases. These will be dealt with in the next chapter, as they form a distinct type of warfare and were chiefly directed against the commerce of the Allies.

The early months of 1915 witnessed a succession of disasters to our auxiliary cruisers engaged in patrol work. On the day following the battle off the Dogger Bank, January 24, the Admiralty announced that the ex-R.M.S.P. liner *Viknor* had been missing for some days, and it was presumed that she had either foundered in the prevailing bad weather or had struck a mine, quantities of these machines having been laid by "neutral" merchantmen off the Irish coast, and bodies and wreckage having been cast ashore. Nine days later, signals and wireless messages ceased from the *Clan Macnaughten*, which was also patrolling in the same vicinity, and beyond some wreckage washed ashore no further trace of her was discovered. Without doubt she had suffered the same fate as the *Viknor*. Again, on March 11, the *Bayano*, a converted Elder and Fyffe liner, was torpedoed in the Irish Channel off Wigtownshire and, as a steamer in the neighbourhood was prevented from searching for survivors amongst the wreckage by the submarine and only escaped a similar fate by flight, all on board were also lost. The coincidence of these tragic losses in the same vicinity is amazing, and it was suggested that the guns mounted proved too top-heavy and rendered the cruisers unseaworthy in heavy weather, but this has been denied.

In the North Sea, after the action on January 24 a period of quiet supervened, and the sole operations in which our Navy was engaged were the hunting down of the enemy submarines and the organisation of a very efficient system for curtailing the activities of these craft, and enforcing the blockade of the enemy ports. The first break was due to the activity of the German Fleet, which according to their reports had on April 23 carried out a series of cruises "as far as the English coast, without sighting a British warship, as the whole British Fleet was concentrated in the Irish Sea and Scottish bases." One is tempted to ask why, if the German ships arrived off the East Coast, they did not shell the open towns in fulfilment of their avowed intention.

The 1st of May witnessed several incidents in the southern area of the North Sea. On this day the old destroyer *Recruit* was torpedoed and sunk off the *Galloper* Lightship, and thirty-nine of her crew were lost. A few hours later, about 3 p.m., the armed trawlers *Barbados*, *Chirsit*, *Columbia* and *Miura*, were attacked by two German Antwerp-built torpedo boats A 2 and A 6, and a short action ensued in which *Columbia* was torpedoed and sunk; only one of her crew was saved, but three others, a lieutenant and two seamen, were picked up by the pursuing enemy. *Barbados* and the two trawlers, however, put up a good fight and beat the enemy off, and sent a message to some destroyers in the vicinity as to the course taken by the enemy. Four destroyers then raced up, *Laforey*, *Lark*, *Lawford* and *Leonidas*, accompanied by the light cruiser *Undaunted*, and a running fight ensued which ended in the destruction of the two torpedo boats. The action had lasted about an hour, but no British loss was suffered, and forty-six prisoners were taken. The three rescued British men from *Columbia* were left to drown like rats by the enemy, as the "time was short and the prisoners were below."

Another mishap occurred whilst a division of our destroyers was patrolling off the Belgian coast on May 9, when the *Maori* had the misfortune to strike a mine, and subsequently sank. The *Crusader* then came up to assist in the



rescue work and lowered her boats, but the crew had already taken to their boats when they saw their ship was lost. A battery ashore then commenced to shell the *Crusader*, and after an hour and a half she was forced to retire without her boats' crews, who were taken into Zeebrugge along with the crew of the *Maori*. Though the loss of one of these powerful destroyers is to be regretted, yet happily it was unattended with loss of life.

More disastrous from this point of view was the accident which befell the new C.P.R. *Princess Irene*, a converted minelayer, whilst lying in the Medway at Sheerness on the morning of May 27. Like the *Bulwark*, she was suddenly blown up, and all on board but a stoker perished, including seventy-six dockyard workmen. A few days later, on June 10, two torpedo boats, Nos. 10 and 12, whilst patrolling the East Coast, were torpedoed and sunk, forty-one of their crews being saved; and two further minor incidents occurred during the end of the month: on the 20th the armoured cruiser *Roxburgh* was damaged by a torpedo in the North Sea but returned to port under her own steam, and ten days later the old destroyer *Lightning* was also damaged and fourteen of her crew were killed.

The enemy, on the other hand, lost the destroyer V 188, which was torpedoed by E 16 on July 26 whilst patrolling the German coast, and another patrol ship was also torpedoed about this time by E 4.

In the early days of August there was a repetition of the activity of May. On the 8th the armed patrol *Ramsey* (late I.O.M. packet) was attacked by the German Armed Fleet Auxiliary *Meteor* and sunk with five of her officers, the remainder of her crew, numbering forty-three, being taken aboard a fishing vessel and later transferred to *Arethusa*. This cruiser, with *Aurora*, *Cleopatra*, *Conquest* and *Undaunted*, immediately set off in chase of the minelayer, and later observed her sinking off the Horns Reef. Her crew had scuttled her on the approach of our cruisers and escaped to a Swedish ship near by.

On this day also the auxiliary cruiser *India* (P. & O.)

was torpedoed off the northern Norwegian coast and was sunk, the survivors, numbering 141, suffering extremely from the intense cold. On the next day the destroyer *Lynx* presumably struck a mine laid by the *Meteor*, and sank with the loss of seventy-four of her crew. These four events, though small in themselves, indicated extreme liveliness on both sides; but, as in May, no developments apparently transpired.

Not until October did any surface ship come to grief. On the 25th, E 5 torpedoed and sank an auxiliary of the "Möwe" type near Borkum Island, but three days later our fine armoured cruiser *Argyll* stranded off the Scottish coast during heavy weather and became a total wreck; fortunately no lives were lost. More deplorable was the mining of the hospital ship *Anglia* (L. & N.W. packet) in the Channel on November 17; she was carrying many badly wounded soldiers from France, and she took down about eighty of the staff and patients. By a curious coincidence His Majesty had only recently crossed over on her after his accident in the Field.

As the year of 1915 had begun with the loss of a large warship, so it ended with the loss of another, in both cases with a heavy toll of lives. On December 31, the fine armoured cruiser *Natal* was lying in harbour when without the slightest warning she blew up with an internal explosion, and over 400 of her crew were killed.

During the winter months little of importance occurred in the North Sea, though the incessant watch was, of course, maintained, and our submarines were continually off the enemy's coast. It was only from the fact that so seldom did his ships emerge that there is so little to relate of their experiences. On December 22, however, E 16 sighted off Heligoland a flotilla of torpedo boats, trawlers, tugs and a sloop, which were forming a screen for a large Fleet Auxiliary presumably engaged in minelaying. Despite her strong protection E 16's plucky commander decided to attack her; by skilful manœuvring he successfully discharged a torpedo at her and observed her begin to sink. This work

involved a few losses to our craft, and E 17 had the misfortune to strand off the Texel during heavy weather on January 9, 1916, when, springing a leak, she sank; fortunately her crew of thirty-three were rescued by Dutch warships and interned. Exactly a fortnight later another submarine came to grief off the Dutch coast, and her crew were partly rescued by British destroyers and partly by Dutch warships; this craft was later salvaged and brought on February 22 to Terschelling, where she was interned.

In the meantime the mining of the battleship *King Edward VII* had occurred in the North Sea on January 8; although the disaster took place in bad weather, not a single life was lost, all being rescued despite the heavy seas. The enemy claim that she had struck a mine laid by the raider *Möwe* on her outward trip.

There were several incidents of importance during February, the first being the narrowly escaped destruction of the boarding steamer *Peel Castle*, a sister ship of the *Ramsey*; on the morning of the 7th fire broke out on board whilst the ship was in the Downs, and it quickly spread. Eventually the flames were subdued by the aid of tugs and fortunately no lives were lost.

On the 11th Berlin made a vain attempt to justify its Fleet's existence by the manufacture of an action between German torpedo boats and several British cruisers "which at once fled, off the Dogger Bank. Our boats pursued them, sank the new cruiser *Arabis*, and hit a second with a torpedo" (which, later, they of course claimed, sank), "and rescued three officers and twenty-one men from the *Arabis*, of whom one officer and three men died." The German newspapers declared that these cruisers had a speed of 16 knots and a complement of eighty men, and had only been commissioned a month. The Admiralty statement, though very brief, put an entirely new complexion on the affair, stating that "the cruisers mentioned were four minesweepers, and three have returned safely." The *Arabis* was an oil-driven cargo ship of about 3697 tons, built in 1914, and had no funnels, this fact doubtless causing the Germans so much confusion.



Far more serious was the loss of the famous light cruiser *Arethusa*. This little ship struck a mine off the East Coast and was presumably towed into port, where it was found that she had received vital injury, and she became a total loss with thirteen of her crew. The loss of light cruisers, whose great value this war has shown, is of far greater importance than that of almost any other type of ship, excepting battleships and battle-cruisers. These ships have seen service all over the globe, and all the available cruisers have been retained for home service for scouting duties. Their high speed gives them greater security than most warships can obtain in these submarine-infested seas; and when they are required to cruise ahead near to the enemy's coast, in their rôle of the "eyes of the Fleet," it enables them to escape from the ever observant patrolling destroyers who may sally out and attack them. The fact that the first intimation that the German High Sea Fleet was out on May 31 was due to a patrolling squadron of these cruisers sighting the enemy and transmitting the news to the battle-cruisers, is ample proof of their immense value. In convoying expeditions such as the raid on Sylt later on, and the Christmas Day raid on Cuxhaven, they are also useful, and the loss of this well-known little ship was unfortunate, the more so as she fell a victim to the cowardly warfare which the Germans have initiated in these waters.

On February 29 there occurred the duel between the raider *Greif* and the auxiliary cruisers *Alcantara* and *Andes*, which resulted in the sinking of the first two ships. This action is dealt with fully in Part II, chap. i.

March saw a continuation of activity in the North Sea, and a part of the German Fleet was observed on the 6th by several Dutch trawlers off Ymuiden, steaming westwards, and later travelling in a north-easterly direction returning home. The object of this cruise has never transpired, but it seems clear that, learning of the whereabouts of our Battle Fleet beforehand, they safely emerged "to cruise as far as the English coast, without a British warship being seen," and incidentally to pass near to the Dutch fishing fleet so

that the feat might be widely published. A large number of mines were sown in their wake, and a few days later no fewer than 300 of these machines were washed ashore on the Jutland coast. Evidence of this was forthcoming when on the 9th the old destroyer *Coquette*, and the torpedo boat No. 11, struck mines off the East Coast and sank, four officers and forty-four men being lost; and two days later when the Fleet Auxiliary *Fauvette* was also lost in the same region, two officers and twelve men perishing.

On March 15 Grand Admiral Von Tirpitz resigned, it is said because his advocacy of ruthless submarine warfare did not meet with general approval, but his resignation did not materially affect the situation. His successor was Admiral Von Scheer.

After the sinking of the two Dutch steamers *Tubantia* and *Palembang*, there was a revival of torpedo craft activity by the enemy in the southern waters. A division of three destroyers, whilst off the Belgian coast on the 20th, encountered four British destroyers, but they immediately fled into Zeebrugge closely pursued by our ships, which succeeded in damaging two of them. Following this came the removal of the *Galloper* Lightship; and from these incidents it was thought that considerable developments were about to take place, it being considered that it was Germany's intention to clear the North Sea of shipping in order to carry out operations unobserved. However, nothing apparently happened.

On March 25 a naval air raid was made on the airship sheds at Sylt, and the seaplane-carriers were escorted by light cruisers and destroyers. Unfortunately the enemy obtained warning of the impending attack, and it cannot be regarded as a successful piece of work. In the patrol encounters two armed trawlers, *Braunschweig* and *Otto Rudolph*, were sunk, but our new destroyer *Medusa* collided with another, the *Laverock*, in the heavy weather which followed, and she had to be abandoned after the whole of her crew had been very skilfully rescued by the new destroyer *Lassoo*. She was later cast ashore on Vlieland. Later on, during the following night, enemy destroyers attacked our retiring cruisers,

but one of them, G 194, was rammed and cut in two by the cruiser *Cleopatra*. Thus it was only by a piece of luck that our loss was balanced, and the aircraft were hotly received by anti-aircraft batteries.

The closing days of April witnessed a remarkable series of incidents in three entirely different localities. The first occurred on the night of the 20th, when a suspicious-looking "Norwegian" steamer named *Aube* was seen off Tralee, county Kerry, accompanied by the submarine U 19, from which latter Sir Roger Casement landed and was subsequently arrested as a rebel, brought to London, tried and executed. The *Aube* was stopped by the sloop *Bluebell* and ordered into Tralee, but before she arrived a couple of German ensigns were hoisted and an explosion followed in which she sank. She had been blown up by her crew, of which three officers and twenty men of the Imperial German Navy were captured. The ship was later examined by divers, and a quantity of ammunition was discovered aboard destined for the Irish rebels.

At midday on the 24th a rebellion broke out in Dublin, and by nightfall many parts of the city were in the hands of the Sinn Feiners. The trouble was not got under for several days, during which time the unrest had spread to several districts in Ireland.

In the meantime a German battle-cruiser squadron, accompanied by light cruisers and destroyers, dashed out under cover of night and made for the Norfolk coast; they began shelling Lowestoft and Yarmouth shortly after 4 a.m. on April 25, but after a twenty minutes' bombardment retired. The squadron was attacked by our light cruiser destroyers, who came under heavy fire, and three of them were hit. This attack was made in conjunction with a Zeppelin raid over Norfolk, when over 100 bombs were dropped without causing any damage, injuring only one man. This raid was followed by two further ones on the next two nights, April 26 and 27.

On the 24th our flotilla delivered a heavy bombardment on the German positions around Ostend.



All these events followed one another very closely, and yet the enemy was nowhere successful. The raid on Lowestoft was presumably a bait for our Grand Fleet to come down south and leave a clear course open for assistance to be sent to the Irish rebels, and it would appear that the rising in Dublin following Sir Roger Casement's capture was somewhat premature according to the German plan. That these projects, commencing with the *Aube's* seizure, should have been brought to an ignominious close, clearly shows that our Fleet was not caught napping. It seems that the German plan was to strike at several different points and cause our Fleet to scatter, when another batch of raiders would be sent out, or perhaps an invasion of our East Coast would have been attempted. On the other hand, the Lowestoft raid may have been undertaken in fulfilment of a promise to the Sinn Feiners to attack us in the east whilst they would attack us in the west.

A remarkable point about these events was that only two warships were lost by either belligerents. These were our submarine E 22 which was sunk by mine, only two of her crew being saved by the enemy; and the German minelaying submarine UC 5 which was captured off Harwich, together with her crew, on the 27th.

During these days, April 22-7, all traffic was stopped between this country and Holland, presumably to allow the dispositions of our Fleet to be carried out without the knowledge of the skippers and crews of the numerous neutral ships; or perhaps a new minefield was sown.

These events terminated the period of guerilla warfare before the two contending fleets met in battle for the first time, but before coming to the stupendous battle fought off Jutland on May 31, it will be as well to note how the much-vaunted submarine campaign had fared since its inauguration in February 1915.

## CHAPTER III

### THE FIRST SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN, 1915

WE now come to one of the most deliberate crimes ever committed by a civilised nation. It will be remembered that, failing to secure for herself a satisfactory condition in August 1914, Germany settled down to a war of attrition in order to wear down our superiority by constantly attacking our warships, which we had, *ipso facto*, to expose to her submarines in carrying out the virtual blockade of her coast. At first she secured some success, notably the sinking of the three "Cressy" cruisers, but as we had learnt the lesson and employed smaller and faster craft, as time went on she could claim little success.

Germany, therefore, turned her attention to our own, and incidentally the neutral countries', commerce in a futile attempt to inconvenience our overseas trade. The international rules for the treatment of the enemy's commerce may be stated in a few words. A warship must, when approaching a victim, hoist its colours before attempting any interference; then the merchantman must be hailed and ordered to stop, when a boarding party will be sent to examine her. Should she endeavour to escape, then *only* does she render herself liable to be fired upon. The ship, when boarded, may either be taken into port, there to await adjudication before a prize court, or if this course is not feasible, she may be sunk "after due provision has been made for the safety of the crew and passengers." A merchantman is a strictly non-combatant ship, and those aboard are immune from captivity and must be landed at a port on the first opportunity.

Owing to the utter disregard of these principles by the

German submarine commanders, practically all our ships are now armed with guns. The instructions issued on October 20, 1915, to the captains of these ships were explicit; they were only allowed to utilise their armament when attacked by an armed ship, and must not interfere with any hostile, neutral, or friendly ships; in opening fire, the British colours must be first hoisted, but the fire must not be maintained if the attacker stops or hauls down her flag. Owing to the German submarines attacking without warning, no such craft should be allowed to approach, and, as Allied submarines had orders not to approach shipping, any such craft will be hostile. Finally, if the ship, when proceeding to the assistance of a distressed vessel, sights a submarine standing by, she must not open fire unless she herself be attacked.

These orders, it will be seen, are quite fair, but their purpose has been wilfully perverted by the enemy, who, whenever convicted of a crime, invariably stated that he was fired upon first before a warning could be given to the victim. When it is seen that the only warning which is given is the hurling to death of the ship's company, the difficulty will be recognised. Thus a difficult situation arose; for whilst it is admittedly legal to fire upon a ship which endeavours to escape, yet the stoppage and subsequent destruction of the ship (in the less brutal cases) can only mean that the passengers and crew, having taken to the boats, are at the mercy of the seas. A submarine naturally cannot take these people into a place of safety (although in the earlier days several times the boats were towed to the vicinity of the coast), but the least that she can do is to leave a ship alone in foul weather, and in fair to stop and direct the next steamer sighted to their assistance. In many cases several boats' crews, drifting away, have never been heard of to this day.

Had the enemy shown more consideration at the outset, our ships, particularly passenger liners, would probably have stopped to be searched; but where the choice lies between drifting about on the wide seas in open boats and



making a dash for safety in the hope of sinking or at least eluding the attacker, the latter course is obviously the one to be chosen.

During the last months of 1914 a few ships, notably the *Amiral Ganteaume*, with French refugees aboard, on October 26, were torpedoed, but little success was achieved beyond the loss of several civilian lives; however, these incidents showed to what an extent the enemy was prepared to go. We, on the other hand, had organised a very efficient system of inspecting all traffic through the North Sea, both at Dover and at Kirkwall. (Recently Halifax, Nova Scotia, has been utilised as an inspection port to relieve the inevitable congestion at Kirkwall.) All ships on being boarded by our patrols are examined, and if anything is discovered in the way of contraband aboard, the ships are brought into these ports and thoroughly searched. Moreover, owing to the great rise in the imports of the neutral countries adjoining Germany, these nations are "rationed" at their pre-war standard; this may seem unfair to these peoples, but without doubt Germany has obtained great quantities of much-needed supplies through them, and has managed to "rub along." The situation with the neutrals is a very difficult one, and, with the intention of creating ill-feeling between the Allies and the United States of America, a German-American purchased the Hamburg-Amerika liner *Dacia*, loaded her with cotton consigned to Rotterdam, and sent her from Galveston on January 31. This action was directed chiefly against us, as of course we have charge of the blockade in the northern waters, and when the test ship was approaching the Scillies on February 27, her capture by the French auxiliary cruiser *Europe* showed the strong Allied sentiment.

February was a month of several important incidents. On the first day, the British hospital ship *Asturias* (ex-R.M.S.P.) was attacked by a German submarine in the Channel at about 5 p.m., but fortunately the torpedo missed its mark; the submarine could not have mistaken

the identity of the ship, as the light at that time had not begun to fail, and even if it had been dusk the distinguishing marks on the hull quite obviated any mistake. The world was thus given a concrete instance that Germany intended to regard neither the international laws of the sea nor the lives of non-combatants. On this day, also, the armed yacht *Vandura* fired upon the U 21 in the Irish Sea, but did not succeed in sinking her; and in connection with this incident the German allegation that the *Vandura* opened fire without hoisting her colours was denied.

On the 2nd the German Admiralty announced that every effort would be made to attack the large numbers of transports then about to convey troops and stores from these shores, but against these she obtained not the slightest success. One of her submarines, we have seen, had penetrated into the Irish Sea and sank on January 30 three steamers off the mouth of the Mersey, after giving their crews time to escape to their boats. This was the first real attack on our commerce, and was conducted with comparatively careful regard for the safety of the crews. It has already been stated that it is not this part of the campaign which calls for such indignation, as it is unavoidable in submarine warfare, and our submarines have adopted the policy of destruction instead of that of capture in the Sea of Marmora and in the Baltic. It is the utter disregard of all precautions for the lives of the crews and want of humanity; no lives either in the Baltic or in the Marmora were lost through the activities of our craft, but the non-combatant lives lost, directly or indirectly, through the agency of German submarines must be now incalculable. Outrage has followed outrage, and there seems little likelihood of any cessation of such crimes when the opportunity arises until the submarine commanders realise that they will be made personally responsible for the innocent lives thus sacrificed. That these men who have sent thousands of innocent women and children to their deaths can be exonerated from any blame seems impossible; and, therefore, their superiors who give such orders are all the more responsible.

The German submarine campaign began officially on February 18, but on the 5th the German Admiralty had issued a wireless communication declaring that "the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole of the Channel, are declared to be a war zone on and after February 18, and every enemy ship will be destroyed, even if it is impossible to avoid danger threatening the crew and passengers." Neutral ships were also declared to be in danger, owing to the "misuse of neutral flags by the British Government on January 31." There had been issued a statement that a ship, if attacked, may adopt the legal procedure of flying a neutral flag for her protection; and in the past several foreign ships had flown our flag to secure protection; the converse of this rule was therefore quite legal, if not to the liking of the enemy. On the 10th the Holt liner *Laertes* was attacked off the Dutch coast by U 2, but by clever seamanship she escaped; and her captain afterwards received the D.S.O for his gallant conduct. Her attacker opened fire with machine-guns, the first instance of such methods, and these weapons have been barbarously turned upon the crews from time to time.

The day following the fateful February 18 the Norwegian steamer *Belridge* was attacked without warning and damaged, but was towed into Dover; and during the first week of the campaign eleven Allied, American and Norwegian steamers were attacked. Two of these were sunk in the Irish Sea, and the remainder either in the Channel or in the southern area of the North Sea. It was thus evident that Germany had built much larger submarines, with a consequent greater cruising radius (now over 5000 miles), which enabled them to remain for several days in the Channel, or to travel into the busy Irish Sea by way of the north of Scotland or Land's End. On the 25th the hospital ship *St. Andrew* was unsuccessfully attacked off Boulogne.

That these raiders were not to have it all their own way was very evident from the plucky conduct of the little Newcastle collier *Thordis*. This ship was attacked by a



submarine off Beachy Head on the morning of February 28 in heavy weather, but she managed to ram her assailant and, as oil rose to the surface in great quantities, sank her. Further, U 8 was destroyed by a flotilla of destroyers off Dover on March 4, the crew of twenty-nine being captured; and this was followed by the ramming of U 12 by the destroyer *Ariel* six days later, ten prisoners being taken.

The campaign still proceeded, accompanied with absolute disregard for the lives of the crews, of which sometimes only a few were picked up, and little discrimination was shown between Allied and neutral ships. In the first four weeks only nineteen British steamers were sunk, but during the summer when the highest record in the first campaign was reached, thirty-five steamers were sunk in August. The monthly average up to October worked out at nineteen ships per month; and when it is remembered that the monthly average of traffic was about 5500 in and out sailings, it will be seen that the losses were about 1 in 270—a different result to that which Germany had hoped for.

The Admiralty shipping losses returns for 1915 are as follows—

Date.	Arrivals and Sailings. Ships over 300 tons.	Sunk. Excluding Fishing Craft.
Feb. 18–Mar. 17 . . . .	5951	19
Mar. 18–Apr. 14 . . . .	5675	16
Apr. 15–May 12 . . . .	5991	15
May 13–June 9 . . . .	5478	20
June 10–July 7 . . . .	5582	25
July 8–Aug. 4 . . . .	5513	12
Aug. 5–Sept. 1 . . . .	5598	35
Sept. 2–Sept. 29 . . . .	5563	22
Sept. 30–Oct. 20 . . . .	4146	13

During these months, however, some of the blackest crimes ever committed by any nation have fouled the name of the German submarine commanders for posterity.

First amongst these deeds comes the sinking of the unarmed Elder-Dempster liner *Falaba* in the St. George's Channel on March 28. The liner had stopped in accordance

with the submarine's orders and the boats were being lowered; suddenly without the slightest warning a torpedo was discharged and created such havoc that the ship immediately took a bad list, thereby smashing several boats. The liner sank in twenty minutes, before many of those aboard had time to leave her, and altogether 112 lives were lost. Not content with their work, the submarine cruised around the drowning people and jeered at their struggles. According to their Admiralty, this craft "never returned," thereby providing an excellent excuse for repudiating the protest which was lodged.

On the previous day the Yeoward liner *Aguila* had also been sunk in this vicinity, and the submarine had opened fire upon the passengers and crew who were getting into the boats, causing the loss of several lives by this wanton act of cruelty. In all twenty-six lives were lost in this case. Any one wishing to find an excuse for this diabolical treatment will surely be at a loss, for there seems to have been no hurry for fear of any of our warships coming up.

Nor were our fishermen immune from their attacks, and the case of the *Victoria* is typical of their brutality. On April 12 the transport *Wayfarer* was torpedoed, but she was towed back into Queenstown; several lives were lost.

About this time we accounted for several of these craft, but the Admiralty had already commenced to keep the destruction of these submarines secret. They announced, however, on March 25 that the U 29 had been sunk with all hands during an attack on part of the Fleet, and despite all German allegations to the contrary, this submarine was rammed in the open sea by a British warship. The French on the 31st also announced that another craft had been rammed off Dieppe, and large quantities of oil being observed, her loss may be presumed.

To safeguard our liners from these wanton attacks, several of them were armed during April and May with guns solely for defence, and quite a number of submarines were thus accounted for. Flagrant violations of neutrals' rights continued, and on May 1 the American *Gulflight* was torpedoed

and sunk off the Scillies, the captain and two of the crew losing their lives. This steamer was but one of several United States ships which were put down during 1915.

A few days later there occurred the most terrible of all Germany's crimes upon the seas, the more so as the catastrophe was absolutely premeditated. The huge Cunarder *Lusitania* had been posted to sail from New York on May 1, but prior to her departure, pamphlets and newspaper warnings were issued in America to the effect that any Allied ship would be sunk and that the passengers on the *Lusitania* had better defer their voyage. Nevertheless she left New York for Liverpool with 1255 passengers and a crew of 651, and was due to arrive off Fastnet on Friday, May 7. Since November her nominal speed of 25 knots had been reduced to 21 knots in order to save coal consumption and man-power, and on the 7th it had been reduced to 18 knots in order to arrive in the Mersey at a suitable time. The weather, which had been hazy, cleared after passing Fastnet, but at 2 p.m. a torpedo was seen by the second officer, coming straight for the liner. A cloud of smoke and steam immediately came up from between the third and fourth funnels on the starboard side, and there followed a slight shock. This in turn was followed by another explosion, which may have been a second torpedo, or perhaps an internal explosion. No warning whatsoever had been given by the submarine, and the torpedo had been fired from a distance of about 400 yards. Orders were at once given for the boats to be lowered to the rails and for the women and children to be put into them, but unfortunately it was discovered that the engine-room had been wrecked and the way could not be got off the huge liner, and even when she took the final plunge she was still in motion. A heavy list to starboard was immediately taken, and eighteen minutes after the first torpedo had struck her she disappeared beneath the waves, off the Old Head of Kinsale. No fewer than 1198 men, women, and children perished in the space of these few minutes—innocent non-combatants who had no share in the war at all—and only 787 persons were picked up by



torpedo boats, drifters, tugs and fishing smacks, and landed at Queenstown and Kinsale. That many instances of splendid heroism are to be recorded is a matter of no surprise, but perhaps the most widely known was the brave act of the millionaire Mr. Vanderbilt, who, seeing a little girl without a lifebelt on, took off his own and strapped it on her just as the ship sank, and was never seen again. Many people died later and several bodies were picked up at sea, but fortunately Captain Turner, who sank with his ship, was rescued by a trawler.

The German claim that the liner was armed is totally false, and it has been denied both by our Admiralty and by the Customs Officers at New York; a German-American who testified that the ship had four guns mounted, later confessed to perjury. Germany, in another attempt to cover her awful crime, stated that Canadian troops were carried, and that the British Admiralty had ordered all British ships to ram German submarines. The first statement was also denied; but the order referred to in the second assertion was perfectly legal, provided that we were prepared to risk the consequences. These excuses, which seem adequate to the German mind, have only intensified the feeling of horror and revulsion with which the civilised world received the news of this diabolical act.

Captain Turner, at the subsequent Board of Trade Inquiry, was completely exonerated from blame, whilst the German Government was very emphatically condemned for ordering the murderous attack on an unarmed liner, fully knowing that hundreds of souls would perish. Foulcrimes, perhaps, have since been committed against smaller ships—crews of trawlers shot down as they were leaving their ship in compliance with the submarine's orders—but this particular act was attended by the heaviest loss of life, and it is to be hoped that these incidents will not be overlooked on the day of reckoning. Many bloody deeds were wrought by the cruel submarine commanders before this campaign came to an ignominious close, and during 1915 several large ships, both British and American, were sent to the bottom without warning.

It had been decided after the capture of the crew of the U 8 that, owing to the cowardly attacks on harmless merchantmen, the crews when captured would forfeit all claim to the honourable treatment usually accorded to prisoners of war, and that they would be kept apart from other prisoners. This at the time was felt to be quite just, but the result might have been foreseen; and the German Government retaliated by refusing to exchange invalid civilians who were imprisoned in Germany, and by generally increasing their brutality to our troops in their hands. With a view to reopening negotiations with the German Government on these points, on June 9 Mr. Balfour announced in the House of Commons that the difference in the treatment of these murderers had already been annulled—not because of any decrease in their cowardly crimes, but because the submarine question was only one of Germany's many diabolical acts—and that the question of responsibility would be held over until the end of the war. Incidentally he announced that U 14 had recently been sunk and twenty-seven prisoners had been captured.

On the morning of August 19 the outward bound White Star liner *Arabic* was torpedoed without warning off Fastnet, and, taking with her forty-three of the passengers and crew, she sank in ten minutes. Though fortunately the loss of life in this case was not so heavy, yet the attack was just as illegal as the *Lusitania* incident, as both ships were unarmed. U 27, which, according to Berlin, “did not return,” has been suggested as the assailant, but this is incorrect, as the attacker reached home. Closely following this came the attack on the Allan liner *Hesperian* on September 4, also in the same vicinity; and despite a fine effort lasting twenty-two hours to tow her into port, she foundered with thirty-two of her company. In this case only was a gun carried aboard, though purely for defensive purposes.

In the case of the *Arabic* the German Government “disavowed” the act after endeavouring to excuse itself on the grounds that the liner attempted to ram the submarine. When it was pointed out that the liner was struck aft and

that no sign of her presence was observed until the torpedo was seen, it expressed regret for the loss of life. The question of munitions could not enter, as the ship was outward bound. As a result of this attack, Germany promised to allow the crews of liners to get into "a place of safety," but of course this was soon ignored.

The *Hesperian*, on the other hand, they claim was sunk by mine, "as no submarine was in the vicinity"; this was false, as merchantmen were sunk both north and south of this spot on this day and on the next, September 5.

In the *Orduna* incident, which liner had been attacked and shelled on July 9, Germany asserts that the submarine commander mistook this large 15,000 tons liner for a "small enemy steamer," and that the liner only escaped being struck owing "to the submarine pitching, and the distance being too great"—not a very satisfactory explanation.

During October this, the first submarine campaign, collapsed entirely. Whilst it is not expedient to write about the causes of this failure, the *Frankfurter Zeitung* on October 21 published a full description of one of the methods used by our Fleet, and as this message was passed for publication, no harm will be done in quoting the article. "A net has been drawn from Dover to the French coast, and another from Portland Bill to Cape La Hogue, about 260 kilometres apart, allowing space for transports. Further nets, extending from the Mull of Kintyre to the Irish coast, and from Carnsore Point in Ireland to St. David's Head, protect the Irish Sea. To allow the passage of shipping, gates are fitted like pontoons, and these passages are periodically changed. These nets extend right to the bottom, the upper edge being suspended by buoys, and the lower edge anchored to keep them from drifting. The buoys are fixed just under the surface of the sea."

In addition to these nets there have been built very fast ships especially adapted for submarine chasing, with heavy steel rams; and with these and other devices our sailors brought the much-vaunted campaign to a close. Since the spring no official announcements of the German submarine losses have been made, and this secrecy, disappointing



though it may seem, has a very demoralising effect on the enemy. He knows not how, when, or where his craft have been lost, and indeed a submarine may lie for days entangled in the meshes of these nets before her condition is noticed by our ships. Horrible though the fate of these crews is, dying slowly by suffocation, yet one cannot say that they do not merit their end. The souls of the thousands of innocent men, women, and children foully done to death must surely cry aloud for justice on their murderers. These commanders know that they set out to send any ship they come across straight to the bottom without a thought for the safety of those aboard; they also know to a certain extent that large numbers of their comrades, meeting death in a terrible form, have never returned; yet it seems incredible that they do not ask themselves for what purpose these lost crews have perished, unless they glory in their deeds.

The known losses, published officially, during 1915 are as follows—

Sub-marine.	Date.	Vicinity.	Cause.	Fate of Crew
1914.				
U 15.	Aug. 9.	North Sea.	Rammed by <i>Birmingham</i> .	Lost. Denied.
—	Oct. 12.	Baltic Sea.	Gunfire after sinking of <i>Pallada</i> .	" "
—	Oct. 24.	Dutch Coast.	Rammed by <i>Badger</i> .	" "
U 18.	Nov. 23.	North Sea.	" " H.M. ship.	One lost.
1915.				
—	Feb. 28.	Channel.	" " s.s. <i>Thordis</i> .	Lost. Denied.
U 8.	Mar. 4.	"	Sunk by flotilla.	Saved.
U 12.	" 12.	North Sea.	Rammed by <i>Ariel</i> .	Ten saved.
U 29.	" ?	" "	" " H.M. ship.	Lost.
U 14.	June 9.	" ?	" ?	27 saved.
U 51.	July 2.	Black Sea.	Gunfire.	?
—	" 2.	North Sea.	Rammed by s.s. <i>Cottingham</i> .	Lost.
U 27.	Aug. 19.	Irish Sea.	Sunk by <i>Baralong</i> .	"
—	" 26.	Off Ostend.	Bombed by aircraft.	? Denied.
U 41.	Sept. 24.	Western Channel.	Gunfire by H.M. ship.	Two saved.
U 8.	Nov. 4.	Dutch Coast.	Stranded.	Saved.
(new)				
—	" 28.	Off Middlekirke.	Bombed by aircraft.	?
—	Dec. 28.	Black Sea.	Gunfire.	?
U 23.	?	?	Gunfire by H.M. trawler <i>Princess Marie Jose</i> .	Ten saved.

In regard to the craft sunk by *Baralong*, the Germans published a memorandum of the sinking of this craft in which they allege that the destruction was carried out in a murderous manner. The facts are that the submarine (presumably U 27) was attacking the Leyland liner *Nicosian* when she was surprised by a steamer flying the United States flag. Like the *Möwe*, the ship hoisted the British colours before opening fire, and in the subsequent destruction they allege that our sailors on board the auxiliary cruiser *Baralong* shot down the survivors in cold blood; further, they assert that five of the crew who clambered aboard the *Nicosian* were shot. Whilst denying these statements, which were based upon the sworn evidence of several American muleteers, the Admiralty pointed out that Germany had committed three great crimes within the same twenty-four hours—the murder of the crew of the E 13 aground on a Danish island, the sinking of the *Arabic*, and the sinking of the steamer *Ruel*, whose crew were fired upon with shrapnel whilst taking to their boats. Finally, our Government proposed that the whole case should be submitted to a tribunal consisting of U.S. Naval Officers. Should there be a vestige of truth in the accusation, then I think most people would consider that, though the *Baralong* may have departed from naval traditions, the murderers she dealt with do not deserve the consideration which they receive at our hands.

In the case of the U 41 the enemy again asserted that “orders were given to commanders that the survivors of submarines need not be rescued.” This is, of course, a falsehood, and there are no grounds for this protest.

Before coming to the Second Campaign, a few incidents which occurred before its commencement will illustrate the manner in which the enemy fulfilled his promise to the United States after the sinking of the *Arabic*. On November 7 the Italian liner *Ancona* was attacked without the slightest warning by a German submarine flying the Austrian flag off Sardinia. The first intimation of the attack was a shell passing over the steamer; and although

she immediately came to a stop, this action did not prevent the passengers and crew from being deliberately shot down, even when they had taken to the boats. A torpedo finally completed her destruction, and 208 lives were lost in all. Considering that Italy was then not at war with Germany, the incident constituted a very gross violation of international law, while it emphatically ignored the promise to "secure the safety of the passengers and crew."

Six days later the Italian liner *Bosnia* was also sunk by a German craft, and a boat containing twelve persons was never heard of again; and in the sinking of the French liner *Ville de la Ciotat* without warning on December 27 over eighty lives were lost. Finally, the P. & O. liner *Persia* was torpedoed without warning on December 30 and sank in five minutes; the attack, like the above cases, took place in the Mediterranean off Crete, and so swift was the end that 335 lives were lost, including forty-six women and thirteen children.

Whereas the menace in Home Waters had by now been got under control, the large area of the Mediterranean presented an infinitely more difficult problem to grapple with; for almost a year no German submarine had penetrated into the Channel, and during October and November the mercantile losses were practically reduced to *nil*.



## CHAPTER IV

### THE JUTLAND BATTLE, MAY 31, 1916

THE tremendous naval battle which was fought off the coast of Jutland on May 31, 1916, was the first Fleet action which had occurred since the outbreak of war twenty-one months before; and it was also the first naval battle between Dreadnought ships that had ever taken place, for the Heligoland Bight and Dogger Bank actions were more in the nature of large skirmishes. It is true that the Battle of Tsushima in 1903 had been fought by modern warships, but this was before the advent of the famous *Dreadnought*. Since the introduction of this ship in 1906 all the naval powers of the world had built ship after ship, even the smaller countries who could ill afford them, until in 1914 this country possessed twenty such battleships and nine battle-cruisers. With the two "Lord Nelsons" they comprised two very powerful battle squadrons of eight ships each, one of five ships, and three battle-cruiser squadrons of three ships each. In addition we have several squadrons of pre-Dreadnoughts, but there is no evidence that any of ours participated in this conflict, and Germany only brought one of these squadrons into action on this day. During the period from August 1914 to May 1916 both the British and German Battle Fleets had received several additions to their strengths, and also supplementary light cruisers and torpedo craft.

The British reinforcements include the five "Queen Elizabeths," hereinafter called the Fifth Battle Squadron, the two remaining "Iron Dukes," and several of the new "Royal Sovereign" class; finally, there were the four acquired ships from Chile and Turkey. The battle-cruiser

*Tiger*, it will be remembered, was also completed after the outbreak of hostilities. The enemy, on the other hand, had only received the four "Königs" and the battle-cruiser *Salamis* building for Greece, which had been renamed *King George I*," but on being taken over by the Germans had presumably been renamed *Pommern*.

In the official and unofficial reports of the battle, many new names appeared and, on the other hand, several remained unmentioned. Notable for their absence on the British side were the *Queen Elizabeth* and *Australia*, whilst on the German side the *Von der Tann* again was probably absent, although reports differ greatly on this point. Beatty stated that there were five enemy battle-cruisers engaged; and as the new *Hindenburg* could hardly have been completed by then, their force probably consisted of *Moltke*, *Seydlitz*, *Derfflinger*, *Lützow* and *Pommern*. This latter ship appears to have caused considerable confusion in the minds of our sailors, but as no official list of the German battle-cruiser squadron appeared, the above may be taken as probably correct. Whilst the enemy would naturally only cruise out at a period when all his forces were available, the blockading fleet (though in this case our Fleet is in Home Waters excepting during the periodical sweeps of the North Sea) has necessarily to detach certain units for repairs and overhauling.

On this memorable day, according to reliable evidence, our Fleet consisted of 28 Dreadnoughts, 9 battle-cruisers, 8 armoured cruisers, about 30 light cruisers, and probably over 100 destroyers. Against this the German High Sea Fleet, under Von Scheer, comprised 16 Dreadnoughts, 5 battle-cruisers, and 6 pre-Dreadnoughts, with numerous light cruisers and destroyers.

An account of this battle is somewhat difficult to give in simple form, but the accompanying official diagram will be found of great help in following the course of the two Fleets and in illustrating the splendid seamanship of Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, who bore the brunt of the enemy's fire during the whole action, a period of six hours.

On May 30 the Grand Fleet, comprising the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battle-cruiser Squadrons, the 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, with the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Light Cruiser Squadrons and the 1st, 4th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th and 13th Flotillas, left its bases for one of the periodical sweeps of the North Sea which have been carried out from time to time, under the command of Admiral Sir John R. Jellicoe. Part of this force was detached under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, and consisted of the 1st and 2nd Battle-cruiser Squadrons, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, with the 1st, 9th, 10th and 11th Flotillas, supported by the fast 5th Battle Squadron under Rear-Admiral Sir Evan Thomas. It was this part of the Fleet which sighted the enemy battle-cruisers.

The purpose of the sally of the entire modern German Fleet, under Vice-Admiral Von Scheer, is not known definitely. Their official mention of "an enterprise directed northwards" leaves a great deal to speculation on the character of such an "enterprise." There are three more or less plausible theories: (1) that another raid was contemplated on our East Coast with the battle-cruisers, whilst the main Fleet was to occupy any of our forces which would be likely to impede the success of Von Hipper's squadron; (2) that there was an attempt to send out a squadron of light cruisers or commerce raiders to harry our trade routes, covered by the battle squadrons to distract any opposition which they might encounter; and (3) less likely, but possible, a short cruise off Denmark or Norway for battle practice.

Whatever the object was, it was defeated at the outset by the appearance of the Grand Fleet in the vicinity; and it is quite evident that the enemy was very badly informed as to the movements of our Navy. The force under Beatty was cruising to the southward of the Grand Fleet with the light cruisers spread out; at 2.30 p.m. on May 31 *Galatea*, the flagship of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, reported the presence of enemy ships, later found to compose Von Hipper's battle-cruiser squadron. Beatty immediately set



his course to the S.S.E. to place his ships between the enemy and his bases and to intercept him before he could round Horns' Reef; but smoke being seen a quarter of an hour later to the east, he also turned to the E. and later N.E. in order to close the enemy. Almost an hour after the first observation of the enemy, Von Hipper's five battle-cruisers came into sight twenty miles to the N.E. The three light cruiser squadrons almost immediately engaged the enemy light cruisers, and by their tenacity were able to obtain valuable information. The 5th Battle Squadron at this time was eight miles away to the N.W., and the two main Battle Fleets were each about fifty miles in the rear of their battle-cruisers, the enemy steaming north whilst Jellicoe was coming down southward.

The value of aircraft in naval warfare for scouting purposes was strikingly illustrated, when shortly after 3 p.m. a seaplane rose from the deck of the carrier *Engadine*, piloted by Lieutenant Rutland, and by splendid manœuvring under very heavy fire from the enemy light cruisers, the airmen sent very valuable information to Beatty. From these reports Beatty, again turning to the E.S.E. at a speed of 25 knots to converge upon the enemy, formed his squadron into line of battle, *Lion* (flag) leading, *Tiger*, *Princess Royal*, *Queen Mary*, of the 1st Squadron, and *New Zealand* and *Indefatigable* of the 2nd Squadron, with the 9th and 13th Flotillas ahead as a screen. Evan-Thomas, with the 5th Battle Squadron, was 10,000 yards to the N.W., and was ordered to fall in astern. The weather conditions were at this time good, the S.E. wind clearing our smoke, whilst the sun was shining on the enemy. In this position the conflict began.

At 3.48 p.m. both sides simultaneously opened fire on each other at a range of 18,500 yards, and Hipper immediately turned almost sixteen points, whilst Beatty, also steaming southwards, rapidly converged until the range came down to 14,500 yards, and a parallel action ensued similar to the Dogger Bank action. At this time enemy submarines made their appearance, but did not obtain any hits.

It is a noticeable feature of both Sir John Jellicoe's and Sir David Beatty's Dispatches that no account is given of the end of the three battle-cruisers which were lost. From various unofficial reports it appears that just as Evan-Thomas came up with his squadron at 4.8 p.m. and opened a somewhat ineffective fire at 20,000 yards range, a terrible misfortune occurred. The enemy, opening a concentrated but futile fire on *Lion*, transferred their fire to our fourth ship, *Queen Mary*, and by an unlucky chance almost every shell the Germans fired seemed to strike her. Under this terrible tornado she disappeared in a minute and a half, and only two of her crew were picked up by us. Our battle-cruisers are very much less heavily armoured than the German ships, only 9" plating being carried on the *Queen Mary* against 13" in the latest German ships, and 7" in the "Indefatigables" to 10" in the *Moltke* and *Seydlitz*, the extra weight in our ships being devoted to more heavy guns. This loss was shortly afterwards followed by another disaster, and *Indefatigable* was heavily hit and burst into flames; she also disappeared, and again only two of the crew were picked up, this time by the enemy on their return. Thus we had only four ships left to fight the enemy's five. Our slower but more accurate fire now began to tell, and the third enemy ship was set afire at 4.18 p.m.; but the weather conditions were becoming poor and the visibility low, owing to drifting mists.


In the meantime a very dashing torpedo attack by twelve destroyers was ordered at 4.15 p.m. Before arriving at a suitable position, however, an enemy light cruiser and fifteen destroyers intercepted them, but these were forced to retire with the loss of two destroyers. Unfortunately during this skirmish our destroyers lost their favourable formation, but three of them, *Nestor*, *Nicator* and *Nomad*, pressed home the attack on the battle-cruisers and discharged two torpedoes at them. Coming under a very heavy fire, *Nomad* was disabled, but the other two kept on until, suddenly finding themselves in range of the entire German Fleet, they were subjected to a terrific fire. Daunt-

lessly pressing on, *Nestor* was hit and nearly rammed *Nicator*, who alone managed to escape and regain her flotilla. Most of the crews of the *Nestor* and *Nomad* were captured. Other destroyers also attacked the battle-cruisers, and their rear ship was hit.

The fight between the battle-cruisers continued, still on a S.E. course, but at 4.38 p.m. *Southampton*, of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, reported that the German High Sea Fleet was ahead. Four minutes later this formidable array came into view, and Beatty immediately turned about and made for the north, where Sir John Jellicoe was speeding down to meet him. Followed by the enemy battle-cruisers the parallel fight continued, although the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron still kept on to the southward to make observations on the oncoming German Fleet. It is difficult to describe the gallantry of this squadron, approaching as it did to within 13,000 yards under a very heavy fire from the whole German Battle Fleet. Meanwhile with the complete turn of our battle-cruisers, the 5th Battle Squadron was enabled to come into very effective range, and poured out a tremendous fire with their 15" guns; and at 4.57 p.m., the position of the German Fleet being pointed out to him, Evan-Thomas engaged the main German Fleet. At 5 p.m. Beatty's force was thus disposed: *Fearless* with the 1st Flotilla ahead, the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons on the starboard bow, the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron on the port quarter, and *Champion* ahead of the 5th Battle Squadron.

With the setting sun the weather conditions changed, resembling somewhat the position in which Rear-Admiral Cradock was placed off Coronel, and our ships were silhouetted against the west whilst the enemy was partly obscured in the misty east. During the period from 5 p.m. to 6 p.m. our ships, nevertheless, worked havoc on the enemy, and one of their battle-cruisers quitted the line, whilst others were seen to be suffering considerably. It is noticeable, again, that most of the damage to our ships occurred early in the action when the Germans' gunnery was good, but it rapidly deteriorated under our heavier, if slower firing. At





JUTLAND PLAN.

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5.10 p.m. the destroyer *Moresby* discharged a torpedo at their battleships, and eight minutes later observed a hit on their sixth ship, and from observations from *Fearless*, who sighted an enemy battleship on fire and later enveloped in a cloud of smoke and steam, it appears that this ship blew up. At 5.35 p.m. the course was changed to N.N.E., and then later to N.E., as the enemy, still about 14,000 yards away, was hauling to the eastward; and a few minutes later the British Battle Fleet arrived.

Beatty had, in the meantime, informed Jellicoe of the presence of the whole of the modern German Navy; Jellicoe at once proceeded on a S.E. course at full speed to meet him. For two hours the British Fleet, comprising the 3rd Battle-cruiser Squadron, the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Battle Squadrons, the 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, with the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and the three flotillas, had steamed at their utmost, "the whole Fleet maintaining a speed in excess of the trial speeds of some of the older vessels." On nearing the scene of the chase Jellicoe detached Rear-Admiral Hood with the 3rd Battle-cruiser Squadron (*Invincible* [flag], *Indomitable* and *Inflexible*), which was leading the British Fleet, to reinforce Beatty. At 5.30 p.m. Hood sighted gun-fire flashes to the S.W., and sent the light cruiser *Chester* ahead to investigate. This famous little ship was engaged by three light cruisers for about twenty minutes, but though suffering many casualties, she regained the Battle-cruiser Squadron at 6.5 p.m.

The German battleships were now close astern their battle-cruisers, so Beatty, seeing the much-needed reinforcements arriving, altered his course to E. and, steaming at the utmost speed, performed the well-known feat of crossing the T, thereby bringing all his guns to bear on the head of the enemy's line at a range of 12,000 yards. Had the weather conditions been clearer, disaster would have befallen the enemy, but only three of his ships were visible at one time.

Immediately this change of course was observed, Von Hipper turned to starboard to the S.E. The destroyer *Onslow* then spiritedly attacked a light cruiser which was



endeavouring to discharge torpedoes at Beatty and beat her off; she then attempted to attack Von Hipper with torpedoes, but was struck heavily, and only one torpedo was discharged. Thinking that all his torpedoes had gone, her commander slowly retired, but learning that three still remained, returned and torpedoed the light cruiser, and discharged the two remaining torpedoes at the enemy's line. *Onslow* was so severely damaged that she stopped and was later taken in tow by the damaged destroyer *Defender* under heavy fire, and the pair struggled on until midday on June 1, when tugs arrived. The performance of the crews was admirable.

Meanwhile Hood, with his three battle-cruisers, came up and was ordered to take station ahead of *Lion*; and at 6.21 p.m. "Rear-Admiral Hood, bringing his squadron into action in a most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval ancestors," poured a hot fire into the enemy's leading ship at a range of only 8000 yards, producing overwhelming effects. The 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, being in advance of the Battle Squadrons, engaged the enemy cruisers and destroyers which had rushed forward astern of Beatty to interfere with Jellicoe's deployment into line of battle, and *Defence* and *Warrior* sank a light cruiser. These enemy light cruisers were also engaged by our light cruiser *Canterbury* as they were firing heavily upon three destroyers, of which *Shark* sank. In connection with this incident there occurred a very brave and heroic act on the part of her commander, who, seeing his ship badly hit, warned another destroyer which was coming to his assistance to keep off, as otherwise both ships would most certainly be lost. Commander Loftus Jones was wounded in the leg, but went aft to connect the after wheel, and seeing both the fore and aft guns and their crews out of action, he went to the remaining midship piece and kept it in action, the whole time under a heavy fire. Very soon only three men were left to man the gun; and although a shell came and took off his leg above the knee, he continued to give orders until the end was near, when he ordered the survivors to put

on lifebelts. A torpedo finally sent the *Shark* to the bottom, and unfortunately Commander Jones was not amongst the handful of brave men who were picked up late in the following night. He was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross nearly twelve months after, and the remainder of the survivors were awarded the D.S.M.

A few minutes before Hood came in we have seen that *Defence* and *Warrior* had successfully engaged the light cruisers, and at 6.16 p.m. they were seen to be passing down the line between our ships and the enemy. It is thought that Rear-Admiral Sir R. K. Arbuthnot, in the chase of the enemy, had not seen the close proximity of the main action owing to the drifting mists, and before he could withdraw he came under a heavy fire in which his flagship disappeared, whilst *Warrior* was disabled. Covered by a terrific fire from the battleship *Warspite* of the 5th Battle Squadron, which disabled at least two enemy battleships, this ship was enabled to fall back to the rear, but after strenuous efforts to keep her afloat by *Engadine*, who towed her for seventy-five miles, she foundered at 8 a.m. next morning. *Black Prince* of the same squadron was also sunk some time about 9 p.m., and although nothing definite is known of her fate, apparently she fell a victim to torpedo attack and sank with all her company.

Meanwhile the 1st Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, came up astern of Beatty and opened fire at 6.17 p.m. on ships of the "Kaiser" class (their 3rd Battle Squadron) at a range of 11,000 yards; *Marlborough* in particular distinguished herself by her rapid firing, which she maintained in spite of injury caused by torpedo, compelling a "König" battleship to quit the line. The 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons then came up in the rear, all these squadrons swinging into line in a most imposing manner. This action between the two Fleets continued from 6.17 p.m. to 8.20 p.m. intermittently, and but for the enemy's action in constantly turning away to the westward, more damage would have been caused him; for profiting by two torpedo attacks and smoke screens he would alter his

course, though at the same time putting us between him and his bases.

It seems that shortly after Beatty had ordered Hood to lead our line, the flagship *Invincible* was caught by a broadside below the water-line as she listed on the swell, and a fire ensuing, she blew up in a great cloud of steam and foam. This gallant admiral and all but three of his company perished, the survivors being picked up by the destroyer *Badger*. Beatty thereupon ordered the *Inflexible* and *Indomitable* to reduce speed to 18 knots and fall astern; thus the six battle-cruisers now led the van, followed further astern by Admiral Burney in *Marlborough*, with the 1st Battle Squadron. The whole head of the enemy's line had crumpled up under the terrific fire from our ships whilst crossing the T, and he was a demoralised foe. But for the torpedo attacks and the failing light, his complete destruction would have seemed assured.

That the enemy formation was completely gone was evident when at 6.25 p.m. *Falmouth* and *Yarmouth*, of the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, discharged torpedoes at the leading battle-cruiser and secured a hit, and then opening fire, caused her (either *Seydlitz* or *Derfflinger*) to quit the line. It was about this time that *Warspite* narrowly escaped destruction; her steering-gear becoming disabled, she turned towards the enemy, and but for the splendid handling of Captain Philpotts, would have inevitably been battered to pieces. Later, when near the Firth of Forth, she was attacked by submarines, but managed to elude them.

It is on this period of the battle that certain criticism has been made. Admiral Henderson has stated that "we missed victory because at the critical moment, when a torpedo attack was threatened on the rear squadron—which was the only part of the Fleet in touch with the enemy, the leading squadrons being in advance of it and not engaged—the whole Fleet was turned several points away, as stated by the Germans, instead of the squadron affected. Precious minutes and touch with the enemy were lost, as



stated in our own dispatch, because Beatty, who kept in touch with the enemy, was unsupported, although he asked for support; and because no detailed touch was kept with the enemy Fleet during the night and its whereabouts was unknown in the morning, although it had passed during the night astern of our Fleet and was already inside it and to the south of it at daylight." He also states that "it was a victory for neither side, and only an inconclusive action in which strategical and tactical honours fell to the Germans" (*Daily Mail*, October 25, 1917).

That Beatty was unsupported may be true, but the speeds of fast battle-cruisers and battleships differ considerably, and if the pursuit was to be maintained, then inevitably the battle squadrons would have been left behind. To those not on the scene of the battle all the facts of the situation are not known, and Jellicoe laid great stress on the advantage the enemy took of smoke screens and torpedo attacks to increase the range. We had experience of this in the Dogger Bank action, and we have a very skilful opponent to deal with. But it does not seem fair to rely on the German reports for an apparent tactical error during the threatened torpedo attack. Certainly the enemy managed his return to port very skilfully, but we have no evidence as to how many ships really did make port. Beatty himself was certain that we should locate the Germans at daylight, and our flotillas made several successful attacks during the night on the enemy. It was impossible to maintain a "detailed" touch with a scattered Fleet, and we know that several ships returned via the Skagerrak.

Shortly after 7 p.m. Beatty hauled round to the S.S.W. and again got into touch with two battle-cruisers and two battleships. He increased his speed to 22 knots and opened fire at 7.17 p.m., setting one ship on fire whilst another dropped astern. Further success was again denied, as the escorting destroyers emitted vast clouds of smoke, in which the enemy disappeared into the dusk shortly before 8 p.m. The 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons were then ordered to make a reconnaissance to locate the head of the line, and

at about 8.30 p.m. the battle-cruisers again engaged two battle-cruisers and a battleship at a range of 10,000 yards. *Lion* set the leading ship on fire, which turned away listing heavily, *Princess Royal* set fire to a "Deutschland" battleship, and *Indomitable* and *New Zealand* engaged and set in flames the third ship, which heeled over; but the mist coming down, they were lost sight of at 8.38 p.m. Two minutes later all our ships felt a heavy explosion, and the total destruction of one of these ships is assured. A S.W. course was still held until 9.24 p.m., when it was deemed advisable to break off the pursuit of the enemy, owing to the darkness, when the enemy destroyers would prove such a deadly menace. Beatty therefore returned to meet the battle squadrons, which had now lost contact with the scattered German Fleet and were disposed for the night for security against torpedo attacks.

Our light cruisers and destroyers, however, did not leave the enemy unmolested, and several thrilling attacks were delivered by the 4th, 11th and 12th Flotillas, and by the cruiser squadrons. At 10.20 p.m. the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron was engaged with a battle-cruiser and four light cruisers for fifteen minutes, and *Dublin* and *Southampton* came under heavy fire and lost many of their crews, but returned safely. The 4th Flotilla suffered particularly heavily and lost the leader *Tipperary*, the *Ardent* and *Fortune*; but two torpedoes—one from *Spitfire* and the other either from *Ardent*, *Ambuscade* or *Garland*—took effect on two of the fleeing ships. The attack delivered by the 12th Flotilla, on six "Kaiser" battleships and some light cruisers, was made by surprise and the third ship blew up; and twenty minutes later *Mænad* also hit their fourth ship. The only damage sustained was on board *Onslaught*. In the attack by the 11th Flotilla the leader *Castor* became heavily engaged by two enemy ships, one of which was torpedoed by the destroyer *Magic*, and this cruiser also sank at point-blank range an enemy destroyer.

The other flotillas remained with the Fleet to secure it from torpedo attack, and the 13th Flotilla, under *Champion*,

was stationed astern; at 0.30 a.m. a large ship was observed passing close to where *Petard* and *Turbulent* were stationed in the rear. Suddenly switching on her searchlights, this ship opened a heavy fire upon *Turbulent*, which at once commenced to sink. *Champion* herself was engaged three hours later by four destroyers; and *Moresby* at 2.35 a.m. sighted four "Deutschland" battleships, discharged a torpedo, and as two minutes later an explosion was felt, both by another destroyer and by *Fearless*, her loss or disablement may be inferred. According to a German deserter the *Lützow* was sunk by her crew at about 3 a.m. to prevent her capture; and if this statement is correct it would appear to be supplementary of Sir John Jellicoe's estimate of the enemy's losses.

These, then, were the principal incidents of the night actions. In the early hours of June 1, as the *Marlborough* was losing her speed, Sir Cecil Burney transferred his flag to *Revenge*, and his late flagship was detached to its base. At daybreak the Battle Fleet, now S.W. of Horns' Reef, proceeded northwards to collect the destroyers and cruisers, but not until 9 a.m. did all join up, the weather being still misty. The whole Fleet remained in this vicinity for two hours, but their presence had been reported by a Zeppelin at 4 a.m. and no sign was seen of any German ship. The scene of the battle was then thoroughly searched and several of the crews of the destroyers *Ardent*, *Fortune* and *Tipperary* were picked up, whilst the destroyer *Sparrowhawk*, which had been in collision, was sinking and its crew was also taken off. Beyond these no sailors, British or German, were seen. Shortly after 1 p.m. Jellicoe set his course for home, "it being evident that the German Fleet had succeeded in returning to port," and the battle-scarred ships arrived back on Friday, June 2. By 9.30 p.m. the Fleet was reported "fuelled and replenished with ammunition, and ready for further action." A cruiser squadron was sent out to look for *Warrior*, but after searching in vain, returned, and her subsequent foundering is evident.

So ended this tremendous battle, and it left us with the



command of the sea doubly assured. The enemy, after a stay of twenty-two months in port, had emerged at last in force for some unknown purpose; in that purpose he failed. He achieved nothing, and whilst causing us heavy loss he suffered far more heavily himself, as is known only too well by his Admiralty.

Admittedly Admiral Von Scheer extricated his Fleet from a very serious position with considerable skill, by torpedo attacks and by constantly manœuvring, but these were defensive tactics rather than offensive. Nevertheless, it is evident that had the Germans been decisively beaten, their ships would have been unable to regain port, and the enemy was but carrying out his policy of avoiding battle. The Germans fought with great gallantry, Admiral Jellicoe says, and the fight was carried out to the bitter end, each side giving no quarter, and of all the ships engaged not a single warship hoisted the white flag.

Up to the time before Jellicoe arrived Beatty was very hard pressed, and his whole squadron would have been annihilated had he not been able to maintain a superior speed. The lessons of the Dogger Bank action had been well learnt, and whereas he in this case just failed to cut off the enemy's retreat owing to the disablement of the *Lion*, in this battle he had the enemy under control nearly the whole time he was engaged. "The splendid qualities of leadership, firm determination, and correct strategic insight," to quote Admiral Jellicoe, were again very evident in this gigantic conflict, and when Sir John Jellicoe several months later took over the command of the Admiralty, it was felt that in Sir David Beatty we obtained the best successor to the most responsible post of Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet.

The main points about the action were the marked superiority of our gunnery, and the terrible effects of heavily concentrated fire upon one ship; it also illustrated the weakness of any but the thickest of armour from the effects of modern shell fire; and finally, the futility of the submarine in a naval battle. The value of the fast battleships

was strikingly shown, these ships having greater protection than the earlier battle-cruisers, whilst their somewhat smaller armament did not appear to affect the situation greatly.

The splendid discipline and order which prevailed at several critical periods amply illustrated the qualities which these two sailors, most ably supported by their vice-admirals and rear-admirals, had been able to instil into their crews in contrast to the rapid disorder and demoralisation of the enemy. It is needless to say that all the various departments exerted themselves to the utmost, whilst Sir John Jellicoe states that the work of the medical staff was "invaluable and admirable," many operations being performed during the action. Numerous instances of heroism, of course, occurred; the most notable perhaps was the splendid bravery of the sixteen-year-old boy Cornwell of the *Chester*, who stayed out under very heavy fire awaiting orders, with all the gun's crew dead or wounded and himself mortally injured. Like Commander Jones of the *Shark*, he was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. Two other V.C.s were awarded, one to Major Harvey of the R.M.L.I., who, also mortally wounded, saved his ship from destruction by ordering the magazine to be flooded, and the other to Commander Bingham of the *Nestor* for his dashing attack on the enemy battle-cruisers, in which he was taken prisoner. Another brave deed occurred during the transhipment of the *Warrior's* crew to *Engadine*, when Lieutenant Rutland, who had made the flight from *Engadine's* deck, saw a wounded man on a stretcher accidentally fall between the two ships; owing to the rolling of the ships the captain of the *Warrior* was compelled to give orders that a rescue must not be attempted, but this officer went overboard and worked himself aft and managed to put a line around the man's body. It was then discovered that the unfortunate man had already been crushed, but Lieutenant Rutland, who narrowly escaped a similar fate, was awarded the Albert Medal.

The loss of life was, unhappily, very heavy; and on the British side about 6000 sailors perished, whilst of the German casualties we have no definite knowledge. In the death of

Rear-Admirals Hood and Arbuthnot, Captains Prowse of *Queen Mary*, Sowerby of *Indefatigable*, Cay of *Invincible*, Ellis of *Defence*, Bonham of *Black Prince*, Wintour of *Tipperary*, and Commanders Kerr and Jones, the nation suffered a grievous blow. Suffice it to say that they died doing their duty, in the heat of battle for which they had made such preparations during their lives. These officers, having brought their crews to the highest state of efficiency, perished gloriously with their men.

In appreciation of the great services rendered by the Grand Fleet on this memorable day, His Majesty paid a visit to and inspected the whole of the Fleet during June 14-17, when he said in conclusion of his speeches to them, "For your splendid work, I thank you."

The material losses are appended below, but the German losses are very difficult to arrive at, inasmuch as they have never admitted half of their real losses, and the admitted ones are mostly ships which had previously been lost. All access to Wilhelmshaven was forbidden to practically every one for several months, and there is little doubt that hardly a German battleship escaped serious damage.

The German "victory" failed to alleviate the distress at home caused by our blockade and to allow the German ships to resume their trade.

## BRITISH LOSSES

Ships.	Cause.	Time.	Fate of Crew.	
			Lost.	Saved.
<i>Queen Mary</i> .	Gunfire, concentrated.	About 4.10 p.m.	1550	19, and 2 capt.
<i>Indefatigable</i> .	" "	" 4.20 "	963	2 capt.
<i>Invincible</i> .	" "	" 6.30 "	968	3 saved.
<i>Defence</i> .	" "	" 6.30 "	860	—
<i>Warrior</i> .	" , founded later at	" 8 a.m., June 1.	—	—
<i>Black Prince</i> .	Torpedo (?)	" 9 p.m.	—	—
<i>Tipperary</i> .	Gunfire.	" 9 "	175	5 capt.
<i>Turbulent</i> .	" "	" 0.30 a.m.	84	14 "
<i>Ardent</i> .	" "	" 9 p.m.	73	—
<i>Fortune</i> .	" "	" 9 "	63	—
<i>Shark</i> .	" , and torpedo.	" 6.30 p.m.	78	7 saved.
<i>Sparrowhawk</i> .	Collision and foundered.	" 9.30 "	6	Remainder.
<i>Nestor</i> .	Gunfire.	" 4.30 "	—	80 capt.
<i>Nomad</i> .	" "	" 4.30 "	—	72 "
Other ships damaged.			165	



## GERMAN LOSSES

Ship.	Cause.	Time.
<i>Pommern.</i> Battle-cruiser.	Torpedo attack by <i>Moresby</i> .	5.10 p.m.
<i>Kaiser</i> (?). Battleship.	One sunk by battle squadrons.	7 p.m.
<i>Kronprinz</i> (?). „	One torpedoed by 12th Flotilla.	Night.
“ <i>Deutschland</i> .” „	Either „ „ <i>Moresby</i> at	2.37 a.m.
— Large Cruiser.	or sunk by Beatty at	8.40 p.m.
<i>Elbing.</i> Light Cruiser.		
<i>Wiesbaden.</i> „ „	One sunk by <i>Defence</i> , <i>Warrior</i> .	6 p.m.
<i>Rostock.</i> „ „	One sunk by <i>Onslow</i> by tor-	6 p.m.
<i>Frauenlob.</i> „ „	pedo.	
— Destroyer.		
— „		
V 29. „	Two sunk by torpedo attack.	4.15 p.m.
V 48. „	One sunk by <i>Castor</i> by torpedo.	Night.
S 65. „		
— „		
— Submarine.	Rammed by <i>Valiant</i> . <i>New Zealand</i> claims another, whilst a third was reported rammed by a destroyer.	
<i>Lützow.</i> Battle-cruiser.	Destroyed by crew to prevent capture.	3 a.m.
	Probably the one attacked by Beatty at	8.40 p.m.
<i>Derfflinger.</i> „	Torpedoed by <i>Onslow</i> .	6.5 p.m.
	Reported sunk in tow off Wilhelmshaven.	
— „	Torpedoed by <i>Falmouth</i> and <i>Yarmouth</i> .	6.25 p.m.
(So badly damaged as to render their return improbable.)		
<i>König.</i> Battleship.	Attacked by <i>Marlborough</i> , or attacked by Beatty.	7.15 p.m. 8.40 p.m.
— } Destroyers.		
— }		

Seen to sink.

On both sides many ships were damaged, the British ships being *Warspite*, *Marlborough*, *Colossus*, *Chester*, *Dublin*, *Southampton*, *Defender*, *Spitfire*, *Porpoise*, *Onslaught*, *Onslow*.

The Germans again suffered more heavily here ; the following list is compiled from various neutral sources, and cannot therefore be taken as correct. Their battleships include the *König Wilhelm* (?), *Markgraf*, *Grosser Kurfürst*, *König* (damaged by *Warspite*), *Kaiserin*, *Thüringen*, *Ostfriesland*, *Rheinland*, *Westfalen* (reported sunk, probably extensively

damaged), *Hessen*; the battle-cruisers *Moltke*, *Seydlitz* (arrived at Hamburg via Fanoë badly holed), *Hindenburg* (hardly possible for her to have been completed); the light cruisers *Regensburg*, *Stettin*, *Stuttgart*, *München*, and the new *Frankfurt* and *Köln*. Ten destroyers passed through the Little Belt to Kiel damaged, but most of the ships arrived at Wilhelmshaven. where they were repaired.

## CHAPTER V

### THE DEATH OF LORD KITCHENER, THE MURDER OF CAPTAIN FRYATT, AND PATROLLING INCIDENTS, 1916-17

THE victory which was won by our Fleet off Jutland did not receive its full share of recognition until several days after, owing to the unfortunate wording of the first Admiralty statement issued on Friday night, two days after the action, which gave the impression that a serious naval disaster had occurred. This was partially corrected in the early hours of Saturday morning, but not until 9.50 p.m. on June 4 (Sunday) was any connected account published. In the meantime Germany had issued a totally false wireless statement to the world on the Thursday which, failing to receive any report from our Admiralty, also gave the opinion that the British Fleet had suffered a reverse. First impressions always remain, and whilst there appears reason for the delay, Sir John Jellicoe having to collect the many commanders' reports, the victorious return of our sailors was not adequately appreciated.

Perhaps the most remarkable fact about this conflict was the immediate return to the former conditions; to all intents the battle might never have occurred. Indeed, the present condition does not differ greatly from the status in 1915. Such are the results of an indecisive battle.

Five days after the battle off Jutland had been fought, the country suffered the terrible loss of her ablest soldier, Field-Marshal Earl Kitchener. The exact circumstances of the disaster are known to but few, but from the report of the Inquiry issued by the Admiralty it is possible to learn in what manner he lost his life. It appears that Lord Kitchener with his staff left Glasgow on June 5 on board the



armoured cruiser *Hampshire* on a voyage to Russia; and that whilst off the west coast of the Orkneys very heavy seas were encountered, seas breaking over the cruiser, which necessitated her being partially battened down. At about 7 p.m. the two escorting destroyers, *Unity* and *Victor*, were detached "on account of the very heavy seas" and the cruiser then proceeded alone. Between 7.30 p.m. and 7.45 p.m. she struck a mine and sustained such injury that she immediately settled by the bows, until, heeling over to starboard, she disappeared shortly before 8 p.m. On being struck Captain Savill at once ordered the crew to their stations, and attempts were made to lower the boats; the survivors state that the captain called Lord Kitchener to the fore bridge to get into the captain's boat, but none of them were able to say if he did get into it, nor if any boat left the ship. Three rafts, carrying sixty of the crew, were launched and cleared the cruiser; but, suffering terribly from exposure and exhaustion, they gradually dropped off, and only twelve survived the ordeal. Four boats were seen to leave the cruiser by those on shore, and patrol boats and destroyers were at once dispatched, but, as no trace of them were found, they do not appear to have been able to live in the seas.

Numerous suggestions of foul play have been put forward in the House of Commons. Chief amongst these are the presence of a Dutch vessel, suspected of minelaying, in the vicinity; the presence of acid on some of the bodies washed ashore; and the idea that the disaster was due to espionage. Whatever the cause was, either accidental or due to the act of a traitor or enemy, the loss to this country remains unchanged; and perhaps the blow came as greatly to Sir John Jellicoe as to any one, who in his message after the Inquiry says: "I cannot adequately express the sorrow felt by me personally, and the officers and men of the Grand Fleet generally, at the fact that so distinguished a soldier and so great a statesman should have lost his life whilst under the care of the Fleet." It is a most anomalous fact that this great man, winning world-wide fame on the Field, should perish at Sea; and that contrary to all likelihood, his

should be a watery grave. It is a remarkable fact that the German Press was aware of the voyage to Russia several days beforehand, and one cannot help suspecting the presence of a waiting submarine; for it seems incredible that the enemy with this information in his possession would not have attempted interference.

During the summer months the German torpedo craft at Zeebrugge showed an increased activity, interfering with the traffic between this country and Holland, and several minor engagements resulted. The first of these occurred on June 8 off Zeebrugge between our monitors and destroyers and the enemy destroyers; and our monitors, forcing the enemy to retire into port, also engaged the coast batteries. Before the second of these encounters a few small incidents have to be recorded. On the night of the 16th the old destroyer *Eden* sank in collision with another ship in the Channel, and three officers and several men were lost. An enemy claim in the early days of July that one of our submarine destroyers was torpedoed in the North Sea was denied by the Admiralty, who stated that one of our mine-sweepers had on the 4th been struck by a torpedo, but had returned to port safely. The enemy claims made during 1916 are too numerous to repeat here; they were almost entirely false; and the only losses sustained during July were the armed patrol trawlers *Eva*, *Nellie* and *Onward*, sunk on the 11th.

The second of these destroyer encounters took place in the same vicinity at midnight on July 22, when our light cruisers and destroyers sighted three enemy ships off the *Noord Hinder* Lightship. They at once made off, but, reinforced by three other ships, they were later again engaged off the Schouwen Bank; and after a running fight reached Zeebrugge with two ships damaged. The British ships escaped damage, and our only loss was two wounded.

The purpose of these raids has already been stated, and the enemy had recently seized two British steamers, the *Brussels* and *Lestris*, on June 25 and July 6 respectively. The subsequent cruel murder of Captain Fryatt of the G.E.R.

*Brussels* ranks as one of the most diabolical murders the enemy has committed since 1914. Captain Fryatt had as far back as March 28, 1915, attempted to ram the German submarine U 35 near the *Maas* Lightship; knowing full well the treatment he would receive from the submarine if he stopped in accordance with her orders, and having the lives of the passengers and crew in his charge, he dashed at full speed towards the submarine, which barely escaped destruction. His action was perfectly legitimate, and was the only method of defence he could adopt; and for his brave act he received a gold watch from the Admiralty. Since then he had been a marked man by the ruthless foe, and several attempts had been made to capture or sink the *Brussels* by their submarines. As these proved unsuccessful, the enemy resorted to his capture by torpedo boats, and one of these succeeded on the afternoon of June 25 and brought the cross-Channel steamer into Zeebrugge. The captain was sent to Bruges, and the crew to the camp at Ruhleben. Exactly a month later, July 27, the whole civilised world was shocked to learn that the brave captain had been tried by court-martial, sentenced to death as a *franc-tireur*, and executed at Bruges. This was done in spite of the urgent representations of Mr. Gerard, the American Ambassador at Berlin, who endeavoured at the least to procure for him a proper defence. There is undoubted evidence that his death had already been decided on before the mock trial began, and he was duly murdered before any steps could be taken by Mr. Gerard because "it was impossible to detain the German submarine witnesses." That this cold-blooded crime will in due course be avenged is without the slightest doubt, and one hopes that the time will not be far off before his murderers are arraigned before their judges and sent to their doom. The names of his murderers, the court as well as the witnesses, are known to the Admiralty, and they will not, let us hope, escape.

The armed steamer *Eskimo*, an ex-Wilson liner, was also captured by the auxiliary cruiser *Vineta* on the 27th in the Skagerrak and brought into port. Little of note occurred



during these months, but in August there was considerable activity. On the 13th the new destroyer *Lassoo* was either mined or torpedoed off the Dutch coast, but with the exception of five of the crew, all were rescued by Dutch torpedo boats.

On the morning of the 19th our light cruisers, supported by part of the Grand Fleet, were "sweeping" the North Sea off the enemy coast when they reported the presence of several enemy ships on the horizon. Our light cruisers at once went in search of the enemy, and *Nottingham* and *Falmouth* were torpedoed by waiting submarines, and took down with them forty-eight of their crews. The enemy did not escape unscathed, for two of their submarines were rammed, one being seen to sink, and the other in all probability being also lost. In addition our submarine E 23, sighting the returning decoying squadron, torpedoed the *Westfalen* and considerably damaged her, as she was escorted home by five destroyers. Lieutenant-Commander Turner, with great bravery, again attacked her in spite of the screen of destroyers, with what result is very doubtful. For the enemy state that she regained port under her own steam, and she figured in the Mutiny in 1917. The Germans, moreover, assert that a British battleship had been "heavily damaged by one of our submarines, a column of fire rising forty feet high from the aft funnel." This was absolutely denied by the Admiralty, as was also the claimed destruction of a destroyer. From these incidents it will be noticed that there was an increased submarine activity on both sides, and that the German Fleet did not feel equal to encounter its "beaten" enemy. Since then up to recently no German surface ships, other than torpedo craft and a few raiders, have ventured far from their shores. The German sailor from *Lützow* who had deserted states that on this same day the *Grosser Kurfürst*, *Markgraf*, *Moltke*, *Von der Tann* (?) and the new *Bayern* left Germany to bombard our coast, but on nearing it, they were warned by a Zeppelin of the approach of the British Fleet and returned. This may have been the decoying force, or it may have been

an entirely detached squadron. He also states that on the 27th the *Grosser Kurfürst*, *Markgraf* and *Bayern* unsuccessfully searched the seas for a lost Zeppelin. Whether his accounts are true we cannot say, but that several attempts have been frustrated is common knowledge.

A few days later the armed boarding steamer *Duke of Albany* was torpedoed and sunk in the North Sea with the loss of two officers and twenty-two men. On October 23 the minesweeper *Genista*, after a fight with the enemy, was torpedoed and sunk by a submarine with all but twelve of the crew. On the other hand, one of our submarines torpedoed and badly damaged the light cruiser *München* off the German coast on the 19th.

There then occurred the much-discussed raid on our cross-Channel service, which absolutely failed in its object, but caused us some losses. On the night of October 26 ten German destroyers left Antwerp or one of the Belgian bases to attempt to penetrate into the Channel and work havoc on the numerous shipping likely to be found there. Profiting by a stormy night with no moon, the destroyers managed to reach the outer patrolling cordon which unceasingly guards our transports to France. Here they met, and presumably were challenged by, the old destroyer *Flirt*; failing to receive satisfactory replies, she promptly opened fire and was engaged by four enemy ships. Our other patrols were now roused, and measures were at once taken to arrest the enemy's progress. The valuable destroyer *Nubian* was struck by a torpedo and seriously damaged, but was taken in tow; owing to the heavy weather the rope parted and she stranded. The empty transport *Queen* was also attacked and was abandoned after the whole of the crew had been taken off, though she remained afloat for six hours after. Finally seven Allied armed drifters were sunk.

On the other hand, the Admiralty stated that two German destroyers had been sunk; but this announcement was modified a few days later by Mr. Balfour, who stated that "there was ground for thinking that two German destroyers struck mines, blew up, and probably sank. There was no

ground for thinking that any German destroyer was destroyed by gunfire from British ships." But for the unnecessary air of mystery with which this small episode was enshrouded, the incident would speedily have been forgotten, as the object of the raid, that of interrupting our traffic to France, signally failed. The enemy had, aided by the bad weather, succeeded in penetrating as far as Folkestone, but once there he was immediately driven back; and as the subsequent attempts proved, he was more unsuccessful and not even passed Dover. The presence of the torpedo craft at Zeebrugge and the other ports constituted a continual menace, and as a result of this raid our cordon was drawn still tighter in the Straits.

Up to the time of writing there has not been a single soldier's life lost nor any stores, ammunition, etc., during the whole forty months which have elapsed since the British Expeditionary Force landed in France in August 1914. This truly remarkable feat which has so successfully been accomplished is in a locality only a few hours' steaming from the enemy's bases, and on this occasion alone has he met with any success.

A little incident in connection with these destroyers occurred within a few days of the raid. The Dutch steamer *Oldambt* was seized on the night of November 1 and a prize crew was put aboard, who proceeded to take her into Zeebrugge; our patrols, however, arrived and at about 7 a.m. recaptured the steamer together with the prize crew, and on the way back five enemy destroyers appeared, but at once retired, and the *Oldambt* was then towed into a Dutch port. More successful were the enemy on the 10th when the Dutch steamers *Königin Regentes* and *Batavier VI* were taken into Zeebrugge, but the former was released a few days later.

With a view to fighting this menace a series of air raids were undertaken on Ostend and Zeebrugge, and they have been attended with considerable success.

On November 4 the German submarine U 20 stranded in a fog near Harboere, Denmark, and a strong force of



destroyers, covered by several battleships, immediately came to her assistance. They were, however, unsuccessful, and she was blown up by the crew. Our craft off these coasts were not slow to take advantage of this opportunity afforded by the presence of the enemy's capital ships; and one of our submarines succeeded in torpedoing two "Kaiser" Dreadnoughts, though owing to the numerous destroyers about, the extent of the damage could not be observed.

The destroyer *Zulu* was damaged by a mine on the 8th.

Two further attempted raids by enemy destroyers were made on the nights of November 23-4 and 26-7, and both utterly failed in their purpose. In the first case six German destroyers, whilst endeavouring to pass through the Downs, were sighted at 10.45 p.m. by the Ramsgate patrol, and immediately made off before they could be engaged, though their rearmost destroyer fired upon and slightly damaged the armed drifter *Acceptable*. In the second raid the armed trawler *Narval*, engaged off Lowestoft in mine-sweeping, was sunk and the crew captured.

Beyond these two insignificant events little of importance occurred at sea during the closing days of 1916, but the end of November and the beginning of December witnessed most remarkable alterations at Whitehall. On November 29 the whole country was amazed to learn from Mr. Balfour that Admiral Sir John Jellicoe had been appointed First Sea Lord in place of Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, who was in turn appointed to the command of the Royal Naval College at Greenwich. Sir John Jellicoe was succeeded by Admiral Sir David Beatty as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet. Rumour had anticipated these changes, as it was felt that the Board of Admiralty was in need of a "re-vitalisation" with a more forceful personality straight from the actual warfare to take charge. There was no reflection cast upon the late First Sea Lord, but this war has amply shown the need for younger men fully acquainted with the entire modern factors which have presented themselves. Who, therefore, could fulfil this post without

seriously weakening the position afloat? Admiral Sir David Beatty had already shown his ability on the three occasions when he had engaged the enemy, and in him there was found the best successor. The choice apparently lay between Sir Cecil Burney and the other admirals who had so distinguished themselves in the Jutland Battle, but Admiral Burney went with Jellicoe to Whitehall as Second Sea Lord, and the country was well content that the security of the Empire should rest in the hands of the gallant Beatty.

These primary changes were of course followed by a general re-shuffling of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty and also at sea. The new Board of Admiralty appointed under the great seal dated January 11, 1917, comprised—

Rt. Hon. Sir E. Carson.	First Lord.	Succeeded Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, now Foreign Secretary.
Adm. Sir J. R. Jellicoe.	First Sea Lord.	Succeeded Adm. Sir H. Jackson, app. to R.N. College, Greenwich.
Adm. Sir C. Burney.	Second „	Succeeded Vice-Adm. Sir R. S. G. Calthorpe to Adm. Comm. Coast-guards and Reserves.
Rear-Adm. F. C. Tudor.	Third „	Remained.
Capt. Comm. 1st cl. L. Halsey.	Fourth „	Succeeded Commodore Lambert.
Capt. Comm. 1st cl. G. M. Paine.	Fifth „	<i>New Air Lord.</i>
Capt. E. G. Pretzman.	Civil Lord.	Succeeded Earl of Lytton.
Rt. Hon. Sir F. J. S. Hopwood.	Addit. Civ. Ld.	Remained.
Rt. Hon. T. J. Macnamara.	Financ. & Parl. Sec.	„
Earl of Lytton.	Addit. Financ. & Parl. Sec.	Represented Admiralty in House of Lords.

On sea in February, Rear-Admiral Sir W. C. Pakenham was appointed to the command of the Battle-cruiser Fleet, and Vice-Admiral Sir C. Madden succeeded Admiral Burney as second in command of the Grand Fleet.

Almost simultaneously there occurred the change in the Government, and it was stated that the result of the new Admiralty Board would be a stronger naval influence in the War Cabinet, and a closer co-operation with the Allied

Fleets. Illustration of this was forthcoming when on January 25 it was announced that at an Imperial Conference between the British, French, and Italian Admiralties important decisions had been reached. The new Board was at the outset confronted with a very formidable task, that of the submarine campaign, which had during December reached serious proportions. This is dealt with fully in the following chapter.

Whereas there had been no change in the Administration since the spring of 1915, during 1917 there have been many alterations which have culminated in the great misfortune of Jellicoe's resignation.

On December 21 two unnamed destroyers collided in very heavy weather and foundered, six officers and forty-nine men being lost. Just a month later a small engagement took place between our destroyers and the Zeebrugge flotilla. There had recently been a revival of activity of these craft, and the Dutch steamers *Prins Hendrik* and *Oldambt* were recaptured. About mid-January there set in a very severe frost over all Northern Europe and, evidently fearing to be frozen in, the Zeebrugge craft made a sortie to return to Germany. On the night of January 21 the division encountered our destroyers off the Dutch coast, and during the subsequent engagement our ships accounted for one of the enemy, whilst the remainder, heavily damaged, were scattered. Whether it was these ships which were again encountered off the Schouwen Bank has not transpired, but later a sharp engagement ensued, in which one of our destroyers was torpedoed and was later blown up after the survivors had been taken off. Our losses were three officers and forty-four men. One of the enemy ships later put into Ymuiden with her steering-gear disabled; her commander, two officers, and eighty men had been killed, and ten severely wounded were taken ashore into hospital. The sufferings of the wounded must have been terrible, for it was stated that the dead had frozen to the decks. From the survivors on board this ship, V 69, it appears that a



collision with another destroyer could not be averted owing to the derangement of her steering-gear, but the destroyer still continued the fight and safely returned to Germany. The crew openly stated that ten German destroyers had been sunk, but this was doubtless an exaggeration, although the enemy was severely punished. The V 69, enjoying the right of asylum until her navigating machinery had been repaired, left Ymuiden on February 13 and arrived at Emden. Damage to her military parts could not, of course, be put right.

On the night of January 25 a small unidentified vessel fired a number of shells on Southwold, but caused no casualties and hardly any damage. Whether this craft was a destroyer or, more probably, a submarine, was not discovered, but the raid in itself was insignificant. It closely resembled a submarine raid near Whitehaven on August 16, 1915, when several shells were fired on some benzine works, and another on Seaham Harbour on July 11 at 10.30 p.m., when thirty shells were fired, mortally injuring a woman and damaging a house.

Another of these raids was made on the night of February 25, when two destroyer divisions simultaneously attacked. One force was sighted and attacked by a British destroyer at about 11 p.m. and they were forced to retire. At the same time other destroyers appeared off Broadstairs and Margate and shelled the open towns for about ten minutes, retiring just before the arrival of our patrols; the casualties were a woman and her child killed and her two other children seriously injured.

Before following the later raids it will be necessary to give an account of the loss of the auxiliary cruiser *Laurentic*. This fine ex-White Star liner was patrolling off the North Irish coast on January 25 when at about 6 p.m. she struck two mines and sank an hour later. The weather was bitterly cold, and the heavy death-roll of 349 included very few killed by the explosion. Trawlers arrived on the scene about two hours after the disaster, and fortunately Captain Norton, formerly of the *Hogue*, and his boat's crew were

picked up at 1 a.m. Many were not so lucky, and one boat was not sighted until twenty-three hours later, all its crew being frozen to death.

Further misfortune followed when the transport *Mendi*, carrying the last batch of the South African labour contingent for France, collided in a fog in the early hours of February 21 with the R.M.S.P. *Darro*. The disaster occurred off the Isle of Wight, and the ship sank in twenty-five minutes, with three officers, seven Britishers, and 615 natives.

Again, on February 8 an "old type destroyer" was mined in the Channel at night, taking down with her all but five of her crew. On March 1 another was mined in the North Sea and all on board were lost; whilst a third was also mined in the Channel on the 15th and twenty-nine of her crew were lost.

Another raid on our Channel traffic was attempted on the night of the 17th. Shortly after midnight enemy destroyers appeared off Ramsgate and shelled the town, but caused no casualties, and in a few minutes hurriedly withdrew and escaped. Like the previous raid, two divisions of enemy ships were employed, the second attempting to break through into the Channel during the confusion. This division was sighted by a British destroyer, which engaged them with torpedoes and guns, but she was herself torpedoed and sunk. Another destroyer, whilst picking up the eight survivors, was torpedoed and damaged, and a steamer was also sunk in the north end of the Downs.

Enemy ships again appeared on the night of the 28th off Lowestoft and sank the patrol trawler *Mascot*, but hurriedly retired from our ships.

On March 21 it was announced that two minesweepers had been sunk by mines with fourteen of their crews; and on the 27th it was stated that another destroyer had been mined in the Channel, of whose crew only four officers and seventeen men were picked up. On this day another was lost in collision with a steamer and one of the crew was killed.

The succession of hospital ship outrages is dealt with in the following chapter.

During April and May mines and torpedoes claimed yet further victims. An old minesweeper, with twenty-four of her crew, was sunk on the 3rd; a patrol was lost in the Channel with sixteen lives on the 10th, whilst proceeding to the assistance of a hospital ship; and an old destroyer was mined in the Channel on May 2, sixty-two of the crew being lost. Another minesweeper was torpedoed on the 5th with twenty-two of her crew.

On the other hand, an unofficial report from Holland states that on the evening of May 16 a German torpedo boat and an auxiliary cruiser both foundered off Schiermonnikoog, after a loud explosion.

To combat the activities of the German Flanders flotillas, the Dover Patrol instituted a series of heavy and incessant bombardments from the air and sea, and these aerial attacks have been continued right through the year. In one of these on the night of April 17, after an aerial attack on the mole, our flotillas torpedoed two destroyers, one of which sank; the other was badly hit. Five days later our seaplanes attacked five destroyers off Blankenburge and secured a good hit on one, whereupon the others instantly closed upon it; but two hours later only four destroyers entered Zeebrugge, and it is presumed that the stricken ship, G 88, subsequently sank.

It was on the night of April 20 that there occurred the brilliant fight between the flotilla leaders *Broke* and *Swift* and six German destroyers. Our two ships, whilst patrolling at about 0.30 a.m., suddenly sighted the enemy flotilla 600 yards to port, steaming at high speed towards the English coast. The night was pitch dark, but calm. Instantly both sides opened fire, and *Swift*, commanded by Commander Peck, dashed at the leading destroyer to ram her, but missed. He, however, shot through their line and turned on his foe, torpedoing another boat in the meantime. The leading destroyer, pursued by *Swift*, fled into the darkness, but *Broke*, which was astern and had successfully torpedoed their second destroyer, loosed all her guns on the five remaining craft. Commander Evans thereupon turned



and rammed the third boat square abreast the aft funnel, and locked thus, a hand-to-hand fight ensued between the crews. In this position the other German boats poured a very hot fire into the brave little ship, but the crew valiantly drove back the boarders and, wrenching herself free, attempted to ram the sixth and last enemy ship. She failed, but hit her with a torpedo which broke her back. The two remaining uninjured destroyers then hotly engaged *Broke*, and all three ships followed the direction in which *Swift* had disappeared. *Broke* was then hit by a shell which disabled her engines; she, however, managed to shake off the enemy and made for a burning destroyer to rescue the crew, who were crying for help. On drifting up they suddenly opened fire, and *Broke* had to silence her with four rounds, finally torpedoing her. *Swift*, on her return, came across the rammed destroyer and, observing her heel over, rescued the survivors. Thus ended an action lasting only five minutes, in which the odds had been one to three, but in which the enemy had been thoroughly beaten. The two sunken ships were G 42 and G 85, and there is a possibility of a third having sunk from torpedo injury. Commanders Evans and Peck were awarded the D.S.O. for their conduct and several of the officers and crew were also decorated, whilst His Majesty sent a special message of congratulation to the crews of these little ships.

The German flotilla again emerged, and shortly after 2 a.m. on the 25th shelled Dunkirk; in the subsequent action by the patrols and batteries the French torpedo boat destroyer *Etendard* was sunk. Again, on the night of the 26th Ramsgate was revisited and two civilians were killed, but the enemy was driven off.

Off the Dutch coast a small running fight occurred on May 10 between our light cruisers and destroyers and eleven enemy destroyers. The enemy fled to the south under cover of dense smoke-clouds, and was pursued for over an hour by our ships, when four destroyers chased them into Zeebrugge. Unfortunately they were unable to engage them at close range, but several of the ships were hit. Contrary to the

enemy assertions, no British destroyer was lost, and indeed our only casualty was one wounded. Zeebrugge was also heavily bombarded on the 12th by aircraft and monitors.

On the night of the 19th another engagement occurred off Dunkirk, and four French torpedo boats engaged and pursued an enemy flotilla, suffering only slight damage.

The activity off Flanders continued during June, and we have seen a gratifying absence of destroyer attacks as a result of these incessant assaults. On June 5, during a very heavy bombardment on Ostend, six enemy destroyers emerged to escape from the terrible fire of our monitors, but they were immediately engaged by our waiting cruisers and destroyers, and a running fight ensued in which S 20 was sunk and another enemy ship was badly hit.

During the summer of 1917, beyond the inevitable patrolling losses, the warfare has been almost entirely confined to submarine hunting. There have been a few encounters between surface ships, mostly off the German or Danish coasts; and it is a gratifying feature that only once were our patrols interfered with off Flanders. The numerous destroyer losses during the spring have also been reduced, but no large ships have been in action since the Jutland battle. Indeed, the enemy is relying solely upon his submarines, and the menace absorbs all our energies.

There was much aerial activity during 1917 in addition to the daily fights off Flanders, and our patrols have accounted for a few German aircraft. Three Zeppelins were brought down by our light forces off the German coast; L 22 was destroyed on May 14, L 43 on June 14, and another on August 21. Also the drifter *I.F.S.* on June 5 attacked five seaplanes and shot down two of them, and the armed trawler *Iceland* brought down two more off the Tyne on July 9, taking four prisoners.

In the patrol of the North Sea and in the destruction of the enemy submarines we have lost several ships. In some cases the locality and date are not given.

During May the auxiliary cruiser *Hilary* was torpedoed and sunk in the North Sea, and a destroyer was lost in

collision without loss of life. Another auxiliary cruiser, the *Avenger*, was torpedoed and sunk in the North Sea on June 13, and one of the crew was lost.

On June 27 the old French cruiser *Kléber*, returning from African waters, was sunk by a mine whilst off Brest, and three officers and thirty-five men were lost. On the same day the transport *Armada* was torpedoed and sunk in the Atlantic whilst carrying a few troops, and this was the first instance of a transport being sunk in this ocean. Fortunately only eleven lives were lost. On July 4 it was announced that an old destroyer had struck a mine in the North Sea and had sunk with all but eighteen of her crew; and a newer craft was torpedoed and sunk on the 6th with the loss of eight lives.

Far more terrible was the tragic loss of the fine Dreadnought *Vanguard* on the night of July 9, whilst at anchor. She was one of our first Dreadnoughts, and with appalling swiftness blew up and disappeared with 804 of her crew, only three survivors being picked up. The disaster closely resembles the accident to the *Bulwark* nearly three years ago, and like that catastrophe the internal explosion may be attributed to gases generating amongst the ammunition. The theory of an explosive amongst the coal finds considerable support, for many ships on proceeding to sea have been found with bombs placed aboard.

Nearly a fortnight later our old submarine C 34 was sunk in an action with an enemy submarine, losing all but one of her crew. This little craft would have had little chance against the modern enemy vessels, and she was presumably engaged in coastal operations off Flanders.

In the far northern waters of the North Sea the auxiliary cruiser *Otway* was torpedoed and sunk on the 22nd, and ten men were killed by the explosion. This was the first loss in this patrol since the sinking of the *India* in August 1915. On the 30th it was announced that the old cruiser *Ariadne* had been torpedoed and sunk with thirty-eight of her crew; and on August 14 that a destroyer had struck a mine and sunk with three officers and forty-three men.



From these bald official statements it is impossible to gather any details regarding their losses.

On the other hand, one of our submarines had captured the ex-Dutch steamer *Batavier II* (seized by the enemy) on July 27, but the ship foundered before reaching port. Our light forces had also captured four German steamers off Holland on July 16 whilst endeavouring to carry on a coastal trade, and two others were forced ashore. Again, our light forces on August 16 sighted an enemy destroyer near the Bight at 9.45 a.m., and in the pursuit damaged her. Later they sighted several minesweepers and heavily hit two, but these also escaped through the minefields; our ships were unsuccessfully attacked by submarines.

Another small encounter occurred on September 1 when our light forces sank four minesweepers off Jutland, and the enemy retaliated by shelling Scarborough from a submarine on the evening of the 4th. A number of shells were fired at the town, killing three people and injuring five others, but the submarine was attacked and driven off by minesweepers. On the 15th the French patrol *Jeanne* was lost in collision, with twenty of her crew.

Off Flanders our aircraft, in the course of their daily operations, bombed enemy destroyers and sweepers on this day, and secured a good hit on a destroyer and broke a minesweeper's back. Ostend was heavily bombarded on the 22nd and again on October 21. In this area the Dover Patrol lost a destroyer by torpedo at the entrance to the Channel, with loss of life, the announcement being made on September 23.

On October 2 the old armoured cruiser *Drake* was torpedoed off the north coast of Ireland; she regained port, but foundered in shallow water, and an officer and eighteen men were killed. On the 5th it was announced that the auxiliary cruiser *Champagne* had been torpedoed and sunk with the loss of five officers and fifty-one men, and that the minesweeper *Begonia* was considerably overdue. On the 19th the well-known auxiliary cruiser *Orama* was also torpedoed and sunk, but fortunately all the crew were

saved; and another destroyer was lost in collision with all but two officers and twenty-one men.

Before following the patrolling incidents, it will be necessary to describe briefly the amazing Mutiny in the German Navy.

Most unexpectedly there was divulged in the Reichstag on October 11 the news that a very serious naval mutiny in the German Fleet had broken out on July 30, nearly three months previously. From a very vivid account by a German officer who escaped to Switzerland, published in the *Daily Mail* in October, it appears that the rising had been planned some time beforehand, and emissaries of an Extreme Socialist Party had been sent to various centres to commence a seditious propaganda. This officer had charge of seven men and women at Wilhelmshaven, who obtained positions in a huge hospital for terribly mutilated soldiers. He stated that 9000 "repulsive" patients were lying here awaiting death, and eventually they are buried at sea, sometimes no fewer than 700 a day. It was on board one of the ferry steamers employed on this gruesome task that in June there occurred the original outbreak, for when the Lutheran minister was about to consign the dead to the waves with the words, "They have given their lives for the Kaiser . . .," a mate defiantly interrupted with, "Not willingly. They would have damned their souls before offering them to the Kaiser." The crew hesitated to arrest the man, so the captain himself stepped forward to do it; a struggle ensued, and the four men who sided with the captain were thrown overboard with him, whilst the parson was shot. The mutineers were tried and shot on June 24-5. On the 29th the Socialist officer called a secret conference, at which twenty-five naval officers attended, and the propaganda was pushed forward. On July 29 news was received from Kiel that eighty-one emissaries, entered as nurses, had been arrested and taken away, and also that the crews were now housed in barracks as the authorities could not trust them afloat. This system was simultaneously commenced at

Wilhelmshaven, and on the next morning 8000 sailors and marines were called to parade to listen to an old naval officer employed on Government propaganda. Calling for cheers, he was met with an uncanny silence, and the other officers commenced to harangue the men angrily. They were met with laughter; the men were then ordered back to the barracks, passing close to the orators, who made insulting remarks to them. When one young marine sarcastically smiled at the insults, an officer struck him on the face, and there followed a terrible scene. Suddenly the men became like mad beasts, and in a few minutes over fifty officers were dead. The mutineers then wrecked the Zeppelin sheds with four airships in them, others made for the Observatory and wireless stations, and a few destroyed the railway stations. The forts now opened fire upon the Zeppelin wreckers, and the rebels tried to storm them. The north arsenal fort, however, sided with the rebels and opened fire on the other forts. A terrific din resounded over Jahde Bay, and the authorities, in order to allay the suspicions of the populace, ordered all the fortifications to join in, and later announced that there had been an Army and Navy practice! At 2.30 p.m. the fire ceased and silence reigned; this was suddenly broken by a number of terrific explosions, and it was learnt that four new warships on the stocks had been blown up. The end came tamely, for, lacking leadership, the rebels quietly made for their ships; before they reached them a heavy machine-gun fire was poured into them, and although a few guns were stormed, the rebels were surrounded by Oldenburg troops and captured. The Socialist officer and his men escaped arrest by assuming an innocent attitude in fighting the many outbreaks of fire.

Another account gives details of the revolt at sea. The crew of the battleship *Westfalen* mutinied and threw the captain overboard, and the crew of the new light cruiser *Nürnberg* also seized their officers whilst at sea and made for Norway. They, however, encountered a flotilla of torpedo boats who, getting suspicious, wirelessly to Wilhelmshaven and received orders to stop or sink her. These



rebels also surrendered. This report states that the Kaiser visited Wilhelmshaven and desired the execution of every seventh sailor ; but Michaelis dared not comply, and eventually only three were shot, many others receiving penal servitude sentences aggregating 200 years.

Revolts amongst the submarine crews were also reported, and there was an echo in the Austrian Fleet.

From the above account, it is clearly shown that the temperament of the German is unfitted for a revolution. The mutineers after an aimless outbreak of anger and rioting were ordered back to their ships by one elderly officer. Thus we have a concrete answer for those who place their hopes on a revolution in Germany.

Passing by the first convoy attack for the present, we come to a small incident of interest. On November 3 our patrols off Flanders were attacked by an electrically-controlled high-speed motor boat, but the craft was destroyed. A few days later the Admiralty stated that in 1885 a craft similar to this was experimented with by the torpedo school on *Vernon*. This boat was partially closed in and carried a drum of insulated wire about forty miles in length through which it is controlled electrically from ashore. In the bows over 300 lbs. of high explosive are carried. For attacking, the crew leave the ship after starting the engine, and it is accompanied by a seaplane at a distance of three to five miles. Thus she is able to signal to the operator the course to be given. Whilst running the craft zigzagged, and on colliding the charge is automatically exploded. She was the third boat, the first running into a pier and blowing it up, and the second was destroyed also in an unsuccessful attempt on our patrols.

On this same day our destroyers attacked and destroyed in the Kattegat the German raider *Marie* and ten patrol trawlers without loss. This ship was evidently endeavouring to gain the outer seas under cover of the smaller craft when she was intercepted. We took sixty-four prisoners.

For the first time for months the Flanders flotilla emerged

on November 12 under cover of the land batteries to attack our patrols, but they were forced to return immediately without causing us any damage. When one compares the activity of these destroyers during the winter months of 1917-18, it will be seen that the Dover Patrol had been most successful in its task.

Five days later our light cruisers sighted and engaged four enemy light cruisers and several destroyers and sweepers in the Bight; and in the pursuit our ships set their leading ship on fire, badly damaged another, whilst a heavy explosion was observed on a third. In addition a minesweeper was sunk. The enemy was pursued through his minefields by our destroyers until four battleships and battle-cruisers appeared, when he retired. We suffered a few casualties.

On December 12 one of our destroyers was lost in collision, and two of the crew were drowned.

Meanwhile there had occurred the first attack on our convoying destroyers to Scandinavia. Since April no fewer than 4500 ships had been safely escorted across the North Sea along this route, but on the night of October 16 twelve neutral merchantmen left the Shetlands under the protection of the destroyers *Mary Rose* and *Strongbow* and three small armed ships, of which one only was equipped with wireless. During the night one of the steamers fell astern owing to shifting cargo, and this armed ship was detailed to remain with her. Just before daybreak, 6 a.m., two ships were sighted bearing down upon them and, failing to get any satisfactory response, they were attacked. They proved to be a couple of very fast and heavily armed raiders, and *Mary Rose* was speedily blown up by a shell in her magazine, whilst *Strongbow* had her wireless installation wrecked by the first shot. Thus they were deprived of communication with the armed ship to the rear. After a short action lasting barely half an hour *Strongbow*, fighting to the last with her colours flying, also sank, and the enemy then commenced deliberately to shell the merchantmen without giving any warning of their murderous intention. During the action, which took place between the Shetlands

and the Norwegian coast, three steamers made their escape; but five Norwegian, three Swedish, and one Danish ship were thus sunk, and over forty of their crews were killed. Our loss was the entire crew, numbering eighty-six, of the *Mary Rose*, and forty-six on *Strongbow*, the patrol boat *Elise* very bravely picking up under very heavy fire twenty-nine Scandinavians. As neither this armed trawler nor the other which was present at the action carried wireless, the first intimation of the encounter was their arrival at 7 p.m., and thus the enemy had a whole day in which to effect his escape.

The second attack was made simultaneously with a raid on our fishing trawlers off the Tyne. At 4 a.m. on December 12 a group of six trawlers were suddenly surprised by a flotilla of large enemy destroyers and a brisk fire was opened on them. One trawler was sunk and another damaged, and two neutral steamers were also sunk. Later in the morning it appears that these destroyers were again sighted. Sir E. Geddes stated that two convoys were being escorted across to Norway when one was attacked by large enemy destroyers at 11.45 a.m.; this convoy, consisting of one British and five neutral steamers, was escorted by the destroyers *Partridge* and *Pellew* and four armed trawlers as an anti-submarine protection, but another force had been dispatched for security against any German ships. This, however, did not arrive in time. Immediately the ships scattered, but in a very few shots the four armed trawlers, *Lord Alverstone*, *Livingstone*, *Tokio* and another, were disposed of. *Partridge* was also speedily set in flames and blew up fighting to the last, and *Pellew* was badly holed and had her engines partially disabled. Later she was brought home safely. The convoy was then attacked and sunk, 115 of their crews reaching the Norwegian coast, and eighty-eight were rescued by British destroyers which had come up in advance of the cruiser squadron. *Pellew* had lost four killed and two injured, and all the crew of the *Lord Alverstone* were saved; fifteen were captured from *Tokio*, eleven from *Livingstone*, and twenty-four of the crew



of the *Partridge* were landed at Kiel. There were also reports that fourteen more had reached Bergen. The enemy again successfully escaped; and it was announced that an inquiry had been commenced into the circumstances of the non-arrival of the reinforcements.

As with the first raid on our Channel traffic, a great deal of unnecessary criticism has been expended upon these incidents. What is much more remarkable is that there have been so few attacks, for more now than ever is it easy to make these dashes upon our convoys. As Sir E. Geddes stated, the range of vision for even a light cruiser squadron on a dark night is barely five square miles, and there are 140,000 square miles of the North Sea. Given a dark night, some swift ships, and information as to the movements of the convoys, nothing is more simple for the enemy. Since this system of convoy commenced our losses in this manner are only 1 in every 200, or .5 per cent. Had the submarine losses not aggregated such a high total this incident would have passed without comment.

On December 22 it was announced that the armed boarding steamer *Stephen Furness* had been torpedoed and sunk in the Irish Channel, six officers and ninety-five men perishing, and on this day three of our destroyers were sunk off the Dutch coast one after the other. It appears that after the first ship had been struck either by mine or torpedo, the others closed upon it and shared a similar fate. The disaster occurred in a fog, and thirteen officers and 180 men were thus lost. On the last day of the year it was also announced that the minesweeping sloop *Arbutus* had been torpedoed and had foundered in the following heavy weather, two officers and seven men being lost; and that the armed boarding steamer *Grive* had been torpedoed and sunk in bad weather, but without loss of life.

Thus ended the year 1917 at sea. It had not been marked by any incidents of importance, and all operations had been confined to patrol craft. The New Year has commenced under a new Administration, and of course the future alone will show if better results will be obtained. In many

quarters there is the cry for more vigorous and energetic policy, but prophecy is a dangerous practice. Suffice it to say that under Admiral Jellicoe and his colleagues the Navy has secured for us the safety of our coasts, the safe transport of our soldiers to their respective theatres, and the supply of not only England, but our Allies and their armies. It is impossible not to have a feeling of regret that Admiral Jellicoe was ever asked to leave the Grand Fleet, and that his services should not be made the utmost use of would be deplorable.

Since the reconstruction of the new Board of Admiralty in the spring of 1917 many changes had been made in it, but the existing Board prior to Admiral Jellicoe's resignation was as follows—

Sir E. Geddes.	First Lord.	Appointed . .	17.7.17
Adm. Sir J. R. Jellicoe.	First Sea Lord.	App. Chief of Naval Staff .	14.5.17
Vice-Adm. Sir R. Wemyss.	Deputy First Sea Lord.	Appointed . .	10.17
Rear-Adm. L. Halsey.	Third Sea Lord.	„ . .	14.5.17
Rear-Adm. H. D. Tothill.	Fourth „	„ . .	„
Capt. Comm. 1st cl. E. M. Paine.	Fifth „	„ . .	„
Vice-Adm. Sir H. F. Oliver.		App. Dep. Chief of Naval Staff	„
Rear-Adm. A. L. Duff.		App. Ass. Dep. Chief of Naval Staff, for anti- subm. duties.	„
E. G. Pretyman.	Civil Lord.		
Sir A. G. Anderson.	Addit. Civ. Lord.		

The former First Lord, Sir E. Carson, became a Member of the War Cabinet.

The former Second Sea Lord, Admiral Burney, was appointed to Special Duties.

The former Third Sea Lord, Rear-Admiral Tudor, was appointed to the China Station.

This chapter would be incomplete without a brief outline of the assistance which we have received from the United States of America. Their first material help came with the arrival of their flotilla under Vice-Admiral Sims on May 16, and they immediately set to work on their task of assisting us in our convoying operations and in submarine hunting. In June during the temporary absence of Vice-Admiral

Bayly, commanding the Irish Naval Station, Vice-Admiral Sims was appointed to take over his command, and he says that it was the proudest moment of his life.

During June the first American contingent sailed for France, but before leaving home waters they were the object of a determined but unsuccessful submarine attack. On the night of the 22nd a flotilla of submarines was sighted and a very fierce fire was opened on them, to which they replied with torpedoes; one of the attackers was sunk. A few days later the attack was repeated, but they were avoided by steaming at high speed; and the troops landed in France on the 26th.

Again, submarines attacked a merchant convoy, escorted by American destroyers, whilst off the French coast, but apparently they lost one of their craft. Then on October 6 they claim the destruction of another by depth bombs. On the 16th, however, one of these destroyers was hit by a torpedo and damaged, one of the crew being killed and five injured.

On the next day the homeward-bound transport *Antilles* was torpedoed, and she sank with sixty-seven of those aboard; and on November 6 it was announced that the *Finland* had been attacked and damaged, and that eight lives were lost.

On the previous day the patrol *Alcedo* was torpedoed and sunk with the loss of one officer and twenty men; and on the 19th the destroyer *Chauncey* collided and sank with twenty-six of her crew.

During this month, however, the destroyers *Fanning* and *Nicholson* sighted a periscope and fired a depth bomb; they were rewarded by the craft rising to the surface and surrendering, but during the attempt to tow her to port she foundered.

In the early days of December another destroyer, *Jacob Jones*, was torpedoed and sunk off the Scillies, but forty-three of her crew were saved. A small patrol was also sunk in this month.

During the coming year we hope to receive very valuable



help from our Allies, both on land and sea, and Admiral Benson is co-operating with the Admiralty to secure the best results.

Mention should also be made of the aid which we are receiving from our Eastern Ally. During 1916 the Japanese relieved us of the guarding of the East Indian Ocean and the North Pacific, and their flotillas in the Mediterranean have already proved their value. In this last year their squadrons are patrolling the South Atlantic for us, thereby enabling us to concentrate our energies in defeating the submarine menace in home waters. Since the siege of Tsingtau our Allies have only lost one warship, and this loss was due entirely to accidental causes. On January 14, 1917, an explosion occurred on board the fine cruiser *Tsukuba*, which was lying in the harbour of Yokosuka, and the subsequent fire blew up the magazine twenty minutes later. About 400 lives were thus lost.

As we have been recently so often assured that we are now entering upon the final phase of this terrible conflict, it is again possible that the enemy will attempt some sort of an invasion of these shores, and it will be well to examine the question and the probability of success.

An invasion of a country, especially an insular country, is very dissimilar to a raid. A raid is purely of a temporary character, and where a few troops are landed they remain ashore just long enough for them to complete the destruction of their object, generally an observation or wireless station, or some such naval or military post. An invasion, on the other hand, is an operation in which troops, if successful in making a landing, proceed to carry out a conquest of the territory with the purpose of holding it. Now in our case, with our superior Fleet, we have been able to carry out several such invasions during the war, notably the subjugation of the German Colonies and the Dardanelles and Mesopotamian campaigns. The enemy attempted the first invasion of the Riga province by landing troops in the rear of the Russian Army, and, although the German Fleet was

vastly superior to the Russian Fleet, because he did not use his ships to the utmost advantage the undertaking was unsuccessful. With the demoralisation of the Russian nation he has been more fortunate.

With the increased stress which we hope will become more manifest in Germany, there seems every likelihood that the enemy will attempt an invasion of these shores, more as a last death struggle than anything else. The projected invasion was, we know, cancelled after the troops had left their ports on the transports. Why? The answer is simple. In an invasion of a hostile island the troops have to be conveyed across the seas in transports. Now it is evident that to send these transports across the seas without adequate protection is sheer butchery, and therefore a strong force must either accompany the fleet of transports or first proceed ahead and destroy or drive away all opposition likely to be encountered. Should the warships be successful, then the transports can proceed with their valuable cargoes and arrive at their intended destination.

This might occur in the case of the stronger Naval Power, but it is inconceivable where the inferior Navy is concerned. Firstly, once the army of invasion had been embarked upon the large liners and left port, the passage of such a large Fleet could scarcely pass unnoticed across the North Sea, either by our flotillas or our submarines off the enemy's coast, or by the shipping which ceaselessly flows through to the northern ports. (Of course, had the submarine campaign been successful, it "should" have driven all commerce off the seas.)

Secondly, should it be fortunate enough to pass these obstacles unseen as their isolated raiders have done, there remain our coastal patrols which would immediately flash out the news of their appearance and bring down the battle squadrons which are ever ready at a moment's notice. This idea is practically inconceivable, as even in the Scarborough raid the enemy made off in about forty minutes, and any disembarkation would require considerable time.

Thirdly, there remains the question of "adequate"

protection for these transports. There are apparently two methods of ensuring this : either for an action between the Fleets to be sought, when the inevitable reduction in the strength of *both* Fleets would lessen the superiority of the stronger Navy, or first clear the course to be taken either by drawing the battle squadrons away on a false scent, or by torpedo attacks drive our ships away from this vicinity.

Now it is generally recognised that any German volunteering for the invasion of England is prepared never to see his country again, save as a released prisoner of war. We have kept a considerable force of men mobilised in this country to combat this eventuality and this would be supplemented by the Volunteer Training Corps, while it is certain that practically every one capable of bearing arms would assist in the extermination of the invader, provided that necessary arms could be obtained. Therefore it appears that the object of the enemy's Fleet is not so much the defeat of our Navy, but the rendering of it harmless for the necessary period required for the disembarkation ; though it is certain that our overwhelming destroyer force, together with our submarines, would cause tremendous havoc on the enemy transports either during their passage or whilst the troops were disembarking. From this it will be seen that the destruction of these craft would also have to be undertaken, no easy task and certainly not possible before the appearance of our Grand Fleet, even if it had been deluded into following up a false scent. Even if our Fleet should suffer disaster, or, what is equally improbable, be taken unawares, the task of reducing the torpedo craft would take up too much valuable time.

There seemed the probability of this eventuality after the Jutland battle, but our Fleet remaining on the scene of the fight destroyed any shadow of a chance ; we can rest assured that should the enemy attempt this undertaking he will be encountered and thoroughly beaten by our " sure shield."

Although figures on the whole convey little to the average man, yet one cannot but be impressed by the tremendous



success of the task of the Navy given to our sailors as set forth in Mr. Lloyd George's speech on October 29, 1917. He stated that the Navy had secured the safe transport of 13,000,000 men, 2,000,000 horses, 25,000,000 tons of explosives, 51,000,000 tons of coal, oil fuel, etc., 130,000,000 tons of goods. In performance of this gigantic undertaking we have lost at sea 3500 troops, of which 2700 were lost through the action of the enemy. Earl Curzon also stated that the personnel had risen from 145,000 to 430,000, and the tonnage from 4,000,000 to 6,000,000, whilst our mine-sweepers had risen from only 12 to 3300 craft. Our submarines had made 40 successful attacks on enemy warships, and 270 successful attacks on other enemy ships. These largely consist of the haul in the Sea of Marmora.

This is the answer to the cry, "What is our Navy doing?"

## CHAPTER VI

### THE SECOND SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN, 1916-17

IN the early days of 1916 there came the announcement that a far more formidable submarine warfare would officially commence on March 1. Germany, profiting by her past experience, had constructed a fleet of "super-submarines" of greatly increased size, power, speed, and endurance. They were reputed to be of 1200 tons, with a speed of 20 knots on the surface, and an armament of 4" guns, whilst their radius of activity was stated to be of 4000 miles; thus they constituted veritable underwater cruisers. In addition they were credited with having a very sharp prow constructed to cut through the nets barring their entrance into frequented areas. With their increased radius their operations could be carried into far waters, or, on the other hand, could be used on nearer stations for a far longer period before returning home or meeting a supply ship. These details were never officially confirmed, but they are probably correct. These, then, were the craft which commenced this second campaign, but at the present time very much larger and more powerful craft are in existence.

The campaign became effective almost immediately, and the list of shipping losses at once rose considerably, amongst them being the usual proportion of outrages. The opening haul, insignificant in itself, was disquieting, as it included the French minesweeper *Au Revoir* sunk off Havre. It will be recollected that since the spring of 1915 there had been no report of the presence of any submarines in the Channel, as the nets and other devices had prevented their passage through the Straits of Dover. It was therefore disturbing, as it appeared that the new craft had overcome our obstructions.

More than ever the chief aspect of this new campaign has been the utter disregard for the shipping of the smaller neutral nations, until at the present time the list of neutral losses often exceeds the Allied losses. As early as March 16 came the first flagrant violation in the sinking of the large Dutch liner *Tubantia* off the *Noord Hinder* Lightship. There was no excuse whatever for this attack, as the steamer, outward bound from Rotterdam, was on its way to Buenos Ayres and was only calling at Dover for mails or passengers. The liner, one of Holland's largest, sank in three hours, which fortunately allowed all on board, numbering 377, to escape to the boats. This outrage, for which no satisfaction has been forthcoming, was closely followed two days later by the torpedoing of another Dutch boat, the *Palembang*, also in the same vicinity, which resulted in the loss of a life. Hereupon commenced a warfare conducted against the shipping of the world, excepting for a time American ships.

Then came the torpedoing of the cross-Channel steamer *Sussex* on the 24th. She was carrying 380 passengers and a crew of 40, and at 3 p.m. was struck by a torpedo; the boats were immediately launched, but one capsized through overcrowding, and fifty lives were thus lost, including many American and other neutral subjects. The *Sussex*, however, did not sink, and was later towed into Boulogne; whilst her assailant, understood to be U 28, was captured on April 4 off Havre. Germany made skilful attempts to repudiate all responsibility, first by entirely "disavowing" the act, then in May, when the United States refused to be taken in by their bluster, presenting a Note to Washington promising "that vessels both within and without the area declared as a naval war zone shall not be sunk without warning, and without saving human lives, unless the ship attempts to escape or offer resistance." This explicit promise has not been kept at all, and only American ships were immune from the continued ruthless barbarity. As a typical case, the day following the anniversary of the *Lusitania* crime was marked by the sinking of the White Star liner *Cymric*, which was torpedoed without warning at about 4 p.m. on



May 8, off the south of Ireland. Five of the crew were lost, but no passengers, as the liner had been converted into a cargo boat.

During the summer months there occurred the sensational arrival of the mercantile submarine *Deutschland* at Baltimore, U.S.A. This craft arrived at that port on July 9, after a passage of about sixteen days, if we are to believe Captain König's statements, of which the greater part was accomplished on the surface. She carried a valuable cargo of dyestuffs, mails, and precious stones; and she was reported to be of about 1000 tons, measuring 300' long, and 40' broad, and was capable of a surface speed of 14 knots. Her arrival caused a great impression, and it seems to have been overlooked that several Canadian-built craft had come over during 1915. A voyage across the Atlantic was undoubtedly fraught with danger, especially as the *Deutschland* had no escorting ship; but the greatest danger was when clearing home waters, after which all would be comparatively plain sailing.

The *Deutschland* left Baltimore on August 2, and arrived back at Bremen on the 24th; and a sister ship, the *Bremen*, also set out and presumably eluded our patrols, but as nothing more was heard of her it seems that she was lost at sea. More successful was U 53 who, after crossing the Atlantic, destroyed seven steamers off Nantucket on October 8, amongst which were a Dutchman and a Norwegian. Fortunately no loss of life occurred, although the steamer *Stephano* was shelled for some time before being sunk. U 53 arrived home on October 31, simultaneously with the reappearance of *Deutschland* at New London, U.S.A. Captain König stated that this time he had come north of the Orkneys instead of through the Channel, leaving Bremen on the 11th. He left America for the second time on November 21, and again safely returned to Bremen on December 10.

The *Deutschland* obtained the status of a merchantman in America, as she carried no armament, and could therefore remain for some time in port. The U 53, on the other hand, was a warship pure and simple, and only remained in Newport

for a few hours before she left to sink the steamers on her return.

Meanwhile during August and September the submarine campaign showed a slight slackening off in the rate of losses, though the neutral countries suffered as much as we and our Allies did, despite repeated protests. Spain and Norway, in particular, were singled out for indiscriminate violations, but a sharp protest from Spain resulted in a "guarantee" for the safety of the Spanish fruit ships. Norway has obtained no such satisfaction, and her losses continue to mount up.

The principal feature of the campaign at this period was the capture of several ship-captains, who were later transferred to prisons in Germany and Austria; apparently they have been well treated. The reason for their capture does not appear very evident, unless the enemy think that by such a course we shall be deprived of officers to command our ships. On October 19 the Cunarder *Alaunia* was sunk, and this month saw an increase in the daily toll of our merchantmen, as also in that of Scandinavian ships. Up to the end of this month no fewer than 153 Norwegian steamers and 58 sailing vessels had been lost, of which 97 were sunk without warning, 45 were mined, and 21 sunk either by mine or torpedo; and thus 153 Norwegians had been killed. The direct cause of Germany's hostility towards these neutral countries was their prohibition of belligerent submarines in their territorial waters, any submarine sighted being liable to destruction.

During the months of November and December the campaign assumed a formidable menace, and the daily toll increased yet more. The majority of these losses occurred in southern waters, either off Spain or in the Mediterranean, and in addition several warships fell victims to these pests. On November 6 the P. & O. liner *Arabia* was sunk in the Mediterranean, but by the splendid conduct of the passengers and crew all were saved, with the exception of two engineers who were killed in the explosion.

The most remarkable event in December was the appearance

of a submarine off Funchal in Madeira, which shelled the town for two hours and torpedoed two steamers and the French gunboat *Surprise*, with thirty-four of her crew. She was heavily fired upon by the land batteries and was driven off. This little piece of work strikingly illustrated the radius of the "war zone." On the same day the armed steamer *Caledonia* was sunk in the Mediterranean, despite a plucky attempt by the captain to ram the submarine; and he was taken prisoner on the German craft. Grave fears were entertained for his safety owing to the murder of Captain Fryatt, but the Germans, unwilling to cause another outbreak of worldwide horror, decided that he should not be shot as a *franc-tireur* as his ship was an armed cruiser, and therefore justified in the attempt. The many naval losses in the Mediterranean are recorded later.

On the other hand, there had been ample evidence that many of the German and Austrian submarines had been destroyed. The U 46 was destroyed by our patrols in the Bay of Biscay, and there was another which foundered off Norway on the 26th, whilst the Italians captured the new U 12 and the minelaying UC 12 about this time.

During the first few days of February 1917 events followed one another with extraordinary rapidity. On the 1st the German Government announced that all hospital ships would be sunk at sight owing to the "gross violation of the Hague Agreement"; they declared that "they had conclusive proof that in several instances enemy hospital ships had been misused for the transport of munitions and troops." They particularly cited the case of the *Britannic*, which had, according to "the sworn evidence of an Austrian singer, transported 2500 troops to England in November 1916." Further, that several hospital ships had at various times transported munitions from England to France, and that our hospital ships had been systematically used for the transport of troops and stores during the Gallipoli campaign. All these allegations have been emphatically denied by the Admiralty, and the only inference to be drawn from this declaration is that they are endeavouring to destroy all



shipping in order to secure for themselves a monopoly after the war.

The next step was the astounding announcement to the U.S.A. that all ships found in a specified zone (roughly encasing the British Isles from Norway to Faroe Islands, and from these islands down to Cape Finisterre in Spain, and part of the Mediterranean), irrespective of nationality, destination, or cargo carried, would be sunk without warning. Two American steamers were "allowed" to sail from Falmouth once a week (one each way), provided that the steamers should be bedecked and bedizened with colours of German choosing—"a large chequered white and red flag painted on their hulls"—to arrive at Falmouth on Sunday and depart on Wednesday; whilst a Dutch paddle-steamer would be permitted to sail between Flushing and Southwold once a week during daylight.

The impudence of this amazing declaration quite surpasses all previous German announcements, but the substance of the Note was really little different from the practice hitherto maintained, though American ships had been more or less immune. It was, it is true, a direct cancellation of the conditions laid down in compliance with the American demands after the *Sussex* outrage, and as such constituted an open challenge to the United States. Therefore it was but to be expected that America would break off diplomatic relations two days later, February 3; and President Wilson further announced that "if American ships and American lives should be sacrificed by their naval commanders . . . I shall take any means that may be necessary for the protection of our seamen and our people in the prosecution of their peaceful and legitimate errands on the high seas. I can do nothing less. I take it for granted that all neutral Governments will take the same course."

Germany claimed that she "would not be able to answer before her conscience if she left any means whatever untried to hasten the end of the war," being forced by reason of the Allies' rejection of her peace offer to fight for her existence and "abandon the limitations which she had hitherto

imposed on herself." Truly one of the most hypocritical utterances which official Germany has ever made, considering that the said "limitations" were bounded not by design but by opportunity.

The German case in these pages has not been unfairly presented, but surely there is not the slightest excuse for this step. Germany, suffering from semi-starvation during the winter months, desires her arch-enemy also to suffer privations. Whereas we can bring about our blockade without endangering the lives of neutrals, the starvation of our islands can only be ensured by the stoppage of all traffic to these shores. In order to accomplish this Germany must destroy every vessel bringing food to this country.

Thus far the German argument is plain, as it leaves out of the line of reasoning the whole question of humanity, but the German is never humane unless circumstances compel him to be. It is when he declares war on the shipping of the world in this zone that the argument becomes less clear. Certainly with America and a few other neutrals against her Germany can ultimately surrender without losing too much prestige. It appears that she expected that with President Wilson at the peace negotiations she would be able to obtain more favourable terms than she would otherwise receive from the long-outraged European Powers, or that should America take up arms she would be able to cripple our commerce before the effect would become apparent. If she expected that America would refrain from mingling in the strife and continue to derive vast profits from the Allies at the expense of her honour, she was mistaken.

Immediately following the German declaration, some of the German liners lying in the American ports and at Honolulu and Manila were extensively damaged by their crews, and in some cases rendered almost useless; amongst these was the interned gunboat *Geier* at Honolulu, which was burnt by its crew. Fortunately the majority were seized before the crews could commence their sabotage, and these liners have now been renamed and are to be used as transports.

The first neutral ship to be sunk was the Dutch *Gamma*, from New York to Amsterdam, which was shelled and finally sunk with bombs on February 1. An American steamer, the *Housatonic*, was sunk on the 3rd, but she was bound for England and was sunk after a warning. In the sinking of the Anchor liner *California* and the Cunarder *Laconica* on the 8th and 25th respectively, both without warning off the Irish coast, several American lives were lost. Since then numerous American ships have been sunk, and all of their ships are now being armed with guns. Thus war became a matter of time, and President Wilson's speech to Congress on April 3 was the only honourable outcome to the whole outrageous declaration. He truly stated that "Right was more precious than peace," and it is impossible to realise to the full extent the tremendous significance of the World's greatest Democracy, a peace-loving nation, entering this welter of blood and strife and suffering purely for the future welfare of humanity. America being so far removed from the conflict, had at times seemed indifferent to the outrages against civilisation, but for this very reason she had been able to judge with a greater clearness and coolness the tremendous issues at stake. Her ultimate decision, therefore, confirmed to the highest degree the righteousness of the Allied cause. May our high ideals remain unsullied in the hour of victory!

The material assistance which American intervention brought will become apparent as time goes on. She immediately began with the seizure of the large German liners interned in her ports, with a view to utilising them as transports for the Expeditionary Force to France. After the formal declaration of war upon Germany on April 6, the German crews were, of course, removed, and again much damage was done to the machinery of these liners, in addition to the blowing up of the interned gunboat *Cormoran* at Guam with seven of her crew. On the other hand, the U.S. guardship *Scorpion* at Constantinople was interned by the Turks.

In addition America is constructing a huge fleet of wooden,



steel, and composite ships for food transport, and they will, of course, be armed for defence against the submarines. Mines, anti-submarine devices, and numerous chasers were also sent over, and the arrival of the destroyer flotilla was the precursor of further units from the other side. With British and American ingenuity it may well be that the back of this grave menace will ere long be broken.

In addition to the menace of the torpedo, mines are a great source of trouble, as the enemy craft, specially built for this purpose, strew the shipping lanes with large numbers, generally in the wake of the minesweepers, and the task of sweeping is unending. These mines have been sown in far-distant waters, even off Aden and the Indian coast and off the South African coast. Evidence of this came in the splendid episode of the mining of the troopship *Tyndareus*; when off Cape Agulhas this ship struck a mine during a gale at 8 p.m. on February 9, and immediately began to settle by the head. She was carrying part of the Middlesex Regiment and the troops behaved splendidly, putting on their lifebelts and lining up as if on parade; and when ordered to "Stand Easy" they commenced to sing. The ship was on the point of foundering time and again, but very fortunately two steamers arrived in half an hour, and the men were safely transferred to them and taken into Simon's Town. The *Tyndareus* subsequently put in here under her own steam, though very low in the water. Like the *Birkenhead*, the troops faced the probability of imminent death with the greatest courage and discipline. The liner *City of Athens* was also mined and sunk in this vicinity on August 10, and seventeen lives were lost, sharks following in the wake of the boats.

Two chief features of the campaign at this period were the persistent attacks on the ships chartered by the Belgian Relief Committee carrying food for the stricken Belgians in the conquered territory, although under a promise of safe conduct; and the deliberate and murderous fulfilment of the German threat to sink our hospital-ships.

Of these the first victim was the *Asturias*, which was

illuminated and bore all the distinguishing marks; she was torpedoed without warning and sunk on the night of March 20, and took down with her fourteen wounded soldiers, nurses and R.A.M.C. staff, and twenty-nine of the crew, whilst thirty-nine were injured. She was carrying 1000 sick and wounded troops at the time. Thus in the second attempt the enemy was more successful.

Following this the *Gloucester Castle*, a converted Union Castle liner, was torpedoed and sunk without warning in the Channel on the night of March 30, but all the wounded were saved. The ex-Moss liner *Salta* was mined in the Channel on April 10, sinking during very bad weather; no wounded were aboard, but forty-two of the staff perished.

In consequence of these attacks our aircraft bombed the open town of Freiburg on April 14, and unfortunately killed ten women and children. The question of reprisals is a difficult one, and whilst it is a tremendous trial to refrain from actions which are rightly condemned by civilisation, even if it prevents further outrages, the temptation ought to be put aside if we intend to continue the fight against murder. After all we are fighting against this sort of thing, and our argument loses all force if we use these selfsame methods.

On the night of the 17th two further attacks were made. The *Lanfranc* (Booth liner) and the *Donegal* (Midland Railway) were both torpedoed and sunk at about 8 p.m. in the Channel, and considerable loss of non-combatant life resulted. The *Donegal* was carrying slightly wounded cases, and 29 of these as well as 12 of the crew were lost. The *Lanfranc* carried 234 British, and 67 German wounded, a medical staff of 52, and a crew of 123. Of these 13 British soldiers, 5 of the crew, and one of the staff were drowned, in addition to 15 German wounded who displayed great cowardice in rushing for the boats; many of these were helped into the boats by British wounded. Owing to the previous attacks our hospital ships, in order to reduce the target for the waiting enemy, no longer bore distinguishing marks or brilliant lights, and were provided with escorts. One of these ships, however, was distinguished; both were escorted,

With the exception of the torpedoing of the *Dover Castle* (Union Castle Line) in the Mediterranean on May 26, in which six lives were lost, no further attacks were made during 1917; and in August it was reported that negotiations between the Spanish Government and Berlin were proceeding whereby hospital ships were to be safeguarded, provided that a Spanish naval officer was on board. On the 16th Lord Robert Cecil confirmed the report, but stated that Germany had not acquiesced; and on the 31st a German wireless displayed great distrust, inquiring how the German submarine commanders would be safe against any repetition of the *Baralong* affair. However, arrangements were satisfactorily concluded on condition that our ships kept out of the specified zone and disembarked their patients at a western port; and until early in 1918 there was no departure from this contract.

April was by far the worst month for our shipping, for it would seem that with the shorter days the new craft were very successful. During the week ending the 22nd no fewer than forty-one large and fifteen small steamers and ten fishing craft were put down, and it is understood that our losses during this month aggregated about 850,000 tons. Whilst the Admiralty continued to refrain from publishing the lost tonnage, the enemy, on the other hand, made very serious claims, his record being—

January	.	.	.	.	439,000 tons
February	.	.	.	.	781,500 „
March	..	.	.	.	861,000 „
April	.	.	.	.	1,091,000 „
May	.	.	.	.	869,000 „
June	.	.	.	.	1,000,000 „
July	.	.	.	.	500,000 „
August	.	.	.	.	808,000 „
September	.	.	.	.	672,000 „

But Sir Eric Geddes on November 1 stated that for the last two months the British losses were only about 200,000



each. He said that the enemy would dearly like us to publish our tonnage losses, as he was completely in the dark as to the identity of his victims. In many respects the weekly returns are undoubtedly misleading, for a coasting steamer putting in at three ports close together registers six in the traffic return. That the number of ships lost has not reduced the in and out traffic to any degree is explained by the better use of our ships. There are very few fishing craft and not many small steamers now put down, but the recent big ship losses are barely two below the average. Certainly the losses are now lighter than a year ago, but it must be remembered that from February 5 to December 29 no fewer than 750 large and 269 small steamers and 168 fishing craft were sunk, and as time goes on there are less and less ships left to carry on the trade. For Sir E. Geddes has stated that our rate of construction does not equal the rate of destruction, and that the enemy is building submarines faster than we are destroying them. It is understood that their rate is about two or three a week; they have now reached the large dimensions of 5000 tons, and they carry 6" weapons. The existence of *dépôt* submarines such as the *Deutschland* has greatly facilitated their operations.

The average French losses are about two large and three small ships, with a weekly traffic of about 1800; Italy's average is also about two large ships, but only one small ship, and her traffic is about 825 in and out sailings. Norway's losses are stupendous for a neutral, now aggregating 324 ships sunk.

In spite of these obstacles our anti-submarine system has resulted in the destruction of over 50 per cent. of the enemy craft in the Arctic, Atlantic and North Sea; and during the period from August to October we had accounted for as many as we had destroyed during the whole of 1916. We know that the practice of employing seaplanes as escorts has met with success; and that the system of convoy, whilst possessing many disadvantages, has resulted in losses equalling only 1 in 200.

Quite a number of theories have been put forward when the weekly returns show a fluctuation either one way or the other, but there does not seem really any certain rule as to adverse conditions. Those who based their hopes in the spring on better things on the grounds that during the longer days our patrols would have a longer hunting day, forgot that this same factor meant that our ships were thus in danger for a longer period, and that the submarine could observe the surface of the seas for a greater distance in the calm weather. Again, the theory that shorter days would mean less daylight for the submarine commanders, similarly overlooked the fact that stricken ships would have less chance of regaining port in foul weather. Perhaps the best reason for these fluctuations is that, as in everything, there are more successful men engaged, and these more skilful German commanders are quite well known to our sailors; thus they know when they have returned home for overhauling, and when they are again preying upon our commerce.

The complaint that ships, notably the meat ship *La Blanca*, have been torpedoed after leaving one British port *en route* for another is a very serious fact in these times. In this particular case engine trouble had caused this ship to put into the nearest port, and she had then been sunk whilst proceeding to her destination. It has been officially stated that only unforeseen circumstances have been the cause of such mishaps.

The enemy continues to commit foul murders on the seas, and the sinking of the steamer *Belgian Prince* on July 31 was a typical case of German cruelty. After this steamer had been torpedoed the captain was taken into the submarine as a prisoner, and the crew, divested of their lifebelts and much of their clothing, were placed on the submarine's deck. Suddenly without the slightest warning the craft dived and left the struggling men to drown in the water. Thus only three out of a crew of thirty-eight survived and were picked up.

Then the Elder-Dempster liner *Apapa* was torpedoed shortly after 4 a.m. on November 28, and commenced to

sink on an even keel. The passengers were taking to the boats when another torpedo came along which immediately blew up the sinking liner, and she fell over to starboard, thereby taking down all the starboard boats which had not yet been launched. Over eighty lives were lost through this inexcusable act, and there was no approaching British patrol or ship to warrant the firing of the second torpedo.

There has been considerable activity in the Irish Sea, but on the whole the majority of the losses occur in the Mediterranean; and off the East Coast the losses have almost been reduced to *nil*.

In spite of these formidable obstacles the spirit of the seamen remains undaunted, and no tribute can be too high for these men who "carry on." Torpedoed crews sign on directly they arrive back in port, and many have been torpedoed five or six times. The case of the skipper of the fishing smack *Nelson* is but typical of the dogged spirit of them. One August afternoon a submarine was sighted and shells were fired on the little ship; Skipper Crisp, however, ordered his fire to be withheld until the craft was but 100 yards away. The enemy's fourth shot unfortunately mortally wounded the brave skipper, and his son took the tiller; when only five rounds of ammunition were left he ordered the survivors to "abandon the ship and throw the books overboard." He refused to be taken into the boat, and said to his son, "Tom, I'm done. Throw me overboard." He could not be moved, and when his little ship sank fifteen minutes later, he went down with her. Two days later the few survivors were picked up. Skipper Crisp was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.



# ADMIRALTY RETURNS OF SHIPPING LOSSES, 1917

Date.	All Nationalities. Excluding Fishing and Local Craft.		Over 1,600 tons.	Under 1,600 tons.	Fishing Craft.	Unsuc- cessful At- tacks.	Total Sunk.	Total At- tacked.
	Arrivals.	Sailings.						
Feb. 25 . .	2,280	2,261	16	6	5	16	27	43
Mar. 4 . .	2,528	2,447	15	8	2	14	25	39
„ 11 . .	1,985	1,959	12	3	3	12	18	40
„ 18 . .	2,528	2,554	17	8	21	21	46	67
„ 25 . .	2,314	2,433	20	7	14	11	41	52
Apr. 1 . .	2,281	2,399	18	14	3	21	35	56
„ 8 . .	2,406	2,367	17	2	7	12	26	38
„ 15 . .	2,379	2,331	19	9	11	13	39	52
„ 22 . .	2,585	2,621	41	15	10	29	66	95
„ 29 . .	2,716	2,690	39	12	7	29	58	87
May 6 . .	2,374	2,499	19	22	15	30	56	86
„ 13 . .	2,568	2,552	17	5	3	15	25	40
„ 20 . .	2,664	2,759	19	9	3	12	31	43
„ 27 . .	2,719	2,768	18	2	2	22	22	44
June 3 . .	2,693	2,642	15	3	5	15	23	38
„ 10 . .	2,767	2,822	24	11	6	20	41	61
„ 17 . .	2,897	2,993	25	5	—	37	30	67
„ 24 . .	2,876	2,923	21	6	—	19	27	46
July 1 . .	2,745	2,846	16	5	12	14	33	47
„ 8 . .	2,898	2,798	13	3	6	16	22	38
„ 15 . .	2,828	2,920	15	4	8	11	27	38
„ 22 . .	2,791	2,791	19	3	1	16	23	39
„ 29 . .	2,747	2,776	22	3	—	12	25	37
Aug. 5 . .	2,673	2,796	20	3	—	12	23	35
„ 12 . .	2,776	2,666	15	1	3	9	19	28
„ 19 . .	2,838	2,764	15	4	2	14	21	35
„ 26 . .	2,629	2,680	20	6	—	8	26	34
Sept. 2 . .	2,384	2,432	19	2	—	6	21	27
„ 9 . .	2,744	2,868	11	15	4	10	30	40
„ 16 . .	2,695	2,737	9	11	1	11	21	32
„ 23 . .	2,775	2,641	12	2	2	12	16	28
„ 30 . .	2,680	2,742	10	4	—	11	14	25
Oct. 7 . .	2,519	2,632	13	2	5	4	20	24
„ 14 . .	2,124	2,094	14	5	—	6	19	25
„ 21 . .	2,648	2,689	19	8	—	7	27	34
„ 28 . .	2,285	2,321	13	4	—	4	17	21
Nov. 4 . .	2,384	2,379	6	4	—	3	10	13
„ 11 . .	2,125	2,307	1	5	—	5	6	11
„ 18 . .	2,531	2,463	11	7	—	3	18	21
„ 24 . .	2,058	2,122	13	7	—	10	20	30
Dec. 1 . .	2,179	2,133	16	1	4	11	21	32
„ 8 . .	2,426	2,384	14	7	—	9	21	30
„ 15 . .	2,461	2,499	13	3	2	11	18	29
„ 22 . .	2,341	2,460	12	1	1	12	14	26
„ 29 . .	2,111	2,074	18	4	—	7	22	29
TOTALS . .	113,950	115,114	749	271	168	602	1,190	1,792

Total traffic . . . 229,064

(Excluding a large ship sunk during November, and another and a fishing vessel sunk during raid on convoy, December 12.)

AVERAGES . . . 2,532 2,558 16.6 5.97 3.73 13.28 26.3 39.6

Average total traffic for the 45 weeks: 5,090.31

## PART II

### CHAPTER I

#### THE SIEGE OF TSINGTAU, AND THE CAREERS OF THE GERMAN CRUISERS AT LARGE

THE German settlement of Kiao-Chau dates from 1898, when Germany demanded from China the lease of this area in compensation for the murder of two German missionaries by the natives. Since that date this undeveloped tract of land with the fine natural harbour at Tsingtau has grown almost out of all recognition, for the Germans were not slow to realise the immense importance of establishing a base or colony whence Teutonic affairs in the Far East could be controlled. The only European Power of any importance without settlements in this quarter, beyond a few scattered islands in the Pacific, it behoved Germany to obtain a naval base to uphold her prestige in the impressionable East.

She commenced by constructing very efficient landworks to guard the harbour and anchorage, and from time to time several warships have been based upon this port to fly the German flag in these distant waters. In 1914 there was a very powerful squadron at Tsingtau under the command of Vice-Admiral Graf von Spee, consisting of the two armoured cruisers *Scharnhorst* (flagship), *Gneisenau*, the light cruisers *Emden*, *Leipzig*, *Nürnberg*, and the Austrian *Kaiserin Elisabeth*, the old large gunboats *Geier*, *Cormoran*, the smaller river gunboats *Ilitis*, *Jaguar*, *Luchs*, *Tiger*, *Ruchin* (minelayer), the destroyers *Taku*, *S 90*, and finally a few liners, one of which, the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, escaped with the cruisers and put to sea. In addition there were the two small river craft of the type used by the Powers for suppressing Chinese piracy in the numerous creeks and rivers, the *Tsingtao* and *Vaterland*, based upon Canton and Nankin respectively.

When war broke out, with the exception of the two armoured cruisers and *Nürnberg*, which had been at Ponape in the Carolines since July 20, the remaining ships were lying in Tsingtau.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was founded upon the understanding that Britain would safeguard Japanese interests in the West, whilst Japan was to guarantee ours in the East should they become at all jeopardised. Nevertheless we always kept a considerable squadron (detailed in the first pages of this book) based upon Hong-Kong to counterbalance the growing European forces in this region; there were also the East Indies and Australian squadrons to reinforce it if necessary, and in 1914 there were in addition the French cruisers *Montcalm* and *Dupleix* and a few destroyers at Saigon, and the Russian *Askold*, *Zhemtchug*, and a few torpedo craft at Vladivostock. With these forces the containment of the German squadron seemed assured, but unfortunately this was not the case, for two days after Britain's declaration of war the *Emden*, *Leipzig*, *Cormoran*, *Geier*, and the Hamburg-Amerika liner *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* succeeded in eluding our China Squadron and gained the outer seas, where they rejoined Von Spee at a rendezvous at the Marshall Islands on the 19th.

Though they had forestalled the intervention of Japan, which would have rendered their escape practically an impossibility, our Ally very soon ranged herself with the Entente, and on August 15 presented an ultimatum to Germany requesting the disarming of her warships and the surrender of the colony, seven days' grace being given. There was, of course, no answer forthcoming, and war was declared on the 22nd. A blockade of the coast was announced on the 27th, and preparations were commenced for the reduction of this stronghold.

In the meantime a very daring reconnaissance of the fortifications was made by the destroyer *Kennet* on the 24th, but coming under heavy fire from the forts, she lost four men killed. Not so fortunate were the Japs, for on the night of September 4 the destroyer *Shirotaye* was patrolling the coast



and had the ill-luck to run aground, the crew being compelled to abandon her. This was followed a fortnight later by the loss of their torpedo boat No. 33, which was shelled and sunk by fire from the German gunboats in the harbour.

On September 19 the Anglo-Japanese Expeditionary Force left Tientsin for Lao-Shan Bay, accompanied by *Triumph* and *Usk*, and arrived on the 22nd. Minesweeping then commenced, attended by the loss of a Japanese minesweeper, and on the next day the troops landed and began the siege of the German base. Heavy fire was opened on the forts and gunboats, the destroyer *Taku* being destroyed, and on October 6 two others were also sunk and *Iltis* damaged.

Our ships greatly assisted the troops in the investment and frequently came under fire whilst operating in the bay. On the 14th *Triumph* was struck by shell fire and lost three men killed and wounded, and on the night of the 17th our Ally suffered the heavy loss by torpedo attack of *Takachiho*. This ship was patrolling Kiao-Chau Bay when out of the darkness the destroyer S 90 loomed in sight and discharged a torpedo at her, which sank her with all but one officer and nine men.

On the night of November 6 the Austrian cruiser *Kaiserin Elisabeth* was blown up in the roadstead, and on the next day the Governor surrendered to the troops. All the vessels were found to have been destroyed by their crews or sunk by gunfire with the exception of S 90, which had endeavoured to escape from the doomed base three days after her successful attack on the cruiser, but had stranded sixty miles to the south and become a total loss. In addition two auxiliary cruisers were discovered and one blew herself up, whilst the other was captured.

So ended an episode which was neatly carried out with comparatively small loss of life. Japan had thus punished the second of the Powers which had robbed her of the fruits of her victory against the Chinese in 1894-5, and though the importance of the capture of Kiao-Chau was overshadowed by the dark days which we were experiencing nearer home,

yet the removal of this fortified base had a considerable influence on the subsequent events; it deprived Von Spee of any adequate base and at the same time released many Allied warships to scour the seas for the German cruisers at large.

Before following Von Spee, it will be convenient to take the case of the German warships in the Mediterranean, as they were the first of Germany's cruisers to be run to earth. These were, of course, the fine battle-cruiser *Goeben*, the fast new light cruiser *Breslau*, and the old *Panther*, notorious in the Agadir incident in 1911; they were based upon Austrian ports; the two former ships were reputed to be amongst the fastest warships afloat, and arrived in the Mediterranean in 1912 after their completion.

The latter days of July 1914 in the Mediterranean were full of complications, for the Entente Powers were in the perilous position of not knowing who were their secret enemies. In agreement with the treaty with France we were bound to protect the northern seaboard of France, whilst she had to guarantee our interests in the busy Mediterranean; but as well as this France had to transport her Algerian army to Marseilles at a time when the attitude of Italy was an uncertain factor, and the two enemy cruisers were at large.

We had in the Mediterranean at this time a powerful squadron based upon Malta, consisting of the battle-cruisers *Indefatigable*, *Inflexible* and *Indomitable*, the armoured cruisers *Defence*, *Warrior*, *Black Prince*, *Duke of Edinburgh* of the First Cruiser Squadron, *Chatham*, *Dublin*, *Weymouth*, *Gloucester* of the Second Light Cruiser Squadron, and the Fifth Destroyer Flotilla comprising sixteen "G" craft; finally there were three old submarines, six old torpedo boats, and three auxiliary ships. Taken collectively it will be seen that the Allies had a very powerful force in these waters, although France did not possess a single fast cruiser, and it seemed that the capture or destruction of the two swift enemy ships was purely a matter of time.

It seems that we contented ourselves with merely "shadowing" them; but it must be borne in mind that the bulk of the French Fleet was engaged in transporting the French troops, which they accomplished without the loss of a single life, and that Rear-Admiral Troubridge with the Second Battle-cruiser Squadron was stationed in the Straits of Otranto, containing the Austrian Fleet and preventing the return of the cruisers. Also that doubtless a considerable part of the Allied Fleet was at hand in the event of Italy declaring war.

On August 1 the *Breslau* met the *Goeben* off Brindisi and they were joined by the supply ship *General*, with the evident intention of seriously deranging the French transportation. Arriving at Messina, they were informed that coaling by belligerents was prohibited by the Italian authorities, and were therefore obliged to coal from the German steamers in port. They left during the early hours of August 3, and at 6 p.m. Admiral Suchon was informed of France's declaration of war, at the same time being ordered to "make for Constantinople with all speed." It is highly significant that Germany had even then determined to embroil the Turk in the war. Suchon was, however, fully resolved to get in the first shot, and made for the ports of embarkation of the French troops. Arriving off Philippeville at 4 a.m. on August 4, he shelled the town whilst *Breslau* fired upon the towns of Bona and Bougie, but failed to cause any serious damage; returning to Messina, they met at 10.45 a.m. *Inflexible* and *Indomitable*, which were later joined by *Weymouth*, and knowing that England's declaration of war was only a matter of hours, Suchon again entered the port where the German liner *General* was awaiting him and coaled from her.

This was a most audacious move, but Suchon fully expected that Italy would adhere to the Triple Alliance, although not bound to such a course unless an Ally was unprovokedly attacked; much to his astonishment he was informed that "on the ground of neutrality" Italy gave him twenty-four hours in which to leave. *Goeben* therefore



left at 5 a.m. on the 5th, nearly six hours after Britain declared war, followed at a distance of five miles by *Breslau*, who was ordered to close up at night, both steaming at a speed of 17 knots. *General* was ordered to work along the coast to Santorin, and she eventually reached Turkey.

Thus they left Messina, with bands playing and flags flying, and so fully determined to fight their way through that the officers left their wills in the hands of the German Consul. It was commonly supposed that the British battle-cruisers were at the southern exit to the Straits, and that a strong French squadron awaited the enemy in the northern entrance ; but this was only partly true, as Rear-Admiral Troubridge was fulfilling the important dual rôle of containing the Austrian Fleet and barring the return of Suchon. At the Court of Inquiry into the circumstances his course was upheld, and he was acquitted of any blame. His fine work in Serbia later is recorded further on.

On reaching the open seas Suchon received the following message from the Kaiser : " His Majesty fully expects the *Goeben* and *Breslau* to break through." Shortly afterwards *Gloucester* was sighted wirelessly that they were making for the Straits of Otranto, and as this admirably suited their plan she was unmolested. At 10 p.m. *Breslau* closed up and immediately came the signal, " Make for Cape Matapan " (Greece), and simultaneously *Gloucester's* wireless was jammed for two hours, thereby preventing their change of course becoming known, and thus gaining the precious time on which the whole plan of escape depended.

Now commenced the famous flight of these cruisers which, steaming at their utmost speed, eluded the outlying cruisers, the pursuing *Gloucester* and a few destroyers, which were on their track. Only when the *Ægean* Sea was reached were these destroyers, headed by *Gloucester*, shaken off for a time amongst the many islands. *Goeben* could have sunk her small pursuer with a few shots had she known that there was no support at hand, but by this bold pursuit a contrary impression was created, and the German ships were unable to cause any damage to our shipping in the busy lanes.

The conduct of the *Gloucester's* captain has rightly been described as "a model for the Navy."

Once in the *Ægean*, they were able to gain time enough to coal from transports sent out by King Constantine in direct contravention of the wishes of M. Venezelos, the Premier. With the 1000 tons of coal, they were able to enter the Dardanelles on August 11, just five days after leaving Messina. The excessive strain put on the *Goeben's* boilers resulted in the furnace crowns collapsing, and the damage has never been satisfactorily repaired.

Turkey had now these two warships on her hands, and supported by Germany, considered herself justified in "purchasing" the cruisers to replace the *Reshadieh* and *Sultan Osman I* (building in England and acquired by us for £4,000,000); she also stated that the crews had been landed and the Star and Crescent hoisted. That this statement was a falsehood was soon known, and the Turks' duplicity led to the recall of the British Naval Mission under Rear-Admiral Limpus on August 14.

The gunboat *Panther*, after being erroneously reported sunk, arrived at Smyrna on the 24th. Little is known of her career, but one would not be far wrong in supposing that her escape was facilitated by the doubtful attitude of a neutral Power.

The remaining episodes in the careers of the two cruisers will be dealt with in the chapter on the Black Sea campaign.

In addition to Von Spee's squadron there were several other cruisers and gunboats scattered about the globe. Representing the German flag in Indian waters was the small squadron based upon Dar-es-Salaam, the capital of German East Africa, consisting of the light cruiser *Königsberg*, and the two gunboats *Eber* and *Möwe*. The *Eber* was at Cape Town on the outbreak of war, but hurriedly put to sea and reached Bahia in Brazil during September, where she lay interned until that country declared war on October 26, 1917, when her crew set her on fire and destroyed her. The destruction of the two other ships was accomplished

quite early, for on September 9 Dar-es-Salaam was shelled by our old cruiser *Pegasus*, and amongst the shipping destroyed was the *Möwe* and the floating dock. Retribution, however, soon followed, for ten days later, whilst *Pegasus* was cleaning out her boilers and repairing her machinery in Zanzibar Harbour, *Königsberg* suddenly appeared and at about 5 a.m. opened fire on the British cruiser. Although taken at such a disadvantage and completely outranged by her antagonist's newer 4" guns, *Pegasus* put up a gallant if ineffectual fight, but was very soon completely disabled, and she had to be beached on the following day. She had lost seven killed and thirty-seven wounded, but she does not appear to have caused *Königsberg* any damage, as the latter steamed away to the south. The heroism of the party of Marines, who continued to hold up the colours when they had been shot away, will long be remembered.

As a result of this attack, combined with the serious depredations of the *Emden* in the Indian Ocean, a vast concentration of Allied cruisers was organised to run these raiders to earth. On October 30 the *Goliath*, *Chatham*, and *Weymouth* discovered the *Königsberg* lying up the Rufiji River in German East Africa, hidden by the dense foliage. Being of greater draught, the pursuers were unable to reach her, and though she was attacked by gunfire the results could not be observed. The three British ships lost two men killed and one officer and one man wounded. Colliers were then sunk in the only navigable channel to "bottle her up," although to all appearances she was aground, and her crew were entrenched on the river banks; pending her actual destruction *Dartmouth*, and later *Weymouth*, were left on guard.

Though prevented from committing further damage to our shipping (her only exploit had been the sinking of the *City of Winchester*, value £275,000, off Socotra on August 6), her total destruction would not only release any guarding ship, but remove any uneasiness as to her possible escape. The Admiralty, therefore, sent out two monitors in June 1915 to complete the task, as they would be able to close up nearer



owing to their shallow draught. At 4.15 a.m. on July 4 *Mersey* and *Severn*, accompanied by *Weymouth*, *Hyacinth*, and *Pioneer*, arrived off the mouth of the Rufiji. The position of the cruiser was first located by seaplanes, and at 6.30 a.m. fire was opened; the reply was rapid and accurate, and *Mersey* was hit twice and lost four killed and four wounded. Spotting was very difficult for our ships, whilst the enemy had in all probability the ranges worked out beforehand. At noon *Königsberg's* masts were still standing, but when a salvo burst aboard, fires broke out and her reply ceased. In the meantime *Weymouth* engaged the batteries on the banks, whilst *Pioneer* shelled the guns at the mouth of the river.

A further attack was delivered on the 11th, and it was during this day that everything aboard the monitors, including even the faces of the crews, was painted green, while boughs were plentifully strewn about the decks to give the impression of a floating island, common in those parts. Being thus able to drift quite close to the cruiser, they suddenly opened fire and set her ablaze fore and aft, completing her destruction. *Mersey* lost two more wounded on this day.

Subsequently the guns of the *Königsberg* were brought ashore and were used against our forces in the German East African campaign, whilst her gunners were employed on the great lakes on armed steamers and gunboats, whose exploits are described further on.

The few remaining gunboats were speedily destroyed or rendered harmless, and none of them had any destructive careers. *Soden* was captured by our forces in West African waters on September 30, *Komet* was discovered by the Australian gunboat *Nusa* at Rabaul, New Guinea, on October 15, where she was sending out wireless messages about the movements of our cruisers, and became an unit of the Australian Navy under the name of *Una*; *Planet* was scuttled by her crew in the Caroline Islands during September, and finally the *Tsingtao* and *Vaterland* were disarmed on September 26 and August 18 at Canton and Nanking.

Returning to the Far Eastern Squadron, we find that on

escaping from the besieged base *Emden*, *Leipzig*, *Cormoran*, *Geier*, and *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* (now armed) rejoined Von Spee on August 19 at the Marshall Islands. He had left the Carolines after the declaration of war and sailed northwards to an island where he coaled and provisioned, then turning southwards, he arrived at the Marshall Islands with the whole squadron. *Emden* almost immediately parted company and sailed westward to carry out independent operations in the busy Bay of Bengal, where victims would be numerous; *Nürnberg* also left for Honolulu, and the remaining ships set their course for Fanning Island. Here *Nürnberg* met them on September 6, and cut the cable to Bramfield Island on the next day. From thence the squadron sailed for Tahiti, where on the 22nd they found and destroyed the disarmed and dismantled French gunboat *Zelée*, and they also shelled Papeete. Meanwhile *Leipzig* had on the 18th sunk the oil-tanker *Elsinore* and landed her crew on Galapagos Island.

In following the course of these cruisers one has to depend to a great extent on the letter of a German sailor, but its authenticity seems indubitable. Leaving the Polynesian Archipelago behind him, Von Spee started across the Pacific for Easter Island, where he found the *Dresden* awaiting him. This cruiser had been operating in the South Atlantic and had sunk the steamers *Hyades* and *Holmwood* off Pernambuco on August 16 and 26 respectively, but when these waters had become too hot for her she left for the Pacific, and on her way sighted and chased the steamer *Ortega* into the uncharted Nelson Strait in Southern Chile. *Ortega's* captain brought his ship safely through, was specially complimented by the Admiralty for his skill and bravery, and was later awarded the D.S.O. in addition to French decorations. Captain Kinneir was later granted a commission in the R.N.R., but died recently.

The two gunboats were presumably left behind, as they turned up at two American ports some time later, *Cormoran* at Guam in the Marianne Islands on October 7, and *Geier* at Honolulu on November 6, where they lay interned until

America finally declared war upon the world's enemy. The latter was set on fire by her crew on February 3, 1917, when diplomatic relations were severed, and the *Cormoran* was blown up on April 7, with the loss of two officers and five men, when war was declared.

Von Spee continued his course across the Pacific with either the intention of bombarding the British Columbian seaboard, or making a dash up the Atlantic home, or both. It was whilst on the way to the Canadian coast that the fight off Coronel happened.

In order to take the whole of the circumstances into consideration it is necessary to go back to the late summer of 1913. On September 28 Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock left Devonport in command of the newly constituted West Atlantic Squadron (Fourth Cruiser Squadron), which comprised *Suffolk* (flag), *Essex*, *Berwick*, *Lancaster* and *Bristol*. This fact is important as it constitutes an emphatic denial of the charge that this admiral was sent out with an entirely inferior squadron to fight Von Spee's powerful squadron. At that time these two admirals with their squadrons were at totally different sides of the world, and no one could foresee that they would be pitted against one another in a death-struggle, especially as our China Squadron had been strengthened to counterbalance the German Eastern Fleet.

As it was, the vast concentration of Allied warships, composed of as many ships as we could spare and divided into small squadrons, prevented Von Spee from attacking our Canadian ports. Unfortunately one isolated squadron, consisting of *Good Hope* (the new flagship of Rear-Admiral Cradock), *Monmouth*, *Glasgow* and the auxiliary cruiser *Otranto*, encountered the enemy off the Chilean coast on November 1. Cradock had passed the Straits of Magellan on October 1, and had vainly sought for the enemy; sweeping up the coast in another attempt to locate Von Spee, he was about to receive reinforcement in the old battleship *Canopus*, a slow ship of 17 knots at its best, but carrying heavy guns. Cradock decided that his duty lay, rather than



in retiring before the superior foe and leaving a course open for the Canadian coast, in endeavouring to inflict enough damage on the Germans to necessitate the temporal postponement of their project long enough to allow other pursuers to converge upon them. This unselfish decision ended in the sacrifice of this noble officer and his men.

The best account of the battle is given in a letter of Von Spee's to a friend, as the report of the *Glasgow*, the survivor of the action, is necessarily vague owing to her hasty retirement at the end. His squadron was composed of *Scharnhorst* (flag), *Gneisenau*, *Leipzig* and *Dresden*, as *Nürnberg* had been detached to San Francisco some time previously and only returned just at the end, whilst *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* had sailed for the Atlantic.

November 1 was bright and clear, but there was a high wind and occasional showers, accompanied by heavy seas. Learning from espionage sources that a British cruiser had put into Concepcion to coal, Von Spee decided to intercept her on the twenty-four hours' grace expiring; he sent *Leipzig* on ahead to reconnoitre, and was informed that two cruisers, *Monmouth* and *Glasgow*, were leaving the port; these were then joined by *Good Hope* and *Otranto*. Von Spee then came up and was sighted by our cruisers, who attempted to close in on the coast and engage the enemy whilst the sun was still high. In this they were unsuccessful, for *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* worked up to 20 knots and delayed the action until 6.10 p.m., when his light cruisers, which were longer in raising full speed, closed up. The light was now very much in his favour, the glow silhouetting the hulls of the British ships, whilst his ships were becoming almost invisible in the darkening east.

Just after the sun set Von Spee closed in to 10,000 yards and opened fire. *Good Hope* was engaged by his flagship, *Monmouth* by *Gneisenau*, and the plucky little *Glasgow* fought the two light cruisers as *Otranto* was ordered to escape, being absolutely unfit to fight regular warships.

With rapid and effective fire *Good Hope* and *Monmouth*, whose main-deck guns were rendered practically useless by

the heavy seas which continually swept over them, were soon set ablaze. Less heavily gunned, the British fire was reduced to such an extent by the weather that the only guns capable of reaching the enemy were the pair of 9·2" weapons of *Good Hope*, whilst the two German armoured cruisers could bring a dozen 8·2" guns to bear on them. Von Spee rightly did not allow the action to be fought at a range in which the 6" guns of *Monmouth* could have proved useful.

A tremendous explosion on *Good Hope* occurred, the fire reaching the magazine, "but," says Von Spee, "she continued firing for a short time." Game to the last, Cradock held out supremely.

Darkness coming on, the range dwindled down to 5000 yards, but the Germans ceased their fire when the gunners could no longer see their targets; only fires were discernible, and then these too vanished. Von Spee says that he thought that the cruisers had managed to subdue their flames, and he was strengthened in this belief when at 8.40 p.m. he heard firing about ten miles away. This, we know, is incorrect, as there is no doubt that *Good Hope* foundered almost immediately after the explosion; *Monmouth*, on the other hand, apparently drifted away completely disabled, as Von Spee learnt on steering to the spot from whence the firing came. Here he found the returning *Nürnberg*, who was finishing off this cruiser; but not being acquainted with the position, she dared not stay to rescue the crew, as she stated that she had sighted a four-funnelled cruiser in the vicinity; this was probably the approaching *Scharnhorst*. Von Spee has been accused of inhumanity for not rescuing the crews of these ships, but the heavy seas had prevented any boat from being launched to save the *Monmouth's* crew when the misunderstanding was cleared up; and in the case of the *Good Hope* he never discovered that she had foundered until the next day when he steamed into Valparaiso to enforce her internment, fully expecting that the crippled cruiser had put in for repairs. In this connection it must be noted that Cradock had during the morning forbidden a boat from *Glasgow* to be launched, regarding

such an action as highly perilous; how much more so must it have been at night when the conditions had not improved! I emphasise the denial of these charges because Von Spee had never shown any lack of courtesy or humanity; he was in fact a brave sailor, and when he met his death a month later he went down fighting to the last. An instance of his respect for his dead antagonist was forthcoming at a dinner given in his honour a few days later; when a German rose and proposed the toast "Damnation to the British Navy," he and his officers rose also and walked out.

The *Glasgow*, though severely damaged on the water-line, was fortunate in escaping her consorts' fate; she had pluckily fought both *Dresden* and *Leipzig*.

Thus terminated an action gallantly contested against vastly superior odds, and it was the only action, excepting the disablement of *Pegasus*, up to the Jutland battle in May 1916 in which a British warship was sunk by gunfire from the enemy. The only chance of success Cradock had was to close rapidly and bring his quicker-firing 6" pieces to bear, but this Von Spee would not allow.

The news of this reverse was definitely known by the Admiralty on November 3, and two days later Vice-Admiral Sir F. C. Doveton Sturdee was appointed to the command of the battle-cruisers *Invincible* and *Inflexible*. His orders were to proceed with all haste to the South Atlantic, where it was anticipated that Von Spee would resume his activities, and picking up any cruisers on his way down, seek out and destroy the enemy. Leaving Plymouth on the 11th, Sturdee avoided the busy shipping lanes and, collecting the cruisers *Carnarvon*, *Cornwall*, *Kent*, *Bristol*, *Glasgow* and the auxiliary cruiser *Macedonia*, he carried out a sweeping movement across the South Atlantic without success, and arrived at the Falkland Islands to coal at 10.30 a.m. on December 7. The secrecy with which this dramatic move was carried out is wonderful considering the network of German spies, and no hint was given Von Spee of the presence of these two powerful cruisers. At the same time nearly ninety Allied cruisers were closing down from the Pacific, including the



released Japanese Fleet, and the *Australia*, which up to the battle off Coronel had been employed in the work of convoying expeditions to the various German colonies. Von Spee was therefore caught between two fires, but his appearance came surprisingly soon.

At the Falkland Islands Sturdee divided his squadron—the two light cruisers coaling at Port Stanley, and the battle-cruisers and armoured cruisers at Port William, whilst *Macedonia* and *Kent* were posted as guardships respectively at the two ports; *Canopus*, which had been in port already for a few days, was stationed outside, but did not take any part in the action.

At 8.30 a.m. next day the signal station on Sapper Hill reported that two cruisers, later found to be *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg*, were coming up with their guns trained on the signal station. *Kent*, the only ship with steam up, was ordered to weigh at once, and steam was ordered to be raised for full speed in the other ships. Twenty minutes later another column of smoke was sighted from the south, the Falkland Islands having evidently been the prearranged rendezvous for the enemy. *Kent* then proceeded to the entrance of the harbour, *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg* being then eight miles off and the other two ships still about twenty miles away, but further smoke was sighted and this was observed to come from a light cruiser and two supply ships, *Baden* and *Santa Isabella*.

The first two ships approached to within six miles and were about to shell the wireless station when *Canopus* opened fire on them; they then hoisted their colours and turned away, and it appears that they had perceived the tripod masts of the two battle-cruisers in Port William, for with increased speed they steamed towards their consorts to warn them of the danger.

Half an hour later the British squadron left harbour and sighted the enemy hull down in the E.S.E., the day being bright and clear. The pursuit began at 10.20 a.m., when the two battle-cruisers and *Glasgow* went in stern chase after the fast-retreating foe. Speed was eased to 20 knots at 11.15 a.m.

to allow the other cruisers, *Carnarvon*, *Cornwall* and *Kent*, to get into station, the enemy at this time just showing above the horizon; as they still kept their distance the armoured cruisers were again left behind, and *Invincible*, *Inflexible* and *Glasgow* again proceeded at high speed. At 12.55 p.m. fire was opened on *Leipzig*, who was falling astern, at a range of 16,500 yards, and becoming too accurate, the three light cruisers *Dresden*, *Leipzig*, and *Nürnberg* left Von Spee and turned to the S.W. *Cornwall*, *Kent* and *Glasgow* were then detached to pursue them.

The battle now became, as Admiral Sturdee says, three separate actions; the primary one between the battle-cruisers and *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, the secondary one between the light cruisers and our two armoured cruisers and *Glasgow*, and the third and subsidiary the destruction of the two supply ships by *Bristol* and *Macedonia*, which was accomplished after their crews were removed to the latter.

To begin with the first, *Invincible* and *Inflexible* concentrated on the two cruisers at a range of 13,500 yards, but Von Spee opened fire and, as Sturdee intended taking no risks with his valuable ships, speed was eased to 24 knots, the range increasing to 16,500 yards. The enemy then turned away and another chase ensued; at 2.45 p.m. fire was reopened, and with such effect that shortly afterwards *Scharnhorst* was set on fire, and *Gneisenau* also appeared to be hit heavily. Von Spee's flagship was soon seen to be in a bad way, and clouds of steam and smoke escaped from huge holes in her sides, from whence a dull red glow could be seen from time to time. A few minutes after 4 p.m. she took a list which rapidly increased until she plunged beneath the waves, a huge furnace. Nevertheless *Gneisenau* continued the unequal fight in a manner bearing striking resemblance to her victim, the *Monmouth*, but at about 5 p.m. her forward funnel fell; although terribly battered she still kept firing gamely, and a shell struck *Invincible*. Sturdee, seeing her enveloped in a cloud of steam and smoke, gave orders for fire to cease, but before they could be complied with, she reopened fire in a last spurt with her one remaining gun.

Fire was finally stopped at 5.50 p.m. by the three cruisers, *Carvarnon* having come up, and the *Gneisenau* lowered her flag, heeling over five minutes later before sinking.

Both these cruisers had fought to the last round of ammunition, and with great bravery continued the unequal fight to the death, fully knowing that there was no chance of success, just as Cradock had done a month previously. On *Gneisenau* alone 600 of her crew were killed and wounded, her decks being described as a shambles, and when she capsized many of the 200 survivors died from the shock of the cold water after the terrible heat aboard before they could be picked up. Thus perished Vice-Admiral Graf von Spee, a gallant and courteous foe, and it is with a feeling of regret that one reads of his end; his record was unstained, unlike that of other officers of the Imperial German Navy, and there is no charge which can be brought against him such as those with which the foul marauders around our shores have familiarised us.

Returning to the chase of the light cruisers, *Glasgow*, being the fastest ship, drew ahead of *Kent* and *Cornwall*, and opened fire at a range of 12,000 yards at 3 p.m. on *Leipzig* (which with *Nürnberg* was astern of the newer and faster *Dresden*), hoping to outrange her with her newer guns and sufficiently damage her until *Kent* or *Cornwall* could come up. In this she was successful, for at 4.17 p.m. *Cornwall* opened fire on her and set her in flames after an action lasting three hours, when they ceased fire. She heeled over at 9 p.m. and sank with all but seven officers and eleven men, who were rescued.

Meanwhile *Kent*, which had not been able to coal but had at 3.36 p.m. been ordered to pursue *Nürnberg*, had with the greatest credit to her engine-room staff been able to raise her nominal speed of 23 knots up to 27 knots; every available article on board was used for fuel, and she was able to come into action at about 5 p.m. An hour and a half later fires broke out aboard the German and *Kent* ceased fire, closing in to 3300 yards. As, however, the colours were still flying she reopened fire for five minutes, when they were lowered by the survivors, numbering only twelve;



they were taken aboard when their ship sank at 7.27 p.m. Unhappily it transpired later that the remaining members of the crew had lined up ready to be taken off, but having neglected to haul down the flag, the last few shots had killed nearly all of them; *Kent* lost in the action four killed and twelve wounded, but further loss of life was avoided by the splendid conduct of one of the crew who at great personal risk threw a piece of burning cordite overboard.

The remaining cruiser *Dresden*, being in the van, made good her escape by her superior speed whilst *Glasgow* was busily engaged with *Leipzig*; the weather conditions changed later, and she steamed away out of sight.

Though the credit lies with Vice-Admiral Sturdee, who so ably destroyed the squadron, yet it must not be overlooked that the combined sweeping movements of numerous cruisers in the Pacific had driven Von Spee on to his guns. Indeed, had Von Spee learnt of the presence of the battle-cruisers and doubled back into the Pacific, he would have undoubtedly encountered *Australia* and several Japanese cruisers which were then sweeping down the South American coast.

Leaving *Dresden* for the present, it will be necessary to follow the light cruiser *Emden*, which had parted company with Von Spee during August. This raider caused us far heavier losses to our shipping than any other of the cruisers, although her destructive career came to an end shortly after the Coronel battle.

*Emden*, it will be remembered, left Tsingtau on August 6 with *Leipzig* and the two gunboats, together with *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, and is credited with the destruction of a Russian Naval Volunteer steamer on the same day. From the time of her parting with Von Spee on the 19th until September 15 her movements were shrouded in complete mystery, and it has never transpired what she did during these four weeks. The delay in setting to work on our commerce was amply made up when on the above date it became known that she had made her first haul. This batch consisted of the steamers *Indus* sunk on the 10th, *Lovat*

on the 11th, *Kabinga* captured on the next day, *Killin* and *Diplomat* on the 13th, on which day the Italian *Loredano* was held up but released later, and finally the *Trabboch*, sunk on the 14th. All the crews were then put on board the *Kabinga*, which put in at Calcutta on the next day; they stated that the raider was accompanied by the H.A.L. *Markomannia* and the Grecian steamer *Pontoporos*, which were acting as colliers. During the night of the 13-14th the cruiser lost her bearings during heavy rains and at daybreak found herself off Pun, so her course was changed and a few hours later she escorted *Kabinga*, with the 417 members of the crews, to seventy-five miles off the Sandheads. *Clan Matheson* was sunk on the next day, and the crew were landed at Rangoon by *Dover Castle*.

Exactly a week later *Emden* appeared off Madras and shelled the oil tanks, setting them ablaze and killing two men, but no damage was done to the town. Next day Pondicherry was visited, but the cruiser disappeared in a S.E. direction. The news of her second raid was brought by s.s. *Gryfedale*, which brought into port the crews of *King Lud*, *Foyle*, *Riberia*, *Umeric*, and *Buresk*, which was captured.

Her hunting-grounds becoming unhealthy owing to the presence of the Allied cruisers, *Emden* sent her colliers towards the Straits of Malacca in the hope of deluding her pursuers into the belief that she had escaped into the Pacific. The ruse was partially successful; the two ships were discovered off Sumatra by *Yarmouth* on October 15, *Markomannia* being sunk and *Pontoporos* captured; the crews, numbering sixty, were taken prisoners. Profiting by this blind, she made her last haul whilst our cruisers were searching Eastern waters; these were *Chilkana*, *Clan Grant*, *Benmohr*, *Troilus* and the dredger *Ponrabbell*, whilst *Exford* and *St. Egbert* were captured, all off Cochin in the Arabian Sea. The crews arrived at Colombo on the 25th on board the latter steamer, and this last raid brought the total damage wrought by this cruiser up to £3,500,000. In every case the utmost regard for human life was observed, and no charge was brought against Captain Müller for uncourteous conduct; indeed he

refrained from sinking the *Kabinga* as this would have necessitated the captain's wife having to tranship in rough weather.

In her last desperate effort to escape from the slowly encircling ring of pursuers, *Emden* arrived off Penang in the early hours of October 30, making for the Pacific. When seen off this port she was mistaken for *Yarmouth*, owing to a fourth funnel which had been rigged up, and she had a Japanese flag flying.

There was at this time anchored in the roadstead the Russian cruiser *Zhemtchug*, in a state of general unpreparedness; and it afterwards transpired during the court-martial of Captain Baron Tcherkasoff and Lieutenant-Commander Kulibin in August 1915, that although warned by Admiral Jerram that the *Emden* was in the vicinity, no precautions were taken. The captain was in the habit of sleeping ashore and receiving visitors aboard contrary to orders; no watches were set, the guns were unmanned, the torpedo tubes unloaded, and the fires drawn; and in this deplorable condition she was discovered by the raider. The captain and lieutenant were sentenced to three and a half and one and a half years of imprisonment, dismissed the service, and deprived of their decorations and rank.

With the greatest effrontery, when challenged by the look-out on entering the harbour, *Emden* replied, "*Yarmouth* proceeding to harbour"; the look-out, however, observed something amiss with the canvas funnel, and was about to give a warning when the cruiser, on turning out, let go a terrific broadside; together with a torpedo, at the Russian. The officers and men aboard put up a brave but hopeless defence, but the torpedo had done her work well, for a heavy list rendered her guns useless, and all her shots passed high over her foe although the two ships were but 200 yards apart. Her disablement was terribly swift; shattered and sinking, a third torpedo blew her up, and she sank like a stone. Of her complement of 355, only 143 escaped unjury, and 85 went down with her.

The raider, however, had not finished her work, and the



little French destroyer *Mousquet*, returning to harbour, was suddenly discovered and sunk almost immediately, after an heroic defence.

This was her last exploit, for whilst the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps was being transported to Egypt in thirty-eight transports, escorted by *Minotaur*, *Melbourne*, *Sydney*, *Pyramus* and the Japanese *Ibuki*, news was received by *Minotaur* that *Emden* was about to attack the wireless installation on Cocos-Keeling Island, with the intention of destroying one of the many stations which were so retarding her escape.

This message was received from Singapore in the early morning of November 9, and *Melbourne* was ordered to proceed at once to the island and engage the enemy. As the whole convoy covered a large area, the nearest cruiser was *Sydney*, also of the Royal Australian Navy, and *Melbourne* unselfishly passed on the order to her sister. *Sydney* came up with her at 9.40 a.m. just after the enemy had landed a party to destroy the plant.

A stiff fight ensued, the *Emden's* fire at first being rapid and accurate, and *Sydney* lost four killed and thirteen wounded; like that of most German ships it soon deteriorated, and the heavier metal of the Australian ship soon began to tell. After two and a half hours *Emden* was run ashore, burning furiously; seeing her disabled, *Sydney* left her to pursue her collier (*Buresk*), which she sank. On returning she found the German colours still flying, so was reluctantly compelled to reopen fire for a few minutes, when at 4.25 p.m. *Emden* surrendered. She had lost 120 killed and 50 wounded, but Captain Müller was taken prisoner, and it is of interest to note that he was the leader of twenty-three German officers who temporarily escaped from Sutton Bonnington Camp during October 1917, and was imprisoned. He was later repatriated. The landing party made good their escape during the day on the yacht *Ayesha*, and eventually reached Germany via Arabia and Constantinople after many adventures.

Tenders were called for by the Australian Government for

*Emden's* salvage in June 1915, but it was found impossible to proceed with the work of refloating her, and in February 1916 operations were abandoned.

The Eastern Seas were thus rid of these raiders, as the destruction of *Königsberg* was brought about simultaneously.

In the Western Seas Germany had three light cruisers—the new *Karlsruhe* and *Bremen* sent out to Mexico during the civil wars, and *Dresden* based upon South American ports.

Of the *Bremen* little is known, and indeed her only exploit was the holding up of the Dutch liner *Gelria*, a day out from Monte Video, in the latter part of August. The next that was heard of her was her arrival in January 1915 at Wilhelms-haven, badly damaged by a mine. If she was ever on the high seas after war broke out, she must have slipped past our patrols in the North Sea during the long nights, being the sole survivor of Germany's High Seas Fleet stationed abroad with the exception of *Goeben* and *Breslau*.

The *Karlsruhe* had a very fruitful, though brief, existence, and confined her operations to the middle Atlantic, off Brazil. In August she was sighted off Venezuela steaming eastwards in company with a collier, and during this month and September she accounted for several of our merchantmen, including *Bowes Castle* on August 18, *Cervantes*, *Highland Hope*, *Lynrowan*, *Niceto da Larringa*, *Maple Branch*, *Pruth*, *Rio Iguassu*, *Strathroy*, and the Dutch *Marie* bound for Belfast; *Cornish City* was sunk on September 21, and she captured *Condor*, *Indriani* and *Farn*. (The latter arrived at San Juan in Porto Rico on January 24, 1915, in charge of a lieutenant for provisions, but failing to clear she was interned on the next day.) The crews of all these ships were landed at Teneriffe by the German steamer *Crefeld* on October 23.

Following this, another German ship, *Asuncion*, landed at Para in Brazil on November 2 the crews of the sunken *Glaston* and *Hurstdale*, and the captured *Vandyck*; this last steamer was captured on October 26, and the passengers,

who were treated well, state that the raider had been in action with *Bristol* and had had her steering-gear smashed. Her stern was screened with canvas until the damage could be made good from one of her victims, and they were informed that when she had at last managed to throw off her pursuer she had but one ton of coal on board, having used all her wooden fittings.

Since the arrival of these passengers and crews nothing more was heard of her, and rumours became prevalent of her destruction in the West Indies; these reports, combined with the entire absence of news, prompted the Admiralty to announce on March 20, 1915, that "there is every reason to assume the destruction of the *Karlsruhe* last November" in that vicinity. This we know was true, for Captain Aust, her second officer, in his book on her adventures gives a graphic account of her end.

It appears that the cruiser was lying off the north-eastern coast of South America on the evening of November 4, and the crew were having their supper. The officers were in the after part and were about to rise, when at about 8 p.m. there was a heavy explosion, accompanied by a grinding and crashing, in which the lights went out, and the ship rocked violently. She immediately heeled over, and whilst in this position Captain Aust states that he saw what he thought was the hull of a ship drifting past; this was in reality the forward half of the cruiser. The *Karlsruhe* had been completely blown in two. The bows sank at once with the majority of the crew, but the stern remained afloat long enough (twenty minutes) to enable two of her consorts, *Indriani* and *Rio Negro*, to take off the survivors. The latter arrived in Germany some time later, whilst *Indriani* landed the remainder in an American port on the 29th, from whence they reached Norway.

Captain Aust considers that the disaster was due either to an internal explosion or a submarine. Whilst the former theory is probably correct, yet the torpedoing by a submarine should not be dismissed entirely; we were told soon after the outbreak of war that Canada had already placed at the



disposal of the Admiralty two submarines building at Vancouver, and it would not be inconceivable that others building at Atlantic Canadian ports should travel down to the West Indies and there lie in wait for the enemy.

There now remains only one regular cruiser at large to be dealt with; this was the elusive *Dresden* which, it will be remembered, escaped from Sturdee during the Falklands' battle. Closely pursued for several days, she at last managed to gain time to put in at Punta Arenas on December 12 to coal, but learning of the approach of one of our cruisers, she continued her course through the Straits of Magellan with the indefatigable *Glasgow* on her track. Still eluding this tenacious little ship, she buried herself amongst the numerous islands and creeks of Southern Chile; whilst here she captured the collier *North Wales* and obtained the much-needed fuel, the crew being landed by her supply ship *Rhakotis*. Remaining in Chilean waters, she coaled at Sandy Point, staying there for thirty-two hours, thus doubly violating Chilean neutrality as she had coaled at Valparaiso after the Coronel battle; for international law prohibits a belligerent warship coaling twice within three months in the same country's ports. On February 27 she sank the *Conway Castle* off Mocha Island, but in an endeavour to break away she reached Juan Fernandez island on March 9, where she coaled from the German liners *Alta* and *Sierra Cordoba*.

Five days later she was discovered here by *Kent*, *Glasgow* and *Orama*, an auxiliary cruiser, and was summoned by *Glasgow* to surrender. She refused and *Glasgow* opened fire, but five minutes later *Dresden* hoisted a white flag and a *parlementaire* was sent to the British to expostulate against the attack whilst in neutral waters. The party was informed, however, that although she had been there for five days her flag was still flying and she had her guns trained, and that she must either surrender or come out and fight. Seeing no escape, her captain gave orders for the ship to be blown up, which was accomplished after the crew had been dis-

embarked. Her casualties were fifteen wounded, which *Orama* conveyed to Valparaiso.

Chile subsequently presented a protest to Great Britain against the *Glasgow's* attack in her territorial waters; but when our apology was tendered it was pointed out that *Dresden* had been at Juan Fernandez island for thirty-two hours before our cruisers arrived (there is evidence that she had been longer) but was uninterned, that she had twice coaled in Chilean waters within three months, and that when found her guns were trained and ready for action with her colours flying, there being no necessary force on the spot to insist on her disarmament; and in view of these irregularities *Glasgow's* course was upheld.

Thus ended the last of these cruisers, and a touch of the dramatic was given by the presence of *Glasgow*, which had been engaged off Coronel with her, again at the Falkland Islands' battle when all excepting *Dresden* were sunk, and since then had been in continual search of her, finally running her to earth.

In addition to these warships, Germany always intended to supplement the cruisers with a number of fast liners, fitted with mountings for 6" and 4.7" weapons. These ships were to put to sea immediately from wherever they happened to be lying, and assist the regular cruisers to prey upon the enemy's commerce. In status they were similar to the privateer, and each captain carried with him a commission already signed by the Kaiser. There had been much discussion during 1913-14 in naval circles, and we had replied by arming a few of our liners; after the outbreak of hostilities numbers of our large ships were commissioned by the Admiralty and have done a great deal of valuable work in supplementing the patrol force, both in the home waters and on the oceans. Reference has already been made to three such ships in the foregoing account.

About half a dozen German armed liners managed to put to sea, but with the exception of two their careers were short and harmless.

A few days after war broke out the Nord-Deutscher-Lloyd *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* was seen racing down the River Hudson painted black from top to bottom, armed with ten 4" guns, and loaded with coal in bags, presumably to recoal the light cruisers in the Atlantic. Thus equipped she left New York to prey upon our shipping.

Finding the North Atlantic lanes too well guarded, she carried out her operations further south in conjunction with *Dresden*, *Karlsruhe*, and *Bremen*, hoping to interrupt our South African and South American trade. On August 15 the Union Castle liner *Galician* sighted a large liner bearing down upon her, which ordered her to stop. Scenting something suspicious, she began to send out a call for help, but was instantly stopped by the peremptory message, "Stop message or we sink you." Sailors then boarded her and, purchasing a supply of cigars and wines, ordered her to follow. At midnight the passengers were ordered to abandon the ship, but before the order could be complied with the raider hurriedly steamed away with the welcome message, "No more orders. Good-bye." Next day she arrived at Las Palmas and destroyed the wireless of the R.M.S.P. *Arlanza*, which was lying in harbour, and, sailing away to the south, sank the steamers *Kaipara* and *Nyanza* a few hours later.

Her brief career terminated on August 26, when she was attacked by *Highflyer*, close inshore off the West African Coast, and after a brief action was set on fire and sunk, the survivors escaping to the shore. Our losses were one killed and five wounded.

Following this loss came the capture of the armed Hamburg-Amerika *Spreewald* by *Berwick* in the West Atlantic on September 12, together with two colliers which had 6000 tons of coal and 180 tons of provisions aboard, doubtless for the cruisers infesting these seas, to obviate the necessity of disclosing their movements by putting in at a port to revictual.

The next raider to come to an end was the Hamburg-Amerika *Cap Trafalgar*, armed with eight 4" guns. Whilst



coming up the Atlantic she was attacked by our auxiliary cruiser *Carmania* off Trinidad on September 14. Thereupon commenced a most interesting duel between the two converted liners; both narrowly escaped destruction, for with their very thin hulls a few well-aimed shots are enough to send a ship of this type to the bottom. After an equal fight lasting one hour and forty-five minutes, *Cap Trafalgar*, now a blazing furnace, capsized and her crew was picked up by an empty collier near by. *Carmania* lost nine killed and six wounded, which amply illustrates the fierceness of the action, and a fire breaking out on board was only just got under control.

Meanwhile the armed liner *Bethania* was captured on the 15th, the *Preussen* was interned at Sarang Bay during August, and the *Berlin* (more fully described in Part I) was also interned at Trondhjem on November 11.

The two raiders which caused us serious damage were the N.D.L. *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and the Hamburg-Amerika *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*. We have already followed this ship across the Pacific with Von Spee up to the time when she parted company with him, after leaving Easter Island. Her first victim was the *Charcas*, which was sunk in December off Corral in Chile; the crew was landed at Valparaiso; however, she soon left for the Atlantic Ocean, where she secured many victims, mostly small sailing vessels. On January 27 she sank the Russian and French barques *Isabel Browne* and *Pierre Loti*, and the next day the United States sailing vessel *W. P. Frye* and the French barque *Jacobsen*, ninety-five prisoners in all being taken.

During February further victims were claimed: the barque *Invercoe* sunk on the 12th, the steamer *Mary Ann Short* on the 18th, on the next day the French liner *Florida*, and finally the steamer *Willerby* on the 20th, 242 additional prisoners being captured. These state that whilst at sea the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* presented a remarkable appearance, being painted black on one side and white on the other;

probably when these crews were captured she was being transformed into a less conspicuous ship, and her white hull was being painted warship black. Her armament consisted of three 8" and ten 5" guns which had been received from Von Spee, and she had a crew of 350, being quite a formidable opponent.

She arrived at Newport News (Virginia) on March 11, badly in need of repairs and a thorough overhaul after her long cruise. She was given a month in which to effect her repairs, but as she made no attempt to leave she was interned on April 8.

The last of these raiders was the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, which, like her sister *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, was at New York on the outbreak of war. She had arrived on July 30, and left a few days later with clearance papers for Bremen, but with the intention of harassing our overseas trade. Painted grey and armed with two guns, she left with a large supply of coal aboard.

Choosing the busy Atlantic as her hunting-ground, she did not secure any success for some time, but on September 25 the German steamer *Prussia* put into Santos with the crew of the *Indian Prince*. The Houlder liner *La Correntina*, with a cargo of frozen meat, was sunk 200 miles off Buenos Ayres, and the crew landed at Monte Video by the *Sierra Cordoba* on November 23, together with the crew of the French barque *Union* sunk on October 28. The former ship carried a gun, but unfortunately had no ammunition aboard.

Not until December 4 did she secure any further victims, when on that day she sank the French steamer *Mont Agel* in ballast, and captured the British *Bellevue*; from this latter she replenished her much-depleted bunkers and took aboard 3000 tons of coal, after which she sank the vessel on the 20th. This was followed by the loss of the French barque *Anne de Bretagne* on the next day, all the crews being landed by the German *Otavi* at Las Palmas on January 3.

On February 18 the German steamer *Holger* arrived at Buenos Ayres with a large haul of prisoners numbering 243,

the crews of the steamers *Highland Brae*, *Potaro*, *Hemisphere* (captured on December 28 and her cargo and stores transhipped, and sunk on January 8), and the Norwegian and Canadian barques *Simantha* and *Wilfrid*, all sunk off the north coast of Brazil. The total damage was estimated at £250,000. The *Holger* was interned as an auxiliary on the 21st, as she failed to clear after being given twenty-four hours' notice.

The last two victims were the *Tamar* sunk on March 25, whose stores were transhipped before the scacocks were opened, and *Coleby* sunk two days later. After her long cruise the *Kronprinz Wilhelm's* condition, together with the Allied cruisers on her track, necessitated her putting into a neutral port for repairs; being advised by wireless from *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, she ran for Newport News, where she arrived on April 11, with only twenty-five tons of coal left. Her condition was very bad and there was little food left; she had also sixty-six cases of beri-beri aboard. The prisoners were subjected to much hardship, although not treated harshly. She was interned later.

Both of these raiders were seized when America broke off diplomatic relations with the Central Empires on February 3, 1917.

With the return of this raider the seas were once more clear. They caused us the loss of the cruisers *Good Hope*, *Monmouth*, *Pegasus*, *Zhemtchug*, the destroyer *Mousquet* and the gunboat *Zelée*, in addition to fifty British, six French, and one Russian ships sunk, and seven British ships captured. An American, a Dutch, and a Norwegian ship were also sunk. To achieve this the enemy lost two armoured cruisers, six valuable light cruisers, seven gunboats, two small river craft, and six armed liners, excluding two interned. When it is borne in mind that the whole of the famous Anzac contingent was transported during their careers, as well as numerous expeditions to German colonies, it will be seen that relatively little was accomplished by the first High Seas Campaign.



## THE SECOND CAMPAIGN ON THE HIGH SEAS, 1916-17

It has been shown that with the internment of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* at Newport News, during the spring of 1915, this campaign terminated. This warfare against our shipping was followed by the inauguration of the first submarine campaign in our home waters; in due time this also failed. Germany then resorted to yet another plan, pending the commencement of her second submarine campaign; this was to send out raiders disguised as neutral merchantmen from her ports, and prey on our trade in a similar manner to that of her lost cruisers. She had already lost too many of these valuable ships to detach any more on a comparatively subsidiary operation, and our strong patrols would prove difficult to elude and a great deal more so on a return journey, for once the presence of the raiders on the ocean was reported they would be diligently sought for and their ultimate fate assured.

Germany therefore hit upon the plan of either building or converting several ships to appear like harmless tramps, which would stand a greater chance of slipping into the Atlantic undetected. Moreover, if these ships were painted with a neutral country's colours and flew a corresponding flag, there was a good chance that the majority would be successful in their enterprise. We know that a dozen such ships were constructed, but only a small part of these have come into prominence, and the fate of the remaining ones has not been disclosed. These raiders were very heavily armed both with guns and torpedo tubes.

The first to come to grief was torpedoed by our submarine E 5 on September 25, 1915, near Borkum Island, and a second was also torpedoed in the same vicinity on December 22 by E 16; but beyond that their tonnage was given as about 4000, no particulars were published of these auxiliary craft. They were presumably engaged in minesowing.

On January 22, 1916, the fine new Elder-Dempster liner *Appam*, overdue at Plymouth, was posted four days late, and as the weather had been stormy, fears were entertained

for her safety. She had been sighted by the steamer *Palma* on the 18th in fine weather, but no further news of her was forthcoming and the worst was feared; the supposed loss of the liner was inferred when one of her empty lifeboats was picked up at sea off Morocco on the 16th, and corroborated by the knowledge that German submarines had laid mines in the Bay of Biscay. The *Appam* had on board the ex-Governor of Sierra Leone, a number of German prisoners, and much bullion.

The dramatic arrival of this liner at Norfolk, Virginia, is well remembered. She arrived at that port on February 1, flying the German flag and in charge of German sailors commanded by a Lieutenant Berg; and it is possible to reconstruct the greater part of the raider's career from information given by the passengers and crews of her many victims. Captain Harrison of the *Appam* states that his ship was captured in fine weather on January 16; he was steaming at a fair speed when he sighted a tramp off the Canaries. On drawing nearer the ship's company was amazed to see a shot fired across her bows; being completely taken unawares, they had no time to get their 3" gun into action, and were compelled to heave to. Simultaneously the supposed tramp's forecastle, which was nothing more than a canvas screen, fell away and a battery of guns was revealed to the astonished victims. In the face of this formidable armament Captain Harrison surrendered and a prize crew came aboard under cover of their guns, disarming the passengers and crew and locking them in their cabins. The twenty German prisoners were of course liberated, and assisted the prize crew. The *Appam's* company were daily exercised in small numbers, rendering it quite an easy task for the few Germans to control several hundred prisoners, none of whom have any complaint to make against their captors, even the liberated prisoners.

With the arrival of the raider, which was named *Möwe*, they learnt that several ships, offering no resistance, had already been taken. These were the collier *Corbridge*, captured on January 10 and taken over by a prize crew, and the *Farringford* which was sunk, followed three days later

by *Dromonby*, *Author*, *Trader*, and on the 15th by *Ariadne* with a cargo of wheat, all the crews being subsequently transferred to *Appam*.

On the day following the capture of the *Appam* a very thrilling encounter took place between the *Möwe* and a merchantman, which she was about to capture. This was the *Clan MacTavish*, which, scenting something suspicious, opened fire with her little 3-pounder at the approaching raider without the slightest warning. Unfortunately the shots missed, and before she had time to reload *Möwe* dropped her screen and poured a full broadside into the plucky steamer. For half an hour this unequal combat raged and fires broke out aboard the *Clan MacTavish*; two torpedoes were then discharged from tubes on the raider's deck, and the steamer heeled over and shortly sank. She had lost fifteen killed and four wounded, and boats from *Möwe* and *Appam* picked up the survivors. In recognition of this brave defence Admiral Jellicoe sent a telegram to the owners, expressing the admiration of the Fleet and sympathy for the relatives. This little action typically illustrates the spirit of our mercantile marine; it was not the outcome of an impulse, but the fulfilment of a resolve made seven months previously. The ship had been attacked by a submarine, and Captain Oliver and his officers made a vow never to surrender their ship should they be attacked, but rather go down fighting to the last. They had heroically kept their promise.

Soon after this, *Appam* parted company from *Möwe* and *Corbridge*, and by extremely good luck safely arrived at the American port without encountering any ships; all the prisoners were released on February 4, with the exception of thirty-two officers and men who had been taken away on *Möwe*. A formal demand for the release of the ship on behalf of the owners was presented by the British Ambassador, and this has been successful.

Great mystery surrounded the identity of the raider, for the captains of the *Corbridge* and *Trader*, who were taken aboard her, discovered a nameplate bearing the name *Ponga*,



and declared that she was built at Bremerhaven quite recently as a commerce raider of 6000 tons. The crew, who wore cap-bands with the names of *Möwe* and *Taula*, were very large and were armed with rifles. Sir E. Mereweather, the ex-Governor of Sierra Leone, thinks that she was originally a fruit ship of 4000 tons and 17 knots, having escaped from the Canaries. According to his statements her armament consisted of two 6·7" guns mounted forward, four 4·1" pieces mounted aft, and a 3-pounder on her after deck. In light of the subsequent events there is little doubt that she left a German port about December 27, laid mines off the East Coast, and then passed out into the Atlantic over the north of Scotland.

For about three weeks nothing more was heard of her, but on February 23 the steamer *Westburn* arrived at Teneriffe, likewise flying a German flag and with a German prize crew in charge. She brought 206 prisoners from the sunken steamers *Flamenco*, *Horace*, *Belge*, *Luxembourg*, and the sailing vessel *Edinburgh*. At the time there was a British cruiser lying in port, and seeing the *Westburn* clear after a stay of twenty-five hours, she prepared to follow and capture her; however, in sight of land her crew abandoned her and blew her up with dynamite, and returned to harbour. The prisoners state that she had been used as a convoy to carry the crews, and that after all the coal had been transhipped to *Möwe*, the collier *Corbridge* had been sunk in the mouth of the Amazon. Only in one case had loss of life occurred, and that was when *Flamenco* sent out a S.O.S. message and was fired on; she sank immediately with one of her crew.

The *Möwe's* return to Germany was undoubtedly a clever piece of work, but, as her victims could testify to their cost, she was perfectly disguised as a Swedish merchantman. She made the return journey via the north of Iceland, and with favourable weather reached Copenhagen on February 29, and arrived at Wilhelmshaven on March 4. On this date the German Admiralty announced that after a successful cruise lasting several months, *Möwe* had returned with

4 British officers, 29 marines and sailors, and 106 Indians as prisoners, together with 1,000,000 marks in gold (from *Appam*). In addition to the foregoing steamers she had sunk the French *Maroni* and the Saxon *Prince* (600 miles off the south of Ireland on February 25). Commander Count von und zu Dohna-Schlodien claims to have laid the mines which sank the battleship *King Edward VII* on her outward journey.

Thus ended a singularly fruitful raid, but the German luck did not hold. Simultaneously with the arrival of *Möwe* at Copenhagen, the enemy sent out another raider to replace her, hoping also to elude our patrols. Experience is priceless, and on this day, the 29th, the *Greif* was well out when she was sighted by our auxiliary cruiser *Alcantara* (R.M.S.P.) in northern waters. Painted in Norwegian colours and flying a similar flag, she was well disguised. Our patrol would have probably passed her had she not made off; scenting something suspicious *Alcantara* went in chase, and after a two hours' steaming brought her to. A boarding party was then lowered and was about half-way between the ships, when *Greif* dropped her fore-castle, lowered the Norwegian flag, hoisted the German flag, and opened fire at a range of only 800 yards, blowing the boarding boat out of the water, and killing three of its crew.

Thereupon commenced an action lasting for forty minutes, in which *Andes*, a sister ship, arrived and joined. At the end of this time the *Greif* was set ablaze fore and aft, but still kept up a good reply, all the ships travelling at a fair speed. She then discharged three torpedoes at *Alcantara*, two of which struck her, and, listing heavily, she sank. She was closely followed by her foe, who was steadily pounded by *Andes* until a violent explosion occurred, in which she disappeared. Our losses were 5 officers and 69 men killed, whilst of *Greif's* crew of 321, only 5 officers and 115 men were picked up.

This was the answer to the German boast that our patrols were a failure. The action was fought at an unfavourable range for the British ships, the main action being at a range

of only 600 yards, but up to the end *Alcantara* wrought great havoc on the heavier armed raider.

The fifth raider was reported to be at large on December 4, 1916, in the Atlantic, but not till the arrival of the Japanese steamer *Hudson Maru* at Pernambuco on January 16, 1917, did any definite news transpire. This steamer was captured on January 12, and brought 237 officers and men from the steamers *Georgic*, *Radnorshire*, *Mount Temple*, *Voltaire*, *Netherby Hall*, *Dramatist*, *King George*, *Minieh*, and the two French barques *Asnières* and *Nantes*. In addition to the *Hudson Maru* she captured the steamers *St. Theodore* and *Yarrowdale*. The former was converted into a raider on December 28 for independent operations, after serving as a convoy for the crews, but was sunk later when the return journey was about to be made. *Yarrowdale* arrived at Swinemunde in the Baltic on January 19 with 469 prisoners.

All the above steamers were sunk between December 12 and January 10; but excepting in the case of *Radnorshire*, sunk on January 8, the dates were not published. On January 30 it was reported that *Cambrian Range* had been sunk by a raider some time before the 17th. The captured crews complained of harsh treatment and bad food, and the British and French crews were all herded together with the numerous Lascars.

Not until March 23 was any further news forthcoming, when Berlin reported that *Möwe* had safely returned after a cruise lasting several months, and again under the same commander. Her bag consisted of eighteen British steamers sunk and one captured, of which eight were armed, and five on Admiralty service, also four sailing craft sunk, including two French, one Canadian, and one Norwegian. She brought 593 prisoners back. The later prizes were *Brecknorshire*, *Esmeraldas*, *French Prince*, *Otaki*, *Rhodanthe*, *Katherine*, *Demerton*, *Governor*, *Eddie*, and the Canadian and Norwegian sailing vessels *Jean* and *Staut*. Several of these were sunk on her return voyage, which was again skilfully managed.



The captured crews state that the *Möwe* was of 12,000 tons gross and had a speed of 16 knots, measured 500' by 50'; she was armed with two 5" guns mounted forward, two 8" amidships, two 5" after, several quickfirers and torpedo tubes. She was painted black, and had one telescopic funnel and two masts.

The only consoling fact about these serious losses is the comparative safety of the crews, who had not been left to drift about on the wide seas.

A further development came to light on January 22, when the Danish steamer *Hammerhaus* arrived at Rio de Janeiro in charge of a German crew. This ship had fallen in with a raider bearing the name of *Puyne*, and had been used as a supply ship and later as an auxiliary cruiser. On attempting to leave by night after taking on board a quantity of stores and ammunition, she was ordered to stop by the port authorities, but refused; she was fired on by the forts, and was then interned.

The arrival of the French barque *Cambronne* at Rio de Janeiro on March 31 with 200 British, French and Italian sailors from the sunken steamers *Gladys Royle*, *Horngarth*, *Lady Island*, the sailing vessels *British Yeoman*, *Pinmore*, *Perce* (Canadian), the French sailing vessels *Antonin*, *Charles Gounod*, *Dupleix*, *La Rochefoucauld*, and the Italian *Buenos Ayres*, revealed the fact that a captured American barque named *Pass of Balmaha* had been converted into a raider and named *Seeadler*, fitted with motors, armed with two 4.2" and sixteen machine-guns, and equipped with wireless. She had been operating off Trinidad.

On March 13 Tokio announced that a Japanese steamer had been sunk in the Indian Ocean by a raider. Also from the fact that on July 30 it was stated in the House of Commons that the P. & O. liner *Mongolia* had been sunk by mines laid off the Indian coast by a raider named *Wolf*, it appeared that there were several raiders at large.

The *Seeadler* herself, after leaving the Atlantic presumably via Cape Horn, arrived in the Pacific; definite news

of her transpired later, but in the House of Commons on August 8 Dr. Macnamara stated that "the Admiralty were not without knowledge of the whereabouts and fate of these vessels (*Puyme, Ritz, Seeadler, Vineta, and Wolf*), and that any disclosure would be injudicious."

Soon after, news was received of the fate of the *Seeadler*. This raider had escaped from Germany in December 1916 disguised as a Norwegian merchantman, loaded with timber; she had been boarded by a destroyer, but as her papers were in order and nothing suspicious was observed, she succeeded in gaining the Atlantic. After sinking the shipping in the South Atlantic she made for the Pacific, and Captain von Okner claims to have destroyed in a short period £8,000,000 worth of shipping here. Her victims remained unidentified, with the exception of three American schooners, *A. B. Johnston, R. C. Slade, and Manilla*, from which she obtained much-needed supplies of explosives.

As his ship was becoming foul the captain made for Mopela in the Society Islands, where he beached her, and her overhaul was proceeding satisfactorily until a tidal wave lifted her right on to a reef, upon which she broke her back. Her crew then completely destroyed her and camped ashore with their captives. Captain von Okner and five officers then decided to endeavour to seize another ship, and went away in the motor launch on August 21, nineteen days after the accident, but they were captured on October 6 at Lantoa Island, Fiji.

Meanwhile a French auxiliary schooner arrived off Mopela to take off the American sailors, but she was seized by the remaining Germans, who, having armed her, put to sea on September 5 and continued the *Seeadler's* career. After their departure, Captain Smith of the *Slade* and three men also put to sea in an open boat, and after a journey of 1000 miles arrived at Pago-Pago, in Samoa, on September 29. They made no complaint against their treatment by the Germans, and the remaining forty-three American and French sailors were rescued by a naval expedition during October. Of the captured French *Lutèce* nothing was reported.

## CHAPTER II

### THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN

THE entry of Turkey into the European conflict has been one of the most criticised events of the war, and it cannot be said that that criticism has left the credit of the Government unshaken; indeed, throughout all the Mediterranean and Balkan policy it is impossible to be satisfied with our diplomacy. It must be borne in mind before forming a hasty judgment, that in such countries as Turkey and the Balkan States they only go on the principle that Might is Right, and when war is brought to their very borders and they are threatened with Armageddon in its worst form by a Power who knows no Right, the baser nations take the side of whomsoever seems to them to be the stronger. We cannot pretend that our policy with Serbia and Montenegro favourably impressed the hesitant nations, and it was therefore all the more to the credit of Rumania when she took the plunge.

Turkey has for several years been slowly but surely permeated with German influence and intrigue, and amongst other matters the sale of the two old German battleships *Kurfurst Friedrich Wilhelm* and *Weissenburg*, together with the four destroyers S 165, S 166, S 167, and S 168, in August 1910, significantly showed the extent to which this influence had penetrated. No absolutely independent Power would have wasted its none too plenteous money upon a pair of obsolete warships; it would have rather bought or built light cruisers of more modern design. To Germany Turkey owed her salvation in the Balkan Wars in the shape of funds and help, as it was not Germany's intention that a less amenable nation should interrupt a through German passage



to India. It was Germany's aim to keep her unmolested until "Der Tag" should dawn, when she would have a clear road to the East via Austria and Turkey, eliminating the obstacle made by Bulgaria and Serbia either by swift blows at them or by intimidation. Herein lay the joint in the plan; Germany never dreamt that the Powers, least of all England, would take up the cause of Serbia. Should Russia, and consequently France, intervene, she counted upon a swift stroke against the latter, whom she believed to be thoroughly disorganised, and then meant to return and attack Russia before she had time to arm her millions. How she would have succeeded in this plan, but for England's intervention, we now know. Furthermore, with the two great Powers *hors de combat*, she could have finished off England later and have become undisputed Mistress of the Seas. This then was the general plan in 1914.

On the declaration of war on Germany on August 4, the Admiralty took over the two Turkish Dreadnoughts completing in this country, the *Reshadieh* and *Sultan Osman I*; Germany on her part acquired the Greek battle-cruiser *Salamis*. The transactions were perfectly legal, and the purchase-money was paid immediately. It proved, however, a lucky stroke for Germany, who exerted her energies to produce a feeling of distrust between the two nations; and on the arrival of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* in the Dardanelles a few days later, the Turks were induced to "buy" these fugitive warships, ostensibly to replace the two Dreadnoughts taken over by us.

Their German crews remained aboard despite protests from the Allies, and it was stated that lack of trained personnel to man them was the reason, though we know that they were retained in reality to assist in the fortification of the Dardanelles defences. Owing to its anomalous position the British Naval Mission under Rear-Admiral Limpus, which had done good work in reorganising the Turkish Navy, was recalled on September 14, the decision of the Admiralty being hailed with relief by the Mission themselves.

The Dardanelles were closed on October 3, and the British

squadron, waiting outside for the two warships to become in a true sense Turkish ships, was shut out. From this time it became evident that Turkey's entry into the war was only a matter of time, and the breach was made on October 29, when Turkish warships raided Odessa, and *Breslau* shelled Theodosia and Novorissik on the next day.

On November 1 the Allied Consuls applied for their passports and left Constantinople; and hostilities commenced next day with the sinking of the gunboat *Burak Reis* off Smyrna. On the 3rd a bombardment by an Allied squadron at long range on the outer forts of the Dardanelles caused an explosion, accompanied by dense volumes of smoke, in Helles Fort, and *Goeben* was reported holed whilst lying in the Straits. On the same day *Minerva*, supported by the destroyers *Savage* and *Scorpion*, finding the town of Akaba occupied by Turkish troops under the command of a German officer, shelled the fort and, landing a force, evicted the garrison with considerable loss to the enemy. On the 7th there was a further bombardment of Smyrna; but after this the Turks were left alone, as all our available forces were employed in rounding up the commerce raiders.

On December 14 came the news of Lieutenant Holbrook's wonderful feat in B 11; taking this old submarine up the Dardanelles in spite of a difficult current, he safely dived under five rows of mines and torpedoed the old battleship *Messudiyeh*, which was guarding the minefield. Before diving again he observed her to be sinking, but was chased by torpedo boats and shelled by the forts; happily he returned safely after an arduous journey, and was awarded a well-merited V.C. on the 22nd for his brave and skilful feat. This was but the first of a long series of splendid submarine activities in these waters (described at the end of this chapter), but whilst subsequent attacks were performed by our latest craft, B 11 was obsolete and its offensive capacity very limited. Of course the Turks, once warned, did everything in their power to increase the difficulties attending a voyage up the Straits, but it is impossible to give sufficient praise to Holbrook's remarkable success.

A further bombardment of the forts on December 20, and several shellings of the Syrian coast, where Turkish troops were concentrated, kept the enemy in a state of unrest; on the night of January 6-7 *Doris* landed a party at Alexandretta, and the subsequent operations here are dealt with in Chapter VI.

The first Allied loss in connection with this campaign was sustained on the 17th, when the French submarine *Saphir*, in an attempt to emulate the feat of B 11, stranded in the Straits; to prevent her capture she was blown up by her crew, who were taken prisoners.

On February 2 it was reported that in a surprise attack by the Allies, four of the forts had been destroyed and two ammunition dépôts set on fire by four destroyers; and this was followed by another attack on the 7th. It was not until the 19th that any serious attempt was made to force the Dardanelles.

It is as well to review the general situation in Europe at this time. Russia had been forced to retire along the whole front through lack of ammunition and arms to equip her uncounted millions of manhood. It was impossible to get any supplies through to her, as the Arctic was frozen over and Japan had not then been able to send any appreciable quantity. If once the Dardanelles could be forced we could send her what she so much needed, whilst the enormous quantities of wheat lying at her Black Sea ports would have been very welcome to us; and finally the effect the forcing would have upon the hesitant Balkans, and even upon Italy, would be very favourable.

The first few months were extremely critical for us, both on land and sea. On land Russia, by her most unselfish conduct, was able to prevent the capture of Paris, but she was now paying the price, and it was stated that her soldiers were without ammunition and were fighting entirely with the bayonet, owing to the totally inadequate supply of ammunition due to the inefficiency of the Army authorities. On sea we had managed to hunt down the raiders, transport a huge army from across the ocean, keep an incessant watch



off the enemy's coasts, and maintain our vast overseas trade. It was now the time to repay the debt to Russia.

Now that almost the last of the raiders had been destroyed we could devote the use of the naval forces thus employed to another purpose; and owing to the efforts of our ship-building yards in speeding up the construction of our new ships, we were able to dispatch a small squadron, assisted by a French squadron under Rear-Admiral Guepratte, to Eastern waters. This Allied Fleet could be reinforced from time to time by the China and East Indies Squadrons. It was well known prior to the war that the Straits were very heavily fortified with a large number of 28 centimetre Krupp guns, mounted upon disappearing turrets, and all the ranges had been worked out. Since then the work had been continued by the *Goeben's* crew.

Now that the findings of the Dardanelles Commission's Report have been published, little need be said about the arguments for and against the campaign. Put briefly, it appears to the average man that it ought never to have been commenced unless it could have been backed up immediately by a military expedition. It appears that the naval and military advisers were one and all of the opinion that the forts could be reduced by a naval attack, although Lord Fisher was not in sympathy with the idea. Greece was then under M. Venezelos, who had promised assistance. The immense advantages to be derived from a success seem to have obscured the thorough investigation which such an enterprise demanded; it must be remembered that a purely naval attack on land fortifications has always been held to be unsatisfactory. We had at that time no men to spare for another campaign, as all our available resources were urgently needed in France.

Two points appear very prominently in the whole affair: that the landing should not have been attempted unless success had been more assured, this being possible before the enemy had time to make any elaborate preparations, but not very certain in the case of a naval attack, as the larger element of risk entered in unless a combined attack was delivered. Secondly, that, as Lord Fisher proposed, the

campaign should be abandoned when it was seen that all surprise had been anticipated and our troops were encountering a stubborn defence. This course would undoubtedly have had a damaging effect on our prestige, but surely this was not to be weighed against the thousands of brave lives which were sacrificed on this blood-drenched peninsula. However, those who have the most to say in denunciation of the War Council would have been the first to give praise if the whole campaign had been successful. Still, one feels that when this country is fighting for her very existence, such gambles are out of place.

The attack was ordered to commence on February 19, and was duly begun by Vice-Admiral Sir Sackville Carden with a fleet of battleships, a battle-cruiser, and flotillas, and aided by the French squadron. The outer forts were shelled at long range, and Cape Helles and Kum Kale were hit with considerable effect. At 2.15 p.m. *Vengeance*, *Cornwallis*, *Triumph*, *Suffren*, *Gaulois*, and *Bouvet*, supported by *Inflexible* and *Agamemnon*, engaged the forts at closer range with their secondary armaments, the forts replying; but on being subjected to fire at moderate range, the forts on the European side were apparently silenced, and only one continued to reply from the Asiatic shore.<sup>1</sup> Operations were suspended when the light failed, but we had sustained no casualties. On the next day the seaplane carrier *Ark Royal* was in attendance for scouting purposes.

<sup>1</sup> The following are the various forts with their armaments, herein referred to by their letters :—


A. Cape Helles Battery . . .	Two 9·2" guns.
B. Seddul-Bahr . . . . .	Six 10·2" "
C. Orkhanieh Tabia . . . . .	Two 9·2" "
D. Kum Kalossi Tabia . . . . .	Four 10·2" and two 5·9" guns.
E. Fort Dardanus . . . . .	Four 5·9" guns.
F. Suandere . . . . .	—, —
J. Rumilieh Medjidieh Tabia . . .	Two 11", four 9·4" and five 4" guns.
T. Tabia Namazieh . . . . .	One 14", one 10·2", eleven 9·4", three 8·2" and three 5·9" guns.
U. Hamidieh Tabia . . . . .	Two 14" and seven 9·4" guns.
V. Hamidieh 3 . . . . .	Two 14", one 9·4", one 8·2" and four 5·9" guns.
Kum Kale (Asiatic side) . . .	Four 5·9" guns.

Until the 25th the weather was unfavourable, when *Queen Elizabeth*, one of our latest Dreadnoughts, rendered great service in the reduction of the outer forts A, B, C and D, and with *Agamemnon* silenced A, whilst *Irresistible* and *Gaulois* engaged C and D; during this action *Agamemnon* lost three killed and five wounded from a shell fired from A. *Vengeance* and *Cornwallis* then ran in under cover of long-range fire and engaged A, reducing it, whilst C and D opened a slow and ineffective fire. These were then engaged by *Charlemagne* and *Suffren* at 2000 yards range, which ceased when it was seen that they were in no condition to offer effective resistance. *Vengeance*, *Albion* and *Triumph* then completed the destruction of A, B, C and D, and minesweeping operations commenced and were continued, until by the next morning the Straits had been swept four miles up. The attack on the next forts was then undertaken, and proceeding to the edge of the mineswept area, *Majestic* and *Albion* entered the Dardanelles, and at 9.15 a.m. opened fire upon E and some new batteries on this side, the reply being ineffective and the damage to the ships slight. The outer forts were evacuated after a shelling, and demolishing parties landed at B and Kum Kale from *Vengeance* and *Irresistible*, one party even penetrating as far as Krithia. A, B and C were completely, and D partially demolished, and twenty-four concealed and four Nordenfelt guns were also destroyed. Our casualties were one killed and three wounded.

Operations were again interrupted by the frequent gales experienced at this season in the Mediterranean; on March 1 the attack was resumed, and *Triumph*, *Albion* and *Ocean* entered the Straits and again attacked E and White Cliff Battery, their fire being returned; an aerial reconnaissance disclosed several new gun positions without the weapons yet mounted. Minesweeping continued under heavy fire, and the Straits were swept clear to within one and a half miles of Cape Kephez, with the loss of six wounded. Meanwhile the French squadron shelled some batteries at Bulair, in the neck of the peninsula.

Next day *Swiftsure*, *Cornwallis* and *Canopus* attacked E, but





OFFICIAL PLAN OF THE DARDANELLES FORTIFICATIONS.

[To face page 200.]



they were heavily fired upon by Fort No. 9 and howitzers; No. 9 was damaged and ceased firing at 4.50 p.m., but all three ships were hit, yet the only casualty was one wounded. On this day the Russian *Askold* arrived from the East and did good work both here and later off the Bulgarian coast. Demonstrations were also carried out further up the coast, *Dublin* destroying an observation station, whilst *Sapphire* shelled troops and guns in the Gulf of Adramjti, and the French squadron bombarded the Bulair forts and wrecked the Cavack Bridge. On this day six modern field guns were destroyed near B; these concealed batteries gave a great deal of trouble, as the rugged character of the Peninsula rendered the location of them by aircraft very difficult.

On the next day, the 3rd, *Irresistible*, *Albion*, *Triumph* and *Prince George* resumed the attack on E and concealed guns in its neighbourhood, and the reply was less active. The weather was unfavourable but improved on the 4th, and the attack, minesweeping and demolishing work, continued, four Nordenfelts being destroyed. The ships landed a party as the enemy was holding the villages in force, and in the skirmishing we lost nineteen killed, three missing and twenty-five wounded. *Prince George* also shelled Besika, and *Sapphire* in the Gulf of Adramjti silenced the guns, and on the following day shelled troops and a military station at Tuzburna.

On the next day a larger attack was delivered on the inner forts. By indirect fire *Queen Elizabeth* fired twenty-nine shots on J, L and T, the magazine of L blowing up and disabling the fort; she was supported by *Inflexible* and *Prince George*, who dealt with the howitzers. J and T were damaged, and the effects were observed by *Cornwallis*, *Albion*, *Irresistible* and *Canopus* from inside the Straits. Heavy fire from the concealed batteries was ineffective.

On this day the East Indies squadron under Vice-Admiral Sir R. Peirse, flying his flag on *Euryalus*, bombarded Smyrna; fire was concentrated upon Fort Yenikale, and after thirty-two hits two of its magazines blew up, *Euryalus* firing with



particular accuracy. As there was no reply, the bombardment was then conducted at a closer range. On the next day Peirse swept in through the minefields and drew fire from subsidiary batteries up the hillside containing 6" and 4.7" weapons, and from three field-guns, all of which were silenced in an hour; other batteries were silenced in the afternoon. *Euryalus* and a battleship were struck by a 6" shell and a few casualties resulted; in addition several minesweepers were hit, and during later operations in the Gulf of Smyrna the *Okino* was blown up with the loss of ten killed. The work of the minesweeper is ever a hazardous task, but when under heavy fire, as the trawlers in these operations were, it is rendered doubly so, and no praise is too great for their devotion to duty.

Meanwhile at the Dardanelles the general attack was continued on the inner forts; *Queen Elizabeth*, supported by *Agamemnon* and *Ocean*, opened an indirect fire at a range of 21,000 yards on forts U and V, and was struck by three shells from howitzers and field-guns, but escaped damage. Inside the Straits *Vengeance*, *Albion*, *Prince George* and *Majestic*, and the French *Suffren*, attacked E and F, and were replied to by concealed guns. J, which previously had been attacked, opened fire, but was hit with the 12" shells and ceased fire. Most of our ships were struck, but no damage or casualties were reported, and during the night minesweeping continued under cover of *Majestic*.

On the next day the attack was resumed, and the French squadron, covering *Agamemnon* and *Lord Nelson* in a direct bombardment of the inner forts, engaged E and the concealed batteries and silenced the fort at last. The two large battleships then engaged the Narrows Forts at about 14,000 yards range, and several explosions were caused by the heavy shells, both J and U being silenced. *Gaulois*, *Agamemnon* and *Lord Nelson* were each hit three times but not seriously damaged, and the latter had three men wounded. *Dublin* remained off Bulair, and was shelled.

It was whilst covering the minesweepers that *Amethyst* made her spirited dash up the Straits as far as Nagara, the

furthest point any surface ship reached ; it was made on the night of March 9 amidst a perfect hail of shells from the forts, and a shot striking her, it killed twenty-six of her crew and wounded thirty-four others. Fortunately the other two shells which struck her did no further damage, and she returned safely. On the night of the 16th the minesweeper *Manx Hero* was blown up with the loss of three killed and two wounded, but the work continued for ten days until the Straits had been cleared up to a distance of eleven miles.

On March 16 Vice-Admiral Carden, who was incapacitated by illness and was leaving for England, was succeeded by Rear-Admiral John Michael de Robeck to the command of the Mediterranean Fleet, and the attack, which had been ordered to be made with practically all our forces at hand, was postponed until the morrow. It will have been noticed that whilst the outer forts speedily succumbed, the inner ones and the numerous batteries had put up an unexpected defence. The attack on this day, the 18th, was by far the largest yet undertaken, and at the close of it it was apparent that a purely naval attack had been unsuccessful. Whether Admiral Carden already recognised the fact we have not been told, but as he resigned on the day before the original attack was to be delivered, namely the 17th, it seems possible. He had been ordered to force the passage immediately if possible, despite the cost it would entail ; and reinforcements had already been sent out in anticipation of losses. Against the forts great damage was undoubtedly done, but in the light of subsequent events the damage to the concealed batteries and howitzers remains a doubtful factor.

The tremendous attack commenced under Admiral Robeck on March 18 at 10.45 a.m., and the violent assault on the forts in the Narrows began. *Queen Elizabeth*, *Inflexible*, *Agamemnon* and *Lord Nelson* opened a very heavy fire on forts J, E, T, U and V, whilst *Triumph* and *Prince George* attacked the batteries at F, E and H ; all of the ships were heavily fired upon by the field-guns and howitzers, as they were lying about six miles up the Straits. Soon after, above the terrific din, a yet louder explosion was heard, and it was

seen that *Inflexible* had been struck by a floating mine, and was considerably damaged in the bows. She quitted the line and eventually reached Tenedos. At about noon the French squadron under Rear-Admiral Guepratte, consisting of *Charlemagne*, *Suffren*, *Gaulois* and *Bouvet*, advanced up the Straits under a terrific fire and engaged the forts at closer range; E, F, J and U replied strongly, but were nevertheless silenced at 1.25 p.m. by the ten battleships in the Straits, all of which were hit several times.

Shortly afterwards the French squadron was relieved by *Swiftsure*, *Vengeance*, *Albion*, *Ocean*, *Irresistible* and *Majestic*. As they were turning out, the leading ship, *Gaulois*, struck a mine and was badly damaged; far more terrible a few minutes later was the blowing up of the *Bouvet*, which had also struck a mine and sank in three minutes in thirty-five fathoms of water, with practically all of her crew. Her destruction was hastened by an internal explosion which immediately followed. *Suffren* too was badly hit and had to be beached later.

The British relief squadron opened fire at 2.36 p.m., and a veritable inferno began, for the large British ships were now firing over the older ships, and the blowing up of the magazines ashore and the strong reply made a deafening din. At about 4 p.m. it was seen that *Irresistible* had been struck by a mine and commenced to sink; she quitted the line listing heavily, and made for the beach. Happily most of her crew were rescued by the destroyer *Wear*, which in a very gallant manner ran alongside under very heavy fire, enabling the crew to jump aboard. A few men remained aboard the sinking ship and fought her guns to the last, and she was very heavily shelled by the Turks until at 5.30 p.m. she foundered. Shortly after this disaster *Ocean*, which had closed in to her assistance, was struck by a mine and heeled over; she was also struck by a rain of Turkish shells, and commenced to sink, but fortunately practically all of her crew were taken off under heavy fire by the destroyers. She sank at 6.5 p.m. in deep water.

Though these casualties were attributed to floating mines,



it would perhaps be more correct to say torpedoes, as considerable doubt existed as to the character of the mines. Turkey had secured a new invention in mines, through Germany, whereby these mines are discharged from a torpedo tube, and in shape are similar to a small torpedo. They are particularly adapted to these waters, and rise and fall to specified depths at various intervals. They are not drifting mines in the sense of those which Germany indiscriminately strewed in the North Sea, as these are never lost. The current in the Dardanelles is twofold, one on the surface flowing outwards into the Mediterranean, and the other sixty feet deep flowing inwards to the Sea of Marmora to counteract the vast evaporation. Thus by sinking after drifting down for a prearranged distance, they return by the lower current, and by their mechanism rise again at their point of starting. They presented a very difficult problem to grapple with, for an area which was considered swept clear would be just as dangerous when the engines floated downstream. We may presume from the fact that no further losses were recorded from this cause, that our sailors, with their characteristic thoroughness, overcame the difficulty.

These were the losses sustained upon this memorable day. The serious damage to *Inflexible* was not made public for some time afterwards, the Admiralty report merely stating that her forward control position had been damaged and required repair; in reality she was only just kept afloat by the prompt action of her engine-room staff in immediately closing her watertight doors. At Tenedos she was temporarily repaired and later arrived in England, and fourteen months later participated in the tremendous naval battle off the Jutland coast. Beyond the two battleships which were sunk, no other British ship suffered severely, but the French squadron appears to have been more unfortunate. Only the *Charlemagne* escaped injury, and *Gaulois* remained ashore until the 20th, when her repairs had been completed. In personnel we had lost sixty-one killed, wounded and missing, but the French loss was very heavy.

Operations terminated at about 6.30 p.m. The damage to the forts could not, of course, be ascertained, and the enemy only reported trifling damage. When the landing was made a month later it was found that it was not half as serious as was at first thought. Certainly *Queen Elizabeth* and the other large ships had done great havoc to the masonry, but more than this we do not know.

The Admiralty also stated that the battleships *Queen* and *Implacable* were due to arrive to replace any casualties.

The attack was not followed up on the 19th, and next day the weather turned stormy. The Admiralty, however, stated that operations were continuing, though what precisely was meant by "operations" was not apparent. As it cannot be supposed that the loss of two old battleships was the cause of the suspension of the assault, it appears it had at last become obvious that without a combined naval and military attack the whole plan was doomed to failure.

Sir Ian Hamilton, who was present at the attack on the 18th, cabled to London that such was his opinion, at the same time estimating the strength of the Turks on the Peninsula at about 30,000 men.

Preparations for the great attack were then commenced. It will be remembered that M. Venezelos, when in power, had expressed the opinion that should the attack promise to be successful, his country would set aside its neutrality and dispatch a force of 20,000 men to co-operate with us; indeed, he even went so far as to grant us the use of the island of Lembros as a base, and later Mudros became the port for the arrival of the Anglo-French Expeditionary Force. Unfortunately, a strong German influence at the court at Athens resulted in his fall, and consequently his promises became worthless. We were threatened with the refusal of the Greeks to continue to allow us to use Lembros, but this danger was averted.

These were a few of the difficulties which faced General Hamilton, and the whole of our plans had to be recast; the deficiency of troops had to be made good from England,

though we could ill afford them, but the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps was still in Egypt, and the immortal 29th Division was sent out to reinforce them. France also sent out a force under General D'Amade.

The enemy was not slow to take advantage of the delay thus created, and he strongly fortified all points of command and repaired the damage sustained. Troops were concentrated for the attack which they knew was impending, and every effort was made to resist the landing in every possible manner.

Whilst these preparations were in progress a few minor events were taking place. During this period our ships were, of course, actively patrolling the Turkish coast, and the destroyer *Renard* had a particularly exciting trip. Covered by *London* she made a spirited dash ten miles up the Straits on a scouting mission on April 13, and although heavily fired on, both ships escaped any injury or casualty. There was also an unsuccessful attack on our arriving transports four days later, in which fifty-one lives were lost. The transport *Manitou*, whilst in the Ægean Sea, was attacked by the Turkish torpedo boat *Demir Hissar*, out from Smyrna, and after giving the troops eight minutes in which to abandon their ship, she discharged three torpedoes at her, all of which missed. The cruiser *Minerva*, with the destroyers *Jed*, *Kennet* and *Wear*, then came up and chased her until she was forced ashore on Khios Island. The loss of life occurred owing to the davits breaking and upsetting one boat, whilst another boat swamped through overcrowding.

On the 17th, also, our submarine E 15, whilst attempting a difficult reconnaissance of the Kephez minefield, had the misfortune to strand; worse still, her crew were captured before they had time to disable their craft, and the Turks made great efforts to refloat her. Seeing that there was a chance of her falling into their hands, picket boats from *Triumph* and *Majestic*, under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Robinson, put off at night, and, under very heavy fire from Fort E close by, they managed to blow her up with a torpedo. One of the picket boats was holed and



sank just as its crew was picked up by the other, and the only casualty was one killed. It was afterwards stated that the task had been made possible by a reconnaissance by the old submarine B 6. The officer in command was specially promoted to the rank of Commander on the next day, and later gained the V.C. for other services.

The plan which was carried out on April 25, when the British troops landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula, cannot be told in detail, but a general idea of what took place on that memorable day may perhaps be gathered from the following account. No pen can tell of the splendid heroism of our troops and our sailors, and the deeds which are already well known are but a few among many actions of dauntless courage.

The idea was to throw ashore the troops on five beaches at the toe of the Peninsula, namely S, V, W, X, and Y, while the French made a temporary landing at Kum Kale on the Asiatic side as a diversion, all under cover of heavy gunfire from the Fleet. The character of the terrain was such that there were but very few places suitable for troops to be landed, the coast line being generally composed of precipitous cliffs. Little wonder that the Turks had strongly fortified these shores with machine-guns, entrenchments, barbed wire entanglements which even extended some distance under the sea, and large holes at the water edge with spikes placed in them. The country was covered with dense scrub and provided admirable protection for the numerous machine-guns, and later for the snipers who made themselves almost invisible in these bushes.

On the five beaches, the landings at S and Y were to prevent the arrival of reinforcements and to protect the flanks of the troops at V, W and X, as these were the main landings; the former were to be made at dawn, and the others at 5.30 a.m. after half an hour's bombardment by the Fleet. Further up the coast the famous Anzacs were to land at Gaba Tepe; and finally a demonstration was to be made in the Gulf of Xeros.

The only unstable element was the weather, but fine weather was generally prevalent towards the end of the month. This, then, was the general plan, but it is impossible to describe fully the varying failures and successes during this day and the ensuing night.

Taking first the Australian landing, of which Rear-Admiral Thursby had charge, this was supported by the *Queen*, *Prince of Wales*, *London*, *Triumph*, *Majestic*, *Bacchante*, the destroyers *Beagle*, *Bulldog*, *Chelmer*, *Colne*, *Foxhound*, *Ribble*, *Usk*, the seaplane carrier *Ark Royal*, the balloon ship *Manica*, and fifteen trawlers. The first three battleships were to land the troops at 4.20 a.m. and the three other ships were to cover their landing by gunfire, and supply boat crews for the troops; further troops were landed later from the transports, but this operation was delayed owing to their inability to sail in closer, as the howitzers and field-guns and the Turkish ships in the Narrows prevented this. The landing was successfully accomplished, and stores and ammunition were disembarked next day under heavy and incessant fire, both from the concealed batteries and from the warships. The wounded were taken off at the time the troops were landed in case of a retirement, and this work called for great determination and coolness.

The landings at the tip of the Peninsula were under the charge of Rear-Admiral Wemyss with *Lord Nelson*, *Swiftsure*, *Implacable*, *Cornwallis*, *Vengeance*, *Albion*, and *Prince George*, and the cruisers *Euryalus*, *Talbot*, *Minerva*, *Dublin*, and twenty minesweepers. At Y Beach the King's Own Scottish Borderers were embarked on *Amethyst* and *Sapphire*, and the transports *Southland* and *Braemar Castle*, and left for Cape Tekeh; the troops then disembarked into the boats, which pulled for the shore, covered by *Goliath*. They landed at 5 a.m. unopposed, so rapidly were they put ashore; but encountering later severe opposition on the top of the cliffs, they were forced to retire, and re-embarked, together with the Plymouth Battalion of Royal Marines which had reinforced them, on *Goliath*, *Talbot*, *Dublin*, *Amethyst* and *Sapphire*.

The landing at X Beach was described by Vice-Admiral de Robeck as "a model operation." The Royal Fusiliers were landed at 7 a.m. from *Implacable* without a single casualty.

W Beach. At 5 a.m. *Euryalus* opened a heavy fire on the beach and it was continued until the troops were landed; unfortunately it did not create the damage which was expected on the entanglements. On the Lancashire Fusiliers landing at 6 a.m., they were met with severe opposition from machine-guns, pom-poms and rifle fire, and found the wire entanglements scarcely damaged. The defensive character of this beach added greatly to their difficulties, and some troops had to be landed on the rocks on the flanks to put out of action machine-guns which were greatly harassing our landing. When this was accomplished, the landing was established, but at a great cost.

V Beach. It was foreseen that at this beach the greatest difficulties would be encountered, as it was guarded by the village of Seddul-Bahr and high cliffs on either side, with entanglements stretching under the sea. Here it was that the collier *River Clyde*, which had had plates cut out of her sides and a gangway built to enable the 2000 troops to land from a bridge of lighters to the shore, was run ashore. The beach had been subjected to a heavy shelling, but as the troops in the first trip were about to land they were suddenly met with a murderous fire, and not a single man escaped death or injury; the boats themselves were so riddled with bullets that they sank. Seeing this, Commander Unwin ran his ship ashore, and attempts were made to place the lighters in position, but they failed to reach their allotted stations, leaving a gap too big to be jumped over. Nevertheless some soldiers jumped into the sea and waded ashore, but this method proved too costly, and the disembarkation was ordered to cease.

Commander Unwin, with two midshipmen and two seamen, then left the collier and, waist-deep in the water and under a perfect hail of bullets, got the lighters into position. It was impossible, however, to disembark the troops until



nightfall, as the bridge was swept by shell and rifle fire, and the troops had to remain in the collier. At nightfall they found some shelter on the beach and in the village, where severe resistance was encountered; but assisted by fire from *Albion*, they carried the village at 1.45 a.m. on April 26. For their heroic task, Commander Unwin and his four men all received the coveted Victoria Cross; and it was typical of the glorious deeds which were performed during these days.

S Beach. Here the landing, covered by *Lord Nelson* and *Cornwallis*, encountered little opposition, and the troops were firmly established by the next day.

At Kum Kale the French landing was entirely successful and, covered by *Askold*, the troops re-embarked without serious loss next day, the operation being of a purely temporary character. These troops then took up a position on the right flank of our Army on the Peninsula.

Mention should be made of the work carried out by the destroyers on this day: *Grampus*, *Pincher*, *Rattlesnake*, *Renard*, *Scorpion* and *Wolverine*, assisted by French sweepers, performed minesweeping in the Straits under heavy fire; and the destroyers at Gaba Tepe were responsible for the quickness of the landing, the second party being thrown ashore with the greatest rapidity.

The Turkish Fleet lying in the Narrows was prevented from seriously interfering by fire from *Queen Elizabeth*, who also sank a large transport of 8000 tons in the Straits with three shots. *Triumph* also shelled Maidos, which was in flames on the 29th.

Sir Ian Hamilton described the Royal Navy as "the father and mother of the Army"—a singularly apt phrase. In all these operations the Navy was in charge until the troops were ashore, and thus all confusion was avoided, and the two services worked together in the greatest harmony.

Thus was the Expeditionary Force firmly established on the Peninsula, but at what a cost! During the five days ending April 30, we lost no fewer than 177 officers and 1990 men killed, 13 officers and 3580 missing, and 412 officers and 7807 men wounded, of which the Navy only lost 27 killed

and 52 wounded. The only ship seriously damaged was the old *Prince George*, which was rather badly holed.

By the 27th the various landings had joined up and formed a continuous front three miles in length and two miles from the toe of the Peninsula, and the next few days were spent in consolidating the gains, and in landing artillery, ammunition, stores, animals, etc.

The work of the Navy now concentrated on the adequate transport of reinforcements, the re-embarkation of wounded, and the maintenance of the supplies. This arduous work was carried out with the greatest skill and bravery, although all the landing-places were under incessant fire from the enemy right up to the end of the campaign. Yet in spite of these difficulties quays were constructed, and the Army was supplied with the greatest regularity. In addition the larger ships guarded the flanks of the Army until the arrival of monitors.

On April 30 we lost the Australian submarine AE 2, which was endeavouring to penetrate into the Sea of Marmora, and her crew were captured. The French also lost their *Joule* by mines on the following day. It will be shown later what an immense success our submarines achieved in the Sea of Marmora, and how they ultimately succeeded in practically cutting off communication between the Peninsula and Constantinople by sea.

For several days the task of shelling the Turkish flanks was continued without incident, although on May 9 both *Agamemnon* and *Cornwallis* were hit and somewhat damaged, incurring a few casualties. This comparative immunity was broken on the night of May 12-13, when *Goliath* was supporting the French from inside the Straits. Shortly after 1 a.m. she sighted a small ship bearing down on her and hailed it; receiving an indistinct reply, she was about to repeat a challenge when she was struck by three torpedoes from the craft, which was later found to be the Turkish destroyer *Mauvenet-i-Millet*; and rapidly heeling over, she disappeared beneath the waves three minutes later. Such was the swiftness of the disaster that over 300 of her crew

perished. This attack was of interest, in that it was the first of the much-discussed night torpedo attacks with which the Japanese had made us familiar in their attack on the Port Arthur Fleet in 1904. The enemy destroyer apparently made a dash down the Straits from Nagara, and by good luck managed to get quite close before her presence was detected, when she successfully discharged her torpedoes, and made her escape at full speed. It was quite a neat piece of work, but, provided our destroyers were busily employed, comparatively simple. After this our battleships were only employed by day as flank ships.

About this time (May 10) German submarines made their appearance in the Mediterranean, and a reward of £2000 was offered for information leading to their destruction; from this one can judge the serious aspect which the authorities took of their presence; it necessitated the whole of our plan of transport being recast. One of these craft, U 23, left Wilhelmshaven on April 25, and arrived off the Dardanelles on May 25, according to her commander. After the first hint of its presence our more valuable units were immediately sent home, until by this date only one or two battleships remained. Their place was taken by monitors and the "blister-ships"; these latter were cruisers of the "Edgar" type. They presented a most unwieldy appearance and were said to be torpedo proof. The monitors were armed, some with two 14" guns, others with a 9·2" piece fore and a 6" gun astern, yet others with a couple of 6" guns.

Unfortunately they did not arrive until the submarines had commenced their activities. Directly they arrived, practically all the battleships and cruisers left, and their work was continued by the monitors, "blister-ships," and a few destroyers. According to the German commander, U 23 arrived on May 25, and on this day our ships were subjected to many attacks. At about 8 a.m. *Swiftsure*, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Nicholson, was unsuccessfully attacked, and about two hours later *Vengeance* had a torpedo fired at her. More unfortunate was *Triumph*, who, in company of two destroyers, was supporting the Anzacs off Gaba



Tepe; at about 12.30 p.m. two torpedoes struck her amidships and she immediately listed, capsizing nine minutes later; in this position she remained for over twenty minutes, when at 12.53 p.m. she disappeared beneath the waves. Unfortunately about 200 lives were lost, but the destroyer *Chelmer* ran alongside and took off the survivors. Though hotly pursued by cruisers and destroyers, U 23 escaped, and even discharged a torpedo at *Talbot*. Shortly afterwards Rear-Admiral Nicholson transferred his flag to *Majestic*, and detached *Swiftsure* to Mudros.

Two days later the old *Majestic* was supporting the troops from inside the Straits. At about 5.30 a.m. she was also struck by a torpedo which blew a large hole in her bows, and listing she turned right over, and later sank. Fortunately all but forty-nine of her crew were rescued, mostly by the sweeper *Reindeer*. Singularly enough she, with *Albion*, had been the first battleship to enter the Straits, and she was the last to remain. Both this ship and *Triumph* had been hammering at the forts since February, and had a proud record.

Meanwhile the town of Gallipoli had been shelled and set in flames by our guns on the 22nd, whilst the gunboat *Hussar* shelled the ports of Tchesme, Sidia, etc., opposite Khios.

In the advance on Krithia by the Anzacs on June 28, *Talbot*, *Scorpion*, *Wolverine* succeeded in keeping down the enemy's fire by their very accurate shooting; and on the next day *Pincher*, *Chelmer*, and *Humber* (one of our original monitors) engaged the enemy's heavy guns for half an hour, *Wolverine* at night getting her searchlights on some troops and causing great execution by her fire. Four days later she repulsed an attack by her "accurate fire." Of course, Krithia was the key to Achi Baba, which hill dominated the Nagara Forts, and the importance of its capture would have been inestimable. Unfortunately we were never destined to take it, though later on in a great attack some of our troops pushed forward far enough to see the Hellespont shining below, but they were compelled to fall back before superior forces.

During July the French lost two ships; on the 4th, the empty transport *Carthage* was torpedoed and sunk off Cape Helles, with the loss of six lives; and on the 26th, their submarine *Mariotte* was sunk in the Straits and her crew were captured, after an action with an enemy submarine.

On the Peninsula tremendous efforts were being made, and a general feeling of optimism prevailed, only proving the disillusionment the more bitter. A great attack was ordered to be delivered by the Anzacs, with the object of breaking out from Anzac with a rush and cutting off the bulk of the Turkish Army in the southern end of the Peninsula; and further to gain such a command for our artillery as to cut the sea communications to Constantinople, and incidentally secure Suvla Bay for a winter base.

This famous attack failed through inability to develop it rapidly enough; the supports, having lost their way, did not arrive to time when the slopes of Sari Bair had been carried. After the landing at Suvla Bay had been effected, the divisional commanders stated that the men were exhausted through lack of water, and the attack, therefore, was abandoned. Sir I. Hamilton says that the fact that the Turks suffered from the same difficulty seems to have been overlooked, and that "inertia" prevailed.

On August 8 our submarine E 11 torpedoed and sank the Turkish battleship *Haireddin Barbarossa* (ex *Kurfurst Friedrich Wilhelm*), which was carrying a number of troops aboard to reinforce the Turkish Army, but this success was neutralised by the torpedoing of our transport *Royal Edward* in the Ægean Sea on the 14th, when we lost 854 soldiers. During the last days of August the Turkish Fleet in the Narrows was shelled, and several of the ships were hit.

In the months of September and October several losses were sustained from the activities of the submarines. On September 2 the transport *Southland* was torpedoed in the Ægean, but she managed to reach Mudros under her own steam; the troops were, however, transferred to the hospital ship *Neuralia* as a precautionary measure, and in this manner thirty-one lives were lost. This was followed by the loss of

the French auxiliary cruiser *Indien* on the 8th, which sank in two minutes, but with only eleven of her crew. A third transport to be attacked was the *Ramazan*, on the 19th, whilst carrying 380 Indian soldiers; she was shelled and sunk in the Ægean Sea, and only seventy-five soldiers and twenty-eight of the crew were saved. Our submarine E 7 was also lost in the Dardanelles, and her crew were captured.

In the meantime Bulgaria had entered into the War, and a further sphere of work for the Navy was opened; the French squadron was requisitioned to convoy the Army to Salonika for the relief of the Serbians, and a blockade of the Bulgarian coast was declared on October 16, two days after hostilities broke out. The deadlock which had been arrived at on the Peninsula was now more than ever apparent, and even a slight gain was accompanied by heavy losses. The War Office then cabled to General Hamilton on October 11, to inquire what was his estimate of the losses which would be entailed by an evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula, but he replied that such a course seemed to him "unthinkable." However, he was recalled to London to give his reasons, and state his opinion as to the continuance of the campaign, and Sir C. Monro was appointed to be his successor *pro tem*.

During the end of October we suffered further naval losses. The transport *Marquette* was torpedoed and sunk in the Ægean Sea on the 26th, with the loss of ninety-nine lives; and two days later the auxiliary minesweeper *Hythe* collided off the Peninsula with another ship and sank. She was carrying 250 troops at the time, of whom two officers and 143 men were lost, in addition to one officer and nine men of the crew. France lost another submarine about this time, the *Turquoise* being sunk by gunfire in the Sea of Marmora and her crew captured; later reports stated that she was salvaged and was in the service of the Turks under the name of *Ahmed*, that of the gunner who hit her.

Another transport, the *Mercian*, was also attacked by a submarine, but she escaped with the loss of thirty killed, thirty wounded, and thirty missing, the date and locality being unspecified. We also lost one of our newest submarines



on November 5, the E 20, whose crew were lost, excepting three officers and six men. On the 10th the destroyer *Louis* was driven ashore during a violent south-westerly gale, and became a total wreck.

On the Peninsula a further attack near Krithia, in which *Edgar* and two monitors assisted, resulted in the gaining of some new positions on November 17, but both Anzac and Suvla were evacuated on December 19. The news came as a surprise, and the message stated that the troops were withdrawn without molestation from the enemy, who was in complete ignorance of the move. Great credit was given to the Royal Navy and to the generals concerned for this operation, and it appears that the success made a profound impression upon the authorities, who expected that severe losses would be entailed.

By January 9, 1916, the complete evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula was completed, and the Anglo-French force re-embarked without much loss; all the guns and howitzers were also got away, with the exception of seventeen worn-out guns, which were blown up. The French sustained no loss. The evacuation was carried out at night, and the remaining parties were in the greatest peril; for, of course, had the enemy discovered the movements, the rearguard would have been annihilated. Although submarines were sighted during the operation, only *Prince George* was struck by a torpedo, and this failed to explode. The weather, however, became rough and a gale sprang up, causing a large horse-ship to sink in collision with a French battleship. It had been intended to shell the beaches and earthworks, but the presence of submarines rendered this inadvisable, and only the stores could be destroyed.

The evacuation had been ordered in consequence of General Monro's report. He stated that no purpose was served by remaining, as the Turks were holding our force with comparatively few men; an advance on Constantinople was out of the question; disease was rife amongst the troops, and no fewer than 96,683 had been admitted into hospital during the period from April 25 to December 11; further, there

was no place on the Peninsula to which they could be withdrawn to recuperate, as all the shores, landing-places, and hospitals were under incessant fire, though in this last respect the Turk was more humane than his overlord. All things considered, an early evacuation was deemed advisable.

The cost of this campaign was terrible; the killed alone amounted to 1745 officers and 26,455 men, whilst 353 officers and 10,901 men were posted as missing, and 3143 officers and 74,952 men were wounded. The total cost was thus 5241 officers and 112,308 men.

The news undoubtedly came as a relief, for the losses were absolutely disproportionate to the gains; and though the disappointment was very bitter, yet better that our prestige should suffer than thousands more hearts. It is very difficult to understand the unbounded optimism of General Sir Ian Hamilton, who was amidst all this suffering; all his dispatches were written in the most cheerful vein, long after it was obvious to the ordinary man that success was unattainable.

During this war we have suffered many reverses to our arms, but foremost amongst them stand the Dardanelles venture and the Mesopotamian campaign. In all of them the spirit of our men has shone like a beacon through the clouds of defeat.

#### OUR SUBMARINES' WORK IN THE SEA OF MARMORA, 1915

Reference has been made to the splendid work of the Allied submarines in these waters, and as their operations were independent of the campaign on the Gallipoli Peninsula, it is advisable to deal with their exploits separately.

Ever since the entry of Turkey into the War no Turkish warships, other than a few gunboats at Smyrna and their submarines, have emerged from the security of the Dardanelles defences. Consequently there has been no opportunity of attacking them by surface ships, except by indirect fire over the Peninsula, which is at the best unsatisfactory. No Allied surface ships managed to pass the formidable

Turkish fortifications, but there remained much scope for submarine work. The difficulties attending a safe passage up the Narrow Straits are manifold even for ships, so that the success of a submarine in its enterprise is something of a wonderful feat, and the perils which have to be encountered can be judged by the losses incurred in these narrow waters.

The passage can be likened to a bottle, for on entering the narrow neck the submarine suddenly finds itself in a vast inland sea where its dangers are considerably lessened, but there still remains the exit through the neck to be accomplished. The twofold current has already been mentioned, and this factor caused much difficulty for submarines diving from one to the other, as great disturbances were encountered. They had also the devices of the enemy to overcome—nets, minefields, gunfire from the forts, patrol boats, and coastal batteries.

We had but three very old and small submarines at Malta in 1914, all of the B class which were practically obsolete even for coastal work, and it was supposed that we should have to await the arrival of modern craft from England before the submarine campaign could commence. It was not so, however, for Lieutenant Holbrook in B 11 showed the world what an indomitable spirit could do with an out-of-date engine of war. Taking his old craft into the Dardanelles, he penetrated up the Straits on December 13, and encountered a number of mines; undisturbed, he dived under five rows of them and came up near his unsuspecting victim. This was the old battleship *Messudiyeh*, which was guarding the minefield off Kephez Point. He discharged his torpedo at her, and dived to avoid observation; hearing the dull roar which denoted a hit, he rose three minutes later to see the battleship sinking, but was immediately seen by the torpedo boats and forts. He then found himself in a veritable nest of hornets; he was forced to dive to escape destruction, and on one occasion had to remain submerged for nine hours before he could rise to ascertain his whereabouts. Happily he and his crew returned safely, and he was awarded a well-earned Victoria Cross,



whilst his second in command received the D.S.O. for "conspicuous bravery."

On the next day B 9 also attempted to emulate her feat, but the Turks were now warned, and she was observed and forced to retire by the explosion of mines around her.

The Turks immediately strengthened the defences in consequence of these attacks, and before our craft once more penetrated into the Straits several losses were incurred. The first of these was the loss of the French *Saphir*, which was sunk by Turkish ships near the Dardanelles whilst on observation duty on January 16, 1915, and whose crew was captured. The second loss occurred shortly before the great landing on the Peninsula, when reconnaissances were very necessary. On April 17, E 15 attempted the very difficult passage of the Kephez minefield, which was ten miles up the Straits right under the guns of Fort Dardanus (E), but had the misfortune to run aground. Despite all their efforts the crew were captured before they could refloat her or even disable her, and it was seen that the Turks were making strenuous attempts to salve her. As it seemed that they would probably succeed, B 6 set off and made a valuable reconnaissance; from her it was learnt that the matter was very urgent, and at night on the 18th Lieutenant-Commander Robinson from *Triumph*, with two picket boats from *Triumph* and *Majestic* manned by volunteers, put off to the scene of the mishap, and although under heavy fire from Fort Dardanus, they succeeded in torpedoing the stranded submarine. One of the boats was holed and sunk, but the only loss was one man killed. Lieutenant-Commander Robinson was specially promoted to the rank of Commander on the next day.

With the landing of the Expeditionary Force on April 25, our submarines were employed in a campaign which later succeeded in practically cutting off all communication by sea with Constantinople. Unfortunately, its effect was not felt until the enemy was firmly entrenched and a comparatively small number of troops were holding our forces; but it nevertheless made their conditions at times intolerable by the non-arrival of provisions and stores.

The first submarine to be successful in passing the few miles of danger was E 14, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Boyle. With great skill he actually sank a gunboat on his way up the Straits, escaped the perils of the mines and forts and patrolling craft and entered the Sea of Marmora. Here, on April 29, he sank a transport and another gunboat, and off Kalolimni Island on May 10 the large transport *Gul Gemel*, which was carrying six 3" field-guns, ammunition, and 6000 troops for Gallipoli. He returned on the 18th, and was closely pursued down the Straits by a tug, a gunboat and several destroyers, but evaded them and safely rejoined the Allied Fleet after a three weeks' cruise. He also was awarded the Victoria Cross for his work.

Meanwhile another of our craft had come to grief. This was the Australian AE 2, which had been brought from Australia; she had evidently passed the Narrows and was about to enter the Sea of Marmora, when she was fired upon from patrol ships on April 30, and sunk. Her crew were captured. The French also lost another submarine on the next day, the *Joule*, which was lost by mines.

Amplly setting off these mishaps, E 11, under Lieutenant-Commander Nasmith, carried out a very successful cruise in the Marmora during May. Making for Constantinople, he sank on his way the old gunboat *Pelenk-i-Deria* on the 23rd, the transports No. 62 and another, and three storeships with ammunition, one of which was the *Nagara*, sunk on the 24th, which forms the subject of one of Mr. Rudyard Kipling's entertaining stories of the "Trade." He then entered the Bosphorus on the next day and penetrated as far as Constantinople, accounting for a gunboat and the transport *Stamboul*, and later an ammunition ship which was lying alongside the arsenal was also torpedoed. As the waters were becoming unhealthy and his stores were getting low, he returned to the Dardanelles and safely negotiated its perils. Here, to his disappointment, he failed to pick up some battleship as he had expected, so he audaciously returned to sink a transport which he had observed in the Straits,

and was successful in sinking it, when he returned. He was very deservedly also awarded the V.C.

During June there came a report of the loss of three small gunboats and three transports, and all communication was practically severed between the capital and the Peninsula by these submarines.

On July 6 one of our submarines sank the transport *Bigha* off Mudania, and a steamer and two lighters in tow in Haidar Pasha harbour, whilst on the 17th another craft shelled Gheresen Station near Tuzla and entered the Golden Horn, where she damaged a destroyer and sank a gunboat. Two transports, *Vega* and another, were also sunk off Constantinople, and E 7 shelled the powder mills on the coast and damaged the railway near Kara Burnu. The French submarine *Mariotte* unfortunately encountered an enemy submarine in the Straits on the 26th, and after a fight she was sunk and her crew captured.

The largest single ship loss due to these craft occurred on August 8, when E 11 was just about to return to the Marmora. On proceeding up the Straits she sighted the battleship *Haireddin Barbarossa* off the town of Gallipoli, carrying many troops aboard; this she was successful in torpedoing, and another submarine also sank the gunboat *Berk-i-Satvet* and a transport in the same vicinity. Twelve days later E 11 sank the two ammunition transports *Espahan* and *Tenedos* off Haidar Pasha; and Lieutenant D'Oyly Hughes was landed near Kretzou, where he partially blew up the Gebize Bridge on the Ismid-Haidar Pasha railway line. For this deed he was awarded the D.S.O.

E 2 also was successful in these operations, and on August 15 she sank a minelayer, on the 17th another ship was sunk in Artaki Gulf, and two days later a larger ship, presumably an auxiliary, was put down off Mudania.

Before continuing to follow the adventures of these submarines, it will be as well to endeavour to get an insight into the character and conditions of these operations. Those who have read Mr. Rudyard Kipling's graphic accounts of their work cannot fail to be struck with the very humane



method of our commanders, and the marked regard they showed for the lives of enemy crews. In no case was an unarmed ship sunk without the safety of the crews being provided for, and this precaution led to several narrow escapes. Often they had hailed a craft, which was to all intents a harmless ship, but were received with gunfire, rifle fire, bombs, and in some cases ramming. The case of the *Nagara* well illustrates this point, and several times the crew of a dhow was taken aboard, fed, and later put aboard another ship, though these incidents were not in strict accordance with the apparently correct method of submarine warfare.

The perils of a successful passage have already been described, and several of our craft have had very nerve-racking experiences in the Straits. Often the crew suddenly found that their bows were unable to rise in response to the navigator, only to discover that a mine was suspended from one of her hydroplanes, or horizontal rudders, and they were compelled to carry this death-dealing machine down the Straits until, in wider water, they suddenly reversed their engines, enabling the mine to slip off. Again, another came to a dead stop and refused to move a yard further; investigation revealed that a collection of netting, etc. had become entangled in her bows and obstinately refused to clear, and in this case the submarine suddenly went full speed ahead and cut through the whole mass, arriving at her base a leaking, dripping box of machinery. Sometimes the crew, with infinite patience, spent hours in clearing away the encumbrances.

The cruises lasted on some occasions for seventy days—all but three months—and they were all this time without a base, the only safe resting-place being the centre of the Sea of Marmora, where the sailors could bathe and even do their washing, though their washing-day sometimes came to an abrupt end, and we do not know what became of their laundry on the “drying-ground.”

It is a cause of great regret that France, the pioneer in submarine construction, should have lost so many of her

craft, and at the same time have had so little success with them in these waters. One of the few instances of a French submarine at work in the Sea of Marmora was on August 29, when Paris announced the destruction of a destroyer and two transports in the Bay of Ak Bashi, and of two others between Nagara and Gallipoli.

Further losses were experienced during September and October; E 7 was sunk off the Dardanelles about September 4, and her crew were captured; the French *Turquoise*, after passing through the Straits during the latter part of October, had the misfortune to be disabled by gunfire from coastal batteries, and her crew were also captured. The Turks later succeeded in salving her, and she was renamed *Ahmed*.

On November 5 E 20, one of our newest submarines, was just returning from a cruise in the Marmora when she was also sunk, and three officers and six men of her crew were taken prisoners. This was the last loss we incurred, and although they had been numerous, a reign of terror existed in this sea. The Turks had built and equipped a large number of fast motor-boats armed with quick-firing guns, especially adapted for submarine hunting, similar to our craft in use in home waters, but they did not affect the situation. In December another outburst of activity occurred, and E 11 had quite an exciting cruise. On the 2nd she shelled a train on the Ismid line, on the next day she torpedoed the destroyer *Yar Hissar* in the Gulf of Ismid, whilst on the 4th a 3000 ton supply ship was sunk off Pandermo by gunfire, together with four sailing vessels. A few days later a submarine appeared off Constantinople and entered the Golden Horn to shell the arsenal.

The work after December was sporadic; a French submarine entered the Marmora in February and torpedoed the old French tug *Le Rhône*, which had been seized by the enemy, and six sailing vessels laden with ammunition in the Bosphorus. In the latter part of April the transport *Chirketi Hairie* was also sunk.

Of course, after the evacuation of the Peninsula in January

1916, there remained no reason for detaching valuable craft for these operations, and with the departure of our Army and Fleet from this region most of the submarines also left.

Their total bag in these waters consisted of two battleships, two destroyers, twelve gunboats and minelayers, and 202 transports and supply ships, which, in conjunction with Russia's great hauls in the Black Sea, reduced Turkey's mercantile marine to a minimum. To achieve this we lost AE 2, E 7, E 15, E 20 and the French *Joule*, *Marlotte*, *Saphir*, and *Turquoise*.



## CHAPTER III

### THE BLACK SEA

THE position of Turkey bears a marked resemblance to the position occupied by Germany between the Baltic and North Seas, inasmuch as both Fleets are inferior to their chief opponents, yet their natural advantage of being between the two opposing Allied Fleets which await them outside, and their comparatively secure bases wherein they can still remain a menace without actually coming into conflict, to a great degree nullify their inferiority. But whereas Germany is vastly superior to Russia in the Baltic and in the early days of the war Turkey was so in the Black Sea, yet neither have utilised this superiority to any extent. With the arrival of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* in Turkish waters, Turkey at once became the stronger naval Power.

Russia, whose Fleet is split into two squadrons (one in the Baltic, which is her primary force, and the other in the Black Sea), has pursued an energetic policy since the Russo-Turkish War in 1877-8 here, and had in 1914 created a considerable force to oppose her ancient enemy. The one drawback was the decree refusing her egress into the Mediterranean. She possessed the fairly modern pre-Dreadnoughts *Evstafi* and *Ivann Zlatoust*, the *Panteleimon* (late *Kniaz Potemkin*), the old *Rostislav*, *Tri Sviatitelia* and *Georgeoi Pobiedonostez*; in addition there were two new light cruisers, four gunboats, twenty-six destroyers, nine torpedo boats, eleven submarines, minelayers, etc. Against this Turkey had the very powerful battle-cruiser *Goeben* (whose damage to her furnaces has handicapped her somewhat, though her armament completely outranged anything the Russians could put against her), three light cruisers, *Breslau*,

*Hamidieh*, *Medjidieh*, the four old battleships, *Haireddin Barbarossa*, *Torgud Reis*, *Messudiyeh*, *Muin-i-Zaffer*, eight destroyers, twenty-seven gunboats, and thirty-seven torpedo boats, several of which were of little value.

Thus it will be seen that the advantage was with Turkey in modern ships, and had the *Goeben* and the fast cruisers been handled with skill and dash they should have constituted a serious menace to the Russian Fleet. All actions would then have been fought at a range suitable to the ex-German ship, whose 11" guns would have wrought tremendous havoc on the older and slower Russian ships.

Great efforts on the part of Messrs. Brown of Clydebank, who had taken over the yard at Nicolaieff, to endeavour to reduce the lengthy period required for the completion of Russian ships, were rewarded in the summer of 1915 by the completion of the first of the three Dreadnoughts, *Ekaterina II*, *Imperatriza Maria*, and *Alexander III* of 22,500 tons, which carried ten 12" guns.

The conduct of this warfare has been one of raids on Turkish shipping, punctuated by skirmishes and sporadic sorties by the enemy.

It will be remembered that *Breslau* had appeared off the Rumanian port of Sulina on October 25 to escort two German steamers to Constantinople. This Rumania had protested against in accordance with her prohibition of the passage of ammunition and war material through her territory, and she therefore detained them. However, the *Breslau's* captain landed, and with a "menacing air" ignored all remonstrances, and convoyed the ships away. Russia replied by declaring the two ships to be German and stating that they would be engaged and fought if sighted.

It was Turkey who opened hostilities, doubtless by order of Germany. On October 29 Odessa was amazed to hear the sound of heavy guns at sea, and two ships were seen firing on the docks and harbour. The gunboat *Donetz* was sunk and both the minelayer *Prut* and gunboat *Kubanetz* were so badly damaged that they also sank next day.

Theodosia was also shelled, and on the 31st much damage was done to the docks at Sevastopol. War, of course, could not be averted after these unprovoked attacks, and Turkey became the open enemy of the Allies on November 4.

Russia retaliated with a raid on the Anatolian coast, the rich coal district, shelling Zunguldak and Kozlu on the 7th, and a bombardment of the Bosphorus and the destruction of several vessels at Ervilea three days later. Four transports sunk off Zunguldak, and five others off Trebizond a few days later somewhat restored the balance.

The one real action in the Black Sea took place on November 18 when the Russians were returning from the Anatolian coast and sighted the two German ships. The action started off the Chersonese lighthouse, and the Russian ships concentrated their fire on the *Goeben*, as her consort had wisely retired out of range. The flagship *Evstaffi* hit her with the first shot and caused an explosion which was followed by a fire. More explosions occurred, and had the Russian guns been the modern 12" weapon the *Goeben* must have gone down. As it was she seemed taken completely unawares, and only after considerable delay returned the fire. Even then she could have given the weaker Russians a sound drubbing at a safe range, much as Sturdee did off the Falklands. As it was she only secured one hit at a range of 7500 yards on the flagship, causing the loss of thirty-three killed and twenty-five wounded. After fourteen minutes she turned tail and fled into the mist with her superior speed. Since then the enemy has never seriously challenged Russia's mastery in this region.

Operations then settled down to guerilla warfare between the flotillas, supplemented by minelaying. A detailed account of these raids on the Turkish shipping would prove tedious, but to illustrate the thoroughness of the work it was computed that of the traffic between Constantinople and the Anatolian ports no fewer than 1500 vessels with their cargoes (chiefly coal), and valued at £16,000,000, were destroyed during 1914 and 1915. Though repeated attempts have been made to create a new fleet for the transport of



this valuable product, they have all failed. Forty sailing craft captured at a time by a couple of destroyers was a common occurrence, and Turkey thus lost practically all her mercantile marine.

In addition to these operations, extensive minelaying was carried out off the Bosphorus from time to time, with disastrous results for the enemy. The first victim was the cruiser *Hamidieh*, whose adventurous career in the Balkan War is well known; this ship was damaged off Constantinople on December 12, but regained port with considerable difficulty. On this day also the *Breslau*, appearing off Sevastopol, was driven off by seaplanes and destroyers.

Further damage from the minefield followed when the new gunboat *Issa Reis* was sunk on the 18th, and the *Goeben* was also damaged on the 26th, to such an extent that repairs have never been satisfactorily effected; it was this mishap which gave rise to the rumours that she had been converted into a hospital ship, but false as these reports have proved, the damage has undoubtedly crippled her.

On January 5 a neat little piece of work by the cruiser *Pamyat Merkurie* and the destroyer *Gnievny* was reported. Coming across the *Medjidieh* convoying a transport, they attacked and put to flight the cruiser and sank the transport. Two days later all the shipping at Sinope was destroyed, and this was followed by raids on the ports of Samsoun, Tribia, Surmaneh, and Khopoh, despite the attempted interference of *Breslau* and *Hamidieh*, which were driven off and damaged.

Meanwhile the mines off the Bosphorus claimed further victims—the gunboat *Peik-i-Chevket* was severely injured and had to be towed to Stenia in a sinking condition; on the 21st a gunboat of the “Reis” type struck a mine and disappeared, followed by a sister ship on February 15, and three torpedo boats a few days later foundered one after the other. Beyond a fruitful raid off Trebizond on the 10th, nothing of importance happened until April, when on the 3rd two

enemy ships appeared off Odessa and captured the crews of two steamers, which were then sunk; thus far, aided by intelligence of the absence of Russian patrols, they were successful, but ill-luck attended their return journey, for *Medjidieh*, one of the cruisers, struck a mine in the Gulf of Odessa, and in spite of all efforts sank in shallow water. She was salvaged two months later by the Russians and brought into port.

On this same day *Goeben* and *Breslau* on their return were discovered by the Russians and were pursued till nightfall. Not content with this failure, these two cruisers, accompanied by torpedo boats, again ventured out into the Black Sea, and again misfortune followed; in their absence the ever-watchful Russians seized their opportunity and laid mines in the entrance to the Bosphorus. The Turkish squadron on its return lost two torpedo boats before this danger was detected, and was forced to remain outside until they were swept up.

Simultaneously with the Allied landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula on April 25, the Bosphorus fortifications were shelled by our Ally. At 8 a.m. a Russian squadron opened fire and shelled part of the Turkish Fleet in the Straits (the other section comprising the three cruisers was lying off *Nagara* in the Dardanelles), forcing them to retire. Twenty-five explosions occurred in the forts; *Torgud Reis* ineffectually replied, and enemy torpedo attacks were also fruitless. In a very entertaining account of this event Berlin reported that the Russian squadron, consisting of five battleships, two cruisers, twelve destroyers, and transports, was beaten off and the leading ship hit, whilst they only escaped by a hasty retreat to the fortified harbour of Sevastopol! Continuing their imaginary news, they claimed that the battleship *Panteleimon* was torpedoed and sunk on May 22 off the Bosphorus; Petrograd stated that this ship was in port that day and no warship had been sunk.

On the night of June 11 a couple of Russian destroyers, whilst patrolling off the Bosphorus, suddenly encountered

a ship; both parties saw each other at the same time, and when the *Breslau* switched on her searchlights, thereby revealing her position, she was immediately attacked and a sharp encounter ensued. The cruiser was struck several times, and explosions, followed by fires, occurred; a stray shot hit one of the Russian ships and killed and wounded seven of her crew.

During July a destroyer was attacked by a German submarine off Tobekmedje, but counter-attacking, forced her to dive; she did not reappear and her loss was presumed. Several raids were also carried out, both by surface ships and submarines; three cases in which these latter were successful show the remarkable adaptability and spirit of their crews. The *Murj* sank a coal-laden steamer and several sailing vessels for Constantinople, whilst *Nerpa* accounted for another steamer and attacked a large transport of 7000 tons off the Bosphorus; this she torpedoed and sank, but was then shelled by the land batteries and some destroyers which had raced up. Notwithstanding her vastly superior opponents, she at once proceeded gallantly to attack her new foes and actually drove them back into the Straits. On the next day, July 19, another submarine pluckily attacked a large armed transport of 6000 tons and sank her, despite the fire which was directed at her. The total result of these raids now amounted to forty-seven steamers, two tugs, and 500 sailing craft destroyed and captured.

The *Breslau* was again damaged in an attack; a large hole below the water-line between her third and fourth funnels was made with a torpedo, and she was laid up for some time for repairs. About this time the first of the new Russian Dreadnoughts was completed, and Turkey lost any claim to the command of the Black Sea. During the remainder of July several destructive raids caused a great scarcity of coal in the Turkish capital, despite the fitting out of a new fleet of coal-carriers. This also suffered the same fate as the previous one in August.

Realising the futility of sending out unprotected flotillas of these craft, the Turks instituted a system of convoy;



but even this was equally unsuccessful. On September 7 the *Hamidieh* and two torpedo boats were convoying four transports and a barque to Constantinople, but were met by the two destroyers *Bystry* and *Pronsitelny* under Captain Prince Troubetsky; in spite of the cruiser's fire they pluckily attacked the Turks for three hours and then pursued them to Constantinople, when they returned and sank the transports. *Hamidieh* was damaged and one of her 6" pieces was put out of action.

A few days later by way of reprisal a Turkish cruiser appeared off the Crimean coast and shelled the lighthouse and a factory, but in all probability an accompanying submarine was hit and sunk. The Russian torpedo craft still kept up their raiding operations, which were often carried out with great dash under very heavy fire from the shore batteries, and in addition they had to keep open the route for communications for the Caucasian Army.

On October 5 Bulgaria declared war after much vacillation, and further coasts had to be patrolled. Considerable activity occurred in Bulgarian waters, *Goeben* arriving at Varna, and a few days later the Russian Fleet shelled the port. Turkish submarines, presumably sent overland in sections to Bulgaria or Turkey, now made their appearance. A couple, after shelling a lighthouse on the Crimean coast, attacked three Russian sailing vessels, but when about to destroy the third several destroyers arrived and chased them, one probably foundering during a very violent storm which arose. The Bulgarian coast was mined on October 15 and interest centred in these waters. U 26 arrived at Varna, which was shelled again, together with Burgas, on the 23rd and 27th; and although the *Goeben*, *Breslau* and *Hamidieh* sided with the batteries in their reply, no damage was sustained by our Ally, and by November 16 the last of the three Dreadnoughts reinforced the blockading Fleet.

A small Turkish raid was made on the 29th on Russian shipping, but another on December 10 was frustrated by the arrival of warships; on this day three Russian torpedo boats, whilst off Kephren Island, encountered two enemy

gunboats, one of the "Malatia" type and the other of the "Burak Reis" type, and after a short action disabled them and destroyed a large sailing ship. On cruising near this spot a few days later they were surprised to find that one of them was hardly damaged and her flag was flying, though the other was almost submerged. The crew of the former were making strenuous efforts to save their ship, but seeing the Russian ships closing in to destroy them, they blew her up to prevent her capture.

Several ships were destroyed off the Bulgarian coast during December, including the coal steamer *Karpatzi*. During a raid on the 26th the destroyer *Gromky* was unsuccessfully attacked by a submarine which discharged three torpedoes at her, and counter-attacking, probably sank her.

On January 8 *Goeben* was again encountered, but she fled, and the steamer *Carmen* was also sunk. From prisoners taken from her it was learnt that the two gunboats recently destroyed had been ordered to proceed to the assistance of a stranded submarine in the mouth of the river Melen, but had been caught before arriving at the spot. Acting on this information destroyers steamed to the place and on the 10th destroyed her.

It will be remembered that at this time the Grand Duke Nicolas was developing his offensive in the Caucasus, being greatly supported by the Fleet. A detachment was landed from the ships on the night of January 26 to capture the village of Endelfi, and although the covering ships were attacked by submarines its officials were brought back to the ships. On February 16 another party captured a fortified position at the mouth of the Vitzen, and a few were wounded by rifle fire. Preparations were then made for the capture of Trebizond, on the grounds that it would provide an excellent base for the troops and obviate the transport of stores along bad roads. The fort was violently shelled on March 4, and under cover of the guns Atina was occupied; the progress after then was slower and the fort did not fall until April 14, when heavy gunfire from the Fleet greatly assisted the operation.

Meanwhile activities reverted to the Bulgarian coast. Here the destroyer *Lieutenant Pustchin* was torpedoed and sunk on March 9, the majority of the crew being saved by other ships and also by the Bulgarians. A week later the large steamer *Esperanza* of 7000 tons was sunk off Kuleka and her crew captured.

Up to this time the naval warfare had been carried on without any gross violation of the recognised principles of war, but unhappily it seems that in every sea in which a German sails there must occur deeds of criminal brutality. Germany had up to then only once attempted to sink a hospital ship, but the record was not maintained; and what made their crime worse was the attempt to cover the deed by the false announcement of an important military success.

The status of a hospital ship has been already given, and the attack was a flagrant violation of the regulations. On March 30 the old French liner *Portugal*, which had been converted into a hospital ship for the conveyance of the wounded between Batum and the Crimean ports, was off Phatie on the Anatolian coast, and was proceeding to Batum to bring the wounded home. She stopped off this place prior to embarking them, and was about to anchor; suddenly without the slightest warning a torpedo struck her in the region of the engine-room, and was followed by a second which wrought such tremendous havoc that she sank in one minute. Lifeboats were put off from a torpedo boat and a trawler, and 11 Charity Sisters, 3 commanders, 2 doctors, a priest, 125 men of the Russian Naval Medical Service, and 13 of the French crew were rescued; Count Talistchoff and Baroness Meyendorff were amongst the lost, which included 15 Charity sisters, 50 R.N.M.C., and 23 of the crew. The lying Turkish version stated that a submarine north of Batum had torpedoed a large transport of 12,000 tons carrying troops and war material, and that another transport of 15,000 tons was sunk on the next day. No such large ships were attacked, and the *Portugal* was of only 7000 tons.

The Turks now realised the gravity of the situation in this



region and dispatched *Breslau* to reinforce the coastal army. Though for a day or two she shelled the Russian trenches, she was driven off by the Russian ships, and returned to Constantinople somewhat damaged. The destroyer *Strogy* also rammed and sank a submarine on the place where the *Portugal* had gone down. The raids continued, and the number of vessels destroyed now totalled 70 steamers and 800 sailing ships.

Trusting to the Russian Fleet being concentrated in Anatolian waters during the fall of Trebizond, *Breslau* made a dash into the Black Sea and reached Dupatonia on the Crimean seaboard and presumably laid mines. Most of these were cleared up, but on June 22 the Russian steamer *Mercury* with 800 passengers, most of whom were children, struck a mine off Odessa and sank with loss of life. Further misfortune followed in the early days of July when *Breslau* appeared off Sochi flying the Russian colours and, hoisting the Turkish flag, torpedoed and sank the transport 121 which was carrying supplies for the Caucasian Army. She also claims to have destroyed another transport off the mouth of the Vardar which had been disabled by a submarine on the previous day.

The cowardly attack on the *Portugal* was repeated on July 9, when another ship was sunk. This was the *Uperiode*, which was steaming for Batum for wounded, but as none were on board the loss of life was not so heavy as it might have been. As a result of these attacks Russia on the 20th declared that Turkey had forfeited her right of immunity, and that thenceforth any Turkish hospital ship would be sunk.

During the last days of August Rumania placed herself on the side of the Allies, and several attacks on Varna by air and sea were effected, much damage to her harbour being reported. In September further attacks were delivered and the civil population evacuated the port.

In October a very plucky feat by the commander of the Russian submarine *Tuilen* was reported; after a sharp fight off the Bosphorus he captured the armed transport *Rodosto* of 6000 tons. The ship was much damaged and in flames,

but by great exertions she was brought into Sevastopol, where the commander received a well-merited decoration. Turkey, on the other hand, claimed to have sunk a transport of 3000 tons off the Rumanian coast a week later.

On the occupation of Constanza in October by the enemy, this port was heavily shelled, together with Mangalia; the raids were continued, but as there were few ships left the hauls were fewer and less frequent.

During November Russia had the great misfortune to lose, at any rate temporarily, one of her fine Dreadnoughts. At 6 a.m. on the 20th a fire broke out, followed by an internal explosion, on the *Imperatriza Maria*; and though the brave crew did their utmost to fight the flames, which had reached the petrol tanks, they only succeeded in flooding the magazine. In an hour she sank in shallow water, and it was stated that hopes were entertained for her salvage. Three officers and 213 men lost their lives.

A renewal of activity by the Russian torpedo boats on January 6, when no fewer than forty Turkish vessels with food for Constantinople were sunk and their crews captured, was closely followed by a second attempt to raise the blockade, when twenty-three newly-built ships were captured and sunk off the Anatolian coast. During the next few weeks a number of other craft were accounted for.

On June 30 *Breslau*, in the hope of taking the Fleet unawares whilst Russia was in the throes of her Revolution, appeared off Odessa and, shelling the lighthouse, disabled some coast guns. On the island of Fidonisi, near the estuary of the Danube, she landed a party who captured a machine-gun and eleven men; though chased by the old battleship *Rostislav*, she regained the Bosphorus. Presumably during these operations Russia lost an old torpedo boat by mines.

The Russian Navy has, relatively, been little affected by the Revolution, but at Sevastopol an outbreak during mid-June occurred in the naval barracks; the sailors demanded the resignation of Admiral Koltchak and his staff, and threatened his arrest. The Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet refused to give up his sword and flung it

into the sea, but to avoid bloodshed sent messages to his officers to accept the situation. He was supposed to have leanings towards the Royalists. Otherwise the trouble was slight, and the new conditions soon asserted themselves.

July saw a recurrence of patrol activity, and on the 5th three fast cutters raided Lake Razin in the estuary of the Danube, destroying a gun and capturing a few prisoners. An enemy ship was also shelled and sunk by the shore batteries on the Danube.

It was unofficially reported in September that a Bulgarian torpedo boat and a German submarine had been mined off Varna and sunk; and on October 2, torpedo boats raided the shipping off the Bosphorus, sinking a tug and two coal barges and bringing another barge into Sevastopol with thirty-nine prisoners. A few days later several more vessels were sunk, and a submarine also captured and brought into port the corn steamer *Sultan*. Eleven schooners were destroyed off the Anatolian coast by torpedo boats on the 9th; and during the end of the month wreckage of a German submarine drove ashore near Batum.

In a small encounter in Inda Bay the destroyers *Bystry* and *Pilky* encountered a Turkish torpedo boat and two steamers; all these were sunk, and a battery on shore was silenced on October 31. Another enemy destroyer was torpedoed and sunk in the Gulf of Inadz, on the coast between Constantinople and Burgas, on November 4; and a steamer was also shelled and a battery destroyed.

During the autumn of 1917 Admiral Suchon, who brought the two cruisers into Turkish waters and was in command of Germany's eastern Fleet, was recalled, from which it appeared that little further was to be expected from the Turko-German Navy in the Black Sea. Of the *Goeben* nothing had been heard for nearly two years, beyond the fact that the Kaiser had held a meeting on board during his Eastern visit in October.

To summarise the naval losses of the opponents is somewhat difficult owing to denials and rumours. Turkey's



definite losses are: the cruiser *Medjidieh*, the gunboats *Issa Reis*, two "Reis" type, one "Malatia," one "Burak Reis," and one "Berk-i-Satvet," a destroyer, six torpedo boats, and probably five or six submarines. These do not include losses incurred in the Sea of Marmora.

Russia has lost the *Imperatriza Maria* (temporarily?), the gunboats *Donetz* and *Kubanetz*, the destroyer *Lieutenant Pustchin*, a torpedo boat, the minelayer *Prut*, and the transport 121. In addition the hospital ships *Portugal* and *Uperiode* were sunk.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE CAMPAIGN IN THE BALTIC SEA

SINCE the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-5, when the Russian Fleet was practically annihilated, drastic changes have been made in the Russian Naval Administration and in the commands at sea. Under the late Admiral Essen, who ably commanded the *Novik* in 1904, an energetic policy had been outlined and was in the course of execution when war broke out in 1914. It will be remembered that at the time of the cessation of hostilities with Japan she had lost all her newest battleships, and only the *Tsarevitch* survived of all this class of warships which had been in the conflict. Similarly of the armoured cruisers only the *Gromoboi* and *Rossiya* remained, and of the fourteen light cruisers which were engaged only the *Askold* and *Zhemtchug*, based on Vladivostock in 1914, *Bogatyr*, *Oleg*, *Aurora*, and *Diana* were left. In addition she lost thirteen of her new destroyers.

With this greatly reduced fleet Admiral Essen set about the reconstruction of a new and more efficient Navy, both in regard to material and personnel. In the foregoing chapter it will be recollected that there was one newly completed battleship in the Black Sea, which did not participate in the Far Eastern War, and thus escaped her sisters' fate; this was the *Kniaz Potemkin*, later renamed *Panteleimon*. Likewise there was also another new battleship which was not quite ready to leave with the reinforcing Fleet and was completing at the Petrograd yard; and this ship, the *Slava*, supported by two old ships, *Peter Veliky* and *Imperator Alexander II*, formed the nucleus around which this indefatigable officer built up the modern battle Fleet. There

were four battleships already voted, the *Imperator Pavel* and *Andrei Pervosvanni* in the Baltic, and *Evstafi* and *Ivann Zlatoust* in the Black Sea, all of which were serviceable pre-Dreadnoughts but were not completed until 1910-11.

Perceiving the futility of building vessels which would be semi-obsolete by the time that they would be ready for service, he first removed all the incompetent officers and thoroughly reorganised the shipbuilding and dockyards. He also ordered the immediate construction of four armoured cruisers, in place of any further battleships until their period of building could be reduced; these were the *Admiral Makaroff*, *Bayan*, *Pallada*, and the most powerful armoured cruiser afloat, the *Rurik*. She was little less in value than a battleship of that date, and was superior to the German *Blucher*; of course our battle-cruisers were much stronger but also more costly. He also continued the construction of torpedo craft.

Having won over the Duma to sanction an ambitious programme, after a hard struggle, he authorised the construction in 1909 of four battle-cruisers, the *Gangut*, *Poltava*, *Petro-pavlovsk*, and *Sevastopol*, to be completed during 1914-15; in 1911 the three Dreadnoughts already described for the Black Sea; and another four battle-cruisers in the Baltic, the *Borodino*, *Ismail*, *Kinburn*, *Navarin*, to be completed by about 1917. In addition in 1913 four light cruisers, *Bootakof*, *Greig*, *Spiridoff*, and *Swietlana*, were ordered, and two others were being built at Danzig in 1914, *Admiral Nevelskoi* and *Mouravieff Amursky*; these were, of course, taken over by the enemy, under the new names of *Pillau* and *Elbing*; the latter was lost in the Jutland battle. Finally, the flotillas have been enormously extended, both surface and under-water craft being built in large numbers.

Unfortunately the War broke out before any of this new programme was completed, and Russia only had her six pre-Dreadnoughts, supported by the squadron of six armoured cruisers, and four old light cruisers; there were also the destroyers, torpedo boats, gunboats and submarines. This small fleet was pitted against the might of



the second naval power of the world, and put up a most successful defence against it.

Of course the general policy pursued has been one chiefly confined to flotilla warfare, and the Russian flotillas were augmented in the autumn of 1914 by the arrival of several British submarines in the Baltic. As the British fleet is almost twice as strong as the German High Seas Fleet, so the Russian Baltic Fleet is more than twice inferior in point of numbers to the German Fleet. Not so in spirit, for our Ally showed the most extraordinary pluck in beating off the German forces in action and so restored the balance, thanks to Admiral Essen and his supporters.

Germany possessed the incalculable advantage of the Kiel Canal, through which she can pass the bulk of her navy from the North Sea bases to Kiel unperceived; but one cannot help thinking that she has not made the most of this valuable asset, for on nearly every occasion on which her squadrons have cruised near the Russian coasts they have been received with energy. The rôle assigned to the Russian Navy has been to remain a "Fleet in being" without neglecting any chances of inflicting damage upon the enemy on every possible occasion.

Hostilities opened on August 2 with a shelling of the port of Libau, an important Russian base on the Courland coast, by the cruiser *Augsburg*, but the damage inflicted was small and was unattended by loss of life. Considerable activity by both fleets followed, in which a German torpedo boat struck a mine and sank, and a shelling of the Dagerort lighthouse on the 13th was also reported. On the 27th a squadron of German cruisers was chased by Russian forces, and one, the *Magdeburg*, stranded off Odensholm; on the approach of the Russians, who were preparing to attack her, the captain ordered the crew to blow her up after the majority of them, including twenty-one wounded, had been taken off by the destroyer V 26. The captain and 101 of the crew perished.

As in the North Sea, considerable time elapsed before the conditions settled down, and the enemy suffered further

casualties. It was during September that there occurred the famous piece of trickery played by Admiral Essen on the foe. Painting a few of his cruisers to resemble German ships, he came across an enemy squadron one dark night and managed to approach quite close to them before the ruse was discovered; opening fire, he severely damaged a cruiser and eight destroyers in the following confusion.

During October German submarines were very active and attacked the Russian patrols. On the 10th *Admiral Makaroff* escaped destruction by sheer good luck, but the next day was more unfortunate; *Bayan* and *Pallada* were both attacked and their torpedoes hit *Pallada* and sank her with the entire crew. Two of the assailants were later reported sunk by *Bayan* and the destroyer *Letutschi*, though Berlin denies their loss. Libau was revisited by two cruisers and ten torpedo boats, and a few fires broke out during the shelling.

November was a particularly costly month for Germany, for in addition to the loss of the armoured cruiser *Friedrich Karl*, which struck a mine and foundered with heavy loss of life, the battleship *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* and the cruiser *Hertha* collided and sustained severe damage; finally, a minelayer, whilst laying drifting mines, was sighted and shelled by a Russian flotilla, and a shell striking one of her mines aboard, blew the ship to pieces.

The danger of employing old heavy cruisers on patrol duty in submarine infested waters seems to have been observed here also, for after this only light cruisers and torpedo craft were encountered. Our submarines commenced their successful operations early in the New Year, and their first victim was the light cruiser *Gazelle*, which was so seriously damaged by a torpedo off Rügen on January 25 that her engines were wrecked, and she was only prevented from sinking on the spot by the arrival of a Swedish ferry-boat, which towed her into Sassnitz in a sinking condition. She was totally disabled, but the British submarine returned unharmed in spite of numerous mines which were thrown out by the cruiser. This incident was closely followed by

the sinking of a destroyer on the 28th by a torpedo from E 9.

A very interesting account of the passage of these submarines through the Sound was published later in the year, but it is probable that most have slipped through into the Baltic without any escort at all. This report stated that a flotilla of submarines, escorted by a British squadron of Dreadnoughts, cruisers and destroyers, entered the Skaw; leaving behind the larger ships, the submarines were escorted as far as Elsinore, when they passed through into the Baltic. This flotilla consisted of about ten craft, according to Danish sources, but this was doubtless in excess of the actual number. It is difficult to see the object of such a strong escort, which would have put the enemy on his guard; more probably, a British squadron was on its periodical sweep in the North Sea, and the submarines took advantage of the protection which it would afford and arrived simultaneously off the Skaw.

Little occurred in the Baltic until Hindenburg commenced his offensive against the Riga and Courland provinces during May. With the object of repeating the attacks on Libau, an enemy flotilla of destroyers arrived, but were driven off by the Russian patrols on the 5th; the town, unfortunately, fell into the enemy's hands three days later, the objective being to establish a base for a projected drive on Petrograd. After the occupation of the port, our submarines utilised their opportunity and attacked the numerous transports entering the harbour, one of which was torpedoed on the 10th.

In Mr. Rudyard Kipling's graphic accounts of our submarines' work in the Baltic, he emphasises the extreme difficulties with which our men had to contend. The depth of the Baltic is not very great in many parts, and a submarine if forced to descend suddenly finds itself hitting the bottom with great violence almost immediately; also the violent Baltic gales from the north and the intense cold, with the drifting ice, all combine against the success of this work, although these conditions do not seem to have very much effect on the achievements of the gallant crews.



During the end of May the Germans claim the loss of an Allied submarine, but no official confirmation has been issued, and in nearly all cases where the destruction of these craft is claimed, there exists a certain amount of doubt unless the crew be captured. Mr. Balfour, when First Lord of the Admiralty, classed these losses under three different headings—the certain, the probable, and the possible—and this seems to be the best way of aggregating them.

In June there was again considerable activity off the Courland coast during the Russian retreat from the province. The enemy ships were driven off and our submarine E 9, during an attack on a squadron of battleships, torpedoed a large destroyer on the 4th, whilst E 1 sank a large transport between Gothland and Windau and damaged a torpedo boat off Windau. Another blew up after striking a mine, whilst a second-class cruiser was damaged by mines and had to be towed into Libau.

During these operations an enemy submarine torpedoed and sank the minelayer *Yenesei* with all on board except thirty-two. This was somewhat compensated by the loss of three enemy torpedo boats which were sunk or damaged. Again two days later, on the 8th, a submarine attacked a squadron of ten battleships off Windau and hit one.

In the last days of June there was a great outburst of activity in this region, both on land and on sea. An attempt which ended in failure was made to land troops in the rear of the Russian Army. The German Fleet which convoyed the transports consisted of coast-defence battleships, and these were covered by four cruisers and torpedo craft. Arriving off Windau on June 28, the troops were landed after a bombardment of the town; suddenly the Russian flotillas appeared and attacked the covering screen, forcing them to retire with the troops unsupported. These were all captured, and during the retreat they lost a torpedo boat which struck a mine.

This skirmish was but the precursor of further operations on a larger scale which commenced on July 2. During this

day several actions were fought; at 6 a.m. the Russian cruisers *Rurik*, *Bayan* and *Admiral Makaroff*, with the small *Bogatyr*, encountered off Gothland the minelaying cruiser *Albatross*, another cruiser and torpedo boats, and an action ensued. The enemy fled to the south in the face of these superior odds, and had the misfortune to lose *Albatross*, which had been heavily shelled and was driven ashore in a sinking condition. She had lost twenty-one killed and twenty-seven wounded, and the survivors were interned. Four hours later the Russians sighted another squadron composed of *Roon*, *Augsburg*, and a torpedo boat; these they attacked, and after half an hour they also fled, being joined by another cruiser, and all four were pursued until 11.30 a.m. The Russian cruisers then returned, but were attacked by submarines, which they evaded. Meanwhile in Danzig Bay E 9 sighted at 3 p.m. two enemy battleships and several destroyers, and Commander Horton skilfully manœuvred his craft until he was able to discharge two torpedoes at the leading ship, presumably the *Pommern*. A terrific explosion followed in which this big ship disappeared, for when he dared to rise again he saw but one battleship some four to five miles away; more he could not observe, as a waiting destroyer was only 200 yards away.

Undeterred by these two failures, the enemy still continued his attempts to capture Riga, and several intense actions developed between the Fleets during August. Evidence of the forthcoming attack was revealed by the number of transports in this area, one of which was torpedoed and sunk on the 2nd; this was followed by the forcing ashore of a German gunboat near Windau on the next day by a Russian seaplane.

It was not until the night of the 9th that the preliminaries began. Our Allies had heavily mined the Irben Channel (the only navigable channel for heavy ships), and all the islands at the entrance to the Gulf were also fortified, making the Gulf almost impenetrable. The enemy appears to have been unaware of this and three times attempted to force a passage with a fleet of nine battleships, twelve

cruisers, and torpedo craft; he retired baffled each time, losing two minesweepers in his futile efforts.

A second attack on the next day was equally unsuccessful, and at the same time appearing in great force between the Åland Islands and the Gulf, he contented himself with shelling the lighthouse.

Reinforcements were then sent from Kiel to strengthen the German Fleet for a final attempt; one of these ships, the *Prinz Adalbert*, was attacked by a submarine and badly damaged, necessitating her return to Kiel in tow.

On the night of August 16 large German forces appeared off the entrance to the Gulf and the Russian patrols were drawn closer in, after laying mines in their wake. Although the dense fog greatly assisted the enemy, his advance was gallantly contested and several fierce fights took place during the 17th and the 18th; in these *Slava* put up a splendid fight against the German Dreadnoughts, but by the 19th they had succeeded in penetrating into the Gulf. Once inside, however, they found that the Russian destroyers were a little too unpleasant in their attentions, and they lost several torpedo boats. In one of these actions the gunboat *Sivoutch* was attacked by a cruiser and torpedo boats, but put up a very heroic defence. She managed to sink one of her assailants and continued firing until the end, although in flames, and with her deck red hot she at last disappeared beneath the waves. The Germans claim the loss of the *Koreitz* with 40 prisoners, a destroyer of the "Emir Buchareski" type, and damage to the *Novik*. On the other hand, Petrograd stated that their only loss was the *Sivoutch*, whilst they claim loss or damage to a battle-cruiser, two cruisers, and at least eight destroyers. This was subsequently found to be an exaggerated estimate, though the Russian loss was insignificant compared to the German claim. The battle-cruiser was the *Moltke*, and was torpedoed by Commander Laurence in E 1; she was severely damaged, but regained port. The other cruisers whose disablement was claimed are supposed to have been *Augsburg* and *Thetis*, whilst probably two or three destroyers were sunk and the remainder



severely hit. Berlin admits the loss of one mined and one stranded.

Thus this attempt to secure Riga as a winter base failed, although the enemy had brought some of his heaviest units to assist, and he evacuated the Gulf on the 21st. The Fleet was withdrawn to Kiel, and the project dwindled down to Zeppelin and seaplane raids, while an extensive reconnaissance of the coast-line was made. Taking advantage of this state of affairs our submarines established a blockade of the Southern Baltic on lines similar to the much-vaunted "blockade" of Great Britain—with the vital exception of regard to human life and international rights. E 19 was the most active craft in these operations, which were carried out with such thoroughness that between the 11th and 29th of October no fewer than twenty-eight German steamers were put down without the loss of a single life. In addition a fleet of transports was attacked, of which five were sunk and the sixth was forced ashore.

In the meantime there had occurred one of the foulest and most cowardly of the crimes with which Germany has familiarised us since 1914. The splendid work of our submarines in these waters led to further craft being sent out, and one of these, E 13, whilst passing up the Sound, had the misfortune to ground on the Danish island of Saltholm at about 3 a.m. on August 19. A Danish destroyer was sent to inform Commander Layton that he would be interned if he was unable to refloat his vessel in twenty-four hours, and strenuous efforts were made by the crew, but without success. Three Danish torpedo boats remained at hand in case of emergency, but the enemy, hearing that an unknown submarine was aground, dispatched a destroyer to investigate matters. She, of course, found that the craft was British and that she was guarded by Danish boats, so withdrew; four hours later, at 9 a.m., she reappeared with another destroyer, and when half a mile away hoisted the commercial flag. Before this signal could be answered a torpedo was discharged at 300 yards range, which missed its mark and exploded harmlessly in the sandbank a few yards away.

Then, with their typical treachery and cruelty, the destroyers opened fire with all their guns on the helpless submarine and set it on fire fore and aft; Commander Layton, seeing his ship wrecked, ordered his men to abandon her and line up on deck to be taken off by the Danish guardships. Not content with their outrage the brutal enemy turned their machine-guns upon the crew, who had jumped into the water to escape from the burning craft, and only ceased firing when a Danish destroyer rushed in and ordered the Germans away. Half the crew were killed in this disgraceful manner, and her commander and fourteen of his crew were picked up by the Danish *Falster* and taken to Copenhagen, where they were interned. Here they were treated well, but Lieutenant-Commander Layton gave back his parole some months later and escaped to England. E 13 was later salved and towed into Copenhagen, where she was interned on September 9.

For this foul attack there is not the slightest excuse, for in addition to the cruel murder of the British seamen, the gross violation of Danish neutrality cannot be explained away. It may be said that the destruction of the cruiser *Dresden* was a parallel case, but this ship had already been at Juan Fernandez for several days, and had coaled frequently in Chilean waters but remained uninterned. Moreover she refused to come out and fight, although her guns were still trained. In the case of the E 13 she had only been aground for seven hours, and was in no position to offer resistance had she desired to.

Returning to the Baltic, we find a great nervousness amongst German commanders in October, and several accidents resulted. A torpedo boat was rammed and cut in two by a German steamer, which mistook her for a Russian ship, and all but five of her crew perished. This was followed by the attack on the Danish submarine *Hvalen* by an armed trawler, who also took her for an enemy ship, and the navigator was killed. An apology was presented to the Danes.

There were further successes by our submarines, and the large cruiser *Prinz Adalbert* was again torpedoed, this time by E 8, and sank off Libau on the 23rd with very heavy loss of life. Russian submarines were also successful, and four days later *Alligator* captured a German steamer and brought her into port, and another steamer was captured by a cruiser; both were carrying supplies for the German troops near Riga. A third was sunk by the Russian *Cayman*. By the activities of these craft stores were prevented from reaching the Army and the advance on Riga was checked. The Russian Fleet assisted the troops near Schlok.

E 19 again came into prominence on November 7 whilst patrolling the Southern Baltic; sighting the ferry-boat *Preussen* escorted by the cruiser *Undine* (escorts now being provided for protection against our submarines), she torpedoed and sank the cruiser with twenty-six of her crew, the survivors being rescued by the ferry-boat. About this time the *Frauenlob* was semi-officially reported mined and sunk in this region, but this was denied. However, she was never seen since, although she had previously patrolled this locality with her sister ship, and there seems to be ground for inferring her loss or disablement.

Further attempts to violate the neutrals' rights occurred on November 16 when the British steamer *Thelma* left Trelleborg for England via Gothenburg, keeping within Swedish territorial waters all the way. She was accompanied by the Swedish destroyer *Pollux*; whilst off Landskrona the German destroyer G 132 appeared and attempted to seize her, but was driven off by her escort, and she ultimately reached this country.

On the 20th Russian torpedo boats attacked a large patrol ship of 3000 tons off Windau and sank her, capturing one officer and nineteen men. On this day also a report reached Rotterdam that a Dreadnought had struck a mine in the Baltic and, in spite of all efforts, she slowly foundered with 180 of her crew. This report was denied by Berlin. More unofficial losses were reported; on December 9 a submarine stopped and examined a Danish steamer, but when about



to leave her a German torpedo boat raced up, thinking that she was an Allied craft, and a collision ensued. Following this came the loss of the German guardship *Bunz* off Laaland in the Belt, which was torpedoed and sunk on the 16th by a British submarine. Next day the light cruiser *Bremen* was also sunk off Courland, together with an accompanying torpedo boat; most of the crews were saved.

It will thus be seen that winter conditions did not prevent our submarines from harassing the enemy, effectively shattering the belief that during this season the Russians would be rendered harmless in their frozen waters. Nevertheless the work of our craft was terribly arduous for the crews. Mr. Kipling has said that E 9, returning from an expedition, met with a storm from the north, the spray freezing as it struck, making the bridge a mass of ice six inches thick, and a man had to be employed continually to free the conning-tower with an axe. She reached the ice-breaker, which served as a dépôt ship, considerably overdue, with her plates started by the floating ice and wreckage, which wrenched her hull until the ice-cold waters leaked in.

The New Year opened with several minor incidents, including the reported foundering of a small German auxiliary and the torpedoing of the torpedo boat *Ander* off Aarö Island on the 17th. E 9 also bagged another destroyer on the 28th, but two others which stranded on Saltholm Island were refloated later. In early February persistent rumours of the loss of a German battleship in the Kattegat were denied by Berlin, but with the breaking up of the ice things became livelier.

On March 20 a German minelayer ran ashore on Amager Island but refloated. Our submarines still continued their operations, and one had the audacity to stop a steamer in the Kattegat, and put a prize crew aboard her with instructions to take the ship to England; after an exciting trip they arrived safely at Leith.

During April there was much aerial activity, and *Slava* was attacked on the 27th whilst supporting the Russian flank. A minelayer was sunk off Falsterbo on the 13th,

and this was followed by the sinking of three steamers by a Russian submarine on the 20th of June.

After the Jutland battle the cruisers which had formerly patrolled the Baltic were withdrawn, owing no doubt to the serious losses incurred, and only a few auxiliary cruisers remained. One of these, the *Herzmann*, assisted by two small torpedo boats, was escorting a convoy of several steamers off Nykoepping on June 13; four Russian destroyers then unexpectedly appeared and after a fight sank all three enemy ships, capturing their crews. A small guardship was mined off Falsterbo a few days later.

Another small encounter was reported on the 30th. The Russian cruisers *Admiral Makaroff* and *Oleg*, with five destroyers, sighted a flotilla of torpedo boats and after an action repulsed them. On the next day *Slava* was again attacked whilst supporting the Army, and Reval was bombed. Russian seaplanes attacked the enemy's light forces in the Gulf of Riga, and during this month two new enemy destroyers were sunk. A fresh outburst of submarine activity was also reported, and several steamers were sunk.

August and September saw much aerial activity, and the hangars on Oesel Island, at the entrance to the Gulf, in particular were repeatedly bombed. Berlin claims that a large Russian destroyer was severely damaged by an explosion off Courland on August 22, and further, the sinking by bombs of another in the Gulf on September 9; Petrograd, on the other hand, announced that several armed trawlers had been forced ashore.

Even in the Arctic regions the submarine menace was felt, and on October 7 the Russian flotilla was attacked by two German craft, both of which were sunk in a fierce encounter which followed. A second action was reported a fortnight later. In the Baltic the Russians laid a large minefield off the Gulf of Bothnia to protect the approaches to the capital, and in this connection it was rumoured that the new battle-cruiser *Sevastopol* had struck a mine and sustained damage whilst off Helsingfors, and a few days later that either the *Rurik* or *Gromoboi* had stranded off Hugo, Finland,

and became a total loss. Neither of these reports has been confirmed.

A very smart piece of work by the Russian destroyers was accomplished on November 10. During the night a flotilla of fast enemy destroyers entered the Gulf of Riga, shelled Port Baltic and killed a few civilians; they were encountered by the Russian ships and, after a spirited fight, forced to retire with the loss of between six and nine craft. Owing to the fog the exact number could not be estimated, but judging by the débris picked up and the explosions heard the above number was assumed.

Not until the spring did any events break the monotony of this warfare. The astounding news on March 15 that a Revolution had broken out in Russia and that the Tsar had been forced to abdicate was received everywhere with tremendous surprise. The disruption of the whole country and the consequent disorganisation of the Army will always be remembered with bitter surprise and disappointment, for all the signs then pointed to an early offensive from all fronts which were to culminate in the complete annihilation of the Prussian military system. How this was frustrated by the fraternisation with the enemy and the voluntary retirement of many of the troops is a matter of history, and also the furious assaults by the Franco-British armies in Flanders and in Northern France without the help of our Eastern Ally. The defection of the soldiery was in some small degree balanced by the heroism of the "Battalions of Death"—battalions formed of picked men, and even women, to fight to the last to impede the enemy's progress.

It must not be inferred that the Revolution was an un-called-for evil—only that it came at a most unfortunate time and prolonged the length of the War tremendously. Indeed, had it not broken out the Tsar and his clique would have sold their country as they had already sold many of her secrets.

Fortunately, the Fleets were not affected to such a degree as the forces in the field, but during July a certain amount of unrest was reported. The Kronstadt garrison made a



demonstration at Petrograd, and it transpired that the crew of the battleship *Petropavlovsk* intended to support some uprising of these sailors, and that the submarines were ordered to torpedo her in this event; orders for the despatch of a destroyer flotilla were countermanded by the President of the Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet without the authority of the Provisional Government. However, no serious trouble developed, and the morale of the sailors was unaffected for some time.

Until the great activity at Riga in the autumn the summer passed quietly. Preparations for an offensive commenced with the usual aerial and mine-sowing activity, from which latter cause the destroyer *Lieutenant Bourakov* was blown up off the Aland Islands on August 15, with the loss of twenty-four lives, and in June the destroyer *Barsetant* was lost. By the end of the month the enemy commenced to clear the mines at the entrance to the Gulf, and encouraged by the instability of the troops under General Korniloff, he opened his offensive against Riga on September 1; he easily succeeded in crossing the Dvina and carried the port on the 3rd, the Russians retiring voluntarily to the north.

The contrast between the furious yet futile attempts in August 1915 is too clear. For all the many brave lives sacrificed in the successful defence of this port in that year, two years later their comrades made a mockery of them. This tragic disaster was developed by the enemy with his customary thoroughness, and he employed no fewer than eight Dreadnoughts, twelve light cruisers, forty torpedo boats, and thirty minesweeping trawlers to support his Army.

Against this formidable force the Russian sailors put up for the second time a brave defence, but being unsupported by the troops were eventually forced to evacuate the Gulf. On the 3rd German submarines appeared in the Gulf and shelled the coast, and also attacking some transports, damaged the Russian *Linol*; they were, however, forced to submerge by a vigorous reply. Meanwhile General Korniloff retired on the capital to demand the dissolution of the Provisional Government, but the Premier, M. Kerensky,

ordered his arrest as a traitor ; this was done on the 14th, his staff being also arrested, and General Russky took over his command. The retreat then ceased, but the enemy had by this time gained the command of the coast. On the 26th the destroyer *Okhotnik* struck a mine and sank off Oesel Island with nearly all her crew, and October opened with numerous aerial reconnaissances. The magazine at Oesel was bombed and blown up on the 1st, killing seventy people, and at the same time enemy minesweepers attempted to penetrate into the Gulf through the Irben Straits ; several transports were also bombed off Tserel on Oesel, and one was hit.

The naval battle commenced on the 12th, when transports landed troops on the north coast of this island under cover of a Dreadnought and several other ships ; this large ship struck a mine and made for the coast, where she was probably beached. A landing was also temporarily effected on Dago Island. It is apparent to any one that the control of Riga is incomplete without the command of the islands at the entrance, and they had all been strongly fortified to protect this important port. It was these batteries which repulsed the attack on Dago, and Petrograd claimed that they sank four torpedo boats and forced a cruiser ashore ; they were soon silenced by the fire from the German Dreadnoughts. All day long on the 13th the Russian ships were fighting the large squadron under Vice-Admiral Schmidt, and Arensburg, in flames, fell in the evening to the troops, who were aided by the ships and aircraft. Off the northern part the Russian patrols were later reinforced by a flotilla and beat back the enemy ships out of the Straits between Dago and Oesel. In the Irben Channel enemy cruisers, torpedo boats and sweepers attempted to penetrate, and the south-western coast was also shelled.

The fighting became more intense on the 14th, and the Russian patrol off Soela Sound was attacked by Dreadnoughts ; the destroyer *Grom* was severely damaged by their fire. On the arrival of a dozen destroyers, which managed to penetrate the Sound under cover of the battleships, the

Russian flotilla, consisting of the destroyers *Grom*, *Konstantin*, *Pobieditel*, *Zabiakaletz*, the gunboats *Khabry* and *Khivenetz*, at once accepted battle despite their numerical inferiority, and *Khabry* took *Grom* in tow under heavy fire. The enemy then concentrated his fire upon these two ships and very soon disabled *Grom* and set her on fire; the tow-line parted and *Khabry* again attempted to take her in tow, but *Grom* sank after most of her crew had been rescued. During these operations *Khabry* sank an enemy destroyer, and the Germans retired upon the arrival of Russian reinforcements. All the ships had been hit, but the enemy lost two destroyers and another couple were damaged.

Oesel was captured on the 17th, and automatically the command of the Irben Strait ceased. The Germans then entered the Gulf and were engaged by *Slava* and *Grazhdanin* (presumably a renamed warship) and the cruiser *Bayan* under Admiral Bakhireff; he spiritedly attacked and drove back the foremost ships, sinking two trawlers, and then audaciously opened his fire upon the Dreadnoughts, which were ten in number, ten cruisers, over fifty destroyers, and about nine submarines. He managed to secure several hits aboard the Dreadnoughts before they withdrew and opened fire from beyond the range of the Russian ships; these were thus forced to retire into the Moen Sound, where *Slava*, having been badly hit below the water line, foundered with but small loss of life. Enemy torpedo boats were repulsed by the land batteries, which in turn were silenced by the Dreadnoughts. At the northern exit German ships were also observed, and a shelling of the south-western coast of Oesel by a "Kaiser" Dreadnought took place.

On the next day two German torpedo boats were blown up by mines in the Moen Sound, and on the same day Moen Island was captured. The Russian warships had been forced to retire from the Sound, and despite the minefields sown in the exit, the Russian ships managed to evacuate the Sound without loss. Berlin reported that four vessels were abandoned. Dago was evacuated on the 21st.

As in the operations in 1915, British submarines assisted



the Russian ships, but owing to the lateness of their arrival they were presumably only sent out when the situation had become threatening. Also it appears that the earlier craft had all returned to England, for not until the 19th was any mention made of their work. On this day one of them attacked a transport which was escorted by destroyers and sank her, and also torpedoed a "Markgraf" Dreadnought, but was forced to dive before the result could be observed.

The next day passed quietly, save for the presence of hostile submarines in the Gulf of Finland and many warships and transports in the Gulf of Riga. On the 21st a landing on the Werder Peninsula was repulsed, but Dago was taken; in the Riga region the German troops began to retire voluntarily, supported by a strong squadron.

On the 26th several bombardments of the coast took place: the island of Kano in the Gulf of Finland was shelled by a Dreadnought, a cruiser, and several destroyers and transports, and off Ainazhi ten cruisers and destroyers continued fire for two hours; off Salismunde destroyers appeared and shelled the town for an hour. However, on the next day the Germans evacuated the Werder Peninsula and retired to prepared positions in the Riga locality.

After the safe withdrawal of the Russian warships there were no engagements, and the situation gradually settled down with the enemy in possession of the islands of Dago, Oesel, Moen, and several smaller ones, and with his Army based upon Riga.

The morale of the crews of the ships engaged was sound, and all of them put up a very fine fight against the very strong German squadrons. The subsequent revolt against Kerensky's Government in the early days of November and the part played by the cruiser *Aurora*, a few destroyers and transports, and several hundred sailors, rather confirm the truth that inactivity breeds discontent. In practically all the larger ships in the contending fleets there have been those long periods of waiting which play havoc on all but iron nerves. With their country in such a turmoil and with pro-German agitators rife, little wonder that these

misguided men were swept off their feet from the path of common sense. Under fire from the enemy the Russian sailor has proved himself as staunch as any man, but under the tongues of plausible and false orators he has not been so firm.

Simultaneously with the announcement of the Russian armistice, Admiral Vodensitzky was discharged at the beginning of December, and an unknown man was appointed by the Bolsheviks to succeed him.

The only incident at sea during this period was the mining of the German auxiliary cruiser *Bothnia* in the Sound on the 3rd, most of the crew being rescued.

Thus the New Year opened with Russia still in a state of chaos.

#### WARSHIP LOSSES

	RUSSIA.	GERMANY.
Battleships.	<i>Slava.</i>	<i>Pommern.</i>
Cruisers.	<i>Pallada.</i>	<i>Prinz Adalbert.</i> <i>Friedrich Karl.</i>
Light Cruisers.		<i>Magdeburg.</i> <i>Bremen.</i> <i>Undine.</i> <i>Albatross</i> (minelayer). <i>Herzmann</i> (Auxiliary). <i>Bothnia</i> " "
Gunboats.	<i>Sivoutch.</i>	<i>Ander.</i> <i>Bunz.</i>
Destroyers.	<i>Okhotnik.</i> <i>Grom.</i> <i>Barsetant.</i> <i>Lieut. Bourakov.</i>	Various unidentified (15).
Torpedo Boats.		Various unnamed (9).
Minelayers.	<i>Yenesei.</i>	Unnamed (2).
Minesweepers.		Unnamed (4).
Auxiliary and Patrol Craft.		Unnamed (3).
Transports.		Unnamed (8).
Submarines.		Unnamed (4).

These include only definite losses or cases where there seems to be reasonable ground for supposing loss. Disablements and damage casualties are not included.

## CHAPTER V

### IN THE ADRIATIC SEA

FRANCE and Italy have pursued a policy in the Adriatic much in keeping with the general plan of containing the enemy and endeavouring to entice him from his fortified bases. Austria has the best natural advantages that she can desire, for the wild and rugged Dalmatian seaboard, stretching from Fiume to Cattaro, affords admirable submarine bases and refuges for her warships when hard pressed. The numerous creeks form strong natural harbours, and the addition of artillery placed on the headlands makes such ports as Cattaro almost impregnable.

Like her Allies, Austria has been very chary about meeting her enemies and has only twice been engaged in force, the first time soon after the outbreak of war and the second time immediately after Italy declared war on her hereditary foe. Save in the Black Sea campaign, it has been the offensive force which has suffered the most; for with the exception of the raiding cruisers at large, we and our Allies have sustained comparatively heavier losses than the common enemy. Submarine losses are also excepted because they are the offensive force, but wherever a fleet maintains a blockade of the enemy's coast, then that fleet will be the one to suffer more heavily, as so many of its ships have to be exposed to the perils of war whilst the enemy lies snugly in harbour. This fact has been more accentuated since the submarine became such a power.

Though Italy and Austria were nominally allied, yet their natural sympathies have never lain in the same direction; and whilst these two neighbouring Powers were ostensibly creating a strong Triple Alliance Mediterranean



Fleet, individually each was building up a defence against the other.

Austria had only a part of the French Fleet to contend with in 1914, but wisely she has never put up more than a passive resistance, and has remained a "Fleet in being." Her Navy then consisted of two Dreadnoughts, *Tegethoff* and *Viribus Unitis*, and two others building, *Prinz Eugen* and *Szent Istvan*, which were to be completed by 1914-15; they were fine ships of 20,000 tons, carrying twelve 12" weapons. Next there come the three modern pre-Dreadnoughts *Radetsky*, *Zrinyi* and *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand* of 14,500 tons and armed with four 12" guns; then six older ships armed with three or four 9.4" pieces and of 8340 to 10,600 tons, the *Erz. Ferdinand Max*, *Erz. Friedrich*, *Erz. Karl*, and the smaller *Habsburg*, *Arpad* and *Babenberg*. The old *Wien*, *Budapest* and *Monarch* of 5600 tons complete the battle squadron. These were supported by the modern armoured cruiser *Sankt Georg* and the older *Kaiser Karl VI* of between 6000 and 7400 tons, carrying two 9.4" guns; the rebuilt *Kaiserin und Königin Maria Theresia*, *Kaiser Franz Josef* and *Kaiserin Elisabeth* (based upon Tsingtau) were of 4000 to 5000 tons and carried a couple of 6" or 7.6" pieces. Three small cruisers were built in 1900, *Zenta*, *Aspern* and *Szigetvar* of 2400 tons and armed with eight 4.7" weapons, and were followed by *Admiral Spaun* in 1910 of 3500 tons and armed with seven 4.1" guns; lastly come the *Saida*, *Novara* and *Helgoland*, completed just before hostilities, of 3500 tons and armed with nine 4.1" pieces. Six gunboats, ninety-one torpedo boats, eighteen modern destroyers, and eleven submarine craft complete Austria's Adriatic Fleet, excluding about a dozen auxiliary ships, dépôts, etc.

It will be recollected that during the escape of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* the bulk of the French Fleet was engaged in the safe transport of the Algerian Army to Marseilles, and that the British Mediterranean Fleet was stationed in the Straits of Otranto in the expectation that the two German fugitives would endeavour to regain their temporary bases in the

Adriatic, whilst at the same time they would be effectively sealing up the Austrian Fleet. Whatever may have been said of the dispositions of our ships, Rear-Admiral Troubridge, who was in command, in the court of inquiry maintained that he was justified in remaining here instead of chasing the enemy, for no one thought of Turkey as the destination of the ships; this view was upheld by the court, but there is no doubt that, had they returned to Pola, the campaign in these narrow waters would have been very different. As it was they have been comparatively wasted in Turkish waters.

For the first eight months France took over the task of containing the Austrian Fleet, and with Malta as his base, Admiral Boue de Lapayère commenced his task.

At the very outset Austria strewed the Adriatic with drifting mines which caused extensive damage to the Italian fishing fleet. She was forced to discontinue her nefarious practice by a sharp protest from Italy, though these mines thus sown remain a peril for an indefinite time. Their work soon recoiled on themselves, for on August 13 the Austrian-Lloyd *Baron Gautsch* struck a mine and sank with 150 lives. No military purpose was served, and the French minesweepers at once commenced to sweep them up; by the 18th a channel had been swept clear as far as Cattaro, and the French Fleet cruised as far as this before the enemy was sighted. Off here they sighted the small *Zenta* and a couple of torpedo boats which they signalled to surrender; the Austrians pluckily refused, and the French sailors were then compelled to open fire upon these three small ships. *Zenta* and the torpedo boat No. 19 were soon badly hit, but the remaining ship made good her escape by getting in the lee of her doomed consorts; *Zenta* then sank with 201 of her crew, and No. 19 managed to arrive off Pola, where she also sank with almost all her crew.

Thus the first brush with the enemy ended successfully, and four days later Paris announced that the battleship *Zrinyi* had been engaged, that a shell had penetrated her magazine, and that in the explosion she had blown up.

There has been no confirmation of her total loss, and more probably she received extensive damage or else her identity was mistaken. The French Fleet also bombarded Cattaro, and periodically this base was shelled until the capture of Mount Lovchen on January 10, 1916.

On September 10 an Austrian destroyer and two torpedo boats were reported mined and sunk, and the cruisers *Maria Theresia* and *Admiral Spaun* arrived at Sebenico badly damaged on the 22nd, after they had been shelled at Cattaro. Berlin claimed that the batteries had sunk a French battleship, but this was untrue. Two days later a detachment of Franco-British sailors landed on the island of Lissa after the lighthouse had been shelled, and requisitioned provisions; they also hoisted the Allied flags in the vain hope of inducing the enemy to emerge from his shelter and give battle.

The menace of the drifting mines resulted in further ships being sunk, amongst which was an Italian steamer which went down with forty of her crew on October 3. Four days later two Austrian destroyers and four torpedo boats were again reported sunk by mines, with all their crews, but as there is no confirmation to be had they doubtless reached port in a badly damaged condition.

A report of incendiarism at the dockyard at Monfalcone on the 14th stated that the fire destroyed the stocks and scaffolding which were supporting a cruiser prior to her launch; before the flames could be got under control the ship crashed over on her side and was seriously damaged. Definite news was scarce until October 17, when Cattaro was again shelled; the French ships were, however, attacked by submarines, two of which attempted to torpedo the *Waldeck-Rousseau*, but this cruiser claims to have sunk one by gunfire. On the next day when the French had retired, two Austrian cruisers slipped out of Cattaro and shelled the magazine at Antivari, but they fled on the approach of the Allied ships; and in their hurried retreat a cruiser and destroyer were hit and damaged and a submarine was sunk, whilst another was lost off Pola on the next day, according to unofficial reports.



In November the bulk of the French Fleet evidently withdrew from the Adriatic, and maintained a patrol in the Straits of Otranto. Whilst thus employed enemy submarines were often encountered, but beyond the damage on the *Jean Bart*, which had been torpedoed by U 12 on December 21, no loss was sustained. Berlin claimed that *Courbet* was sunk, but she was in port on that day. The first loss occurred on December 24, when the submarine *Curie* made a plucky attempt to penetrate into the harbour of Pola; by following a torpedo boat she managed to enter the harbour, but unfortunately struck the bottom and lay for several hours disabled in the darkness. Finding himself unable to attack, the commander rose to the surface to get his bearings, but was immediately seen and fired upon by the batteries; six of the crew were killed, and the remainder swam clear of the sinking vessel and were taken prisoners. The submarine was raised a few days later by the Austrians, and under the name of *Zenta* joined the Austrian flotilla.

This mishap was followed by the mining of the destroyer *Dague* off Antivari on February 24, whilst convoying supplies to the Montenegrins; she sank with thirty-eight of her crew, but fortunately the convoy safely reached its destination, landed the supplies, and returned. Far more serious was the loss of the armoured cruiser *Léon Gambetta* on the night of April 27. This ship was patrolling the Straits of Otranto when she was struck by torpedoes from the submarine U 5, which wrecked her dynamos, engine-room, and wireless apparatus. Simultaneously the electric light went out, and in total darkness an attempt was made to beach her; she, however, sank in ten minutes with all but 136 of her complement, as her officers remained at their posts till the end. The survivors were rescued by Italian torpedo boats which had raced to the scene.

In October the command of this French squadron had been transferred to Vice-Admiral d'Artige du Fournet, as ill-health had caused the resignation of Admiral Lapayère, but on May 23 Italy abandoned her attitude of neutrality and declared war upon Austria, relieving the French from

their task. Several French destroyers and submarines, and also a British unit or two, remained to assist the Italians, but the bulk of the squadron was free to be employed in other spheres.

Immediately after the declaration of war the Italian Fleet, under the command of the Duc d'Abruzzi, was called upon to give an account of itself, for within twelve hours many Austrian ships appeared off the Italian seaboard and commenced to shell the towns with the object of demoralising the population. On the whole they were not very successful, and both sides had losses to record.

Off the Venetian coast several torpedo boats and seaplanes appeared, but were driven off after a brief shelling. Porto Buso on the Italian frontier, on the other hand, was entered by the destroyer *Zeffiro*, and the barracks, quays and shipping, including several motor-boats, were destroyed, and fifty prisoners were taken away. In addition two submarines entered Pola and torpedoed an auxiliary cruiser which was escorting some merchantmen, causing her to return to Pola listing heavily.

Lower down the coast the cruiser *Sankt Georg* shelled the railway bridge between Venice and Ancona, and the *Zrinyi*, which had evidently been repaired, with a light cruiser and destroyers shelled both Ancona and Senegaglia, damaging the railway and, according to the enemy, destroying the harbour, bridge, and railway station at the latter place. At Porto Corsini the *Novara*, the destroyer *Scharfschütze* and torpedo boat No. 80 engaged the batteries at very close range; No. 80 was hit and began to make water when *Novara* came to her assistance and covered the retreat. She was also hit and lost one officer and eleven men killed and four wounded, but No. 80 reached Pola in company of *Scharfschütze*. In the south Barletta was attacked by *Helgoland* and several torpedo boats, but they had a hot reception; in an action between Italian destroyers and the Austrian ships the Italian *Turbine* sank after having engaged the cruiser and four torpedo boats for some time single-handed, and thirty-five of her crew were taken prisoners. The *Helgoland* had to be taken in tow by her consorts.

All these actions occurred between May 23 and 24, and considering the forces engaged the losses were extraordinarily light. The enemy completely failed in his objective, and was driven back into his ports. Thereafter only patrol encounters broke the monotony of the warfare.

Pola was attacked on the night of May 30 by an Italian dirigible and the arsenal was set on fire; a flotilla of destroyers also shelled Monfalcone and caused several outbreaks of fire which severely damaged the docks and shipping, and on their return they sank several ships laden with flour. Meanwhile the Italian Fleet cruised in Dalmatian waters, but found no trace of the enemy; observation stations and the wireless installation at Lissa were destroyed for the third time. On June 5 the cables were cut in the Dalmatian Archipelago, and lighthouses and look-out stations were destroyed, in addition to damage to the railway between Ragusa and Cattaro. Monfalcone was again shelled by destroyers and several sailing ships were sunk, despite aircraft attacks; this was repeated on the 8th, when a battery was silenced prior to the occupation of the port by the Italian troops, and Pola was also bombed. At Monfalcone a great quantity of shipping was captured and a torpedo boat, whilst attempting to escape, was shelled and reported sunk. On the next day a Greek steamer with provisions attempted to raise the blockade of the Gorizian coast, but was taken into Venice. Finally a dirigible also bombed the torpedo works at Fiume, but was shelled by six torpedo boats and damaged, and to prevent her capture she was burnt. There was much guerilla warfare during the summer months, one side getting in a thrust, then the other, before the conditions adjusted themselves.

On June 11 Berlin claimed that the submarine U 11 had torpedoed and sunk a British cruiser of the "Liverpool" class off San Giovanni di Medua, whilst accompanied by six destroyers; the cruiser in reality was slightly damaged and returned to port.

A most remarkable incident occurred on the 16th between an Austrian and Italian submarine, and was the first instance



on record of a duel between these craft. On returning from a daring reconnaissance, the Italian *Medusa* suddenly encountered another craft; neither was aware of the presence of the other, but *Medusa* had the misfortune to rise to the surface first, when the Austrian, sighting her through her periscope, immediately discharged a torpedo at her and sank her with all but one officer and four men.

The work of destroying the numerous observation stations, vedette posts, and submarine bases was methodically continued with success by the Italian Fleet, who were aided by Anglo-French forces. Whilst thus employed an Austrian cruiser and four destroyers on the 13th dashed out and shelled Faro, causing insignificant damage, but they claim to have torpedoed and sunk an Italian torpedo boat in the Northern Adriatic.

This was somewhat set off by the bombing of the U 11 on July 1 by an Italian aviator; dropping a bomb from a height of only fifteen metres he struck her on the conning-tower, when she disappeared in the explosion.

The first serious Italian loss occurred seven days later when the cruiser *Amalfi* was returning from a reconnaissance of the Northern Adriatic; she was attacked by a submarine at dawn in heavy weather and was struck by a torpedo which sank her, practically all the crew being saved. Following this mishap further patrolling was carried out off the enemy's seaboard, and the cables between the islands were cut, thereby depriving the enemy of valuable intelligence posts. A second disaster unfortunately closely followed, for after a raid on Gravosa lighthouse and barracks, a reconnaissance of the Guipana Islands, and a bombardment of Cattaro by the heavy cruisers *Varese*, *Ferruccio*, *Pisani* and *Garibaldi*, they were attacked by submarines off the port on the 18th and the latter ship was struck by a torpedo from U 4 and sank with a few of her crew.

Despite these losses the work continued, and following a raid on the Italian coast near Ancona and another at Ortona and Pedaso which resulted in two civilians being killed, the Italians replied with the occupation of Pelagosa Island by

an auxiliary cruiser and a destroyer. These two ships were later assisted by the French destroyers *Bisson* and *Magon* in the destruction of the wireless station and cable at Lagosta; but on the 29th the enemy endeavoured to retake the island, first by shell fire from cruisers and torpedo boats and later by an attempt to land sailors, but they were repulsed and the survivors were forced to swim back to their ships. A second attempt was made on August 17 when twenty enemy ships, accompanied by aircraft, made a determined effort to expel the garrison, but it was met with great bravery and they were again forced to retire without effecting a landing. The Italian loss was only one officer and three men killed and three wounded. Four days later the Italians voluntarily abandoned the island.

In the meantime another raid on the Apulian seaboard resulted in a civilian's death and seven others wounded on the 11th; and on this day the second submarine duel was also reported. An Italian submarine, escorted by a torpedo boat, discovered an Austrian craft, U 12, close at hand when off Venice; pretending blindness she manœuvred to get closer, but was then seen by the Austrian who let go a torpedo at her. Then commenced a most thrilling action which lasted an hour and a half, the submarines darting about seeking an advantage. The end came suddenly, for the Italian, suddenly reversing her engines, leapt over her enemy's back at the moment when two torpedoes had been discharged at her, and immediately let go a torpedo at U 12 which pierced its hull and sank it with all on board. Next day the *Bisson* accounted for U 3 in the Lower Adriatic, sinking her in three shots, and from whose crew it was learnt that U 4 had been sunk in the attack on *Garibaldi*.

Another interesting submarine incident in August was related when the Italian *Nereide* was posted as missing on the 15th, but arrived safely in port later, however; her engines had become disabled and she had lain on the bottom of the sea in total darkness for seventy hours whilst the trouble was put right. This event speaks volumes for the

spirit of the crew, as their experience must have been most nerve-racking.

In September a few minor incidents occurred, including the torpedoing of the Austrian torpedo boat No. 51 by the French submarine *Papin*, which claims to have regained port with damage to her bows. Towards the end of the month Italy lost her first battleship, however, the disaster being due to foul play. On the night of September 27 the harbour of Brindisi was suddenly lighted up by a tremendous blaze, which was found to come from the flagship of Rear-Admiral Rubin di Cervin, the *Benedetto Brin*. The flames quickly reached the magazine and the ship blew up with the Admiral and about 250 officers and men. The battleship lay partially submerged, enabling the guns to be salvaged.

Beyond the transport of supplies to the Montenegrins during October and November and a few losses incurred, there was little of importance to relate. These operations were carried out in a very thorough and successful manner, as the following brief outline will show, and the enemy only emerged three times to interfere. On the first occasion an armed steamer and a motor-vessel with supplies for Durazzo were sunk and their crews captured on November 23. This was followed by a very fruitful raid on December 5, when *Novara* and several destroyers sallied out and sank two small steamers off San Giovanni di Medua, together with five large and seven small sailing craft which were discharging their cargoes. The batteries were also engaged; the French submarine *Fresnel*, which was aground, was destroyed by the Austrian destroyer *Wardsiner*, and her crew were captured; finally, a Greek steamer carrying arms for the Montenegrins was also sunk.

The third sortie on the 14th was less successful, when San Giovanni di Medua was again shelled and the Greek steamer *Thira*, carrying ammunition, was sunk.

An account of the work of the Italian Fleet disclosed the fact that an Expeditionary Force had been landed in Albania for the relief of the Serbians, and that although the transports afforded an excellent target for the Austrian



submarines, no losses from this source were to be recorded. Mines, however, had claimed two victims, the destroyer *Intrepido* on the 14th and the transport *Umberto*, with a loss of forty-three lives in all. During this time the entire Austrian Fleet was lying in Cattaro, but only once, when *Novara* emerged, was any serious attempt made to attack the transports. Submarines were rendered harmless by the escorting craft.

A few days later a submarine was reported lost off Cattaro, and another was rammed whilst attacking a destroyer which was sinking a large sailing vessel with arms for the Albanians. On the 21st, also, two destroyers captured a Greek steamer suspected of carrying oil fuel for Austrian submarines.

There was considerable activity during the last few days of 1915 and losses to both sides were sustained. On the 28th the French submarine *Monge* was sunk off Cattaro by the cruiser *Helgoland* and an officer and fifteen men were rescued; next day, however, a division of Austrian destroyers left Cattaro to shell Durazzo, but encountered an Allied squadron and was pursued back to port with the loss of *Triglav* sunk by gunfire, and *Lika* which was blown up by a mine. A transport with war material was also torpedoed by a French submarine.

Waiting until the Allied ships withdrew, the Austrian division again emerged and shelled Durazzo, the steamer *Michel* with 500 tons of food for the Montenegrins being set on fire and destroyed; this loss of much needed provisions was greatly felt by our worn-out but dogged Ally, and was further accentuated by the mining of the "requisitioned" steamer *Brindisi* (541 tons) off San Giovanni di Medua on January 6; she had on board 425 recruits from America, together with several hundred tons of food for their Army, and as she sank almost immediately over 200 lives were lost. Following this the armed auxiliary *Città di Palermo* was torpedoed in the Lower Adriatic two days later, but by rapid and efficient help from another ship nearly all on board were saved.

On January 11 French marines landed on Corfu to prepare for the arrival of the Serbian Army, which had retired before the overwhelming might of Mackensen, and here this gallant Army recuperated before being transported to Salonika later in the year. On the 13th the enemy claimed that the King of Montenegro had asked for an armistice, but as all the terms offered were refused, the last defence of this brave nation was organised. On this day the French *Foucault* torpedoed and sank the cruiser *Helgoland* off Cattaro. The King and Queen of Montenegro left for Italy on the 24th in a destroyer, and although attacked by submarines until the appearance of reinforcements, the passage was safely effected. San Giovanni di Medua and Alessio fell on the 28th, and by February 6 the gallant Serbians had been transported to Corfu without a single loss. An attempt by Austrian destroyers to interfere was beaten off by a British cruiser and a French destroyer, which covered the removal, and they were again attacked off Durazzo on the next day.

An interesting account of these operations was issued in February, and it gives some idea of the difficulties which were overcome so well. Since December 260,000 troops, a great number of cattle, and 300,000 cwts. of material had been transported by 250 steamers, 100 of which were necessarily of small tonnage to enable them to sail close inshore. Though aerial, mining, and torpedo attacks were attempted (the latter by cruisers as well as torpedo craft), only three small steamers were lost, two by mines and the other by torpedo, after the cargoes had been discharged. These facts testify to the splendid efficiency of the escorting ships in the nineteen attacks by enemy submarines, and although these were energetically counter-attacked we suffered no losses. During January one Austrian submarine was destroyed, and two others were very probably also sunk.

Vienna announced that a transport was bombed off Durazzo towards the end of the month. On February 24 a couple of Italian torpedo boats were unsuccessfully attacked by a submarine, and later a French destroyer was also attacked in Albanian waters. On March 18 the enemy

allege that the Hungarian Red Cross ship *Elektra* had been torpedoed in the Northern Adriatic, and a life had been lost and two nurses injured. The ship had to be beached to prevent her sinking. No report from our Allies has been made, and it seems likely that she struck a floating mine. This incident served as a pretext for Austria's wanton attack on the Russian *Portugal* in the Black Sea some time later.

The French destroyer *Renaudin* was sunk with three officers and forty-four men on this day, the torpedo literally blowing the little ship in two.

May saw a revival of activity, and on the 3rd four Italian destroyers encountered ten enemy torpedo boats and pursued them into Pola, whilst on the next day the French submarine *Bernouille* torpedoed and sank an Austrian destroyer in the southern region. On the 18th a transport carrying war material was also torpedoed by a French craft, and a few days later two small Italian torpedo boats fought and put to flight a large Austrian destroyer.

On the 28th a very daring piece of work was accomplished by a submarine which penetrated into the harbour of Trieste, despite the mines, and sank a large Austrian transport. Another was sunk in the Dalmatian Channel on June 5. This success was discounted a few days later when the Italian transport *Prince Umberto* with two others, accompanied by a destroyer, was attacked by a couple of submarines; in spite of the counter-attack of the destroyer, she was struck by a torpedo and sank with half of the troops aboard.

Italy retaliated by another attack on the Istrian Peninsula, when torpedo boats shelled a fort near Parenzo on the 11th, returning safely despite aerial attacks. This was repeated on the 25th when they came under violent fire.

Meanwhile on the 23rd the auxiliary cruiser *Città di Messina*, escorted by the French destroyer *Fourche*, was torpedoed and sunk in the Straits of Otranto; although hotly attacked by the destroyer, the submarines escaped, and returning later, sank the *Fourche*, also with small loss of life. This clever piece of work was undertaken with pluck, as the destroyer would naturally be very much on the *qui vive*.



The first attack on the line of British drifters engaged in sweeping and watching the nets in these Straits was made on July 9, when they were surprised by the cruiser *Novara*. Opening fire upon the group she succeeded in sinking the *Astrum Spei* and *Clavis*, capturing the crew of the former, and damaging the *Ben Bui* and *Frigate Bird*. Our loss was ten killed and eight wounded. On the next day the Italian destroyer *Impetuoso* was torpedoed and sunk in the Lower Adriatic with small loss of life, and our Ally also lost the submarine *Giacinto Pullino* on the 11th, which the Austrians claim was captured in the Northern Adriatic and brought to Pola with twenty-one prisoners. The *Zalia* was also lost by striking a submerged mine.

In August Italy had the great misfortune to lose her fine Dreadnought *Leonardo da Vinci*, at any rate temporarily. The circumstances of the disaster closely resemble the blowing up of the *Benedetto Brin* some months earlier. Whilst lying in Taranto harbour a fire broke out and very quickly spread; it was feared that the flames would reach the magazine, and she was submerged after it was ascertained that 31 officers and 229 men had perished. It was stated that hopes were entertained for her salvage, and a reward of £4000 for information leading to the discovery of the origin of the fire was offered.

On the same day enemy ships appeared off Molfetta and shelled the airshed and factory, but on their return *Aspern* and the torpedo craft were attacked by Italian ships and pursued. On the other hand, Italian aircraft bombed Durazzo, and the gunboat *Magnet* was also torpedoed and damaged, losing nine killed and four wounded of her crew. An enemy destroyer was sunk in the Upper Adriatic on August 5.

A week later torpedo boats entered Durazzo and sank a steamer, and an Austrian squadron on its return from a raid on the Apulian seaboard was encountered and pursued into Cattaro by French and Italian destroyers. The French torpedo boat No. 368 sank a German submarine off Pavesta whilst it was endeavouring to enter the Corfu Straits.

There was much aerial activity in September. In October rumours were about of the destruction of a Dreadnought at Pola with all its crew, but nothing definite transpired. On the night of the 16th a remarkable incident off Corfu was reported; 'whilst escorting a transport, the Italian destroyer *Nembo* was torpedoed by the German submarine U 16 close by, but the falling débris from the stricken ship fell upon the attacker and sank her; eleven of her crew were captured. On the next day the French submarine *Foucault* was bombed by a seaplane and sunk.

November opened with a raid on Pola, but unfortunately the torpedoes discharged caught in the ships' nets and failed to damage them. On the 3rd torpedo boats, whilst sinking a large Austrian steamer, were attacked by Austrian craft and a sharp fight ensued, in which the enemy retired. Two nights later three enemy destroyers made a raid on Santa Elpidio, but were driven off by the batteries.

Another heavy Italian loss was the mining of the old battleship *Regina Margherita* on the night of December 11, the ship sinking rapidly with her commander, 14 officers and 675 men.

On the 23rd another small patrol encounter in the Straits of Otranto was reported; four enemy destroyers emerged and attacked the patrols, but were immediately engaged by French destroyers, when they fled under cover of the night. It was seen that two of them were hit, and a French destroyer and a patrol were slightly damaged. Several enemy submarines were also accounted for, and it was announced that U 12 and UC 12 had been captured.

Up to this time the command of the Italian Navy had been vested in the Duc d'Abruzzi; but on his resignation owing to ill-health his place was taken by the Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral Thaon di Revel, who combined the two offices. Under his command there has been no change in the general plan of operations, and incidents consist purely of minor patrolling encounters.

It will be remembered that for nearly all this period British ships have been representing this nation in these

waters, and from time to time accounts of their services have been published. We have a squadron of monitors here which have greatly assisted the Army in its terrific struggles, a few cruisers to counterbalance the marked absence of this class of warship in the French and Italian Navies, a submarine or two, and finally a number of drifters for service in the Straits of Otranto. Here, on May 15, there was a large group, numbering in all some forty-eight craft, engaged in watching the submarine nets; they had an armament of one small gun and a crew of ten, reinforced by a truly heroic spirit. On this day several Austrian cruisers and destroyers emerged from Cattaro to attack an Italian convoy and sank a steamer and a torpedo boat, and then proceeded to attack the line of British drifters. The three Austrian cruisers signalled to the little ships to surrender, but this was far from the intention of the brave crews, and every preparation was made to escape. One, indeed, though but 100 yards from one cruiser, raised full speed and actually engaged her foe with her one small gun; it was unfortunately disabled at once by the cruiser's fire, but the crew of the drifter, *Gowan Lea*, endeavoured to repair it under heavy fire, and then ran alongside another drifter, *Floandi*, of whose crew four had been killed and three wounded, leaving but three able men to man her. The conduct of the *Floandi's* wireless operator is typical of the bravery of these hardy fishermen; this man, Harris, was hit but continued to send and receive messages until he expired over his log. The skipper of the *Gowan Lea* was rightly awarded the Victoria Cross for his gallant behaviour. Of the others, *Bon Espoir*, *British Crown*, *Christmas Daisy* and *Garrigill* refused to surrender, and although under broadsides from the enemy, came through the action safely. Like the *Floandi*, the other wireless telegraphy drifters, *Capella* and *Garrigill*, were especially selected by the enemy for his fire, but the operators all remained at their posts throughout. *Admirable* was abandoned after her boilers blew up, and *Girl Rose*, *Coral Haven* and *Selby* foundered under their crews. Altogether fourteen drifters were lost, the remainder being *Avondale*,



*Craignoon, Girl Gracie, Felicitas, Helenora, Quarry Knowe, Serene, Tait, Transit* and *Young Linnet*, of whose crews seventy-two were taken prisoners.

The enemy, now reinforced by the destroyers, next encountered the British cruisers *Dartmouth* and *Bristol*, but at once fled, closely pursued by our ships and French and Italian destroyers. The pursuit was only broken off when the enemy managed to get into Cattaro and was reinforced by several battleships, but it was observed that one cruiser was in flames and in a sinking condition, whilst another was also badly hit. *Dartmouth* was struck by a torpedo on the return journey and lost eight killed and seven wounded, but returned safely to port. The French lost their destroyer *Boutefeu*, which struck a mine and sank.

After this eventful day things quieted down, although an Austrian torpedo boat was torpedoed off Cattaro on the 26th, and after a fierce engagement the French submarine *Circe* sank a large enemy submarine off this base. The British monitors again rendered valuable support to the Army in an offensive on the Carso sector on August 31 from the Gulf of Trieste, the Hermada fortifications being easily destroyed. How soon this valuable gain was relinquished is now a matter of bitter regret, and even in the retirement our ships again helped to stem the advance of the enemy. During September there was much naval aerial activity.

On the night of the 29th a very exciting action was fought between the destroyer flotillas. It appears that on learning of the presence of two new enemy destroyers the new Italian leader *Aquila*, followed later by a flotilla, sought them out and engaged them both off Cattaro and put them to flight with her fire; unfortunately, after having beaten the enemy a fire broke out in her naphtha tanks and her engines stopped. The pursuit was maintained by the flotilla, and the Austrians were chased into their Durazzo defences in a battered condition. Meanwhile Austrian aircraft hovered over the disabled *Aquila*, harassed the crew as they were repairing the damage, and presumably signalled to the Austrian ships her whereabouts; the cruisers *Novara, Saida*

and *Aspern* then appeared and, thanks to the gallant efforts of the crew, they were received by a brisk fire from the Italian ship. Messages were sent to the returning destroyers not to assist her but to attack the larger enemy ships, and a very hot action ensued until the arrival of Anglo-Italian ships, when the enemy fled into Cattaro, *Novara* being considerably damaged. *Aquila* returned to port after the fire was extinguished and damage repaired.

Shortly after the dramatic reports of the Mutiny in the German Navy rumours soon were afloat that serious disaffection was rife in the Austrian ports, and it appears that several fights occurred between the German submarine crews and the Austrian sailors, in which many of the former were killed. It was said that the overbearing manner of the Germans was one of the causes, and that bad food and the harshness of the Austrian officers were also responsible. However this may be, the crew of the Austrian torpedo boat No. 11 overpowered their officers, ran their ship ashore south of Ancona and surrendered to the Italians.

On the 14th an enemy destroyer was bombed and hit off Pola, and on the next day minesweepers and torpedo boats off the Istrian Peninsula were driven away by aircraft.

All through the retreat the Italian Navy and the British monitors did their utmost to stem the enemy's progress, and there was evidence that tremendous havoc was wrought on the enemy's fortifications. On November 29 the monitor *Picton* made most remarkable practice on three small bridges on the Lower Piave at a range of 18,000 yards, and destroyed them in five shots, the first shell demolishing the pontoons.

On the night of December 9 Italian torpedo craft entered Trieste, attacked two battleships, sinking the *Wien*, and returned safely.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE NAVY IN THE DISTANT SEAS (AFRICAN, SYRIAN, PERSIAN, BALKAN AND MEDITERRANEAN THEATRES)

THE Royal Navy has been called upon during the War to perform a multitude of varied tasks far from where the real issue will be decided. Most of these have been in collaboration with the land forces, but until the seas had been swept clear from enemy raiders the tasks assigned to our ships stationed in foreign waters were confined to the destruction of these pests. These side-shows, if one may use the term, generally took place in African waters, where our numerous colonies lie scattered about.

The conquest of Togoland was brought about very soon, being due to the valuable support of our West African squadron, comprising *Cumberland* (flagship), *Challenger*, *Dwarf*, the Nigerian Government yacht *Ivy*, the steamers *Vampire* and *Walrus*, and the French cruiser *Bruix* and the gunboat *Surprise*. On August 7, 1914, *Cumberland* appeared off Lome, the capital, and, under threat of bombardment, ordered the governor to surrender to the French garrison at Dahomey.

Further down the coast off Kamerun *Dwarf* arrived and patrolled off Duala, pending the arrival of the larger ships. She was the object of several attacks during this time, and on September 9 she captured the armed yacht *Herzogin Elisabeth*; her adventures commenced, however, on the night of the 14th when an armed steamboat, commanded by a missionary, attacked her with an infernal machine, from which she narrowly escaped. The boat was captured. Two nights later, whilst in the Bimbia river, she saw a light coming round the bend in the river, and turning her search-lights on it an armed steamer, the *Nachtigall*, was revealed bearing straight down on her with intent to ram her.



Realising his peril, the commander fired all his guns on *Nachtigall*, unshipping her gun and setting her ablaze from stem to stern; nevertheless the impetus drove her on, and only by reversing at full speed was the main impact avoided. *Nachtigall* then drifted up stream and blew up with practically all her crew of forty-seven.

During this month *Cumberland* and *Challenger* captured no fewer than nine Woermann and one Hamburg-Amerika liners, in addition to the gunboat *Soden*, which was recommissioned. Operations commenced with the capture of Duala, after the mines had been removed by *Ivy* and a shelling of the town by *Challenger*; Bonabera was also taken. Later boat expeditions to Edea and Jubassi were undertaken by our bluejackets. Owing to the climatic and territorial conditions, little campaigning was undertaken until 1916, when on New Year's Day the Allied columns converged on Jaunde, where the enemy made his stand, and the town fell on January 3. The garrison fled to Spanish Guinea. Near Lake Chad, in the north, the Allies took Mora on February 18, and by the end of the month the campaign came to a close.

In Corisco Bay the French gunboat *Surprise*, whilst carrying troops for Libreville, encountered and sank the auxiliary steamers *Itolo* and *Rhios* on August 24, 1914.

Beyond the transport of General Botha's main force to Walfisch Bay in February 1915, the conquest of German South-West Africa did not require naval assistance.

Turning to the operations in German East African waters, we come to perhaps the most varied of these incidental tasks. The first event was a bombardment of Dar-es-Salaam, the capital, on September 9 by *Astræa* and *Pegasus*, two cruisers on the South African station. Parties were landed to demolish the wireless installation and destroy the engines of the steamers in the harbour, together with the floating dock; finally the gunboat *Möwe* was sunk. This port was revisited in December by *Goliath* and *Fox*, when the town was shelled and the shipping destroyed. A blockade of the coast was declared on February 26, 1915.

In the meantime *Pegasus* had been disabled in Zanzibar harbour on September 20, and in turn her attacker, the *Königsberg*, had been compelled to seek refuge in the estuary of the Rufiji River on October 30, where later she was destroyed. Coastal operations, excluding the necessary vigilance required to enforce the blockade, have been infrequent; but in January our ships supported the troops in the retaking of our frontier town, Vanga. The subjugation of the enemy was not seriously undertaken until the conquest of German S.W. Africa was completed, and the forces thus liberated were free to be used here to reinforce the native regiments. The offensive began in earnest in March 1916, under the leadership of General Smuts. During the summer the Navy supported the Army, progressing along the coast; Sudani was occupied on August 1, Bagamojo on the 15th, and Dar-es-Salaam on September 4, being attacked by a naval force in whalers in conjunction with the troops. The ports of Kilwa Kisiwani and Kilwa Kiwindsche were occupied by naval forces under threat of naval bombardment on the 7th, and a Portuguese force crossed the Mozambique frontier on the 20th supported by our warships. The enemy made his stand in the Rufiji valley and put up a very good fight.

Far more interesting are the various actions which have taken place on the great inland seas which form another seaboard to this colony. On the three large lakes, Victoria Nyanza, Tanganyika and Nyassa, duels have been fought between small armed steamers and, latterly, pigmy gunboats.

Taking the first named, an action was reported to have occurred on September 13, when the armed steamer *Kavirondo* fought and captured the armed dhow *Harold*, which, however, foundered whilst in tow with a seaman aboard, and sank another dhow. Two days later an attack by the armed steamer *Owangu* on our steamer *Winifred* forced her to retire, but returning with the *Kavirondo* later we found the port of Karunga abandoned. Since then we have remained undisputed masters of Victoria Nyanza, the remaining small enemy ships being scuttled in July 1916.

On Lake Nyassa the enemy possessed but one gunboat, the *Hermann von Wissman*, which was attacked off Sphinx-haven by the armed steamer *Gwendolen* in August 1914 and disabled. When the offensive in this region was taken a party of the King's African Rifles was landed on May 30 and, aided by the fire from our ships, carried the town and destroyed the gunboat.

Not until December 1915 did any action occur on Lake Tanganyika, a lake of 400 miles length covering over two-thirds of the Belgian Congo frontier, the remainder of the Belgo-German frontier comprising a stretch of land about 150 miles long. Here, under General Tombeur, the Belgians marched on Ujiji in July 1916 and encountered the enemy at Tabora, which fell after a four days' battle on December 22, the Germans retiring on the main force in the S.E. Previous to this several actions were fought on the large lake, where for a time the enemy remained dominant. It must be remembered that these lake-steamers have to be constructed at home first, then sail for Africa, where they are taken down and transported overland to the lakes, and then rebuilt. In the summer of 1915 two small British gunboats left for the Cape, when they were transported overland, and ultimately reached the lake after a journey of over 2000 miles through the heart of Africa. These gunboats, the *Mimi* and *Tou-Tou*, on December 26, 1915, attacked the large German steamer *Kingani*, manned by gunners from the *Königsberg*, and it is reported that so small were the assailants that they were unperceived until they were close enough for their small guns to bear. Such good shooting and spirited manœuvres followed that after five shots the *Kingani*, ten minutes later, was disabled, with all her officers killed, and was brought into port in a sinking condition. Repaired, she was renamed *Fife*, and later reinforced our flotilla. The second action occurred on February 9, 1916, when *Fife* and *Mimi*, after a running fight lasting one and a half hours, sank the *Hedwig von Wissman*. Then came the offensive by the Belgian forces, by which time the enemy had completed a new gunboat



larger than the other. This, the *Graf von Gotzen*, was bombed and damaged on June 10, 1916, and was then destroyed by the Belgian gunboat *Netta* on July 28, being surprised whilst disembarking troops. The new *Adjutant* was blown up on the stocks.

Thus ended the last of these interesting little affairs in which the old element of naval warfare remained, where ship fought ship to the end without the treachery of lurking submarines, and in which our sailors came out without loss owing to their superior shooting and spirit.

The remaining African theatre in which the Navy has lent a hand is in the Syrian and Egyptian regions. It will be recollected that hostilities with Turkey commenced with an attack on the fort at Akaba in the Gulf of Sinai on November 3, 1914. This was delivered by *Minerva*, assisted by the destroyers *Savage* and *Scorpion*, which, finding the town occupied by Turkish troops in command of a German officer, opened fire on the fort and landed a party who drove out the garrison with considerable loss to the enemy. Nearly a month later the *Doris*, on December 17, shelled Alexandretta, and after a further bombardment on January 6-7, landed a party. A patrol of the Palestine seaboard was instituted, and on February 6 *Philomel* was fired on from the shore in the Gulf of Alexandretta, losing three killed and three wounded; she opened fire on the Turkish trenches and killed about fifty Turks. The Russian cruiser *Askold* also assisted in the patrol.

Meanwhile a few Turkish brigades under Djemal Pasha managed to march through the desert and on January 26 came into contact with our advance guards east of El Kantara. In anticipation of the attack the battleships *Swiftsure* and *Ocean*, *Minerva* and *Clio* arrived in the Canal to reinforce *Hardinge* of the Royal Indian Marine, two torpedo boats and the French *Requin* and *D'Entrecasteaux*. On February 3 the enemy reached Lake Timsah and opened fire on *Hardinge*; she had her funnel carried away by a shell which also killed two of her crew and wounded seven, including her navigating officer. This officer had a knee

shattered, an arm broken and several other injuries, but calmly continued to direct the course of his ship. *Swiftsure* took *Hardinge's* place. Torpedo boat O 23 landed a party to destroy pontoons brought by the enemy to bridge the Canal south of Tussum, and *Requin* did good work on their artillery; later at El Kantara *Swiftsure* lost one killed by the enemy's fire, and *Clio* repulsed an attack at El Fardan. Thus was this much-heralded attack brought to nought.

Operations were then confined to a surveillance of the coast, and with the opening of the Dardanelles bombardment the French took over this task. El Arish and Gaza near the frontier were shelled by *St. Louis* on April 12, and in May she again shelled Gaza. On April 29 *D'Entrecasteaux* opened fire on the Turkish trenches at Tarsus, and El Arish was again bombarded by *Jeanne d'Arc*; *D'Estrees* shelled the petrol tanks at Alexandretta on May 13. An act of treachery by the Turks, who fired on a white flag parley boat, was punished by the bombardment of Budrum by *Dupleix*; and at Latakia, when a tug and boat belonging to her was fired on, another shelling was delivered. The German consulate at Haifa was also destroyed.

In the Red Sea *Desaix* landed a party at Akaba on February 23 and put to flight fifty Turks from the village; subsequently the Royal Indian Marine took over this patrol. *Dufferin* experienced another white flag outrage, and lost one killed whilst off Muweilah, which she punished with a shelling of the fort. In May *Northbrook* captured a dhow with sixteen Germans aboard.

These are but the bare details of an arduous and tedious yet necessary task which has been continued with few events to record. Practically all subsequent reports are confined to the losses incurred, and little has been heard of the successes.

Returning to the Mediterranean, both the armed boarding steamer *Tara* and the horse transport *Moorina* were attacked and sunk on November 5 in the Bay of Sollum, together with the Anglo-Egyptian gunboats *Abdul Menim* and *Prince Abbas*. The experiences of the crews of the two former proved very thrilling, for after the loss of their ships they

landed on the inhospitable shore and were immediately surrounded by ferocious tribesmen; they were taken inland to their camp and were treated in a very rough manner. They were kept for several months, their captors hoping doubtless for ransom, but with the reoccupation of Sollum by British troops a force under the command of the Duke of Westminster, comprising nine armoured and twenty-six other cars and ten aeroplanes, left on a 121 mile journey into the desert to rescue the captives. The amazed Senussi, seeing this most extraordinary force sweeping over the sands towards them, took to their heels, leaving their prisoners, numbering ninety-one, behind. These were taken back to Sollum in the cars, and two others who were absent from the camp on this day, March 20, arrived at Tobruk two months later.

On February 8, 1916, the old French cruiser *Amiral Charnier* was struck by a torpedo and sank in a very few minutes. No time was left to launch any boats, and only one raft containing twelve bodies and one living man was picked up a few days later off the Syrian coast.

During the winter months Germany announced that Japan had retroceded to Russia the cruisers *Sagami*, *Soya* and *Tango* (captured in the Russo-Japanese War), and that they were on service in the Mediterranean.

The spring of 1916 witnessed further activities of the enemy submarines. Our minesweeper *Primula* was torpedoed off Port Said on March 1, whilst on patrol duty, and three lives were lost. This was followed by the mining of the sweepers *Nasturtium* and *Ægusa* (ex *Erin*, Sir T. Lipton's yacht, which had done such good work as a hospital ship for the typhus-stricken Serbs in 1915), on April 30, when thirteen lives were lost. Off the Turkish coast the monitor M 30 shelled Smyrna on May 6 and Seddul-Bahr on the 12th, but a shell striking her she was set ablaze and was burnt out next day. Two of her crew were killed and two injured.

On August 3 the sweeper *Clacton* was torpedoed and sunk with five of her crew in the Ægean Sea, and later the armed yacht *Zaida* (Lord Rosebery's ship), whilst engaged



in minesweeping in the Gulf of Alexandretta, became overdue. A Turkish message stated that she was torpedoed, and that four officers and nineteen men were captured, whilst ten were lost.

Then followed a period of immunity, during which time the second attack on the defences of the Canal was delivered. This was on August 4, when the Army was again supported by our monitors, who wrought great execution on the enemy from the Bay of Tina, and he was thoroughly beaten and pursued.

In 1917 he has been driven right over the frontier beyond Gaza, and the forces are once again supported by the Allied ships, *Requin* especially distinguishing herself. This is a matter for much satisfaction, as the importance of the Canal is inestimable. Through it, in addition to the enormous trade, thousands of troops have passed on their way to the various battlefields. It is a wonder that the enemy has not made more serious attacks upon it.

The Palestine campaign was the one bright spot during the latter days of 1917, and our troops have been brilliantly led by General Allenby. Supported by the French Syrian Division and a flotilla of British monitors and light craft, he was enabled to make rapid progress. Prior to its capture Gaza was continuously shelled during the first week in November, and the old French *Requin* was struck by a shell on the 1st and lost nine killed and twenty-nine wounded, but escaped serious damage. During the pursuit of the enemy, enemy submarines were successful in sinking one of our destroyers and a small monitor, in which we lost thirty-three killed. On December 9 Jerusalem fell to our troops, and our ships are still assisting the coastal operations.

#### THE MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN

Turning to the last of these joint campaigns, one cannot help contrasting the similarity between this and the Dardanelles venture. The original object in this theatre was to arrest any advance by the common enemy upon India, which would most assuredly have been undertaken if the

situation in Europe had gone as well as had been intended by Germany. In addition the pressure of the Turks in the Caucasus would have been relieved, and also that on Egypt.

Basra was the port of Mesopotamia, and its early occupation was necessary if the plan was to be nipped in the bud. Thus far the campaign had been successful, also the safeguarding of the Admiralty oil-pipe from the Persian oil fields, but it is the subsequent operations which call forth so much criticism—the advance on Baghdad by General Townshend with insufficient forces, and the criminal lack of medical stores and transport which have needlessly cost this country the loss of so many lives. The troops were pitted against every natural disadvantage imaginable; for when the dust from the arid plains was not stifling to the men and the terrific heat not causing sunstroke, then the whole country was a sea of mud, with the ice-cold waters from the Caucasus bursting the banks of the river and flooding the land. In addition they were at grips with some of the finest fighters in the world.

The failure of the first part of this campaign, like the Gallipoli catastrophe, only serves to accentuate the indomitable will of our troops in the face of such odds. The fault lies not with them but with the administrative powers, either the Indian Government or the War Office.

On October 16 an Indian brigade sailed from Bombay, under General Delamain, for the Persian Gulf, accompanied by a naval flotilla, and arrived off the Shatt-el-Arab on November 3. Operations opened with an attack on the old fort of Fao at the estuary, supported by fire from *Ocean* and *Duke of Edinburgh*, covered by *Odin* and the launch *Sirdar*. The fort was silenced in an hour and the forces landed on the 10th under General Barrett. On the next day and on the 15th two actions were fought with the Turks, in which latter *Espiègle* and *Odin* rendered support, and by the 23rd the enemy was in flight towards Baghdad, leaving Basra in our hands. The advance up the river now commenced, and the troops were supported by the flotilla (sloops *Espiègle*

and *Odin*, Royal Indian Marine *Lawrence*, gunboat *Shaitan*, the 80-ton launch *Miner*, and the yacht *Lewis Pelly* of 100 tons).

On December 3 the flotilla, under Captain Nunn (with the exception of *Odin* which had rudder trouble), sailed for Kurna in advance of the troops and came under heavy fire on the next day, both *Lawrence* and *Miner* being hit. The troops invested the town on the 6th, and they were greatly assisted by the ships. They suffered several losses on the next day, when *Espiègle* and *Shaitan* were struck by shells, the latter losing her rudder and her commander, and *Miner* went aground but later refloated. Kurna fell on the 8th, and for his services Captain Nunn received the D.S.O.

After this things quieted down for a few months until the arrival of General Sir John Nixon, who succeeded Sir A. A. Barrett. In May and June two advances began—one along the Euphrates to Nasriyeh, which fell to General Gorringe on July 24 with the enemy in flight, and the other under General Townshend up the Tigris to Amara, which surrendered to the flotilla and the troops on June 4, with the gunboat *Marmariss*, one large and three small steamers, and several barges. On September 28 a battle was fought at Sanna-i-yat, which also fell, together with Kut-el-Amara, and 1650 prisoners were taken. The enemy was pursued by the cavalry, and the infantry were transported upstream to Aziziyah, where it was discovered that the Turks, now reinforced, were entrenched at Ctesiphon.

During this advance a very heroic incident occurred on *Comet*, one of the gunboats. On September 28 she was ordered to examine and destroy an obstruction across the river; though heavily fired upon by machine-gun and rifle fire, she made an attempt to destroy the middle dhow, but it failed. Lt.-Comm. Cookson then ordered *Comet* alongside, and himself jumped aboard to cut the steel hawsers with an axe. He was at once hit in several places and expired almost immediately, but for this gallant act he was rightly awarded the Victoria Cross, though unfortunately posthumously.



On November 18 General Townshend, being promised reinforcements, advanced on Ctesiphon to give battle, and on the 22nd, supported by the flotilla, attacked the enemy. Apparently he beat their 45th Division, but the Turkish commander, Nur-Ed-Din, receiving reinforcements from Baghdad, counter-attacked and the battle continued till the night of the 27th, when Townshend was compelled to retire to the river for water for his weary troops, having lost 4567 men. His own promised reinforcements failed to arrive, and he commenced his retreat on Kut-el-Amara, which he re-entered on December 3; here he became invested on the 5th. During these operations the gunboat flotilla rendered valuable assistance, but during the retreat it came under heavy fire whilst helping the shipping to escape, and suffered its first losses.

On November 28 the gunboat *Shaitan* grounded above Aziziyah, some thirty miles below, and in spite of all efforts she remained fast; her guns and stores were therefore salvaged by *Firefly* and *Shushan* on the next day. At Umm-el-Tubal *Comet* and *Firefly* engaged a large body of troops on December 1, causing great havoc in their ranks with their lyddite shells; unfortunately a shell, bursting aboard *Firefly*, pierced her boilers and disabled her. *Comet* then took her in tow, but misfortune continued and both ships grounded in one of the bends of the river. *Firefly* being the last to strike was soon refloated and sent drifting downstream, but *Comet* had been driven further on and defied all efforts of the launch *Sumana* to save her; both boats, burning furiously, had to be abandoned after their guns were disabled and crews removed. In addition one tug and three lighters were also abandoned, but the remainder of the shipping and flotilla regained Kut-el-Amara.

On December 5 this famous siege commenced and continued for many months, despite several attempts to raise it by the main force lower down the river. The first of these, under General Aylmer, was made on January 7, when the enemy was attacked at Sheikh Saad and driven back for ten miles, and again at Wadi when they retired a further

five miles. On the 19th Sir Percy Lake, having succeeded Sir John Nixon, attacked the Turkish position at Umm-el-Hannah on the left bank twenty-three miles below Kut, and also Es Sinn on the right bank fourteen miles away. Between January 19 and March 10 several attacks were delivered by General Aylmer, but not until April 5 did General Gorringe, with reinforcements, capture Umm-el-Hannah and Falahiyah. On the 9th the Sanna-i-yat position was unsuccessfully attacked, and again on the night of the 20th.

The greatest privations were now being suffered by the beleaguered force, and aeroplane attempts at landing supplies in the town were but partially successful. A last attempt to avert the inevitable collapse was undertaken by the naval flotilla. It was decided to attempt to get food through on the steamer *Julnar*, and two officers, Lt.-Com. Cowley and Lt. Firman, with several men, volunteered to run the blockade. At 8 p.m. on April 24 the ship left Falahiyah with 270 tons of supplies on board; covered by our artillery she managed to dash past the Es Sinn position, but was heavily shelled and later captured at Magasis, only two and a half miles from Kut. Both officers were killed and the crew captured. For their brave sacrifice they were both posthumously awarded the V.C. All the crew volunteered for the task knowing full well that the chances of winning through were practically nil, but with the truly wonderful spirit of our men, sailors and soldiers, they counted not the cost, and gloriously died in the attempt to bring succour to their stricken comrades.

On the 29th of April General Townshend surrendered with his 200 officers and 11,000 men, together with 28 guns and a few craft, after a siege lasting for 143 days.

After the disappearance of their objective the next eight months were spent in completely reorganising the whole transport and medical services, which, to say the least, were in a very deplorable condition owing to the obstinacy of the Indian Government. Numerous hospital barges were sent out and the troops were properly equipped, with the result that even in December 1916 the sick list was reduced by

one-third per week. In the early stages of this campaign ammunition and animal transports had to be temporarily utilised as hospital ships, and as they were at times compelled to carry both patients and material no claim for immunity could be made for them. Fortunately this state of affairs was remedied in the autumn of 1915, but until this reorganisation was completed everything was in chaos.

On December 13 Sir Stanley Maude commenced the preliminary movements which culminated so successfully. He opened an offensive along the Shatt-el-Hai, the river which bifurcates at Kut and flows southwards to the Euphrates, and drove the enemy back as far as Kut on the right bank of the Tigris during January. On the 21st the attack on Kut began, and from February 6-16 he was engaged in attacking the enemy in the Dahra Bend of the Tigris, west of Kut, and ultimately succeeded in capturing some 2000 Turks here. Next he attacked the Sanna-i-yat position on the left bank on the 17th, and drove the enemy into the peninsula formed by the river at Kut. On the 22nd the assault was more successful, and on the next day our troops effected a crossing at the Shumran Bend. Kut-el-Amara was retaken the next day, February 24, and the first to enter the town again were the naval forces, who hoisted the Union Jack on the Citadel.

Being requested to follow and pursue the retreating enemy, Captain Nunn pressed on and at 9.30 a.m. on the 25th sighted the Turkish rearguard and opened fire on it. The flotilla consisted of *Butterfly*, *Gadfly*, *Mantis*, *Moth*, and *Tarantula*, and all of them were hit; the battle continued all day, when the enemy recommenced his retreat pursued by cavalry, infantry and gunboats. On the next day, the Turks being much demoralised, Sir Stanley Maude ordered the flotilla to follow them up with all speed; Baghailah was passed, and shortly afterwards several steamers were sighted ahead, including the captured *Firefly*. Fire was opened upon her and upon the armed steamer *Pioneer*, which replied effectively with its 4" guns, and the rearguard was also engaged, although they were in force. Great execution was wrought



on them, and our ships were all hit time after time, *Moth* in particular being heavily shelled, as she was the rearmost ship and was caught by their artillery as she was turning a bend; she lost three officers and two men. The ships thus passed the rearguard of the Turkish Army, and opened fire upon the main force; they also recaptured the launch *Sumana*, and the *Basra*, with many wounded aboard, surrendered after being hit by *Tarantula*. *Firefly*, however, maintained her fire, but later, becoming disabled, grounded and was captured. The pursuit was broken off when the light failed, our flotilla having also taken 3 ships, 10 barges, and 30 pontoons. The enemy, in great haste, passed through Aziziyah on the 27th, and until March 7 the voyage upstream was uneventful.

On this day the enemy was discovered by the gunboats and cavalry to be holding the Diala, having evacuated Ctesiphon on the previous day. On the 10th the gunboats assisted in the crossing of the river, and next day Baghdad fell to General Maude. Even up to February 27, 7000 Turks had been taken prisoners during the advance, and since February 23, the day before Kut fell, 28 guns, 19 trench mortars and 11 machine-guns had been captured.

Thus the misfortune of 1915-16 was retrieved, and but for the Russian revolution paralysing all offensives we should have very soon afterwards joined up with them from the Caucasus. Indeed, a detachment had won through from the Grand Duke Nicholas' Army, and at that time everything pointed to a speedy reunion.

The brilliant leadership of General Maude needs no emphasis, for this bare outline of his advance clearly shows his remarkable skill in putting to flight his foes, in spite of their numbers. When the Gallipoli venture had definitely come to an end. The valuable assistance of Captain Nunn, his officers, and men was also recognised; four received the D.S.O., ten the D.S.C., and eighteen petty officers and men received the D.S.M. Captain Nunn received the C.B.

## IN THE ÆGEAN AND MEDITERRANEAN SEAS

In these regions the operations were confined to the safe convoying of thousands of transports conveying troops, stores, animals, etc., to the various overseas campaigns, and in the stupendous task of combating the enemy submarines. Many serious losses have occurred in the transportation, and the menace has been far more difficult to fight than it has been in northern waters. Here with the numerous islands inhabited with natives of doubtful sympathy, many bases have been established for these craft, which obviate the necessity of returning to the Adriatic through the dangerous Otranto Straits. Great quantities of mines have been set adrift from the Adriatic and Ægean Seas in addition to those sown in the shipping routes.

The submarines made their first appearance in the Mediterranean in the spring of 1915 by way of the Straits of Gibraltar, and since then many have safely emerged from the narrow waters of the Adriatic to take part in their murderous activities. Until the Allied landing at Salonika the bulk of the transports were destined for the Gallipoli Peninsula, but with this additional task, and with the arrival of numerous submarines, our patrols had their hands full.

Excluding all events off the Dardanelles and Syrian coasts, the first loss occurred on June 3, 1915, when the French minelayer *Casabianca* struck a mine and sank.

Then came the landing of an Anglo-French force under General Sarraill at Salonika on October 3. The force landed under cover of the Allied ships under Vice-Admiral d'Artige du Fournet, as a result of the refusal of King Constantine to abide by his treaty to ally himself with the Serbs, who were now in full retreat before the hosts of Mackensen, comprising Germans, Austrians, Bulgarians and Turks. A blockade of the Bulgarian coast was declared on the 17th, and a formal protest by the Greek Government against the landing on Greek soil was disregarded on account of the most unworthy conduct of the King and his party. It is difficult to understand the policy of the Allied Governments

in the subsequent events, but the idea was apparently to land a considerable force to endeavour to encourage the assistance of the Greeks and prevent the overwhelming of Greece by a catastrophe such as that which had befallen Serbia. Even passive assistance was withheld, and every obstacle was placed in our way to delay and impede our development.

Taking the situation broadly, the Greeks were no doubt not at all anxious to incur the terrible fate of Belgium, Poland, Montenegro, and Serbia, and in some measure we have but ourselves to blame for this. Against this was their word of honour and the tangible support from the Allies whose troops were already at hand. However, they chose the path of dishonour, and after a year of vacillation a collision inevitably occurred between the Allied and Royalist troops in Athens, and was followed by diabolical outrages, of the approved German style, on many Venezelists, whose bodies were disinterred months later and afforded terrible evidence of brutality. It is unnecessary to recapitulate the whole sordid trend of events to the final "abdication" of the King and his flight on June 12, 1917, leaving his second son Alexander on the throne. The degrading offer of Cyprus for the assistance of Greece and her refusal of it will be remembered with shame by every Englishman.

Immediately afterwards M. Venezelos returned to power and declared war on the Central Powers, and this hesitating nation at last redeemed her pledge, though far too late to render any assistance to her ally.

The first loss at sea was of only a slight character, when the empty French transport *France*, homeward bound, was torpedoed and sunk off Sardinia on November 7, 1915, without loss of life. The destroyer *Branlebas* was also mined in this month.

A shelling of Dedeagatch and Port Lagos by an Allied squadron, including the Russian *Askold*, several monitors, and a few cruisers and destroyers, under the command of Vice-Admiral de Roebeck, was carried out on October 21,



and the shipping and harbour were much damaged. This was repeated on December 17 and on January 18, 1916, when the Italian cruiser *Piemonte* participated.

Through a collision in the Straits of Gibraltar in the early hours of November 1 our torpedo boat No. 96 was sunk, and a like fate befell the French destroyers *Fantassin* on June 5, 1916, and *Yatagan* during December 1916.

By the end of 1915 a large force was collected at Salonika, the troops and stores being transported without loss until January 25, when the *Norseman*, carrying animals and stores, was torpedoed off Salonika and had to be beached in a sinking condition. More serious was the sinking of the French *Provence II* by U 35 in the Mediterranean on February 26 whilst carrying 1800 troops to Salonika; the torpedo struck her in the engine-room, and she quickly sank in fourteen minutes with 930 lives.

During April Cephalonia and several other islands in the Ægean and Ionian Seas were occupied as naval bases to reduce the distance from Alexandria, Cyprus, or Malta.

On April 27 we lost our first warship in these operations. This was the mining of the *Russell*, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Fremantle, but fortunately all but 124 officers and men were saved. Our ships also shot down the Zeppelin LZ 85 in the mouth of the Vardar on May 5.

Rumania's entry into the war on August 27 did not affect the situation in the Ægean to any great degree, but a stronger watch over the doings of the Greeks became necessary; and a premonition of the subsequent undertakings against them was the arrival of twenty-seven Allied warships off Athens on the 31st, detachments being landed ostensibly to protect the Legations. On this day the Bulgarian coast was shelled, and several bombings of Bulgarian troops, dépôts, etc. were undertaken in September by our airmen.

On October 10, with a view to securing a greater sense of safety, Admiral Fournet demanded the surrender of the Grecian Navy, excluding *Kilkis*, *Lemnos*, and *Georgios Averoff*, the occupation of two forts which commanded the

Piræus, the disarming of the three above-mentioned warships, and the transference of the light squadron to Kersatsini. It was reported unofficially that a very dangerous plot to our fleet had been nipped in the bud by this drastic action. The three warships were handed over a week later, and a strong force of Italians and French marines were landed in Athens. The Navy Yard was also taken over.

But when Admiral Fournet demanded the handing over of six batteries of field-guns the King refused, and further French and Italians were landed. Fights took place in Athens in which we lost about forty killed, and several outrages were committed on Venezelists and a few British subjects by the Royalist soldiery and mob. The King evidently found that matters had gone too far, and offered the surrender of eight batteries, but the offer was disregarded and an ultimatum was dispatched. After a great deal of unnecessary intercourse he climbed down, and all our demands were met. For some unknown reason Admiral Fournet was superseded in January by Vice-Admiral Gauchet, and was given a post ashore.

In the meantime several further losses are to be recorded. On October 2 the French submarine-destroyer *Rigel* was torpedoed and sunk. Far more serious was the torpedoing of the large transport *Gallia* two days later whilst carrying 2000 French and Serbian troops; the explosion blew up the ammunition hold and destroyed the wireless before messages for help could be sent out, and the ship sank in fifteen minutes with 600 soldiers, the survivors not being picked up till next day. On the same day our transport *Franconia*, homeward bound without any troops aboard, was also sunk, but only twelve of her crew of 314 were lost.

In the winter months further losses occurred. On November 22 the huge hospital ship *Britannic*, en route for Salonika, was struck by a torpedo in the Zea Channel, but very fortunately remained afloat until 1106 of her staff and crew were taken off by French warships. The German submarine is reported to have tried to jam the wireless messages, but in spite of the attempt only nineteen lives

were lost. Two days later the hospital ship *Braemar Castle*, from Salonika to Malta, was also sunk in the Mykoni Channel, and one life was lost. There is no excuse for these attacks, and although the Admiralty stated that the inquiry failed to ascertain whether the cause was a mine or torpedo, in either case the origin of the outrages is the same. Unofficial reports leave no doubt on this point, and the enemy received much help from the Grecian population.

On November 25 the French battleship *Suffren* was torpedoed and sunk with all her crew fifty miles north-west of Lisbon. Following this came the sinking off Pontellieria Island (near Sicily) of the French transport *Magellan* on December 11, whilst carrying 1000 soldiers; and three days later the British horse transport *Russian* was torpedoed in the Mediterranean with the loss of twenty-eight lives. Another French battleship, the *Gaulois*, was sunk on the 27th, but fortunately remained afloat for half an hour, thereby enabling all but four of the crew to escape. The career of this old ship will be remembered in connection with the Dardanelles campaign.

The transport *Ivernia* was torpedoed and sunk in very heavy weather on New Year's Day, and four officers and eighty-five soldiers, together with two officers and thirty-three of the crew, were lost. Eight days later the old battleship *Cornwallis* was sunk with only thirteen of her crew, and on the 11th the seaplane carrier *Ben-My-Chree*, under that famous airman Commander Samson, was shelled and sunk whilst lying in Kastelorizo harbour, one officer and four men being wounded. The details of this Grecian treachery have not been revealed.

More transports were put down. On the 25th the French *Amiral Magon*, whilst carrying 900 soldiers to Salonika, was torpedoed, and she sank in ten minutes; thanks to the splendid efforts of the escorting destroyers *Arc* and *Bombarde* and some trawlers, only ninety-three lives were lost. The Italian *Minas* was sunk off Cape Matapan on February 15 with troops for Salonika aboard, and several Serbians were lost. This was closely followed by the sinking



of the French *Athos*, carrying Senegalese soldiers and a Chinese labour party from Hong Kong; with the utmost skill and heroism the captain and his officers and crew transferred over a thousand Chinese to the patrol ships, but perished at their posts, having saved in all 1450 lives.

The French destroyer *Cassini* was torpedoed on the 28th, and owing to the magazine blowing up she sank in two minutes; the submarine, calling the drowning sailors to her, opened fire on them and the death-roll was 107. This act was typical of the state of savagery to which the enemy had sunk.

On March 19 the French Dreadnought *Danton* was also sunk, despite an energetic counter-attack by the escorting destroyer *Massul*. The ship sank in half an hour, but 806 lives were saved. During April several more transports were lost; on the 15th two British ships were sunk, these being the *Arcadian* with 233 soldiers and 36 of her crew, and the *Cameronia* with 129 soldiers and 11 of the crew, both in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ten days later the Australian troopship *Ballarat* was also torpedoed, but her living freight was quickly transhipped without a single casualty, owing to the steadiness of the men and the skill of the officers and crew; the liner remained afloat, and an attempt was made to tow her into port, but she foundered fourteen and a half hours later.

On May 4 the transport *Transylvania*, escorted by two Japanese destroyers, was sunk with serious loss of life; in all 402 military ratings were lost in addition to the captain and ten of the crew.

The third hospital ship to be torpedoed in the Mediterranean was the *Dover Castle*. This ship was struck by a torpedo on May 26 at about 6 p.m., and the patients were immediately transhipped without loss; the ship did not sink, however, and the captain and several of the crew returned to her and, raising steam, attempted to bring her into port. Two hours later the submarine reappeared and finished her work, six of the crew being killed by the explosion.

A week later the transport *Cameronian* was sunk in the Eastern Mediterranean and fifty-two soldiers, the captain, one

officer, and nine of the crew were lost. A British minesweeper was mined on July 4 and ten of her crew were drowned.

It will have been noticed after the extraordinary activity of the submarines during the winter a lull followed. This was no doubt due to the arrival of several Japanese and American flotillas during the summer; these valuable additions to the Allied patrols have produced an excellent effect; also when Greece came in her flotilla became available. Curiously enough, she lost one of her destroyers quite early whilst on convoy duty. The *Doxa*, manned by a French crew, was blown up by two explosions on June 28, and twenty-nine French seamen perished. The Japanese *Sakaki* was also hit by a torpedo on June 12, but regained her port with the loss of fifty-five men; next day the Japanese flotilla was again attacked without success, and the enemy retired with the loss of one of his submarines. Again, whilst convoying British transports on July 22 they sighted a submarine about to attack, opened fire and smashed her periscope, pursued and sank her. Further, it was announced from Washington on May 11 that since mid-April the Italians had destroyed thirteen Austrian craft in the Mediterranean. In a duel between an enemy vessel and the French submarine *Ariane*, the latter was sunk with all but nine of her crew on June 19.

There was slight activity during November and December in these waters. On November 18 one of our patrols was torpedoed and sunk with the loss of four officers and five men. On the other hand, the Grecian destroyer *Niki* claims to have sunk a German submarine on the 28th in the *Ægean* Sea. Again the French patrol *Paris II* was shelled and sunk in the Gulf of Avala on December 13, and her commander and sixteen of the crew were captured. On the same day two French destroyers attacked and sank two large German submarines in the Ionian Sea: one sank immediately, and the other was abandoned by her crew of nineteen, who were captured.

On the 15th the old French cruiser *Châteaurenault*, used

as a transport, was torpedoed and sunk, but fortunately all but ten of the crew were saved. Her attacker was reported to have been sunk.

The last two days of 1917 witnessed a triple disaster in the Mediterranean, and the notification of the losses was delayed for a month. It appears that the transport *Aragon* (ex-R.M.S.P.) was nearing her destination on the morning of December 30 when at 10.55 a.m. she was struck by a torpedo, and immediately commenced to sink by the stern. She was carrying a large number of troops and a few nurses, and these latter were speedily transferred to trawlers and destroyers. Many of the men were unable to be taken off, and in fifteen minutes the ship foundered with hundreds of soldiers still on her decks, singing to the last. One of the destroyers who had closed in was herself torpedoed and, blown in two, sank immediately with ten of her crew and many of the rescued. No fewer than ten officers and 581 soldiers, and the captain, three officers and fifteen of the crew, were thus drowned, and the survivors reached shore on board trawlers.

On the next day the Mercantile Fleet Auxiliary *Osmanieh* had the misfortune to strike a mine in this vicinity, and took down with her the captain, two officers and twenty-one men, and one officer and 166 troops and eight nurses. Thus altogether on these two days a total of 819 lives were lost.

The submarine menace still remains a serious factor in the Mediterranean, and most of our shipping losses occur here. Whereas we have met with success more or less around our shores, the French and Italian flotillas are encountering great difficulties in hunting down these assassins of the seas; and it appears that the problem will continue to prove much more obstinate in these waters, owing to the large amount of coast available for the establishment of bases.

#### ON THE DANUBE

In 1914 Austria had a flotilla of half a dozen river monitors, supplemented by a few old torpedo boats, for service



on the great river Danube. These ships were the first to fire a gun in this tremendous war, opening hostilities by the seizure of Serbian steamers. They also were of great assistance to the troops in the attacks on Serbia, for with their 4·7" pieces they wrought havoc on the Serbian trenches. Although the *Temes* was sunk by a mine on October 23 with thirty-five of her crew, the other craft were of value in the first unsuccessful Austrian assault on their small neighbour.

Realising the menace afforded by these ships when the enemy should recommence his offensive, the Admiralty sent out Rear-Admiral Troubridge with a brigade of five officers and sixty men to assist in the defence of the capital. He immediately mined the river, and with his battery later severely handled the Austrian troops. Amongst his officers was a Lieut. Kerr, who had arrived in Serbia in November, and by his efforts prevented the Austrian monitors from descending the Danube.

Serbia did not possess any sort of gunboat to oppose the enemy, but this ingenious officer took over an old ferry-boat, armed her with machine-guns, and then awaited the enemy with his "fleet." The second attack came during November, and the Serbians retired into the hills, followed by the Austrians; under the impression that the Serbs were beaten, only a weak force was left to develop the success, but on December 3 the Serbian Army turned upon the invader and put him to flight. Belgrade was re-occupied on the 15th, in which operations the antique *Terror of the Danube* embarked upon her career. One dark night Lieut. Kerr steamed up to an island in possession of the enemy and compelled the amazed Austrians to evacuate it hurriedly. The next exploit took place on the night of April 21, when this officer again attacked the enemy and succeeded in torpedoing a monitor and sinking her. For these and other services Lieut. Kerr received the D.S.O., in addition to two Serbian decorations.

During the year 1915 several Russian armed launches also arrived and assisted in the defence of Belgrade against

Mackensen's Austro-German army, which for the third time attacked Serbia. The fall of the capital on October 9 was considerably delayed by the work of the Naval Brigade, which prevented the Austrian monitors from getting behind the Serbian flank, and on the 8th was successful in sinking two more monitors by well-directed gunfire. The Brigade retired with the Serbian Army with its guns, and the Danube was once more in the hands of the enemy, who were enabled to bring supplies to their treacherous ally, Bulgaria.

Until the entry of Rumania into the conflict this traffic remained unmolested, but afterwards the enemy monitors again came into prominence. The new monitor *Alnos* shelled several towns near Turnu Severin during August 28-30, 1916, but she was forced to retire by the fire from the Rumanian flotilla. When the retreat of the hard-pressed Rumanians commenced the Danube was crossed during November, after Constanza had fallen on October 22; consequently all the enemy shipping interned there was recaptured, and the Rumanian flotilla was forced to evacuate the Danube and take refuge in Russian ports.

#### THE VALUABLE AID FROM THE COLONIES

Our colonies have all nobly responded to the call of the Old Country, and an account of the naval warfare would be incomplete without a brief *résumé* of the valuable assistance which they have sent us, both in personnel and in ships.

Taking them in order we begin of course with AUSTRALIA, the first colony to establish a Navy of her own. In 1909 she commenced the task with the order for a large battle-cruiser to be named *Australia*, and two light cruisers *Melbourne* and *Sydney*, three destroyers *Parramatta*, *Warrego*, *Yarra*, and the submarines AE 1 and AE 2. All of these were to be built in England, whilst she commenced the construction of another cruiser *Brisbane*, and three more destroyers, *Derwent*, *Swan*, and *Torrens*, to be built at Port Jackson.

In the meantime the Admiralty lent the cruiser *Encounter*

to them, pending the completion of the *Brisbane*, and handed over the two old light cruisers *Pioneer* and *Psyche* in 1913-14; in addition there were two old torpedo boats and three gunboats which were used as training ships, dépôts, etc.

There is no need to enter into the advantages and disadvantages of a local unit; suffice it to say that the presence of the *Australia* certainly did render the Australian coasts immune from the German raiders, but, on the other hand, she was distinctly wasted upon the comparatively unimportant task of convoying military expeditions to annex the German colonies. Until the reverse off Coronel on November 1, 1914, she was not engaged in seeking the enemy, but merely in policing the vast archipelago in the Pacific Ocean.

On August 11 the various elements of the Australian squadron met at a rendezvous and commenced their work under Admiralty orders. Making for Simpsonhaven, New Britain, in the hope of discovering the enemy there, they landed forces to destroy the wireless plant at Rabaul, and *Sydney* left to meet the expedition for the occupation of the colony. *Australia* and *Melbourne* also sailed to convoy the New Zealand Expedition to Samoa, whilst the three destroyers returned to New Guinea. The Expeditionary Force arrived at Simpsonhaven on board the troopship *Berrima* on September 11, and occupied Rabaul without trouble; by the 21st the Marshall and Caroline Islands and New Guinea had also surrendered. The two cruisers then proceeded to destroy wireless stations, the *Melbourne* to Nauru (Pleasant Island) and *Sydney* to Angaur (Pelew Group), whilst the battle-cruiser remained to assist in the occupation of New Guinea, as there seemed a possibility of Von Spee returning to the west, and on October 1 she commenced a systematic search of the island-studded waters. The movements of Von Spee are recorded elsewhere, and it will be recollected that by this time the whole German squadron in reality had reached Easter Island. Von Spee enjoyed the most remarkable luck in his passage across the Pacific, evading all observation, and it was at least expected that he



would attempt to attack the Australian and New Zealand transports.

It was during this search of the Polynesian waters that the gunboat *Nusa* captured the German dispatch boat *Komet* near Rabaul on October 14, where she had been sending out wireless messages about the dispositions of our cruisers. Meanwhile the one loss sustained in these operations had occurred on September 14, when the *AE 1*, whilst patrolling off the coast of New Britain, disappeared without leaving the slightest trace behind as a clue to her fate; it seems likely that she struck a submerged reef which ripped her thin hull, and immediately went to the bottom.

On the receipt of the news of the battle off Coronel *Australia* was at once sent to reinforce the pursuing cruisers, and passing Fanning Island on November 14, she joined several Japanese cruisers in Magdalena Bay, California, and slowly swept down the western coast of South America. There is no doubt that this Australian-Japanese Squadron was largely instrumental in driving Von Spee on to Sturdee's guns, though they themselves were unable to come up with him. In January this battle-cruiser destroyed the supply ship *Eleonore Woermann* off the Falkland Islands.

In the meantime the action which brought this young Navy so much before the public had been fought. It was whilst the famous Australian and New Zealand contingent was nine days out from Albany, and convoyed by *Minotaur*, *Sydney*, *Melbourne*, *Pyramus*, and the Japanese *Ibuki*, that a message was received by *Minotaur* that the *Emden* was about to attack the wireless station at Cocos-Keeling Island, which was then 100 miles to the north-east. *Melbourne* was ordered to proceed at once to the spot, but as *Sydney* was the nearest to the island (the whole fleet of thirty-eight transports with the escorting cruisers covering a wide area) she unselfishly passed on the order to this cruiser. The famous fight has already been described in detail, and the Australians were justly proud of their Navy's first action which ended so well.

Since then nothing more has been published of the splendid

doings of the Australian Navy, but we know that soon after the rounding up of Von Spee the *Australia* arrived in home waters and became the flagship of the 2nd Battle-cruiser Squadron; it was through no fault of hers that she did not take part in the battle fought off Jutland on May 31, 1916. This ship covered no less than 50,000 miles up to March 1915, whilst *Melbourne* alone cruised 11,000 miles in the first six weeks of war; finally, 40,000 troops were transported without the loss of a single life up to May 1915—not a bad record for a Navy only three years old.

In 1917 it was announced that following the launch of *Brisbane* in 1915, another cruiser named *Adelaide* had been laid down at Port Jackson; also that two submarines had been ordered to replace AE 1 and AE 2, which latter had been lost in the Dardanelles.

NEW ZEALAND had, of course, at the same time contributed a similar battle-cruiser, the *New Zealand*, to the Imperial Navy in 1909, which had originally been intended for service in her waters; unselfishly she allowed her to be stationed in home waters, where it was rightly considered she would be of more value. She took prominent parts in the Dogger Bank and Jutland battles. New Zealand was, therefore, dependent upon the Australian squadron for the security of her coasts from the marauding cruisers under Von Spee, and for the safe transport of the expedition to Samoa; this latter was only escorted by their old cruiser *Pioneer*, although Von Spee's two armoured cruisers were in the vicinity. Fortunately they were not encountered, and the convoy was later reinforced by *Sydney*, *Melbourne*, and the French *Montcalm*. The successful occupation of Samoa was accomplished without opposition, and the capital, Apia, surrendered on August 29. It must be borne in mind that without the protecting influence of the Royal Australian Navy, and similarly without the support of the Royal Navy, not a man of this expeditionary force could have left his shore. Such is the influence of sea power, and the New Zealanders were not slow to realise it; with the object of

creating a New Zealand-owned Navy to be under Admiralty orders in war time, the Admiralty handed over in 1916 the light cruiser *Philomel* as a nucleus.

CANADA very early placed her ships entirely at the disposal of the Admiralty. These were the two old cruisers *Niobe* and *Rainbow*, which had been purchased from the Admiralty in 1910, and several small customs cruisers, etc. It has also been officially stated that several submarines have been constructed in Canada and brought over. The Dreadnought *Canada*, acquired from Chile, gave a good account of herself in the Jutland battle.

NEWFOUNDLAND, our oldest colony, had provided up to March 1915 no fewer than 1000 sailors and 1040 soldiers from her small population to fight for their Motherland. The sailors were, of course, of an excellent type for the Navy, seeing that her only industry is fishing. Her first step was to raise the strength of the normal 600 of her Royal Naval Reserve to 1000, which was speedily accomplished. Early in November 300 embarked in the transport *Franconia*; a monthly draft of 150 was subsequently transported to England by the small Allan liners *Mongolian*, *Numidian*, *Pomeranian*, etc., and by March 1000 had been thus dispatched. Of these 58 had made the great sacrifice before the end of this month—25 on the *Viknor*, 22 on the *Clan Macnaughton*, and 11 on the *Bayano*. Many have since then fallen in the service of their King and Country, but these early losses had no deterrent effect upon the spirit of the Newfoundlanders.

Mention must be made of the very fine battleship *Malaya*, whose cost was defrayed by the MALAY STRAITS SETTLEMENTS, and whose part in the terrific combat off the Jutland coast on May 31, 1916, was especially mentioned in Sir J. R. Jellicoe's dispatch.



# WARSHIP LOSSES FROM 1914 TO 1917 (EXCLUDING TRAWLERS, ETC.). BATTLESHIPS

Name	Date.	Cause.	Vicinity.	Loss of Life.
<b>BRITAIN</b>				
<i>Bulwark</i>	Nov. 26, 1914	Blown up.	Off Sheerness.	766
<i>Formidable</i>	Jan. 1, 1915.	Torpedoed.	In the Channel.	551
<i>Irresistible</i>	Mar. 18, "	Mined.	Dardanelles. }	50
<i>Ocean</i>	" "	"	"	500
<i>Goliath</i>	May 13, "	"	"	240
<i>Triumph</i>	" 25, "	"	"	49
<i>Majestic</i>	" 27, "	"	"	—
<i>King Edward VII</i>	Jan. 6, 1916.	Mined.	North Sea.	124
<i>Russell</i>	Apr. 27, "	"	Mediterranean.	13
<i>Cornwallis</i>	Jan. 9, 1917.	Torpedoed.	"	804
<i>Vanguard</i>	June 9, "	Blown up.	Home Waters.	
<b>FRANCE</b>				
<i>Bouvet</i>	Mar. 18, 1915.	Mined.	Dardanelles.	642
<i>Suffren</i>	Nov. 25, 1916.	Torpedoed.	Off Portugal.	730
<i>Gaulois</i>	Dec. 27, "	"	Mediterranean.	4
<i>Danton</i>	Mar. 19, 1917.	"	"	296
<b>ITALY</b>				
<i>Benedetto Brin</i>	Sept. 27, 1915.	Blown up.	Brindisi.	250
<i>Leon. da Vinci</i>	Aug. 2, 1916.	"	Taranto.	260
<i>Reg. Margherita</i>	Dec. 11, "	Mined.	?	690
<b>RUSSIA</b>				
<i>Imper. Maria</i>	Nov. 20, 1916.	Sunk after fire.	Serastopol.	216
<i>Slava</i>	Oct. 17, 1917.	Gunfire.	Riga.	?

# BATTLESHIPS—continued

Name.	Date.	Cause.	Vicinity.	Loss of Life.
GERMANY				
<i>Pommern</i> . . . . .	July 2, 1915.	Torpedoed by E 9.	Danzig Bay.	?
— ("König" class) . . . . .	May 31, 1916.	Torpedo attack.	Jutland.	?
— ("Kaiser" class) . . . . .		" "		
— ("Deutschland" class) . . . . .		Gunfire (?).		
AUSTRIA				
<i>Wiën</i> . . . . .	Dec. 9, 1917.	Torpedo attack.	Trieste.	?
TURKEY				
<i>Messudiyeh</i> . . . . .	Dec. 13, 1914.	Torpedoed by B 11.	Dardanelles.	?
<i>Hairreddin Barbarossa</i> . . . . .	Aug. 8, 1915.	" "	" "	?

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## BATTLE-CRUISERS

BRITAIN				
<i>Queen Mary</i> . . . . .	May 31, 1916.	Gunfire.	Off Jutland.	1550
<i>Indefatigable</i> . . . . .	" "	" "	" "	962 (men).
<i>Invincible</i> . . . . .	" "	" "	" "	968 (men).
GERMANY				
<i>Lützow</i> . . . . .	" "	" "	" "	?
<i>Pommern</i> (ex <i>Salamis</i> , renamed <i>King George I</i> ) . . . . .	" "	" "	" "	?

# CRUISERS

Name.	Date.	Cause.	Vicinity.	Loss of Life.
BRITAIN				
<i>Aboukir</i>	Sept. 22, 1914.	Torpedoed.	Off Holland.	527
<i>Cressy</i>	" "	"	"	560
<i>Hogue</i>	" "	"	"	48
<i>Hawke</i>	Oct. 15, "	"	Off Scotland.	525
<i>Good Hope.</i>	Nov. 1, "	Gunfire.	Off Coronel.	919
<i>Monmouth</i>	" "	"	"	715
<i>Argyll</i>	Oct. 28, 1915.	Stranded.	Off Scotland.	—
<i>Natal</i>	Dec. 31, "	Blown up.	Home Waters.	400
<i>Defence.</i>	May 31, 1916.	Gunfire.	Off Jutland.	860 (men).
<i>Black Prince</i>	" "	"	"	816 (men).
<i>Warrior</i>	" "	"	"	?
<i>Hampshire</i>	June 5, "	Mined.	Off Orkneys.	681
<i>Ariadne</i>	July 22, 1917.	Torpedoed.	?	38
<i>Drake</i>	Oct. 2, "	"	Off Ireland.	19
FRANCE				
<i>Léon Gambetta</i>	Apr. 27, 1915.	Torpedoed by U5.	Straits of Otranto.	614
<i>Amiral Charrier</i>	Feb. 8, 1916.	"	Off Syria.	369
<i>Kléber</i>	June 30, 1917.	Mined.	Channel.	38
<i>Châteaurenault</i>	Dec. 15, 1917.	Torpedoed.	Mediterranean.	20
ITALY				
<i>Amalfi</i>	July 8, 1915.	Torpedoed.	Adriatic.	?
<i>Garibaldi</i>	" 18, "	"	"	?
RUSSIA				
<i>Pallada</i>	Oct. 11, 1914.	"	Baltic Sea.	568
JAPAN				
<i>Tsukuba</i>	Jan. 14, 1917.	Blown up and burnt.	Yokosuka.	200



# CRUISERS—continued

Name.	Date.	Cause.	Vicinity.	Loss of Life.
<b>GERMANY</b>				
<i>Yorck</i> .	Nov. 4, 1914.	Mined.	Jabde Bay.	251
<i>Friedrich Karl</i> .	" "	"	Baltic Sea.	500 (?)
<i>Gneisenau</i> .	Dec. 8, "	Gunfire.	Off Falklands.	764
<i>Scharnhorst</i> .	" "	"	"	587
<i>Blücher</i> .	Jan. 24, 1915.	"	Dogger Bank.	564
<i>Prinz Adalbert</i> .	Oct. 23, "	Torpedoed by E 8.	Baltic.	500 (?)

# LIGHT CRUISERS

<b>BRITAIN</b>				
<i>Amphion</i> .	Aug. 6, 1914.	Mined.	North Sea.	149
<i>Pathfinder</i> .	Sept. 5, "	Torpedoed.	"	259
<i>Pegasus</i> .	" 20, "	Gunfire.	Zanzibar.	7
<i>Hermes</i> .	Oct. 31, "	Torpedoed.	Channel.	22
<i>Arethusa</i> .	Feb. 14, 1916.	Mined.	North Sea.	13
<i>Falmouth</i> .	Aug. 19, "	Torpedoed.	"	11
<i>Nottingham</i> .	" "	"	"	37
<b>RUSSIA</b>				
<i>Zhemtchug</i> .	Oct. 30, 1914.	Torpedoed by <i>Emden</i> .	Penang.	85
<b>JAPAN</b>				
<i>Takachino</i> .	" 17, "	" S 90.	Kiao-Chao Bay.	254

LIGHT CRUISERS—continued

Name.	Date.	Cause.	Vicinity.	Loss of Life.
<b>GERMANY</b>				
<i>Magdeburg</i>	Aug. 27, 1914.	Driven ashore.	Odenholm Island.	102
<i>Ariadne</i>	" 28, "	Gunfire.	Helgoland Bight. }	870
<i>Köln</i>	" "	"	" "	"
<i>Mainz</i>	" "	"	" "	"
<i>Hela</i>	" "	"	" "	"
<i>Königsberg</i>	Sept. 13, "	Torpedoed by E 9.	Rufiji River.	"
<i>Karlsruhe</i>	Oct. 30, "	Bottled up.	Off Venezuela.	"
<i>Enden</i>	Nov. 4, "	Blown up.	Cocos-Keeling Islands.	120
<i>Leipzig</i>	" 9, "	Gunfire.	Off Falklands.	303
<i>Nürnberg</i>	Dec. 8, "	"	"	296
<i>Gazelle</i>	" "	"	"	"
<i>Dresden</i>	Jan. 25, 1915.	Disabled.	Off Rügen Island.	—
<i>Undine</i>	Mar. 14, "	Scuttled.	Off Juan Fernandez Is.	26
<i>Frauenlob</i> (?)	Nov. 7, "	Torpedoed by E9.	Baltic Sea.	"
<i>Bremen</i>	" "	" (?)	"	"
<i>Rostock</i>	Dec. 16, "	"	"	"
<i>Elbing</i>	May 31, 1916.	or gunfire.	Off Jutland.	"
<i>Frauenlob</i> (new)	" "	"	"	"
<i>Wiesbaden</i>	" "	"	"	"
—	" "	"	"	"
<b>AUSTRIA</b>				
<i>Zenta</i>	Aug. 16, 1914.	Gunfire.	Adriatic.	201
<i>Kaiserin Elisabeth</i>	Nov. 6, "	Scuttled.	Tsingtau.	—
<i>Helgoland</i>	Jan. 13, 1916.	Torpedoed.	Adriatic.	"
<b>TURKEY</b>				
<i>Medjidieh</i>	Apr. 3, 1915.	Mined, salvaged by Russia.	Black Sea.	"

# AUXILIARY CRUISERS AND ARMED BOARDING STEAMERS

Name.	Date.	Cause.	Vicinity.	Loss of Life.
<b>BRITAIN</b>				
<i>Oceanic</i> .	Sept. 8, 1914.	Stranded.	Off W. Scotland.	—
<i>Viktor</i> .	Jan. 20 (?), 1915	Missing.	Off N. Ireland.	?
<i>Clan Macnaughton</i> .	Feb. 3 (?), "	"	"	280
<i>Bayano</i> .	Mar. 11, "	Torpedoed.	Off Wigtownshire.	100 (?)
<i>India</i> .	Aug. 8, "	"	Off Norway.	5
<i>Ramsey</i> .	" 5, "	Gunfire.	North Sea.	?
<i>Tara</i> .	Nov. 29, 1916.	Torpedoed by U 35.	North Africa.	74
<i>Alcantara</i> .	Feb. 29, 1916.	"	North Sea.	14
<i>Fauvette</i> .	Mar. 11, "	"	"	24
<i>Duke of Albany</i> .	Aug. 25, 1917.	Mined.	Off N. Ireland.	259
<i>Laurentic</i> .	Jan. 25, 1917.	Torpedoed.	North Sea.	4
<i>Hilary</i> .	May —, "	"	"	1
<i>Avenger</i> .	June 13, "	"	"	10
<i>Onway</i> .	July 22, "	"	"	56
<i>Champagne</i> .	Oct. —, "	"	"	—
<i>Orama</i> .	Dec. 19, "	"	Irish Channel.	101
<i>Stephen Furness</i> .	Dec. —, "	"	"	—
<i>Grive</i> .	" —, "	"	Mediterranean.	191
<i>Osmaniel</i> .	" 31, "	"	"	?
<b>ITALY</b>				
<i>Città di Palermo</i> .	Jan. 5, 1916.	"	Adriatic.	?
<i>Città di Messina</i> .	June 23, "	"	Straits of Otranto.	?
<b>GERMANY</b>				
<i>Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse</i> .	Aug. 26, 1914.	Gunfire.	W. Coast of Africa.	
<i>Preussen</i> .	" ?	Interned.	Sarang.	
<i>Spreewald</i> .	Sept. 12, "	Captured.	Atlantic.	
<i>Bethania</i> .	" 14, "	"	"	



# AUXILIARY CRUISERS AND ARMED BOARDING STEAMERS—continued

Name.	Date.	Cause.	Vicinity.	Loss of Life.
<i>GERMANY—continued</i>				
<i>Cap Trafalgar</i> . . . . .	Sept. 14, 1914	Sunk by <i>Carmania</i> .	Off Trinidad.	
<i>Markomannia</i> . . . . .	Oct. 14, "	" <i>Yarmouth</i> .	Off Sumatra.	
<i>Ophelia</i> . . . . .	Oct. 19, "	Captured.	Off Harwich.	
<i>Navarra</i> . . . . .	Nov. 11, "	Sunk by <i>Orama</i> .	Off Brazil.	
<i>Berlin</i> . . . . .	Nov. 17, "	Interned.	Trondhjem, Norway.	
<i>Prinz Eitel Friedrich</i> . . . . .	Mar. 11, 1915.	"	Newport News.	
<i>Kronprinz Wilhelm</i> . . . . .	Apr. 11, "	"	"	
<i>Meteor</i> . . . . .	Aug. 8, "	Scuttled.	Off Jutland.	
— . . . . .	Sept. 25, "	Torpedoed by E 5.	Off Heligoland.	
— . . . . .	Dec. 22, "	"	"	201
<i>Greif</i> . . . . .	Feb. 29, 1916.	Gunfire.	North Sea.	
<i>Hermann</i> . . . . .	June 13, "	Torpedo attack.	Baltic Sea.	
<i>Secadler</i> . . . . .	Aug. 2, 1917.	Wrecked.	South Pacific.	
<i>Marie</i> . . . . .	Nov. 3, "	Gunfire.	Kattegat.	40
<i>Bothnia</i> . . . . .	Dec. 3, "	Mined.	Baltic Sea.	

## TRANSPORTS

<i>BRITAIN</i>				
<i>Royal Edward</i> . . . . .	Aug. 14, 1915.	Torpedoed.	Ægean Sea.	854
<i>Ramazan</i> . . . . .	Sept. 19, "	Gunfire by submarine.	"	380
<i>Marquette</i> . . . . .	Oct. 25, "	Torpedoed.	"	99
<i>Hythe</i> (minesweeper) . . . . .	" 28, "	Collision.	Dardanelles.	155
<i>Franconia</i> . . . . .	" 4, 1916.	Torpedoed.	Mediterranean.	12
<i>Queen</i> . . . . .	" 26, "	" by destroyer.	Channel.	—
<i>Russian</i> . . . . .	Dec. 14, "	"	Mediterranean.	28
<i>Ivernia</i> . . . . .	Jan. 1, 1917.	"	"	124

# TRANSPORTS—continued

Name.	Date.	Cause.	Vicinity.	Loss of Life.
<b>BRITAIN—continued</b>				
<i>Mendi</i> . . . . .	Feb. 21, 1917.	Collision.	Channel.	625
<i>Arcadian</i> . . . . .	Apr. 15, "	Torpedoed.	Mediterranean.	269
<i>Cameronia</i> . . . . .	" 25, "	"	"	140
<i>Ballarat</i> . . . . .	" 25, "	"	"	—
<i>Transylvanian</i> . . . . .	May 4, "	"	"	412
<i>Cameronian</i> . . . . .	June 2, "	"	"	63
<i>Armadale</i> . . . . .	" 29, "	"	Atlantic.	11
<i>Aragon</i> . . . . .	Dec. 30, "	"	Mediterranean.	610
<b>FRANCE</b>				
<i>Carthage</i> . . . . .	July 4, 1915.	"	Dardanelles.	6
<i>Indien</i> . . . . .	Sept. 8, "	"	"	11
<i>France II</i> . . . . .	Nov. 7, "	"	Mediterranean.	—
<i>Provence II</i> . . . . .	Feb. 26, 1916.	"	"	930
<i>Rigel</i> . . . . .	Oct. 2, "	"	"	?
<i>Gallia</i> . . . . .	" 4, "	"	"	600
<i>Magellan</i> . . . . .	Dec. 11, "	"	"	?
<i>Amiral Magon</i> . . . . .	Jan. 25, 1917.	"	"	93
<i>Athos</i> . . . . .	Feb. 17, "	"	"	?
<b>ITALY</b>				
<i>Umberto</i> . . . . .	Dec. 14, 1915.	Mined.	Adriatic.	?
<i>Brindisi</i> . . . . .	Jan. 6, 1916.	"	"	200
<i>—</i> . . . . .	" 24, "	Bombed.	"	?
<i>Principe Umberto</i> . . . . .	June 6, "	Torpedoed.	"	?
<i>Minas</i> . . . . .	Feb. 15, 1917.	"	Off Cape Matapan.	?
<b>UNITED STATES</b>				
<i>Antilles</i> . . . . .	Oct. 17, "	"	Atlantic.	67

There is no definite information of enemy transport losses.

# DESTROYERS

Name.	Date.	Cause.	Vicinity.	Loss of life.
BRITAIN				
<i>Recruit</i> .	May 1, 1915.	Torpedoed.	Off the Thames.	39
<i>Maori</i> .	" 8, "	Mined.	Off Zeebrugge.	—
<i>Lynx</i> .	Aug. " "	"	North Sea.	74
<i>Louis</i> .	Nov. 10, "	Stranded.	Gallipoli Peninsula.	—
<i>Coquette</i> .	Mar. 9, 1916.	Mined.	North Sea.	48
<i>Medusa</i> .	" 25, "	Collision.	Off Sylt, Germany.	—
<i>Ardent</i> .	May 31, "	Gunfire.	Off Jutland.	73
<i>Fortune</i> .	" "	"	"	63
<i>Nestor</i> .	" "	"	"	?
<i>Nomad</i> .	" "	"	"	?
<i>Tipperary</i> .	" "	"	"	175
<i>Turbulent</i> .	" "	"	"	84
<i>Shark</i> .	" "	"	"	78
<i>Sparrowhawk</i> .	" "	Collision.	"	6
<i>Eden</i> .	" "	"	Channel.	?
<i>Iassoo</i> .	June 17, "	Mined or torpedoed.	Off Holland.	5
<i>Flirt</i> .	Aug. 13, "	Gunfire.	Straits of Dover.	63
—	Oct. 26, "	Collision.	?	55
—	Dec. 21, "	"	?	—
—	" 22, 1917.	Torpedoed by destroyers.	Off Holland.	47
—	Feb. 8, "	Mined.	Channel.	5 saved
—	Mar. 1, "	"	North Sea.	All
—	Mar. 15, "	"	Channel.	29
—	" 17, "	Torpedoed by destroyers.	Straits of Dover.	8 saved
—	" —	Mined.	Channel.	21 saved
—	" 27, "	Collision.	?	1
—	May 2, "	Mined.	Channel.	62
—	" —	Collision.	?	—



# DESTROYERS—continued

Name.	Date.	Cause.	Vicinity.	Loss of Life.
<b>BRITAIN—continued</b>				
—	July 4 (?) 1917.	Mined.	North Sea.	18 saved
—	6,	Torpedoed.	"	8
—	" "	Mined.	"	46 saved
—	Aug. —	Torpedoed.	Approaches of Eng. Ch.	50 saved
—	Sept. —	Gunfire.	North Sea.	86
Mary Rose	Oct. 17,	"	"	46
Strongbow	" "	Collision.	"	23 saved
—	" —	Torpedoed.	Off Palestine.	7
—	Nov. —	Gunfire.	North Sea.	38 saved
Partridge	Dec. 12,	Collision.	Off Holland.	2
—	" 22,	Mined or torpedoed.	"	193
—	" "	"	"	10
—	" 30,	Torpedoed.	Mediterranean.	
—	" "			
<b>FRANCE</b>				
Mousquet	Oct. 28, 1914.	Sunk by Emden.	Penang.	?
Dague	Feb. 24, 1915.	Mined.	Adriatic.	38
Branlebas	Nov.	"	"	?
Renaudin	Mar. 18, 1916.	Torpedoed.	Adriatic.	47
Fantassin	June 8,	Blown up.	"	?
Fourche	28,	Torpedoed.	Straits of Otranto.	?
Yatagan	" "	Collision.	"	?
Cassini	Dec. —	Torpedoed.	Mediterranean.	107
Eteudard	Feb. 28, 1917.	Gunfire.	Off Dunkirk.	?
Routefeu	Apr. 25,	Mined.	Adriatic.	?
—	May —			

# DESTROYERS—continued

Name.	Date.	Cause.	Vicinity.	Loss of Life.
<b>TURKEY</b>				
<i>Demir Hisar</i> . . . . .	Apr. 17, 1915.	Forced ashore.	Off Chios.	
— . . . . .	Aug. 6, "	Torpedoed by French.	Sea of Marmora.	
<i>Yar Hisar</i> . . . . .	Dec. 3, "	" E 11.	" "	
— ("Malatia" type) . . . . .	" 10, "	Gunfire.	Black Sea.	
— ("Burak Reis" type) . . . . .	" "	" "	" "	
— . . . . .	Nov. 4, 1917.	Torpedoed.	" "	

## TORPEDO BOATS

<b>BRITAIN</b>				
No. 10 . . . . .	June 10, 1915.	Torpedoed.	North Sea.	29
No. 12 . . . . .	" "	"	"	11
No. 96 . . . . .	Nov. 1, "	Collision.	Straits of Gibraltar.	48
No. 11 . . . . .	Mar. 9, 1916.	Mined.	North Sea.	
<b>FRANCE</b>				
No. 338 . . . . .	Oct. 9, 1914.	Collision.	?	
No. 347 . . . . .	" "	"	?	
<b>ITALY</b>				
— . . . . .	May 15, 1917.	Torpedoed by destroyers.	Adriatic.	
<b>RUSSIA</b>				
— . . . . .	June 30, "	Mined.	Black Sea.	
<b>JAPAN</b>				
No. 33 . . . . .	Sept. 21, 1914.	Gunfire.	Kiao-Chao Bay.	

# TORPEDO BOATS—continued

Name.	Date.	Cause.	Vicinity.	Loss of Life.
<b>GERMANY</b>				
A 2	May 1, 1915.	Gunfire.	North Sea.	
A 6	" "	"	"	
—	June 28, "	Blown up.	Off Libau.	
—	Aug. 22, "	Mined.	Baltic.	
—	Dec. 17, "	Torpedoed.	"	
—	June 13, 1916.	Gunfire.	"	
—	" "	"	"	
<b>AUSTRIA</b>				
No. 19	Aug. 17, 1914.	Gunfire.	Adriatic.	
—	June 3, 1917.	Torpedoed.	"	
No. 11	Oct. 6, "	Mutined.	"	
<b>TURKEY</b>				
—	Feb. 18, 1915.	Mined.	Off Roshphorus.	
—	" "	"	"	
—	" "	"	"	

## GUNBOATS

<b>BRITAIN</b>				
Speedy	Sept. 3, 1914.	Mined.	North Sea.	1
Niger	Nov. 11, "	Torpedoed.	Off Dover.	15
Abdul Monaim	" 6, 1915.	" by U 35.	Bay of Sollum, N. Africa.	
Prince Abbas	" "	"	"	
Shaitan	" 28, "	Stranded.	Tigris.	
Comet	Dec. 2, "	Gunfire, abandoned.	"	
Firefly	" "	" , recaptured.	"	



# MINELAYERS

Name.	Date.	Cause.	Vicinity.	Loss of Life.
BRITAIN				
<i>Princess Irene</i> . . . . .	May 27, 1915.	Blown up.	Off Sheerness.	{ Crew and 76 workmen.
FRANCE				
<i>Casabianca</i> . . . . .	June 3, "	Mined.	Eastern Mediterranean.	
RUSSIA				
<i>Pruth</i> . . . . .	Oct. 29, 1914.	Torpedoed.	Odessa.	{ Crew and 76 workmen.
<i>Yenesi</i> . . . . .	June 7, 1915.	"	Baltic Sea.	
GERMANY				
<i>Königin Luise</i> . . . . .	Aug. 5, 1914.	Gunfire.	North Sea.	{ Crew and 76 workmen.
<i>Ruchin</i> . . . . .	Nov. — "	Scuttled.	Tsingtau.	
<i>Albatross</i> . . . . .	July 2, 1915.	Forced ashore.	Off Gothland.	
TURKEY.				
— . . . . .	Aug. 15, 1915.	Torpedoed by E 2.	Sea of Marmora.	{ Crew and 76 workmen.
— . . . . .	" 17, "	" "	" "	
— . . . . .	" 19, "	" "	" "	

# MINESWEEPERS (EXCLUDING TRAWLERS)

BRITAIN				
<i>Arabis</i> . . . . .	Feb. 10, 1915.	Gunfire.	Off Dogger Bank.	{ 4 3 13 12 saved
<i>Primula</i> . . . . .	Mar. 1, "	Torpedoed.	Off Port Said.	
<i>Ægeus</i> . . . . .	Apr. 30, "	Mined.	Mediterranean.	
<i>Nasturtium</i> . . . . .	" 23, "	"	"	{ 13 12 saved
<i>Genista</i> . . . . .	Oct. 23, "	Torpedoed.	North Sea.	

# MINESWEEPERS (EXCLUDING TRAWLERS)—continued

Name.	Date.	Cause.	Vicinity.	Loss of Life.
<b>BRITAIN—continued.</b>				
<i>Clacton</i> . . . . .	Aug. 3, 1916.	Torpedoed	Mediterranean. Channel. " ? Mediterranean. ? ?	5
— . . . .	Mar. — 1917.	Mined.		14
— . . . .	" — "	"		22
— . . . .	May 5, "	Torpedoed.		10
— . . . .	July 4, "	Mined.		All
<i>Begonia</i> . . . . .	Oct. — "	Missing.		9
<i>Arbutus</i> . . . . .	Dec. — "	Torpedoed.		
OTHER BELLIGERENTS :—No figures available.				

## BRITISH SEAPLANE CARRIER

<i>Ben-My-Chree</i> . . . . .	Jan. 11, 1917.	Gunfire.	Kastelorizo Islands.	—
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## SUBMARINES

<b>BRITAIN</b>				
A E1 . . . . .	Sept. 14, 1914.	Disappeared.	Off New Britain.	35
E3 . . . . .	Oct. 18, "	Gunfire.	In German Bay.	28
D 5 . . . . .	Nov. 3, "	Mined.	Off Yarmouth.	16
E15 . . . . .	Apr. 17, 1915.	Stranded.	Dardanelles.	4
AE2 . . . . .	" 30, "	Gunfire.	"	12
E13 . . . . .	Aug. 19, "	Stranded (salved).	Salthölm Island, Denmark	15
E7 . . . . .	Sept. 4, "	Gunfire.	Dardanelles.	?
E20 . . . . .	Nov. 5, "	Stranded.	Sea of Marmora.	19
E17 . . . . .	Jan. 6, 1916.	" (salved).	Off Texel, Holland.	—
— . . . .	" 20, "	"	Off Terschelling, Holland.	—
E22 . . . . .	Apr. 25, "	"	Off Holland.	2 saved
C 34 . . . . .	July 21, 1917.	Torpedoed by submarine.	North Sea.	1 "

GERMAN SUBMARINE LOSSES—continued

Number.	Date.	Cause.	Vicinity.
—	Aug. 10, 1916	Captured by Italians.	?
—	" 19, "	Rammed in loss of <i>Falmouth</i> and <i>Nottingham</i> .	North Sea.
—	Sept. —	Sunk by French Torpedo Boat 368.	Off Corfu.
—	" ?	Bombed.	Off Zeebrugge.
—	Oct. 7, "	Gunfire.	Arctic Sea.
—	" "	"	"
—	" "	"	"
—	" "	"	"
U 20	Nov. 4, "	Stranded.	Off Denmark.
—	" "	Gunfire by French minesweeper.	Atlantic.
U 46	" "	Sunk by patrols.	Bay of Biscay.
—	Dec. —	Foundered.	Off Norway.
—	Jan. 26, 1917.	Sunk. Sir E. Carson's speech.	
—	Feb. —	Captured.	
—	" "	Frozen in and crushed.	Kattegat.
—	" "	Rammed by H.M.T. <i>Mona's Queen</i> .	Off Havre.
U 30	" 5, "	Stranded, interned, released.	Off Holland.
—	" 23, "	"	Off Maasluis.
—	Mar. 12, "	Gunfire. Italians.	?
—	Apr. 17, "	"	?
—	" "	"	?
—	" ?	"	?
U 81	" "	"	"
U 83	" ?	"	"
Six admitted by Von Capelle	" 25, "	Torpedoed by French submarine <i>Circe</i> .	Off Cattaro.
Twelve. French reports	May 1-5, "	Sunk by s.s. <i>St. Louis</i> .	Atlantic.
—	" 26, "	Rammed by American steamer.	"
—	" 30, "	Sunk in attack on U.S. transports.	"
—	June —	"	"
—	" 22, "	Stranded.	Off Calais.
—	" 24 (?) "	"	"
—	July 22, "	"	"



GERMAN SUBMARINES LOSSES—*continued*

Number.	Date.	Cause.	Vicinity.
UB 52 . . . . .	Aug. 2, 1917.	Interned.	Ferrol, Spain.
UB 6 . . . . .	Sept. 5, "	Sunk by U.S. submarine.	Holland.
— . . . . .	" 9, "	Interned. Escaped Oct. 6.	French Coast.
U 93 . . . . .	" ?	Sunk by French.	Spain.
U 53 . . . . .	Oct. — "	"	"
— . . . . .	" — "	Sunk by depth bomb by U.S. destroyer.	Mediterranean.
— . . . . .	Nov. — "	"	"
— . . . . .	" — "	"	"

These odd eighty cases give but a poor impression of the success gained by our patrols. They include only the cases where little doubt exists as to their fate, and exclude the many published cases where there are some grounds for a claim.

# HOSPITAL SHIPS

Name.	Date.	Cause.	Vicinity.	Loss of Life.
<b>BRITAIN</b>				
<i>Rohilla</i> . . . . .	Oct. 30, 1914.	Wrecked.	Whitby.	40
<i>Anglia</i> . . . . .	Nov. 17, 1915.	Mined.	Channel.	80
<i>Briannic</i> . . . . .	" 22, 1916.	Torpedoed.	Ægean Sea.	29
<i>Braemar Castle</i> . . . . .	" 23, " "	"	"	—
<i>Asturias</i> . . . . .	Mar. 20, 1917.	"	Channel.	43
<i>Gloucester Castle</i> . . . . .	" 30, " "	"	"	—
<i>Salta</i> . . . . .	Apr. 10, " "	Mined.	"	42
<i>Donegal</i> . . . . .	" 17, " "	Torpedoed.	"	41
<i>Lanfranc</i> . . . . .	" " " "	"	"	34
<i>Dover Castle</i> . . . . .	May 26, " "	"	Mediterranean.	6
<b>RUSSIA</b>				
<i>Portugal</i> . . . . .	May 30, 1916.	Torpedoed.	Black Sea.	90
<i>Uperiode</i> . . . . .	July 9, " "	"	"	?
<b>AUSTRIA</b>				
<i>Elektra</i> . . . . .	Mar. 12, 1916.	Mined (?).	Adriatic.	2


Germany has also lost the supply ships *Itolo*, *Rhios*, *Græcin*, *Holger*, *Locksun*, *Karnak*, *Baden*, *Santa Isabella*, *Eleonore Woermann*, *Pontoporos*, etc.

## PATROLS

British. Two. April 10 and November 1917.  
 French. *Jeanne* on September 16 and *Paris II* on December 13, 1917.  
 U.S. " *Alcedo* on November 5 and another December 1917.  
 German. Numerous, including *Braunschweig*, *Otto Rudolf*, *Crocodile*, etc., mostly trawlers.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY  
RICHARD CLAY & SONS, LIMITED,  
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